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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, AND FORREST L. PRESTON, an
Individual
Defendants-Appellants,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

41589

_____________________)
CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Robert C. Naftz District Judge.

For Appellant:

Michael D. Gaffney
John M. Avondet
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
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For Respondent:
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
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Sixth Judicial District Court- Bannock County

Time: 03:22 PM
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User: DCANO

Case: CV-2012-0005289-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, etal. vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Portneuf Medical Center LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Forrest Preston
Judge

Date

Code

User

12/13/2012

LOCT

MAR LEA

Clerk's

Robert C Naftz

NCOC

MAR LEA

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Robert C Naftz

COMP

MAR LEA

Complaint Filed

Robert C Naftz

SMIS

MAR LEA

Summons Issued

Robert C Naftz

MAR LEA

Filing: A- All initial civil case filings of any type not Robert C Naftz
listed in categories 8-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: merrill and merrill Receipt
number: 0042941 Dated: 12/13/2012 Amount:
$96.00 (Check) For:

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Pocatello Hospital, LLC Attorney
Retained Kent L Hawkins

Robert C Naftz

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Portneuf Medical Center Attorney
Retained Kent L Hawkins

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Motion for personal service on out of state
defendant; aty William Hancock for plntf

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of counsel in support of motin for
personal service on out of state defendant:
William Hancock for plntf

1/4/2013

CAMILLE

Order allowing personal service on out of state
defendant s/Judge Naftz 1-7-2013

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Acceptance of service - srvd on Quail Ridge
Medical Investors on 1-7-2013

Robert C Naftz

MAR LEA

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: beard st
clair gaffney Receipt number: 0002837 Dated:
1/29/2013 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: Quail
Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, (defendant)

Robert C Naftz

ANSW

CAMILLE

Answer and Jury Demand;
defs

ATTR

NICOLE

Defendant: Preston, Forrest Attorney Retained
John M Avondet

Robert C Naftz

ATTR

NICOLE

Defendant: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie,
Attorney Retained John M Avondet

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Order for submission of information for
scheduling order; s/ Judge 2-1-2013

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/04/2013 01:30
PM) Motion for Stay (Defendant's)

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion for stay; aty Michael Gaffney Robert C Naftz
for def

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in support of motion for Robert C Naftz
stay ; aty Michael Gaffney for def

CAMILLE

Affidavit of counsel in support of defs motion for
stay; aty Michael Gaffney for defs

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 3-4-2013@ 1:30pm:

Robert C Naftz

1/7/2013

1/29/2013

2/1/2013
2/6/2013
2/7/2013

Robert C Naftz
aty

HRSC

aty John Avondet for Robert C Naftz
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2/21/2013

CAMILLE

Amended agreed response to order for
submission of information for scheduling order;
aty Kent Hawkins

Robert C Naftz

2/25/2013

CAMILLE

Plaintiff objection to defs motion for stay and
alternatively request for Bond: aty Dave
Gallafent for plntf

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of counsel in support of plaintiffs
objection to defs motion to stay; aty Dave
Gallafent for plntf

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Don Wadle; aty Dave Gallafent for
plntf

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Reply Memorandum in support of
motion for stay; aty John "Avondet for defs

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Robert C Naftz
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
03/04/2013 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel(
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages
Motion for Stay (Defendant's); court granted
Defendant's motion but requires them to post a
bond in the amount of declaratory judgment
signed by Judge Brown in a separate matter

CAMILLE

Affidavit of counsel in support of motion to
compel; aty William Hancock for plntf

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Motion to compel; aty William Hancock for plntf

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
07/08/2013 01:30 PM) Plaintiff's motion

Robert C Naftz

6/17/2013

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Plntfs Motion to compel Robert C Naftz
on 7-8-2013 at 1:30pm: aty William Hancock

7/1/2013

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in oppposition to
Motion to compel; aty Michael GAffney for defs

NICOLE

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
Robert C Naftz
on 07/08/2013 01:30PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages
Plaintiff's motion granted; counsel for Plaintiff to
prepare order; bond posted by 7-22-13 at 5:00pm
or stay lifted; attorney fees and costs also
awarded

7/11/2013

CAMILLE

Minute entry and order; plaintiffs motion to
compel is granted; s/ Judge Naftz 7-11-2013

8/2/2013

CAMILLE

Amended Order for submission of information for Robert C Naftz
scheduling order; sf Judge Naftz 8-2-2013

8/14/2013

CAMILLE

Agreed response to Order for submission of
information for scheduling order; aty Kent
Hawkins for plntf

3/1/2013
3/4/2013

DCHH

6/13/2013

6/14/2013

7/8/2013

HRSC

DCHH

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
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8/22/2013

HRSC

NICOLE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/15/2014 09:00 Robert C Naftz
AM) First setting
One day requested

HRSC

NICOLE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/14/2014 09:00 Robert C Naftz
AM) Backup setting
One day requested

CAMILLE

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial setting and
initial pretrial order; s/ Judge Naftz 8-25-2013

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 10/21/2013 01:30 PM) Plaintiff's
motion

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Plaintiff motion for summary judgment; aty
William Hancock for plntf

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Don Wadle; aty William Hancock for
pint!

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Brief in support of plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment; aty William Hancock for pint!

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of counsel in support of plaintiffs motion Robert C Naftz
for summary judgment; aty William Hancock for
plntf

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion for
summary judgment on 10-21-2013@ 1:30pm:

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment; aty John Avondet for defs

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in support of Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment; aty John
Avondet for defs

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of John M Avondet in support of defs
cross motion for summary judgment; aty John
Avondet for defs

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Defs Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment;
10-21-2013@ 1:30pm:

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Michael Gaffney in opposition to
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment: aty
Michael Gaffney

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in opposition to motion Robert C Naftz
for summary judgment; aty Michael Gaffney for
defs

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs reply in support of its malin for summary Robert C Naftz
judgment; aty William Hancock for pint!

8/26/2013
9/5/2013

9/23/2013

10/7/2013

10/15/2013

HRSC

Judge
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10/21/2013

DCHH

NICOLE

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz
scheduled on 10/21/2013 01:30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: more than 100 pages;
Plaintiff's motion granted by the Court; counsel
will submit order for the Court's review

10/22/2013

CAMILLE

Defendants objection to proposed judgment;
aty Michael Gaffney for defs

10/23/2013

CAMILLE

Judgment; Defendant are hereby ordered to pay, Robert C Naftz
jointly and severally unpaid current annual rent for
the 2010 rent adjustment period in a sum of
$416,812.50: s/ Judge Naftz 10-22-2013

11/6/2013

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs memorandum of costs and attorney
fees; aty Dave Gallafent for pint!

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion for costs and attorney fees:
Dave Gallafent for pint!

DCANO

Filing: L4- Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Robert C Naftz
Supreme Court Paid by: Beard St. Clair Gaffney
Receipt number: 0035253 Dated: 11/8/2013
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Preston, Forrest
{defendant) and Quail Ridge Medical investors,
Lie, (defendant)

APSC

DCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert C Naftz

NOTC

DCANO

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Michael D. Gaffney,
Attorney for Defendants Quail Ridge Medical
Investors, LLC and Forrest L. Preston.

Robert C Naftz

MISC

DCANO

Received Check # 105804 in the amount of
Robert C Naftz
$100.00 for deposit of Clerk's Record on 11-7-13.

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme Court on
11-8-13.

DCANO

Respondent's Request for Additional Records and Robert C Naftz
Reporter's Transcript: R. William Hancock,
Attorney for Plntfs. (Mailed copy to SC on
11-21-13)

NICOLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/16/2013 02:30
PM) Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion to disallow costs and fees;
aty John Avonder for defs

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in support of defs
motion to disallow costs and fees: aty John
Avonder

Robert C Naftz

11/7/2013

11/8/2013

11/19/2013

11/20/2013

HRSC

Judge

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
aty Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
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11/21/2013

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT: Received notice of
Appeal. Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcripts due 2-14-14. (Due 5 weeks prior to
Counsel on 1-10-14) Docket#41589-2013.
Transcripts to be lodged with Court Records:
Summary Judgment held 10-21-13.

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 12-16-2013@ 2:30
pm: aty R William Hancock for plntf

Robert C Naftz

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received a Cert.
Robert C Naftz
Copy of Respondent's Request for Additional
Records and Reporter's Transcript filed in Dis!.
Court 11-25-12. (Respondent counsel failed to
identify the reporter for each additional transcripts
requested and did not serve the reporter as
required by the Idaho Appellate Rules, Thus no
additional transcripts will be required at this time)
Transcripts and Clerk's Record Remains Due
2-24-14. (Counsel's due 1-20-14, 5 weeks prior)

11/27/2013

CAMILLE

Amended respondents request for additional
records and reporters transcript; aty William
Hancock for plntf

Robert C Naftz

12/11/2013

KENDRAH

Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid
by: Beard StClair Gaffney Receipt number:
0038574 Dated: 12/11/2013 Amount: $1.50
(Check)

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Robert C Naftz
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
12/16/2013 02:30PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages
Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees; court will
prepare written order with final judgment

12/23/2013

DCANO

IDAHO SURPEME COURT; Transcript and
Robert C Naftz
Clerk's Record Due 2-24-12 ** 3-4-13 Stay;
07-08-13 Compel; 10-21-13 Summary Judgment.

1/8/2014

CAMILLE

Order regarding attorney fees; Plaintiffs motion
for costs and attorney fees is GRANTED, for
$16,830.93: s/ Judge Naftz 1-7-2014

JDMT

CAMILLE

Final Judgment; Plaintiff is awarded judgment in Robert C Naftz
the amount of $462,033.80: s/ Judge Naftz
1-7-2014

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

KENDRAH

Miscellaneous Payment: Copies Paid by: Merrill & Robert C Naftz
Merrill Chartered Receipt number: 0001006
Dated: 1/10/2014 Amount: $11.00 (Check)

11/26/2013

12/16/2013

1/10/2014

MISC

DCHH

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
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1/21/2014

MISC

DCANO

Notice of Lodging(E-mail only, couldn't open with
her computer program) received from S.Davis
1-21-14.

MISC

DCANO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS received in Court Robert C Naftz
Records on 1-21-14 for the following:

Robert C Naftz

Plntfs Motion Summary Judgment and Dfdts.
Corss Motion Sum. Judg. held 10-21-13.
CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Appeal; aty John Avondet for Robert C Naftz
Defendants

DCANO

AMENDED CLERK'S CERT. OF APPEAL:
Signed and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme
Court on 2-7-14.

DCANO

Robert C Naftz
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Filed Amended
NOtice of Appeal. Transcripts and Clerk's Record
due 4-3-14. Transcripts:
Summary Judgment held 10-21-13
Costs & Fees held 12-16-13.

MISC

DCANO

Stipulation re: Record on Appeal: Michael D.
Gaffney, Attorneys for Defendants.

ORDR

DCANO

Robert C Naftz
Order Re: Record on Appeal: The Reocrd on
Appeal be augmented to include the Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted
on Oct. 8, 2013 and Defendant's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, Submitted on 10-14-13.
Signed Judge Robert C. Naftz on 2-21-14.

MISC

DCANO

SENT CERT. COPIES OF STIPULATION AND
ORDER REGARDING RECORD ON APPEAL
TO SC ON 2-25-14.

Robert C Naftz

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S RECORD (cd) Received in Court
Records on 2-26-14.

Robert C Naftz

2/5/2014
2/7/2014

MISC

2/11/2014

2/21/2014

2/25/2014

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)

~
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

C'812- 5 2.8 9 OC

COMPLAINT
FEE CATEGORY: A
FEES $96.00

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC,
by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, an individual, alleges as
follows:
I. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), is a
Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho with its
principal place of business in the State of Idaho at 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock
County, Idaho 8320 I.
2. Defendant, Quail Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail"), is a Tennessee limited liability

5975: Complaint
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company authorized to do business in the State ofidaho, whose principal place of business is 3570
Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
3. Defendant, Forrest L. Preston ("Preston"), is an individual residing in Tennessee and
whose business address is 3001 Keith St., Cleveland, Tennessee. Preston is an owner of Quail.
4. This lawsuit arises from a dispute regarding the amount of rent due under a Ground Lease
Agreement, dated January 27, 1983 ("Lease Agreement").

That dispute was resolved by a

declaratory judgment entered, following a two (2) day bench trial, by the Honorable Mitchell W.
Brown, District Judge for the Sixth Judicial District, which judgment declared the amount of rent
that was past due.
5. The declaratory judgment action was filed June 29, 2010 by PMC seeking, among other
things, to have the court declare the rent that Quail should have paid to PMC under the Lease
Agreement for the period between February 1, 2010 and January 31, 2013 (the "2010 Rent
Adjustment Period").
6. PMC is the successor in interest to the lessor in the Lease Agreement, succeeding to the
interests of Intermountain Health Care, Inc., and was the plaintiff in the declaratory judgment
action decided by Judge Brown.
7. Quail is the successor in interest to the lessee in the Lease Agreement, succeeding to the
interests of Sterling Development Co., and was the defendant in the declaratory judgment action
decided by Judge Brown.
8. Judge Brown entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum
Decision and Order, and then on November 26, 2012 entered an Amended Declaratory Judgment.

A true and correct copy of the Amended Declaratory Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit 2, and
is incorporated herein by this reference.
9. In his Amended Declaratory Judgment, Judge Brown declared that " ... Quail Ridge is
obligated to promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease
Agreement." Pursuant to the Amended Declaratory Judgment, that sum is the amount of rent that is
now past due for the 201 0 Rent Adjustment Period.
10.

This lawsuit further arises from the Guarantee in Payment and Performance, dated June

1, 2001 ("Guarantee"), in which Preston Guaranteed payment of the rent due in the 1983 Ground

5975: Complaint
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Lease.

A true and correct copy of this Guarantee is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and is

incorporated herein by this reference.
11. PMC is the successor in interest to IHC Health Services, Inc. in that Guarantee in
Payment and Performance.

12.

Both Quail and Preston have failed to pay the amount stated to be due in the Amended

Declaratory Judgment, even though on November 26, 2012 the court served Quail with a copy of

the Amended Declaratory Judgment and said judgment stated that the unpaid rental amount of
$416,812.50 was "promptly" due.
13. Because of Quail's and Preston's failure to make prompt payment, PMC on November 27,
2012 sent a written demand to both Quail and Preston for payment of the remaining rent that Judge
Brown had declared in his Amended Declaratory Judgment to be promptly due. Although more
than ten days have passed since the court served the Amended Declaratory Judgment on Quail, and
more than ten days have passed since the demand Letter was sent to Quail and Preston, neither
Quail nor Preston have paid any portion of the amount due ..
COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT

14.

PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 13 above as if they

had been set forth fully herein.
15.

Pursuant to Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment, Quail is obligated under the

Ground Lease Agreement to promptly pay PMC the sum of$416,812.50.
16.

By failing to promptly pay the rent that Judge Brown declared to be due under the contract,

Quail breached the Ground Lease Agreement.
17.

Quail owes PMC a sum of $416,812.50 in unpaid rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment

Period, plus interest on this liquidated amount at a rate of 12% per annum from and after
November 26,2012, plus attorney fees and costs that PMC has had to incur in collection of these
unpaid rents.
COUNT II
BREACH OF PERSONAL GUARANTEE

18.

PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through17 above, as if they

had been set forth fully herein.

5975: Complaint
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19.

Pursuant to the Guarantee Preston "unconditionally guarantee[d] the payment and

performance of any and all obligations of Quail Medical Investors, LLC, a Tennessee Limited
Liability Company ("Quail Ridge") ... under the Ground Lease."
20.

Furthermore, under the terms of that Guarantee, Preston agreed that "upon any default, [the

landlord], at its option [may] proceed directly, and at once, without notice, against [Preston]
without proceeding against Quail. .. or any other person."
21.

Preston also agreed that "without demand, [he would] immediately reimburse and pay for

all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in the enforcement of this
Guarantee."
22.

Although written demand has been made upon Preston for the payment of unpaid rents for

the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period, Preston has failed to pay the $416,812.50 currently due and
owing as he was obligated to do under the terms of the Guarantee.
23.

Preston is in breach of his obligations under the Guarantee and is jointly and severally

obligated to pay the full amount due.
24.

Preston owes PMC the unpaid rent of $416,812.50 for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period,

plus interest in an amount of 12% for this liquidated account from and after November 26, 2012,
plus reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses involved in bringing this action.
ATTORNEYS FEES

25.

PMC has retained the services of Merrill and Merrill, Chtd. to bring this suit. PMC is

entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement;
pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee; pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 to 12-121 and 12-123;
and, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC, prays
that judgment be entered in PMC's favor and against the Defendants as follows:
1.

Defendants should be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, unpaid current armual rent for

the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period in a sum of not less than $416,812.50;
2.

Defendants should be ordered to pay interest on this amount from and after the date of the

Amended Declaratory Judgment, November 26, 2012, at an armual rate of 12% until the date the
Court enters its judgment.

5975: Complaint
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3.

Defendants should be ordered to pay PMC's attorneys fees and costs associated with the

bringing of this current action; and
4.

For such and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the circumstances of

this case.
DATED this

0

day of December, 2012.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

By

-----='%""'.'-":·"'re.?::~';J----:-;-<:;}L.;~=/··=~"'--·::..::.__:__:;-::._____
Kent L. Hawkins
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC
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GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE

By the· exeeuiioii hereof, and as a condition precedent to, and as inducement for, the
execution and delivery by me Health Services, Inc., a Utah nonprofit corporation ("fiiCHS"), of
that certain Landlord Consent and Estoppel, dated as of June 1, 2001, and the foregoing
Amendment, FORREST L. PRESTON, individually, unconditionally guarantees the payment and
performance of any and all obligations of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, U.C, a Tennessee
limited liability company ("Quail Ridge'') and/or Pocatello Medical Investors Limited
Partnership, a Tennessee limited partnership ("PMI''), under the "Ground Lease" and the
"Sublease" (each as defined in the foregoing Amendment). To the fullest extent possible, the
undersigned expressly waives notice of the acceptance of this Guarantee, notice of demand for
payment, notice of nonpayment, notice of other default, notice of suit, and all other notices to
which the undersigned might otherwise be entitled in connection with this Guarantee. Further,
the undersigned waives any responsibility or duty lHCHS may have to the undersigned to
proceed against Quail Ridge and/or PMI or to pursue any other legal remedy available. Upon any
default, niCHS may, at its option, proceed directly, and at once, without notice, against the
undersigned without proceeding against Quail Ridge and/or P:MI or any other person. In
addition, the undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for
all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this
Guarantee.

DATED" of the t• "''"'"- 200~

at:-.O!" 'R EI ! I,jO:':-sf ibL. ._.-:>t:~ T~ :=. .- -

•

Saltl.alce·142021.4 0033566-00001
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ;' BANNOCK

BY
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******
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
)
PORTNEUF MEDiCAL CENTERS, LlC, )
) Case No.
Plaintiff:
)

CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

vs.

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
LLC and CENTURY PARK
)
ASSOC!ATES,
)

AMENDED
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

)

Defendl!Ilts.

)
)

Following a two (2) day bench nial conducted before the Court commencing on May 14,
2012 and concluding on May 15, 2012 and the Court having rendered its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order the Court hereby enters this

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 through 10-1203. This
Declaratory Judgment declares the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect those
issues. This Declaratory Judgment deals specifically with the rent atljustment provisions of the
parties' Ground Lease Agreement (Section 1.3Jb) and generally with sections l.l, 1.2 and I.3(a) of
the parties' Ground Lease Agreement.

The Court hereby ORDERS ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
(1) Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Pormeuf Medical Centers (PMC) is entitled to an
adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail
Ridge) under the parties Ground Lease Agreement from $9,562.50 annually to
$148,500.00 annually.

DECLARI\1'0RY JUDCMEN'r • l
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(2) This rent adjustment is for the three (3) period commencing on february 1, 2010 and
concluding on January 31, 20 !3 .. Therefore the total rent due PMC from Quail Ridge is
the amowt of $445,500.00 for this three (3) year period.
(3) Quail Ridge has already paid I'MC $9,562.00 annual rent on or about February I
each year during that three year period for a total amount paid of$28,687.50.
(4) Therefore, based upon the rent adjustment, Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay
PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement.
(5) The rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease Agreement, dated January 27,
1983, of which PMC is the successor Lessor and Quail Ridge is the successor Lessee
remains in full force and effect. The next rent adjustment, which is scheduled to take
effect February I, 2013, shall proceed consistent with section !.3(b) of the Ground
Lease Agreement.

IT IS SO OIU>ERED.
Dated this 26 111 day ofNovember, 2012.

~#.~

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

DECI.ARATOR.Y JllDGMENT • 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day of November, 2012, she caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Form of Judgment to be served upon the following persons
in the following manner:

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
I<ent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 99!
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
(208) 232-2499
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael b. Gaffney

)(Faxed

X Faxed

2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 529-9732

~)
•

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT· 3
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

ORDER ALLOWING PERSONAL
SERVICE ON OUT OF STATE
DEFENDANT

THIS COURT having received the Motion for Service on Out of State Defendant, and
supporting Affidavit of Counsel, in accordance with the statutes and Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a copy of the Summons and Complaint be personally
served on Forrest L. Preston in the state of Tennessee, or elsewhere where he maybe found.
DATED this

_2_ day ofJanuary, 2013.

~C.~

Honorable Robert C. Naftz

5975: Order Allowing Personal Service on Out of State Defendant
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Clerk of Court, does hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the
foregoing Order Allowing Personal Service on Out of State Defendant was this ..J_ day of
January, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

R. William Hancock
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

[/u.s.

Mail
[__] Hand Delivery
[__] Overnight Delivery
[__] Telefax

Deputy Clerk

5975: Order Allowing Personal Service on Out of State Defendant
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey P A
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com

,...

')

Attorney for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Answer and Jury Demand

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants.

The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge) through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney
P A, respectfully submit the following Answer to the Complaint filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello
Hospital, LLC db a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC (PMC). Any paragraph not specifically
admitted is denied.

Answer
1. Admit paragraph 1.
2. Admit paragraph 2.
3. Admit paragraph 3.

Answer and Jury Demand PAGE
1
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/

(

4. Deny paragraph 4.
5. Deny paragraph 5.
6. Admit paragraph 6.
7. As to paragraph 7, deny that Quail Ridge was the sole defendant in the declaratory judgment
action. Admit the remainder of the paragraph.
8. Admit paragraph 8.
9. Deny paragraph 9.
10. Deny paragraph 10.
I1. Quail Ridge is without knowledge as to the allegations contained in paragraph II; therefore,
Quail Ridge denies paragraph li.
I2. Deny paragraph I2.
13. Deny paragraph 13.
14. Paragraph 14 realleges the prior paragraphs of the complaint. Quail Ridge incorporates its
answers to the preceding allegations herein.
15. Deny paragraph 15.
16. Deny paragraph 16.
17. Deny paragraph 17.
18. Paragraph 18 realleges the prior paragraphs of the complaint. Quail Ridge incorporates its
answers to the preceding allegations herein.
19. Deny paragraph 19.
20. Deny paragraph 20.
21. Deny paragraph 21.
22. Deny paragraph 22.

Answer and Jury Demand PAGE
2
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23. Deny paragraph 23.
24. Deny paragraph 24.
25. Deny paragraph 25.

Affirmative Defenses
1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. The complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
3. The complaint is barred by res judicata.
4. The complaint is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
5. The complaint is barred by waiver.
6. The complaint is barred by the doctrine of contract modification.
7. The complaint is barred because the subject contract alleged herein lacked a meeting of the
minds.
8. The complaint is barred by laches.
9. The proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in Barmock County
Case No. CV-10-2724-0C, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 40566-2012.
I 0. The complaint is barred because there has been no breach of contract.
11. The complaint is barred because the guarantee is not enforceable.
12. The complaint is barred on the basis that it has failed to mitigate its damages, if any.
13. The complaint is barred by the doctrine of estoppel.
14. The complaint is barred because the plaintiff has failed to join necessary or indispensible
parties.
15. The complaint is barred because the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.

22 of 4473
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16. The plaintiffs claims are barred because the defendants' conduct was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs harms, if any. ·
Jury Demand

The defendants demand trial by jury pursuant to Rule 3 8 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure on all issues so triable.
Prayer for Relief

Wherefore, Quail Ridge prays for the following relief from this Court:

1. Entry of judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff with the plaintiff taking
nothing thereby.
2. Awarding Quail Ridge its full attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Ground Lease
Agreement, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Code§ 12-120.
3. Entry of an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.
4. Granting the defendants any other relief as deemed just and proper under the circumstances.
DATED: January 28, 2013

'"'h~
John M. Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendants

Answer and Jury Demand PAGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on January 28, 2013, I served a
true and correct copy of the ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND on the following by the method
of delivery designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499

Du.s.Mail

~l
05
.
Hand-delivered

U.S. Mail

Hand-delivered

Ill
· ··

Facsimile

~csimile

Answer and Jury Demand PAGE 5
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
JohnM. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorney for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Defendants' Motion for Stay

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants.
The defendants, through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A, respectfully move
this Court for a stay in this action pending the outcome of Quail Ridge's appeal identified as
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 40566-2012. The basis for this motion is set forth in and
supported by the memorandum and affidavit of counsel filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested.

Mic e D. Gaffney
John . Avondet
OfBeard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendants

Defendants' Motion for Stay PAGE 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on February6;:_, 2013, I served

a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY on the following by the
method of delivery designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499

,U.S. Mail

Hand-delivered

~acsimile

U.S. Mail

Hand-delivered

...-;:csirnile

Mich I . Gaffney
John . Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
Attorneys for Defendants

Defendants' Motion for Stay PAGE 2
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Michael D. Gaffuey, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorney for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Stay

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Bonneville )
John M. Avondet, having been duly sworn on oath, deposes and states:
I. I am an attorney with the law firm, Beard St. Clair Ga:ffuey PA, and counsel for the
defendants in the above entitled action.
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge.

27 of 447 1
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3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Defendant's Amended Notice of
Appeal, dated November 28, 2012.
DATED: February (# , 2013

Jo~tv~~K
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

_&~February, 2013.

Not
Pu lie for Idaho
Resi ·n t: Idaho Falls, Idaho
My CofMmmsion Expires: 9/11114
111
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on February b, 2013, I served
a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR STAY on the following by the method of delivery designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 8320 I
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
POBox 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499

~
_,. U.S. Mail Q

U.S. Mail

Hand-delivered

a

Hand-delivered

· . .; Facsimile

'%•

Facsimile

&

~k~

l:GaffileY

Mich
John . Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
Attorneys for Defendants

3
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay PAGE
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorney for the Defendant/Respondent

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC,

Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC

Plaintiff/Respondent,
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED NOTICE
OF APPEAL
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC,
Defendant!A ellant.
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEYS, KENT L. HAWKINS AND R. WILLIAM HANCOCK, 109 NORTH
ARTHUR-5TH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 991, POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, appeals against
the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered October 17, 2012, the Declaratory Judgment entered,

EXHIBIT

A

Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal

Page 1
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November 13, 2012, and the Amended Declaratory Judgment entered on November 26,
2012, in the above entitled action, the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, presiding.

2. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court and the orders from which this appeal is taken is appealable pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule ll(a)(l).
3. The issues raised on this appeal are as follows:
a. Whether the district court erred by disregarding language contained in the
contract in declaring the rights and obligations of the parties arising under
that contract;
b. Whether the district court erred by failing to find that the rent adjustment
clause of the Ground Lease had been waived or modified by the
subsequent conduct and/or transactions of the parties;
c. Whether the district court erred by failing to find that the plaintiff was
estopped from seeking any adjustment in rent due to the 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate;
d. Whether the district court erred by creating a new contract term that was
unsupported by the evidence;
e. Whether the district court erred by finding an absence of course of dealing
by the parties; .

f.

Whether the district court erred in the method, manner. evidence relied
upon, and calculation of any adjusted rent amount; and,

g. Whether the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Brad
Janoush.

Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal

Page 2
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4. The appellant requests a standard transcript of trial in this matter, held on May 1415, 2012. In addition to the standard transcript, the appellant requests the preparation of
the following portions of the reporters transcript
a. A standard transcript of the hearing held on March 26, 2012;
b. A standard transcript of the hearings held on April30, 2012;
c. A standard transcript of the hearing held on May 4, 2012;
d. A standard transcript of the hearing held on May 10, 2012.
5. The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's record
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules:
a. Copies of all deposition transcripts accepted by the Court and admitted in
lieu of live testimony during trial;
6. The appellant requests that the following documents, charts, or pictures admitted
as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
a. All exhibits admitted during trial.
7. I certify:
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal and any request for additional
transcript have been served on each reporter of whom an additional
transcript has been requested as names below at the address set out on the
Certificate of Service;
b. That the clerk of the district couri has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents
requested in the appeal;
c. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal Page 3
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Mic ae . Gaffney
John M. Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on November
27, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANT'S AMENDED NOTICE
OF APPEAL on the following by the method of delivery designated below:
//

Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Fax: 232-2499
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Honorable Mitchell Brown
Caribou County Courthouse
POBox775
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Fax: (208) 547-2147
Rodney Felshaw
Conrt Reporter
Caribou County Courthouse
POBox775
Soda Springs, ID 83276

~

Q

U.S.Mai1

u.F
. '1e
·...· aCSiml

0

U.S.Mai1

a"··" Hand-delivered ~Facsimile
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.... U.S. Mail D
~

~I

Hand-delivered
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Hand-delivered
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Mic ae D. Gaffney
Jo
. Avondet
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorney for Defendants
Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STAY

)

)
STATEOFIDAHO
County of Bannock

)
:ss
)

I, Kent L. Hawkins, being first duly sworn on this oath, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the November 27, 2012

demand letter our firm sent to legal counsel for Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forest L.
Preston.
3.

Our firm never received a response to this written demand letter.

5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Stay
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4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy ofthe Findings of Fact,

Conclusions ofLaw, and Memorandum Decision and Order, entered by Judge Mitchell L. Brown
on October 16,2012, in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of relevant experts from the

Deposition of Forrest L. Preston, taken in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of relevant experts from the

Deposition of Jodi Thomas, taken in Bannock County Case No. CV -2010-2724.
DATED this :l-S'""day of February, 2013.
By

~-;J...._~~
Kent L. Hawkins

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

,fh
'feb, oJ'
;il5- day ofJam!af.y, 2013.

5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of PlaintifPs Objection to Motion to Stay
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this

;;1s;-day of February, 2013, served upon the following in the manner

indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

U U.S. Mail
U Hand Delivery
U Overnight Mail
M"Facsimile

Kent L. Hawkins

5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Stay
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DAVE R. GALLAFENT
KENT L. HAWKINS'
BRENDON C. TAYLOR
KENT A. HIGGINS'
JARED A. STEADMAN
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK
TYLER H. NEILL
*ALSO AD:MITTED IN UTAH

MERRILL & MERRILL
CHARTERED

A.L. MERRILL (1886·1961)
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972)
W.F. MERRlLL (1919-2005)

COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW
109 N. ARTHUR·

5TH

FLOOR

P.O. BOX991

TELEPHONE:208-232-2286
FAX:208·232-2499

POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991

Founded in 1913

November 27,2012

Via Facsimile: 529-9732
Michael D. Gaffney
Bread St. Clair
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Re:

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC
(Bannock Couoty Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C)

Dear Mike:
We are in receipt of Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment entered yesterday in the
above-referenced action, which judgment declares that your client "is obligated to promptly pay
PMC $416,812.50 uoder the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement." Accordingly,
formal demand is hereby made on Quail Ridge and/or Forest Preston, individually, to "promptly"
pay that amouot to PMC.
Although we acknowledge receipt of your Notice of Appeal, we do not believe that the filing of
such appeal has any impact on PMC's right to immediate payment of the past due rent which has
now been declared by the Court as currently due and owing. Quail Ridge is obligated to make
prompt payment of this amouot uoder the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement and
Forest Preston, individually, is liable for this past due rent amouot pursuant to the 2001
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him.
As such, Quail Ridge and Forest Preston, individually, are hereby put on notice that if payment
to PMC in the amouot of$416,812.50 is not made within ten days, then PMC will consider Quail
Ridge in breach of its rent obligations under the Ground Lease Agreement and Forest Preston in
breach of his payment obligations under the Guarantee of Payment and Performance. If you do
not consider yourself as legal counsel for Mr. Preston and are not authorized to accept this
demand for payment on his behalf, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can make
direct demand upon him. Quail Ridge and Mr. Preston should be aware that if full payment is
not received within ten days, PMC will seek all legal remedies available to it uoder Idal10 law,
including but not limited to filing a legal action for collection of this outstanding rent. If such
legal action becomes necessary, PMC will seek attorneys fees pursuant to Section 10.3 of the
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Gronnd Lease Agreement; pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee of Payment and Performance;
and, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 to 12-121 and 12-123. Quail Ridge should take
particular note that Section 10.3 of the Ground Lease Agreement provides that "such attorney's
fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and shall be paid
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment." Forest Preston should take note that the
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him specifically provides that "the
undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for all costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this Guarantee."
Additionally, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, interest is accruing on the amonnt due at 12%
per annum.
For your information, PMC is in the process of appraising the Quail Ridge Property to determine
the rental rate for the 2013 rent adjustment period. We will share the appraisal with you as soon
as we receive it.
In the meantime, if you have questions or if you wish to make additional arrangements for the
payment of the remaining rent due for the 20 I 0 rent adjustment period, or if you have any input
regarding the market value of the property for the 20 13 rent adjustment period, please do not
hesitate to contact me or Kent Hawkins.
Sincerely,

i:~•;;;t;;m/
WaveR. Gallafent
DRG/RWH/5975

cc:

~

Client (via e-mail)
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)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL,LLC, dba
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CEN1ERS, LLC, )
) Case No.
Plaintiff;
)

CV-2010-0002724..QC

)

)

~

) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLlJSIONS
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
OF LAW AND MEMORA!'{])UM
LLC and CENTURY PARK
)
DECISION AND ORDER
ASSOCIATES,
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

This action eame beibre the Court for a twQ (2) day CQurt trial commencing on May 14
and continuing through May 15, 2012. The Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC (PMC) was represented at tril!l by counsel, Kent L. Hawkins and R.
William Hancock. Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investor$, LLC (Qwil Ridge) and CenLury

Park Associates, LLC (Century Park) were· represented by Michael D. Gaffney and 1obn M.
Avondet. At the conclusion of trial, the Court set fonh a post-nial briefing schedule. The parties
agreed tO share the cost associated with the preparation of a transcript of the trial in advance ofposttrial brienng. See Minute Entry and Order entered on May 17, 2012. The Court entered an order

regarding remitting pa;yment to the Court Rewrter and pteparation of the tranSCript ofthe trial. See
Order entered on June S, 2012. the parties were instructed to $llbmit post-trial arguments along
with their proposed findings of. fact and conclusi~ oflaw. There were four (4) depositi~ which
were subrni~d to the Court for its review as part of the trlal record. Pursuant to stip111ation of !he
PINDINGS OF FACT, CONCWSIONS OF LAW AND II!EMOIUNDUM DECISION .4ND 0RD£R- l
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process contemplated by the ~ase Agreement Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 3. PMC also requested that the Court enter summaxy judgment in its
favor and declare that Quail Ridge owed PMC back rent for the yeatS 2007 through 2011 in the
amount of$735,187.50 and rent in the sum of$148,500.00 for2012. Id. at p. 5. PMC argued
that this result was justified under the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' Lease
Agreement. Quail Ridge also :flied a counter-motion for summary judgment. Quail Ridge

argued that the Court should deny PMC's motion for summary judgment and gxant summary
judgment on its behalf. Quail Ridge argued that in .2001, "the ability to adjust rent was removed
from the partics' agreement." Defendants' Motion for SUIIliDllrY Judgment, p. 1. 'The Court
denied both parties' motions for slliJilllary judgment finding that the parties' Lease Agreement
contained ambiguities that would require exllinsic evidence concenring the patties' intenr,
gpecifically as it related to Article I, section l.)(b) of the Lease Agreement.
Numerous pre-trial motions were filed in anticipation of trial. Two (2) of these are
procedurally significant. The fJrst was PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint and tha second was
FMC's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord CoDSent 8lld Esroppel

Certificate. PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted without objection by Quail Ridge.
See Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. The

Court likewise granted PMC's Motion to Enforce the Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate. 3
PMC's Amended Complaint sought damages that were not requested in the oriQinal
Complaint, based upon an updated appraisal. The. Amended Complaint also asserted a claim for

FINDINGS 01 PACr. (,:ON(:J,.VSIOl'IS OF LAW AND MEMOKANDVM DECISION At!D OIIDER • 3
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Z. Deposition Testimony - Guy P. Kroesehe.4
PMC submitted the deposition of Guy P. Kroesche (Kroesche) as part of its case
on rebuttal. PMC submitted the following with regard to Kroesche's testimooy: (I)
During Quail Ridf,e's Cross-examination ofKroest:he the following question was asked:
Okay. But you would agree that that language could have been easily inserted in
the 2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates as it had been in the 1996 certificate, right.
Depo. Kroesche, p. 34, LL.ll-14. The propounded question does require a yes or no response.
Further, Kroesche' s response is uon-responsive. IllStead. he explains that typically esto{lpel
cen:ificates are not identical from transaction to transaction. However. Kroesche fails to respond
to the

specific question, that being that certain language could have easily been iosened in the

2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates just-as it had been in the 1996 certi£icate. Quail Ridge
moved to Strike this response as non-responsive. !d. at p. 35, LL. 10-11. PMC arg11es Kroesche
was entitled tct explain his reasons for not being able to answer ''ye!t' or "1\o." The Court w:ill

SUSTAIN Quail Ridge's objection and find that KrOesche's answer was noo-responsive and will
strike the same.5

PMC also addresses an objection made by Quail Ridge during PMC's re-direct
examination as being beyond the scope of Quail Ridge's cross-examination. This exchange
centered on the following questions:
First of all, there was a question about whether if there hacl been a modification
to the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement, would it have been included in the estoppel
certificate. Can you ariswer that?
"PMC withdn.'W any of the objections to ques1ioM askod by Quail R.k(ge: during Kro*h~~s deposition. PMC's ObJecrfons to
oeoo&1ion Testimony, p. 3. Thcre!bre.. tile Court will address only those issu,. mi«d by PMC In !>MC's Objections to

DtpoSjli!!Jt Tcsdm""l''

_

_

.

'The Coll.tt luls <tOssed dtmuab ll!;it pOI!i<>n of Kro...,ru,•. respons~·>W;Oh bjiS1n:cn Slrick<n by 111\1 c~ $1!6 ori&lnal ~·
®pooftlon at p.l4. Ll,.!$-2$.. p. 35. LL.I-6. 'l'hc..,. quCSiion isc~ an p. 37 ofKr<!escho's 4cposil!011 WbOI\ h* is Ukt4

"you ceuld ••liVe. wben you pr;opan:d tile 'OJ ~pel teRi/iQllc 1lllli !he '1)2 -ppel <:pli~ or wll!\11 you lllerc wl'icWing
rlt<m.lMorte<ll"'au>~&> ID;o !hat lllund l!uho 19% es!OpJ)Ol ~care rellll$lto lllo te~~tal!iustmcnt pr~>Vlsloo, •am:ot?" Tha
response was "[y]es, I could 1unv put DlllliJI di!ferem words in !hi$ oswwel ~ ... lilcludlne I QOiilcllia:vi> wrilton- that
[refeO'lng 10 Jfte language ftom the 19!16 <!$t0pptl <:otti!i"""'J in as well." This 'OS!'"""' wUI beAD MITrE!) OVI!l !It< objo:cti011S
of c:ounsel as stnutd in the deposidon.

·
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PMC next argues that Quail Ridge's objection to the fullowing question, on leading
grooods, should be overruled because the question is not leading:
[a]t any time did you ever promise or make a representation to a Quail Ridge
representative, or representatives from the Pocatello Medical Investors that you
would waive or limit the rights Ullder the 1983 contract to limit or increase the
rent provision - the amooot of rent under that agreement?

Goodwin Depo. p. 18, LL.lS-21. The Court will OVERULE this objection and allow the
answer to stand.1 The Court concludes that this question i$ nat leading because it does not
suggest the answer.
Quail Ridge reassertS all of the oQjecrions made during the course of Goodwin's
deposition. The only objection asserted by Qutril Ridge that has not been addressed above is its
objection, on the ground oflack of foundation, to the following question:
What I want to know is if during the period from 1983 to 2003 you were aware of
this sqjlJS1:ment provisiOJl in the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement
Goodwin Depo., p. 15, LL.18-2I. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. The question
asked if Goodwin was aware of the adjustment provision found in the Lease Agteement. He
answers that he ''was not specifically aware of this arrangemertt." The Court will allow this
answer. Obviously Goodwin lacks foundation to answer 81!Y futtber questions aboijt the so
called "adjustmc.nt provision" of the Lease Agreemc.nt based upOll his ac!missio11, but he cenainly
can testify to what he testified in response to this question.

'G<JodwJn•s answer!<> tltis qoestion wao "no, .u-.• However. Goodwin then adds this unsoliciiCd rcopoose "In 11101, in paragraph 5
ofihat docum~ lite Ia# HnlenceoflhBl piii'JI&!SPh says. 1\<mt 11M been paid throut~t and including l'obn.uny 28, I Q%, Under
Sc<>li\lll 1.3(b) oftheleose, lho ""'' llhall be a<~~_ on lho ~ l!l)ltad.;-t dale. March 1, 1999-1998.- 'l'hisi'OSpOliJc is
Dl!ll"""ll'l>slve and Will be STlUCKEN by the Collt!. PMC's qut~St~!in VIIS l!ini\ed in scope to wlledlllJ Goodwin ever made aey
P''""is<s or rtp.....,ratiODS ro .S!<rllJill or Quail!Udgc. The question oolh:.d fi>r a yes or no I<BP""""· GoadWin's "llo. sit'
o:o!j10IISC will b..JII)WO(I; lhO balancc is non....,ponsive and will be stru.ck. The Coutt has Cro""d through the Slriokcn ponlon of
lhc testimony In rhc orfgirlal dcJ)O.$itiOn ufGaodwin.
.-INDING$ OF FI\CT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 111£M(IRANDIIM DECISIOM ANI> OIUI£R- 7
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Jd. at p. 6, LL.16-18. Again, 'QwUl Ridge objects on the basis that the question assumes
facts not in evidence, lack of foundation of the witness to answer, and speculation.
The Court will OVERRULE both objections. The answers are really of no evidentiary
value. Anton responds generally that he is sure that he would have seen the Lease Agreement
and the reason he believes this is that he was the CEO ofPMC from !981 through 1984. Anton
Depo., p. 5, LL.l0-11. This is sufficient foundation to take the matter out of the realm of

speculation. Further, the Lease Agreement is in evidence. The balance of Anton's deposition
establishes thet he has little or no recollection, surrounding the Lease Agreement or the facts or
circumstances leading to its creation.
Quail Ridge next objects to the following question and answer:
Q. Do you know what involvement he [Gerald O!sonJ had, if any, in the drsfting

of this Agreement?
A. I do not, but he may have drafted the Agreement

ld at p. 7, LL.6-8. Qtlail Ridge objects to this response as being non-responsive. The Coun will

OVERRULE as it relates to Anton's response that he does not know what involvement Olson
may have had in drafting the Lease Agreentent. The balance of the answer and the objection
based upon non-responsiveness will be SUSTAINED.

The balance of this response is

speculative and apparently beyond Anton's Personal knowledge and/or recollection. Therefore,

it will beSTRICKEN.8
Next, Quail Ridge objects to the following exchange on the basis of vagueness, Jack of
foundation, and as$\lllleS facts not in evidence; · ·
Q. Do you have any recollection of that language in this Agreement at all from
1983?

'The Court hru: Cl'OSS~ lhrough lh~ portion of tnis response Untt has hem stricken 1n the original depOSition on (d~ with the:
Collrt.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1\ND MEMOIIANDtJM DECISION AND ORll£R -9
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that the call of the question, seeking Anton's understanding as the CEO of what specific
language meant, is suggestive of an answer. It is therefore, overruled on leading grounds. The
Court has previously foUild that adequate foundation has been laid, establishing Anton's status as
CEO at the time the Lease Agreement was entered and created, to allow him to testify regarding

his recollection of this Lease Agreement and the circumstances surrounding its creation.
Therefore, the objection is overruled on the foundation objection. Finally, the Court oveiTUies on
the speculation, basis. Although Anton is being asked to recall matters that occurred nearly thirty
(3 0) years ago, that will go to weight.

To the extent he remembers the circumstances

snrro\lllding the creation of the Lease Agreement, his testimony will stand.

FINDINGS OF FACT
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to he Conclusions of
Law, they are incmporated in the Court's Conclusions of Law.
(l) PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company authorized to d<;> business in the state

ofidaho. PMC's principal place ofbusiness is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. Amended
Complaint, p. 1, 'lfl, Answerto Amended Complaint, p. I, 'If!.
(2) Quail Ridge is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in
the state of Idaho. Quail Ridge's principal place ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland

Tennessee. Amended Complaint, p. 2, 1!2, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. I, ~I.
(3) Quail Ridge operates an assisted living center located in Pocatello, Idaho. The
assisted living center is located on a 4.25 acre piece of real property which is currently owned by
PMC.
(4) The building from which t."te assisted living

cent~x

is ruu and operated ig owned by
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(5) PMC and Quail Ridge are successors in i.rrte:cst to a certain Ground Lease
Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into on Januacy 27, 1983.
(~)

The Lease Agreement was origirial!y entered into between IHC and Sterling whereby

IHC leased 4.25 acres of real property, as Lessor, to Sterling, as Lessee.
(7) PMC is the successor in interest to lHC ·and Bannock County as it relates to the Lease

Agreement ami occupies the role as lessor. Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to Sterling
and occupies the role of lessee.

(8) The Lease Agreement is for a thirty (30) year tenn of years collllllencing on February
1, 1983 and concluding on January 31, 2013. However, the Lease Agreement provides for one
(I) ten (IO) year option to extend the term of the lease. This option is to be exercised, if at all, by
"giving Lessor written notice ... not later than 120 days prior to the expiration date of the
Term."9 (Lease Agreement, p. 2, §1.2)
(9) The Lease Agreement also proVides that rent shall be paid on an annual basis as
follows:
An initial illllllual rental [sic] shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent
(l So/o) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the f!ISt lhree (3) years
from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the
rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/1 00 Dollu:S ($15,000.00) per acre. 10
(Lease Agreement, pp. 2·3, §l.3(a)).
(10) The total acreage of leased land was 4.25 acres. Therefore, the annual rent for the
first three (3) years ofthe Lease Agreement was $9,562.50.

'The op~.ion app~ to be personal to Sterling. However, this docs not upptar to be an Issue between th.c pmics. despite the tact
tbat th=n: was no evidenca at IriaJ conccmfn.e the Pl.T50nBI nat~ of lbc: option Mel the opdon having been exercJsec&. the part:lcs
se<:m to ~ lbl!l 1he Option Ms loeon exercise<~, tltaz It is assig.nablo to Quail Ridge. an4 "'" tite L""'e Agrumon1 is and Will be
In place mrough Januwy 31, 2<UJ. "lnis"""" ofaf!IWs seems to be further conrnmed by the Landlord Consont and Estopjlel
Certifio>te en"""d io 2001 wbcre the par~ies slOte that the ~· Apeement has b""' oxtend<4 thruu/111 and inoluding!anuftlj' 31,
2023. Therefore, these Issues will no1 be ad<fresso<l or oonaklered -by~~· Court.
''The Commenoemolnt Dale ofrhe Lease Agmcmcnt is dolined as the I" doy ofl'obn:wy, !983, or on or before thirty (30) d•y•
after a building pmnit r.s issu~d whichever is Jeter. See LCMC Agreement. p.2. §1.2. No evid~t:~ ha! been ll1h'04uccd Je&at£hng
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLVs.IONS 01' LAW ANI> MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. 12
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(15) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever submitted this matter to arbitration
as mandated in the Lease Agreement. Funher. the parties freely admit that there has not been
any attempt to arbitrate. 11

(16) The Lease Agreement next provides that in arriving at the adjusted rent every three
(3) years, the parties shollld consider the following:
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (IS%) percent [sicJ of the
fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the
premise. Detenni!llltion of fair market value shall be based on the highest and
best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the
leasehold into account The determination shall take into account the parties'
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to
a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($1 5,000.00) per acre
and shall also take into account any determinations of market value made under
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent
adjustment date.

(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §J .3(b)).
(17) The evidence at trial established that the parties have never followed the provisions
contained in the Lease Agreement to effectuate an acljustment in tbe rent.
(18) Finally, the Lease Agreement provides tbat "iftbe determination of adjusted rent is
made after the applicable rem adjustment date; lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate

applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate is deterinined." (Lease Agreement, p. 3,
§1.3(b)).

(19) Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's designated representative at trial, testified that
Qual! Ridge has paid rent. annually, in the Orlgi:!!al and WJadjusted amoWit of $9,562.50 and is
currant on its annual obligation.

11 Wben !he Court inquired of !he pard" concerning 1his maner !hey both a4vised the Coott that lhoy were waivi~ this
requitement ofthe Lease Agreement. "fhe Coutt telied Llpon whul 1h1 Court detgnnincd\0 bi: a mamhuory Blbitradon pl'OVI:!IIon
wh<11 iL t~=•ed PMC's mollon .eq•..Ung !hOI QIOii) Ridge bo dCnlcd iiSjUI)' domand.
fiNDINGS 01· FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMOI!ANDUM llECISION AND ORDER ·14
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(24) Finally, the 1996 Estoppel Certificate provides that the "Landlords consent to the
Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) a waiver or modification by
Landlord of Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or (b) excuse Tenant's
perfonnance of any term or condition of the Lease [Agreement]." ( 1996 Estoppel Certificate,

(25) No rndence was introduced that IHC attempted to proceed with the three (3) year
annual rent adjustment in 1998 as referenced by the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. 14

(26) Between 1996 and 2001 the relationship between the parties and Lease Agreement

remained static. IHC was the Lessor, Sterling was the Lessee, and PMI was the Sub-tenant or
Sub-Lessee. In 2001, the relationships changed.
(27) Sometime between 1996 and 2001, Sterling determined that it wanted to sell the
building located on the leasehold and Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their
personal guarantees associated with the financing of the building located on the leasehold.
Likewise, PMI wanted to purchase this building.
(28) Richard Faulkner testified that for a nwnber of reasons, not particularly gennane to
this litigation, in order to facilitate the 1ramss.ctio~ between Sterling and PMI wherein PMI would
purchase the building located on the leaseh<?ld, a new emity was created. This entity was Quail
Ridge Medical Investors (Quail Ridge). Quail Ridge then plll'cll.ased the building located on the
leasehold from Sterling and PMI continued on as a subtenant of Quail Ridge.
(29) Richard Faulkner testified that the tranSaCTion was complex and involved a number

of parties (IHC, Sterling, Quid! Ridge, PMI, and the Public Employee Retirement System of

f"Thc only evidence Introduced at trial rc.garding a dcmiUld by JHC or any of jts .succcss:om in interest was in O~ober I)( 2009
wh'n PMC ma.dw a demand for a. rc:nt. Rlumncnt. whio;;:h 1~ to r.hc: present ~ntrovmy and lldgQdon.
fiNDINGS OF FACT, CONCLtJSIONS OF LAW AND MEMOIIANIIVM DECISION AND ORDER· 16
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Under the Lease [Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent at the rate of

NJNE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND
FIFTY CENTS ($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and
including FEBRUARY 28,2001.
(2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,5). This provision contains twO (2) dramatic alterations from the

1996 Estoppel Certificate. First the 1996 Estoppel Certificate states that Sterling (the Tenant) "is
obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." The term "currently" has
been deleted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and reads Sterling (the Tenant) "is obligated to
pay rent at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annwn." Further, while the 1996 Estopplrl Certificate
provides that ''under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease [Agreement], the rent shall be adjusted on the
next rent acljustment date"; this language is glaringly absent from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate.
(35) Rich~ Faulkner discusses, from his perspective and that of Quail Ridge, why the

language of 200! Estoppel Certificate differs froni the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. At trial, the
following dialogue occurred:
Q. If you'lllook at exhibit 228 [2001 Estoppel Certificate] again, going back to
paragraph five, it says that ''under the leas~ tenant is obligated to pay rent at the
current rate of $9,562.50 per annum. The rent has been paid through and
including February 281h, 2001."

Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that appears in the '96 estOppel
certificate is not in this certificate here?
A. That's con:ect. I did not include it in the first draft.
Q. And why was that left out?
A. Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for
the five years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment
mechanism had never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling
Development Group and understood that in the entire 13 yeafs preceding our
involvement no one had ever raised the section of the rent adjusnnent in erder to
increase or change the rent. So I wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that
that had been waived.

Faulkner Tria! Testimony, p. 165, LL.22-25, p. 166, LL.l·17.
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(40) In 2009, shonly after PMC acquired and became successor in interest to the Lease
Agreement, as part ofits larg~ purchase of the hospital operated and known as PortneufMedical
Center, Don Wadle was asked to review the Lease Agreement. He was informed that a previous
adjustment bad not taken place and asked to determine the appropriateness of making an
adjustment to the annual rent.
(41) Don Wadle detennined that an adjustment to the annual rent would be appropriate

and rhat there was a process in the Lease Agreement ro obtain an adjustment.
(42) In 2009, PMC began the process of having the 4.25 acre leasehold appraised and
following the appraisal PMC made Quail Ridge aware of its intent to increase the annual rent in
accordance with the Lease Agreement.
(43) At trial Brad Janoush, a principal with Integra Realty Resources in Boise, Idaho
·.

testified regarding the market value of t11e 425 acres of property which is the subject of the
Lease Agreement.
· (44) Mr. Janoush was admitted to testifY at trial as an expert real estate appraiser and
consultant.
(45) Mr. Janousb opined, after discussilig his methodology, that the 4.25 acres of

property that are the subject of the leasehold had a value of$1,080,000 on January 27, 2007. He
further testified that on Januaiy 27, 2010, the value of this 4.25 acre Jeasehol(l had declined in
value from the January 27, 2007 date to $990,000. 17
(46) Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) testified, by way of depositiOil iniJOcitiCed at trial,
that he "assumed" that the $15,000 per acre figure utilized by the pazties as the "iilir market

"PMC has lltiiUed mat !he applfcablc modlftcallon date I• Janulll'y as. Tho Court is rtOI sure whm: !his d""' comes from. The
copy of tho: Lease= Agreemertt -admhwllnta evidence ai trial reflects a slgnarurc- date or Januat)' 27. 1983. Howatcr4 the Lease
Agrccmontlu.:lf provides that the applicable dii!O for !be nmt adjusunrnt is Fclmuuy I. See Coutt'S Findiup of Fact Numba: 9
ond l'ootnole IQ,
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affirmarlve or negative in fonn and effect, and such declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
(2) Idaho Code §10-1202 provides as follows:
Any person interested under a deed, will, writtcu coutract or other writings
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have detennined any" question of construction or validity arisin3 under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or lh!nehlse and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

[Bold Emphasis Added by the Court]
(3) Finally, Idaho Code §10-1203 provides as follows:
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.
(4) Pursuant ro the foregoing. the Court has authority and jurisdiction to declare the rights
ofPMC and Quail Ridge as the successors in interest to the Lease Agreement.
(5) In 1983, IHC and Sterling entered into a legally binding and valid Lease Agreement

whereby Sterling leased 4.25" acres ofproperty :from IHC.
(6) PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreemenl PMC is

the Lessor and Quail Ridge is the Lessee.
(7) In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Walehailt LLC. 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337

(2005), the Idaho Suprem~ Court discussed contract interpretation. in doing so it stated as follows:
When the language of a contrliCt is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given irs plain
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found
ambiguous, its interjiretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject
to conflicting interpretations.
(8) This Court, upon review of the Lease Agreement concludes that section 1.3(b) of the
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Therefore, the Lease Agn:ement .called for

footnote I 0 to the Court's Findings of Fact.

adjustments to the annual rent on the following dates:
February l, 1986
February l, 1989
February I, 1992
February 1, 1995
February 1,1998
February 1, 2001

February l, 2004
February 1, 2007
February 1, 2010

It also calls for adjUSTments to the annual rent on the following prospective dates:

February 1, 2013
FebrUary;, 2016
February 1, 2019
February 1, 2022
(13) No adjustment to the annual rent under the Lease Agreement was effectuated pursuam

to the terms of the Lease Asreement between t986 and 2010. Further, no pany to the Lease
Agreement even attempted to adjust the annual rent IDltil September and October of 2009 when
PMC attempted to invoke sectionl.3(b) ofthe Lease Agreement to effectuate a modification in the
!lllllual rent amotl11t.
(14) The Court concludes that the second paragraph of section !.3(b) is clear and

'

WJambiguous. It provides the procedure whereby the rent adjustment process is implemented. It
allows for the parties to negotiate and ·submit

by

WilY of ''written agreement" th!;ir

asrectnent

concerning the "fair market value" of the 4.25 '!Cte leasehold for the upcoming three (3) year
adjusnnent period. This period in which the parties are to negotiate and arrive at an agreed upon
"fair market value" of the 4.25 acre leasehold is to (>Ccur within ninety (90) days of rent adjustment

date. If the parues are

succ~

in this

en~vor,

their agreed upon value is "a conclusive

determination •.• offilir market value fur the period to which the adjustment applies." If the parties
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v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 224 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2009). "The
determination of a parties' intent with respect to a contract provision 'is to be determined by
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstances under
which it was made, the objective and purpose Df the particular provision, and any construction
placed upon it by the contmcting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus,
151 Idaho 235, 238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011).

(18) The Court concludes that "fltir market value" is a tenn of art in the legal and real estate
fields. Black's Law Dictionary defines fair market value as ''the price that a seller is willing to
accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." Black's
Law

Dictionary, Seventh Edition. In Logan v. Orand Junetion Allsociates, 111 Idaho 670, 671, 726

P.2d 782 783 (Ct.App.l986), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a case where the trial court

applied a. nearly identical definition of fair market value (the legal definition of fair market value is
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller). Although the Idaho Court of Appeals did not
rule on the correctness of this definition, neither did it indicate that this was not the couect

definition. Rather, it reversed the trial judge on the basis that the methodology it applied in arriving
at fair market value was in error. Brad Janoush, ,PMC's real estate appmser expert, testified that
fair market vall!C' is an antiquated term that was created and used back in the 1980's. He testified
that the tenn now used is ''market value." He defined market value as ''the property's most

probable sales price." He :furlher testified that although the tenn "f8ir market value" "is hardly ever

used cuttently, [it] ... may be thought of as being synonymous with market value."
(19) The Court concludes that these two (2) definitions of market value and fair market
value are consistent and appear to be manageable dc:llnitions for the rent adjostment provision of the
Lease Agreement if standing alone. However, they are not left standing alone.
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County, and forgotten in its entirety except at times when ownership changed hands. It appears that
there was no course of dealing between rn:c and Sterling as well as their successors dealing directly
with the t1uee (3) year adjustment provision. Christison's testimony seems to intimate that IHC
never sought a rem adjustrncntbecause it determined that the value of me leasehold acreage had not
increased in value. Therefore, m a<lji!Stment process would have resulted in no change in the
annual rent or a decrease. However, good management practices and compliance with the Lease
Ajieelllent would have: required that they advise Sterling that they did not believe the value of the
leasehold ju.stif!ed an increase in rent rather than just ignoring or forgetting about the rent
adjustment provision.
(23) As stated in Beus v. Bew;, supra, under Idaho law the parries' intent is to be determined
by the express l.allguage of the document and reviewing the document as a whole. This is an issue
of law. If there are ambigllities, then it becomes a question of fact concerning the intent of me
parries. In ascertaining that irttent, the fact finder may consider extrinsic evidence touching upon the
parties' intent. In this case, the Court is the finder of fact. fn discerning the intem of the parries, by
way of extrinsic or parol evidence, the Court can consider the circumstances under which the
Lease Agreement was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision. and any
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings.

Beus v. Beu.s, lSI Idaho 235.238,254 P.3d 1231,1234 (20ll)(Beus).
(24) As stated and disci!Ssed above, there is almost no credible or relevant evidence on

these issues. The Court, in researching this issue, can find no controlling case law in Idaho that
discusses how the Court should proceed when the record is entirely lacking extrinsic evidence of
prior course of dealings ®dlor the parties' original intent.
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is that there were no course of dealing for the following reasons: (I) Sterling, and later Quail
Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of spealdng if Sterling or Quail
Ridge "rocked the boat" they had nothing to gain and only increased rent to lose if they initiated
a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) IHC and Bannock County, through poor
management and/or having forgotten about the rent adjustment provisions, never sought a rent
adjustment.20
(28) Therefore: (I) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen

thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to establish a
course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to the language
related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions of the Lease
Agreement.21
(29) The Court will apply the current market value to the 4.25 acres of property which

make up the leasehold. The Court accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current marlcet
value of the 4.25 acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February l, 2007 as being $1,080,000.
The Court further accepts Janoush's opinionwith respect to the cun:ent market value of the 4.25
acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February!, 2010 as being $990,000.
(30) In 2009, when PMC attempted to in,voke section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement for
purposes of modifYing the annual rent, PMC had become the successor in imerest to the original

m..

"Again <h< Cou~ recognize$ that Christison u:srlficd that he ll."VIcw.:d all of mc•s CXO<Uior oon- ..~
during his \<n!UC
no lncreur: in rent was sought because he bcliaved. that the w.luc in: the ptopcrty was not there to support a rtl'lt inerease. While
this"""' be an acc1lll>l1: >illlc of a!rairs donng Christison's Tel\\11$ at IIIC. 1969 tbroush 2000; as lanoush's tCSiimony OSIIIblisbod,
In recent )'cars. this ~ cASt of f-159 has become a bot-bed of' commercial development in Poca\eUo, Idaho. For lit~ rQISOn$..
the Coun ;oncludc:s t:hQt there is no course of dcalins with rc:sp~ to IHC ind Bat)flock Couney in their capa.ciey ns lessors due
SDlcly to mi5marttlgement and the fact that the provisions of the Lea!!~ Agreement were forgotten an two (2) occasions in 198j
after the L~c Agr~mi:nt was creared and in 1996 after ll:iC agreed to .f'MI becoming a $\lbll!lnant.
;nCcrtainly 1h~ facwr.s ma.y play a ralc in fuiUrc rent adjustments under &he- Leese Agreement,. but there Is no e.videtlcl!: in the
record to allow them to play a role in <he a<Uus<mcn< proc:css this Coun. iS being osl<ea ro consider a.• part of t~o aoelaratory
]udgm.:n< proeeedin(l. l'or ewnplc, ifrhc panics wctc. by written BU•'I:m<nl. obi• 10 osreo to rent adjustment tllat was lx>$ed on
a value I~ than IS% of marl:ec value as that term wu defined by Janoush or Blaek't Law Dic!ianary~ that would certainly b~ a
rclcvunl ctlUr.l:e: ordealillg.IWiOOncc g.oing. forward.
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(1961). As with all modifications, tbe terms of a contract cannot be altered by
one party without the other patty's approval. !d. at 296, 362 P2d at 386.
Additionally, the minds of the parties must meet as to the proposed modification.
!d. "The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one
party ill. accordance with the tenns of a change proposed by the other." !d.
Whether an alleged modification is proven "is one for the trier of the facts to
decide." Re.s. Eng'g, Inc. v. Siler. 94 Idaho 935, 938,500 P.2d 836, 839 (1972).

1bis Court, as the finder of fuct, determines that the evidence at trial does not support a finding by
this Court of a modification to the terms of the Lease Agreement. Both the 1996 Esroppel

Certificate and the 200 I Estoppel Certificate recite as follows:
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. The Lease constitutes the
Ollly agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord and the Tenant relating
in any way to the Demised Premises.

1996 Lease Agreeme11t, 112 and 2001 Lease Agreement, fl. Both the 1996 Estoppel Certificate and
the 200 I Estoppel Certificate also provided as follows:
Landlord's consent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants d1.1ties or
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tenants perfotma11ce of any
tenn or condition of the Lease (Agre~ent], or (b) a waiver or modification by
Landlord to any rights, ·under the "Lease [Agreement], including without
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement.
1996 Estoppel Certificate, 1110, ancl2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,10.
(35) The only evidence in the record regarding the modification of the Lease Agreeme11t is
the lillbjective intent of Faulkner. Faulkner, testified as the individual dtafting the 2001 EstOppel
Certificate that he purposefully left oin certain language that existed in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate
because he "wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that that had been waived." The Court
would suggest that removing language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing
the same or maldng the other party aware of its deletion does nOt establish ''mutual assent" In fact,
some might q1.1estion the propriety of such conduct. The Court finds that this WJi!ateral

act

of
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(38) The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the doctrine of waiver in Knipe Land
Co. v. Robemen, IS! Idaho 449, 457-58, 259 P.3d 595, 603-04 (2011). In doing so, it stated as
follows:
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or
advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his
detriment." Fullrmon v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006)
(internal quotation omitted). ~waiver is foremost a question of inlellt.'' Seaport
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.l987).
A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be estsblished.
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907
(1993). "Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." ld.
(39) As the Court previously ruled with respect to Quail Ridge's claim of col11ll!Ct

modification, the Court, as the finder of fact, finds no facts to support the claim that ll:IC or
Bannock County voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right. Rather, what the Court has
found is that IHC and Bannock Couney, through poor management and oversight, neglected

and!or forgot about the rent adjustment provision of the Lease Agreeme11t. Such condu<:t does
not establish the requisite intent to voluntarily waive the rent adjustment provision of the Lease

Agreement.
(40) Finally, Quail Ridge asserts thin the Court should apply the equitable dQctrine of
laches to the rent adjustment provisions and not allow PMC to modifY the rent either
rctrQactively or prospectively. The CoUrt will' ax:c.ept Quail'Ridge's laches defense in pan and
finds it to be inapplicable in part.

(41) In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 43 P.3d 1241, 1248
(2002). the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the defense oflaches. In addressing this affirmative
defense, the Supreme Court noted that the party asserting the defense bears the burden ofproving
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Agreement Wltil October of 2009. This was two (2) years end over seven (7) months into the
current rent adjustment period. This was not reasonable, nor was it compliant with the cx:pTCss
provisions of the Lease Agreement, nor was it reasonable to expect Quail Ridge to lmve its
annual rent adjusted two (2) years and seven (7) plus months into the current period.
(44) However, the Court does not find the same impediments to a prospective rent
adjustment. In October of20Q9, PMC notified Quail Ridge that it was seeking to adjust the rent
in accordance with section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. The Court concludes that this was
consistent with the intent of obtaining a written agreement within the ninety (90) window set by
section 1.3 (b) of the Lease Agreement These attempts were l!llsuccessful, and in June of 2010
litigation was initiated. The Court does not believe the doctrine of laches applies to PMC's
attempts to effectuate a rent adjustment for the 2Q 10 rent adjustment period as well as future tent
adjustment periods. The Court collCludes that although both parties failed to comply with the
mandatory arbittation provision of the Lease Agreement, that PMC has complied with the

provisions of the Lease Agreeinent sufficient to justify an adjustment to the llll!lual rent.
(45) Therefore, the Court concludes t4at PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for
the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the amount of$148,500.00 annually. Therefore, fortbe three
(3) year period applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combined annual rent for these three (3)
years is $445,500.00 by January 31, 20 l3, a:ssumlng lhat Quail Ridge remains current on its annual
rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 towards the annual rent for this three {3) year period. As such it is
entitled to a credit in this amount against the $44s',soo.oo. This credit results in Quail Ridge being
obligated to PMC in the total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period ofFebruazy I, 2010
through January 31,2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
NO: · CV-10-2724 OC

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

.

Cleveland, Tennessee
April 11, 2012
DEPOSITION OF FORREST L. PRESTON

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
KENT L. HAWKINS, ESQ.
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
109 North Arthur, 5th Floor
P. 0. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(Appearing via Skype)
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ESQ.
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, P.A.
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 557-5203
(Appearing via Skype)
ALSO PRESENT:

Richard D. Faulkner, Jr., Esq.
Richard J. McAfee, Esq.
Joanna Crooks
Aaron Webb, Esq.
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Forrest L. Preston:

Page

Examination by Mr. Hawkins

3

3

~

The deposition of Forrest L. Preston,

)

a witness called at the instance of the Plaintiff, for

7

purposes of discovery/use in evidence, pursuant to the

3

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, taken by agreement on

3

the 11th day of April, 2012, at Life Care Centers of

~

America, 3001 Keith Street, NW, Cleveland, Tennessee,

l

before Beth Ann Pell, Court Reporter and Notary Public.
S T I P U L A T I 0 N S
It is agreed that Beth Ann Pell, Court
Reporter and Notary Public, may swear the witness,
report his deposition in machine shorthand, and
afterwards reduce the same to typewriting.
All objections, except as to form of
the questions, are reserved until the time of trial.
It being further agreed that all
formalities as to notice, caption, certificate, and

l

transmission, et cetera, and the reading and signing of
the completed deposition by the witness, are expressly
waived.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _!
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FORREST L. PRESTON,
called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. HAWKINS:
Q

My name is Kent Hawkins.

I'm one of

the three attorneys representing the Pocatello Medical
Center in this case.

If the witness would please state

your full name for the record.
A

Forrest L. Preston.

Q

And what is your, what is your address

;:

there?
A

Business address?

Q

Business would be fine.

A

Okay.

3001 Keith, K-E-I-T-H, Street,

Cleveland, Tennessee.
Q

All right.

Tell me a little -- and

let's just briefly -- a little bit about yourself
starting with --well, we're hearing it in a little
different order.
in this suit.

I understand there's two corporations

I'm going to -- if I refer to them as

Quail Ridge and Century Park, is it clear to you of the
two entities that I'm speaking of?
A

Yes.
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY
(423) 267-6000
www.wilsonreporting.com
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1
2

And do you hold positions in both of

Q

these corporations?

3

A

Yes.

A

Q

What are -- what is your position in

each, each of those companies?

5

Quail Ridge is the ownership entity of

A

v

the actual building itself and operation.

'8

is a management company that I formed about six years

~

ago with my youngest son, Bryan.

Century Park

So when you say that you formed

Q

Century Park, are you the sole owner of Century Park?
Q
~:

'

~

A

I share an ownership with my youngest

son, Bryan, yes.
I missed that.

Q

Who do you share

ownership with?
A

My youngest son, Bryan.

7

Q

Just the two of you?

B

A

Yes.

9

Q

All right.

0

Quail?

Who are the owners of Quail?

1

A

B-R-Y-A-N.

Would the same be true of

I have not reviewed that recently, but

2

I believe that I am a 99 percent owner, and there is a

3

one percent ownership of which --

A

5

.~~'

t__

By the way, our video went off here,
so I don't know if that's meaning -- can you still hear
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY
(423) 267-6000
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PAGE 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

F""" PAGE 3 ~~~-==:......:==-;-:~':""::=::'~-~---;
E X A M I N A T I 0 N

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

JODI 'l'HOMAS
PO~ELLO

HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a

PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Page

Examination by Mr. Hancock • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • •

4

Case No.
CV-10-2724 OC

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC,
and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC,

Defendants.
DEPOSITION OF JODI THOMAS
Thursday, April 12, 2012, 1:00 p.m.
Pocatello, Idaho

Lanice M. Lewis

Page 3
PAGE 2

PAGE 4
DEPOSITION OF JODI THOMAS
BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of JODI

THOMAS was taken by the attorney far the plaintiff at

the office of MERRILL & MERRILL, located at 109 North
Axthur, Pocatello, Idaho, Lanice M. Lewis, Court
Reporter and Notary Public, in and for the State of
Idaho, on Thursday, April 1~, 2012, commencing at the
hour of 1:00 p.m., in the above-entitled matter.
AE'E'EARANCES
For the Plaintiff:
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD
BY: R. WILLIIIM HANCOCK
109 North Arthur, 5th Floor
Post Office Box 991
pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286

For the Defendant:
BEARD S'l'. CLAIR GAFFNEY
BY: MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY
2105 coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 557-5210

Al.so E'resent:
'l'yler Neill

E'age 2

www.Tand1Reporti.ng.com

1:00 p.m.
1 April12, 2012
2 (The following deposition proceeded as follows:)
3
4
JODI THOMAS,
5 produced as awitness at the instance of the
6 Plaintiff was sworn, examined, and testified as
7 follows:
8
MR. HANCOCK: And let the record reflect that
9
10 this is the deposition of Jodi Thomas, and it's the
11 lime and place that was set by aprior notice of
12 deposition.
EXAMINATION
13
14 BY MR. HANCOCK:
15
Q. Will you please state your full name for
16 the record, Jodi.
17
A. Jodi Dawn Thomas.
18
Q. And spell your last name.
19
A. T-H-0-M-A-S.
20
Q. And I asked you before we went on the
21 record if I could call you Jodi during the
22 deposition. Is that okay?
23
A. Absolutely.
24
Q. Jodi, have you ever
25 taken before?
T&T Reporting
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19

20
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25

A. Yes.

Q. And was that in another legal matter?
Q. Okay. So you know that there's afew
A. II had to do with residents in our
rules that apply here. I'm going to review those, if
3 community fighting over an estate that we were pulled
thafs okay,Justto 4 into.
A. Sure.
5
Q. Okay.
Q. -to make sure that we make agood
6
A. I guess I'm just lucky.
record for the court reporter, and we make II easier
7
Q. Yes.
for her to do her job.
8
Other than conversations that you may
Firs~ as you know, everything that
9 have had with your legal counsel, Jodi, what steps
we're saying today is being taken down by the court
10 have you taken to prepare for your deposition today?
reporter. Thafs important because in normal
11
A. None.
everyday conversation, Jodi, we have atendency to
12
Q. Okay. You haven't reviewed any
speak over each other.
13 documents?
We anticipate what the other person is
14
A. I did review three letters and some
going to say, and then we immediately respond.
15 fax - I mean, some e-mail strands, I guess you call
Durinq the deposition, we need to slow it down a
16 them.
little bit so that the court reporter can make a
17
Q. Okay. What letters in particular did
complete record because she can only take down one
18 you review?
person ala time.
19
A. Three letters from Portneuf Medical
So that means I'll have to be patient
20 Center.
and make sure that you're done answering your
21
Q. And you ••
question before you -I start - answer my question
22
A. They were --they were addressed to
before I go on to anext question. And I'd ask that
23 me you please make sure that I've completed my question 24
Q. Okay.
before you start answering, even if you think you
6 2;.; .5=......;.A.;;..~-...:;a;,;,;nd;.;;Q;;;;ua;;;;.ii.;,;;Riddg6,;ee.. ;.A.; .;nd;;_;t;.;.;he;; .n; ;.an;.; e-..:.:m.;:;ai:;,_l=~
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1
2
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know what I'm about to ask. Is that okay?
A. Sure.
Q. Another thing is that everything that
happens here today has to be verbal. So sometimes we
want to nod our heads in everyday conversation. Here
you'll need to give verbal responses. And if you
think aquestion lends itself to ayes/no answer, I'd
ask that you please just use r.es or no. Because if
you do uh-huh or uh-uh, !hats hard to tell on the
record sometimes. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. The next thinP., Jodi, is if I ask a
question that you don t understand, my question makes
no sense to you, please just tell me tha~ and I'll
try to reword ftso that it makes sense.
· A. Okay.
Q. Otherwise, if you go on and answer, I'm
going to assume that you understood what I was
asking. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. You indicated that you'd had your
deposition taken before. When was the last time you
had your deposition taken?
A. The one and only time was about amonth
ago, I think.
www.TandlReporting.com
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strand from Dod- -- Don Wadley and myself.
Q. Now, were these letters and e-mails
going back to October of 2009 and early ••
A. Yes.
Q. •• 2010?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, Jodi, as I understand i~
you actually work - or at least on your e-mails, it
shows you working for an entitv named Quail Ridge
Assisted living; is that correct~
A. Correct.
Q. How is that related to Quail Ridge
Medical Investors, LLC?
A. We are- we operate the building.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors is the company, the
management company.
Q. And so is Quail Ridge Assisted living
wholly owned and operated tiy QuaH Ridge Medical
Investors?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. When did you start working for
Quail Ridge?
A. December of 2003 -I take that back.
Well, for Quail Ridge, yes, December of 2003. I've
been with the company longer, but for Quail Ridge,

T&T Reporting
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December of '03.
Q. Okay. What makes you say you've been
with the company longer?
A. I started out at our community in Twin
Falls Bridge View Estates as director of sales and
marketin~ before taking the promotion as GM to Quail
Ridge in 03. So 1-yeah.
Q. So you came to the facility here in
Pocatello, the Quail Ridge facility in Pocatello, in
December of 2003?
A. Correct.
Q. And you mentioned GM. Is that the only
title that you've had here?
A. At Quail Ridge, yes.
Q. Okay. Whatare your job
responsibilities as the general manager?
A. I basically manage the daily operations
of the community. Oversee everything that takes
place in every department.
Q. Sure. Where, ifany, of the
organization of Quail Ridge Medical Investors do you
fi~ Jodi?
A. I run the community. It's- the
company owns and operates 45 buildings in 28 states,
21 states. And so 1-- we have aGM in each

1
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January of1983?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Have you spoken to any of the
participants involved with drafting this ground lease
back in January of 1983?
A. No, I nave not.
·
Q. Is it fair to say, then, Jodi, that you
have no personal knowledge regarding the drafting of
this ground lease back in January of 1983?
A. Yes, thafs fair.
Q. Andspecifically,isitfairtosaythat
you have no personal knowledpe concerning the rent
adjustment language that was mcluded in that ground
lease?
A. Yes.
Q. Jodi, do you claim or believe that the
rent adjustment provisions of the 19831ease
agreement was ever orally modified by any parties to
the agreement?
A. Notthatl'm aware of.
Q. Do you claim that any other written
document modifies the rent adjustment provisions of
the 1983 ~ound lease?
A. ainMR. AFFNEY: I'm going to object. Her

r-

PAGE 12 ~~~~-~-~~--,

community across the country, and we manage the daily 1 opinion is not relevant.
operations and then report to our corporate offices
2 BY MR. HANCOCK:
for any major decisions.
3
Q. You can P.O ahead and answer.
Q. Okay. Whom do you directly report to
4
A Not that Imaware of.
with Quail Ridge?
5
Q. You had indicated, Jodi, that you looked
A. Cody Tower is my regional director of
6 at this correspondence back from --well, e-mail
operations, and he's out of Salt Lake City, Utah.
7 strains back from October of 2009 and then letters
Q. HowdoJOU spell Cody's last name?
8 from the hospitalto you at Quail Ridge after that
A. T-0-W-E-R.
9 period and in to early 2010; is thatQ. I didn't wantto assume anymore 10
A. Yes.
A. First name, C-0-D-Y.
11
Q. -correct?
Q, And he's aregional manager out of Salt
12
So you're familiar with those documents
Lake Ci~?
13 as you sit here today?
A. Yes.
14
A. Yes.
Q. Jodi, how old were you in January
15
Q. Were you the main contact person for the
of1983?
16 hospitalatthattime?
A. January of 1983, I would have been 13, I
17
A. I was the local contact, yes.
guess, because lwas 18 in '88, so...
18
Q. And so was itty~icalforthe hospital
Q. So it's fair to say, then, that you were
19 to contact you with anythmg related to this lease?
not involved in any way with the drafting of this
20
A. We had never had any communication prior
ground lease?
21 to that, other than business, talking to doctors and
A. Absolutely not.
22 nurses as far as admissions go, so...
Q. Okay. Do you personally know any of the
23
Q. And is that- was that your experience,
participants who were involved in the drafting of
24 then -I think you said you started in December of
!his ground lease at issue in this lawsuit back in
'='2"'-5"""""'20""03;;..-~~-~~-~·
www. TandTReporting.com
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
I 09 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY,
and alternatively, REQUEST FOR BOND

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC
("PMC") by and through its attorneys of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., and for its objection to
Defendants' Motion for Stay, respectfully states as follows:
ARGUMENT

I.

The court should allow PMC to proceed to obtain judgment and collect
such judgment.

PMC brought the present action to enforce the Amended Declaratory Judgment entered by
Judge Brown in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724 (the "declaratory judgment"). That
Judgment declared the amount of past due rent owed by Quail Ridge during the last3
years but
·,
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stopped short of issuing a money judgment for the amount due, finding instead that there can be no
breach of contract until the amount of rent had been deciared. 1 Despite the declaratory judgment
ordering that rent was immediately due, Quail Ridge did not pay the rent. 2 This suit was filed to
obtain a money judgment for the unpaid rent, so that collection could proceed for the amount
declared due in the declaratory judgment. Thus, this action is premised entirely on Judge
Brown's Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw and Memorandum Decision and Order and his
Amended Declaratory Judgment.

This action is, however, a new and separate breach of contract claim which has arisen since
Judge Brown's ruling in the declaratory judgment. Quail's failure to immediately pay the unpaid
adjusted rents for the prior 3 years as required by the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement is a new and
current breach of its obligations under the ground lease. Furthermore, this action involves a new
party, Forrest L. Preston. Preston executed a Guaranty in Payment and Performance ("200 I
Personal Guaranty"), wherein Preston personally guaranteed Quail's performance and payment
under the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. 3 Despite a written demand being made upon Preston to
pay the adjusted rents that Quail had failed to pay, 4 Preston has not responded, 5 nor has he paid
the rent declared by Judge Brown as currently due and owing. 6 Preston's failure to pay the rent is
a new and ongoing breach of his obligations to PMC under the 2001 Personal Guaranty.
PMC is concerned about whether it can collect from Quail and/or Preston. Quail is a
Tennessee Limited Liability Company leasing land in Pocatello, Ida:ho. 7 Preston is an individual
1

See Amended Declaratory Judgment, dated November 25, 2012 (Bannock Counly Case No. CV -20 I 0-2724-0C;
Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge), attached as Exhibit 2 to PMC's Complaint.
2

See Affidavit of Don Wadle, at 112.

3

See Guaranty in Payment and Performance, attached as Exhibit I to PMC's Complaint.

4

See November 27, 2012 Letter, attached as Exhibit I to Affidavit of Counsel.

5

See Affidavit ofCounse1, at1f 3.

6

See Affidavit of Don Wadle, at 11 3.
See Findings ofFact, Conclusion of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order, dated October 16, 2012 (Bannock
Counly Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C; Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge), at p. I 0,1\112-4, attached as Exhibit 2 to
Affidavit ofCounse1 ("Memorandum Decision"); see also Deposition of Forrest L. Preston, at pp.3-4, attached as
Exhibit 3 to Affidavit of Counsel.
7
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residing in and primarily doing business out ofTennessee. 8 Defendant Quail's primary interest in
Pocatello, Idaho, is the leasehold that is at issue in this action. 9 Given Defendants' minimal
connections to Pocatello, Idaho, PMC is reasonably concerned that it will be without adequate
protection should it not be allowed to quickly proceed to a money judgment in the present action
and further be allowed to immediately collect on such money judgment.
In contrast, it is without dispute that PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company whose
principal place of business is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. IO It is further without
dispute that in addition to owning the 4.25 acre leased premises at issue in this action, I I PMC
owns and operates its hospital located in Pocatello, Idaho. I2 Given PMC' s substantial connection
to and presence in Pocatello, Idaho, this Court should recognize that Defendants will have
sufficient protection with this court to obtain a refund of any judgment collected by PMC in this
action should PMC not prevail on appeal.
Should PMC be allowed to proceed to and prevail on summary judgment in this matter, this
Court should also allow PMC to immediately collect on any money judgment entered in this
action. This Court should find, considering that PMC is allowing Quail to continue to occupy the
leased premises, that Quail be required to pay the full amount of rent ordered by Judge Brown.
Furthermore, based upon Defendants actions in this matter, PMC is reasonably concerned that
these out-of-state Defendants will simply abandon the leased premises should Defendants not get
the outcome they desire in the appeal.

8

See Deposition ofForrest L. Preston, at pp.3-4, attached as Exhibit 3 to Affidavit of Counsel.

See Memorandum Decision, at p. 10, ~~ 2-4; see also Deposition of Forrest L. Preston, at pp.3-4, attached as Exhibit
3 to Affidavit of Counsel; see also Deposition of Jodi Thomas, at pp. 8-10, attached as Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of
Counsel
9

10

See Memorandum Decision, at p. I 0, 1)1.

ll

See Memorandum Decision, at p. 10, ~ 3.

12

See Memorandum Decision, at p. 20, ~ 40.
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II.

In the alternative, the conrt should wait to stay the case until a
judgment is obtained.

Typically, a case on appeal already has a judgment that becomes immediately enforceable
if the appeal fails. PMC requests that it be allowed to do the same in this case and that it at least be
allowed to obtain a money judgment so as to avoid any further delay after the appeal. This
approach is the most efficient course for all the parties.
The parties agree that this case hinges on Judge Brown's declaratory judgment. Thus, if
Judge Brown's rulings and judgment are upheld on appeal, Defendants are without legal argument
or excuse in the present action. Alternatively, if Judge Brown's judgment is not completely
upheld on appeal, then PMC will be without a basis for the current action. This simple reality
clearly demonstrates that the present action is ripe for a summary judgment and should be quickly
resolved by this Court with little additional expense to the parties.
Indeed, PMC is willing to quickly resolve the present action by entering into a stipulation
with Defendants that a money judgment can be entered in the present matter based upon Judge
Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment with an understanding that the Judgment should be
stayed until the conclusion of the appeal. PMC is further willing to stipulate with Defendants that
the judgment is immediately enforceable if Judge Brown is upheld on appeal or, in the alternative,
is void if Judge Brown's declaratory judgment is not upheld on appeal; subject to a bond, as
discussed below.
The above described approach is not costly to either party and will greatly expedite the
finalization of this dispute at the conclusion of the appeal in the declaratory judgment. Otherwise,
if Defendants are not willing to stipulate to a judgment as outlined above, PMC should be allowed
to immediately proceed to a summary judgment in this matter. Contrary to Defendants assertions
in their motion, no depositions will be required to support such motion for summary judgment
because the motion will be based primarily on the declaratory judgment. Allowing this case to
proceed to summary judgment at this early stage will cost the parties a relatively minimal amount
of additional expense at this point while it avoids the additional delay after the appeal of the
declaratory judgment. IfPMC is not allowed to immediately proceed to a summary judgment in

5975: Plaintifrs Reply to Defendant's Motion to Stay

Page 4

70 of 447

'·

this matter, Defendants may be inclined, if their Answer and motion are any indication, to
unnecessarily drag out this dispute between the parties for many months even if the Idaho Supreme
Court decides in favor of PMC on the appeal. Such continued delay will be prejudicial and unfair
toPMC.
Allowing the case to proceed to judgment brings the case to the same point at which an
appeal is usually filed, which is after the money judgment is entered; the stay is merely to delay
enforcement of the judgment during the appeal. There is no reason to not allow this case to go
that far.

III.

Either way, the court must order Quail and Preston to post a bond.

If the court chooses to allow the case to proceed to judgment, but to then stay collection of
the judgment, the court should order a bond on the amount of the money judgment in this case, or
on the amount declared due by Judge Brown in the declaratory judgment, which is the same
amount. Even if this Court will not allow PMC to immediately collect on any money judgment it
obtains in this action, this Court should recognize that it has broad discretion under I.R. C.P. 62( d)
and I.A.R. 13(b)(l4)-(15) to require the Defendants to post a supersedeas bond as a condition to
granting any stay. Requiring the Defendants to post such a bond in this case will ensure that PMC
is able to quickly collect on its judgment once Judge Brown's rulings and declaratory judgment are
upheld on appeal.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, this court should not stay the present action as requested by
the Pefendants, but rather should allow this action to proceed to a money judgment and allow
PMC to collect the rent on the land being occupied by Quail. Alternatively, PMC should be
allowed to proceed to obtain judgment, with an understanding that such money judgment will be
stayed during the pendency of the appeal of the first case, subject to Defendants posting a bond for
the amount of that judgment.
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DATED this ;uctay of February, 2013.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

,./

~ ~~:;;_

By __~~~~~~~----~-----
Kent L. Hawkins
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Michael D. Gaffuey
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

U U.S. Mail
U Hand Delivery
U Overnight Mail
~Facsimile

Kent L. Hawkins
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!bla ~- The rules ei!etl by PMC do lld appl.rtll !llis ~:a~~e; ~. 1lley i!pply W !be prior
C~~Se

tri!ld l:lll!'iltll JudS!' Brown.

~ DtQWii's filld~, b()-, d!llnoiCl!lilbiWu t!Bacll of

~aud did 4IWIIfd l'MC tllll'. r;;IIeh!)IMI ~it ooll!d i!l!eeull!.

Thll Cow did lld ~~t~ll!l' ll
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!!lillie.!' ju~m.

The ·C®rlooly gnmled dooll!tl!tury mittand lllsmlsll<ld the breach <>f~

claim by !'MC ~Qual! Ri~'<' il)ttlu> otfiiiSI!llelt! period lit issue ln!M C81!e. In sh<m, ~
ill no basis f<>r to~~£Ulri~J& a !l!lperm:lem; bood tn. tl!is-. !f11 holld were 11:> M"'' hoau J1!1'$Wd. il

should have hoau in ll$$0Cilltioo willl tba appeal 11:> a - a II!U!!I>Yjuilpnt Si!ICII thm WS$ no
lllUtley ji'IJ!gmem 11Will'®cl, tba $1,1jl<lrsedem; holld requi~d!ICII twtnpply.

However, l'MC lliWel' ~ a hofld tu. posted in tba afjlW be!la81ie it 1m$ oo money
.iudJ!mmt. iUIIes 13(b)(14)-(lS)apply !)Illy to a~ lakenlrom II tlnlll J~ ThlHIIIle m
a~ laMmlt ad ill :IIlli M!IPJ)tllete ~adi~.

Rn;le ll(b)(l4) I\PJIIies 11:1 etaYhil! ordem

otbar theu moooy judp1«1!s ml1lll!llClalioo with on. ~Ill ad doe.~ oot apply mtl!is - · Rule
IJ(b)(lS).IIjljllim m tba sQ!y t~fmooey j~, wlli<lli is ek.l;rly iupp!IMble be_., J>MC
lru:ks a mwey j.udgmlmt in both - .

PMC ~a~~ it Wlm!S ro ~qJI!IIkly Cllll®t on ill!~" foJJowWg thll'
appeal. H!lwc¥er, following tba ~ PMC wll! sill! baWl 1<1 prove a breolt of~ ad
OOlaln a judgmeat. There Ismj~ llp<ll> wlllch PMC ma,y q~ oollellt. ··'!lmllllUII¢r

willlllilllllllle ro ~ ro trillI Mll Quai! Ridge will-It Ill! de.limses illcludillg res j~ll!

Mll eollli!emllll110pplll. There is a sigaificmt RI'IIOOIII of~ that wll need to be jllll'furil!<ld
~ PMC lllm:~ll bepe In Mq;uire ajudpl«<t lu tills-.

Q.- Ri.dp bllJ1 ~sa~

af!im'lllllive defe- that (:(l!lld preclude all ml!®tlu!l lllltlrity by l'MC. s.uch work wlU be
~

tftbe S~Colllltm~J~Brown.

2 PMC concedes tllat ll'lll cauea of action Ia balled on Judge Brown's fiilldtngs.
In its brletlll!f. PMC eaiiCIIdes ·tlmt 1his entire case is promi.l'ed 1111 !be ll!llidi!y ofJwl!!i>

llmwa.'$ filldillgs of lirolll 1i!ll.dcooclusloml of law. (1'1. Mem. 1112.) Thlio 11ulllWile of!be ~ i.q
vlilll m~~~that lbis <1:lml provides a Cl:lllll!i!l<ltllliii!Ult. Til= ill oo ~fur· tha plll'llns Ill
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kn.:rw metllct !he ~n bmg cleinied b)' PMC iii valid Wllil!he S~ <.'mlrt lms mloo

oo Judge llrown'a findings. Allow !his cue to Jl'IO'*'Ii 10 judgment l!l!wretllll~~ppeal has beon
decided risks m. i®onsistent result 11 is !ilsn ool the 1110s1 <>flrelent lll!e ofjudiWI! resn-.

Walling mttll !he ;appel.latl\1 decli!ioo saves !he pill'lie~~' lime and tesnaree~~lhat Wllll!d be <llllerwlllie
Wll$1cd.

If Ju~ DooWII Iii MVerood, !hen !he j:llll)!iqcm 001it with lh3l iof{)!'lllafitm. IfJ~

Br<lwn is affinood, then !he slay 0011 be lilll:ld ad lhe j:llll)!ie!l mil}' Jl'IO~ will! dist'overy,

e-

dispositiw molioos, illlil, if lleelli!!Sary, ttial. It is only a1hst !he appeal ls complllred.lhal•lhc
)lill1ie!lcmlmow wll.!!lher lhe emire lllwsu!t remain$ valid. P~"ll will'! litis.

-lil

pmlll!lllille md inooru!iili!IM w!lh the~ ofj!ldioial eoo~y.
3 Quail Rkl.ge hee valid lflirmatill(l defen11n.

Quail Ridplms. \'1illid de~ in litis eliSe, J;llill'llllily res jndiellla lll!d oolllltet!!l es10ppel.
J>MC oom'I!Dielnly !ililsto dill!:l01'10 tile ll!lll: tbat It JliiOvimmly saed Quail Rldp ~U>dw It ll1ell!y af
broo~h oJ'eoo!rll!:t IUid llrmmP~< :for !lie l·Y!IV ru:ijuS!Imem period at lllmlil l!IIMs c_,

I'MC aloo

d - not disclose to tile Court &a !'Me Wlllll tolriul with that ~h <.>£ C®lmOI <llaim p!m~

moo its -e. IUid In mS]lellH t11 a "direO!oo verdictM moline, wllh!ll'l!w !be breallh uf C®treel
ellllm, IUid J~

a- eamrud· a diree!OO verdictdii!mi!ISII!g thai c!nim. The illsw mbreallh of

contract waslrlOO t11 !be Com! lll!d I'MC lOlii its brooch of oommctlllaim. l'lllls, reprdl- of me
appeel, the \'1illidi.ty of litis ooliec!!on~~e!i.onli! <llilpll1lld.
Thll$., llllo~ PMC Ill file a l!lOfton for SLmmllll}' J•td!lDlll! will only inclll' OOi1lls llml can
lll!d iilloold be <lelaylid Ulllil !he IIJlpeal is msolwd.
Su~ Coultl'l'vemes .Illidge Bmwn.

~ OOi1lls may not evlm be neoot!illl:t)riflbe

If they me~. !hen maitiog Wlril tbair lliltlm!IJ!

bi!C®leli clellr Jmljodice& no pmy In th!• ~ The oosm are defllm:d llll!il the jli!.)J>lll: time

moo me pa!li«< mow wlm! i~ !fay, reO!lliulh~lhe!!ppe3!.

~11li !he~-
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comse ~llld by I'MC

Conclu&km
Ail a mlllt llf !he foregoing, !lllllll!.ltiou lilt smy ;bould illo pi!IOO and !he req~~es! IW a bt:>ml

llbould oo ®nJad,
DA"fEO: l!ellnmy 28, l~l3

JOOn

voodet

Ofhm Sl. Clalr~ PA
At~;;Jrneysti>rtltc Defelldlmls
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r ~lY 1 am ali<*~sed mtomey ill IIIli stallil nfldnllo and om F<lbmlll)'28, 20!3, I !~IV¢<!
<tl'n!e and cocrect .:opy .:>f !be DEFENDANTS' REl'LY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

Dave Il G!!lll>tem
IlWilllw~

Morrill&: Morrill
PO&x991
P<>OIIIlilUo, ID 83Z04
Fa.~: (208) 2:;2·:14·99'
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J<.>lm

'Oildot
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (lSB # 7938)
MERRILL & M.ERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Poc!ltello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Te!efllX
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

)

)

)
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST 1. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-2012-5289
MOTION TO COMPEL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC,
by and through its coWlSe! of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), and

hereby respectfLilly moves this Court for an order compelling the Defendants, Quail Ridge
Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, an individu!ll, to comply with this Court's Order
dated March 6, 2013. Specifically, in the Minute Entry and Order dated March 6, 2013, this Court
granted Defendants' Motion to Stay pursuant to I.R.C.P. 62(b), "pending the posting of 11 bond by
the Defendants in the amount of$416,812.50, the amount Judge Brown declared to be due."
More than three months have passed since the time this Court ordered Defendants to post a
bond in the am01.mt of$416,812.50 and Defendants have still failed to post such bond with the
5975: Motion to Compel
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Court. Plaintiff has attempted in good faith for several months to get the DefendatJ.ts to comply

with the requirements of the Court's March 6, 2013 Order and Defendants have still failed to post
the bond ordered by the Court.
Plaintiff now respectfully requests this Court to order Defendants to post a bond within 5
days of the hearing of this Motion and. for the court to further order Defendants to pay all of
Plaintiff's attorney's fees associated with pursuing and bringing this Motion to Compel and for
any such further relief the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
This motion is made and based on the pleadings and documents on file with the Court as
well as the &ffldavit submitted simultaneous herewith.
Or&l argument is requested.
DATED this \Zih d!ly o'fJune, 2013,

MERRILL & MERRILL, CI-ITD.

-. William Hflllcoc
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC

5975; Motion to Compel
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the tbregoing
document was this

L

day of June, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated

below:

Michael D. Gaffhey
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

[J U.S. Mail
[J Hand Delivery
[J gyemight Mail
[!::J'Facsimile

Judge Robert C. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, !D 8320 l
(Chambers Copy)

[_J U.S. Mail
[J Hand Delivery
[J ~might Delivery
[flelefax 547-2147

5975: Motion to Compel
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 793 8)
MERIULL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
I09 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telef:ax
Attorneys for Plaintit);
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

Case No. CV-20!2-5289

)
)

AFFIDAVlT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL

)
)

)
:ss
)

I, R. William Hancock, Jr., 'being first duly sworn on this oath, deposes and states as
follows:
I,

I am. one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter.

2,

On March 6, 2013, the Comt entered a Minute Entry and Order granting the

Defendants' Motion to Stay, "pending the posting of a bond by the Defendants bt the amount of
$416,812.50.

S97S: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for PersonRI Sen-ice on Out of StRte Defendant
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A true and correct copy of the Court's March 6, 2013, Minute Entry and Order is

attached hereto as Exhibit l.
4.

On March 12,2013, Kent Hawkins, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the

above-captioned matter, sent COlTespondence to attorney Mike Gaflhey, one of the attorneys for
the Defendants, .requesting that the bond be posted or a check deposited with the Court within 14
days o:fthe court's mling, which would have been March 20, 2013.
5,

A true and correct copy of Mr. Hawkins' March 12, 20131etter as is kept in the files

of the Merrill & Merrill law :firm is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
6.

On March 20,2013, attorney Michael Gaf61ey responded to Mr. Hawkins' March

12, 2013, letter, stating: "With regard to the bond requirement in this matter, my client will most
likely be posting a cash deposit with the clerk in the court and we will keep you apprised of the
status of the deposit."
7.

A trtJe and correct copy of Mr. Gaffhey's March 20,2013, letter is attached hereto

as Exhibit 3.
8.

On or about AprillO, 2013, I telephoned attorney John M. Avonclet, one of the

attorneys for the Defendant, inquiring about the status of the bond and stressing the need to timely
get a bond deposited with the CoM. This telephone conversation ended with Mr. Avondet
advising me that he would check into the issue and get back with me on the status of the bond.
9.

On or about April12, 2013, I received an e-mail from attomey John M. Avondet,

advising me that his client contact with regard to the bond issue, Riel< McAfee, was out of the
office until next week and, therefore, be did not "have an update on jJle bond issue yet."
10.

A true and correct copy ofMt·. Avondet's Aprill2, 2013, e-mail is attached hereto

as Exhibit 4.
11.

On that same date, I responded to Mr. Avondet thanking him for his e-mail and

informing him. that I would not "hassle [him] too much while [he] worked on an answer"
concerning the bond so long as he could "just assure me that [he] will follow through on this

issue.''
12.

Mr. Avondet wrote me back on that same date stating that he would follow-tiP on

the bond issue.

5975: Afl'idavit of Counsel in Support ofMotiorn far Personal Service on Out or State D0fCndant
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A true and correct copy of these additional April 12, 2013, e-mail exchanges is

attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
14.

On or about April26, 2013, Mr. Avondet e-mailed me stati.ng the following: "I

owe you a response to your inquiry Let me at least say that it is being worked on. We'!"e exploring
the option of depositing the required amount into a restricted account that would be FBO Quail
Ridge and PMC, with restrictions being the funds can only be released upon proper court order or
something to that effect. We're working on that portion. So, it's in progress."
15.

A true and correct copy of Mr. Avondet's April26, 2013, e·mail is attached hereto

as Exhibit 6.

!6.

More than a month has pnssed since this last communication from Defendants'

counsel and a bond still has not been posted nor has a cash deposit been lodged with the Clerk of

the Court.
17.

On or about June 10,2013, I telephone attorney JohnAvondet and left him a voice

mail message advising hint that if his clients had not obtained a bond or made a cash deposit with
the Clerk of Court by Thursday, Jtme 13, 2013, then Plaintif'fwouldfile a motion to compel on this
issue and seek attorney's fees associated within bringing such motion.
18.

I followed-up that telephone message with a lette1· to the same effect, which letter

was faxed to Mr. Avondet on that same date.
19.

A tn1e and correct copy of my June 10,2013, letter along with the accompanying

fax continuation sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
DATED this rt'1oday of June, 2013.

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/Z:Jt...- day of hme, 2

13.

7. "'rtJ...l/'-' leJ
. ufo.._
Notary Public thr Tdaho
Residing at: 'Fbto·i-e ds . 1 D
My Commission Expires: h . ";;-I]

l)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a tnle, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this

I b 'fl.. day of J~me, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated

below:
Michael D. Gaffuey
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

[_]U.S. Mail
[_] Hand Delivery
[_] gvemight Mail
L!d11acsimile

Judge Robert C. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, ID 8320!
(Chambers Copy)

[_]U.S. Mail
LJ Hand Delivery
[j Overnight Delivery
[_.j""relefax 547-2147
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIALDISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
•..

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d!bla
PORTNEUF .MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-5289-0C
NUNUTEENTRYANDORDER

QUAIL RlDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
)
individual,
)
Defendants.

)
)

This case came before this Court on March 4, 2013, tbr hearing on a Motion to Stay filed.
by the Defendants. The Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendants' Motion for Stay, and

alternatively, Request for Bond.
Cmmsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendants wore pl·esent. The matter proceeded to

hearing. After considering the parties' arguments and tlpon review of the file and the relevant
law, this Court issued a ruling from the Bench.
Tllis lawsuit arises from a dispute regarding the amount of rent owed by the Defendants
under a Ground Lease Agreement eiecuted on January 27, 1983. The amount of past due rent
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I
CASE NO. CV-2012-5289-0C
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was reso.lved by a declaratory judgment entered by the Honorable Mitcheli W. Brown in
Bannock County Case No. CV-l0-2724. Pursuant to the Amfl!lded Declaratory Judgment
entered in that case, Judge Brown determined that "Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay
[Portrieuf Medical Center] $416,812.5 0 under the tenns of the parties' Ground Lease
Agreement." (See Ex. 2, attached to Compl., Dec. 13, 2012.) Quail Ridge appealed.
The Plailltiff fl.led the current action in order to recover tl1e amount stated to be due ln the
.t·

•

.AI. ....-.. .

........ ..,.,

.

.. -

.

Amended Declaratory Judgment. The Defendants thereafter moved for a stay in this case
pending the outcome of its appeal, arguing a stay is necessary because "[t]he pre.sent action is
entirely premised on the validity of Judge Brown's findings of fact and conclusions of law in
B!Ulllock County Case No. CV-10-2724." (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Stay, Feb. 7, 2013,
2.) The Plaintiff objected to the entry of a stay, but argtted in the alternative tllat this Court
should require the Defendants to post a stlpersedeas bond as a. condition to granting any stay.
The Plaintiff argued that "[r]equiring the Defendants to post such a bond in tllis case will ensure
that PMC is able to quickly collect on its judgment once Judge Brown's rulings and declaratory
judgment a.re upheld on appeal." (Pl.'s Reply to Defs.' Mot. to Stay, Feb. 25, 2013, 5.)
Following oral arguments, this Court granted the Motion to Stay pursuant to Rule 62(b) 1
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, pending the posting of a bon.;! by tile Defendants in the
amonnt of$416,812.50, tile amount Judge Brown declared to be due. Following the posting of
1

Rnle 62. Stay of proceedings.
'

(b) Stay on Motion for New Trial or for Judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
ad~erse. pru:ty as are proper, the cour.t may stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judg,ment pending
!Qe disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion
for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of & motion for judgment in accordance with a
motion for a directed verdict made pur~uant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to tho findings or for
addi(ional fmdings made pursuant to Rule 52(b).
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2
CASE NO. CV-2012·5289-0C
88 of 447

·~

o....v._v

aaau

VV'""lV

Ill

11L..I\I\11..L

U{

l!L:.l\J'i.lLL

P. 09/16

an appropriate bond, this matter will be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal filed in

Brumock Cmmty Case No. CV-10-2724.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

~

day of March, 2013.

~C:.~

ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
Copies to:
Kent L. Hawkins
Michael D. Gaffney

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 3
CASE NO. CV-2012-5289-0C

89 of 447

.~

~., ... ...,

••• ...,

vv·o-.

ill

DAVE R. GALLAF1lNT
KENT L. liAWK!NS*
Bl!ENDON C. 1'AYLOR
KENT A. HIGGJNS*
JARED A. STEADMAN
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK
TYLER H. NEILL
*Al-SO ADMl'l"rED IN TJ7'AH
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MERRILL & MERRILL
CHARTERED
COUNSELORS ANU ATTORNEYS AT L4W
J.09 N. ARTNUR • o•" FLOOR
P.O. BOX991

POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204·0991

A.L. MERRILL (1886-1961)
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972)
W.F. MERRILL (1.919·2005)
TELEPH0Nl!J:208·282-2286
FAX:208·232-2499
Foruu:led in 1918

March 12,2013

Sent Via Facsimile: 208-529-9732
Michael. D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

RE:

PMC v Quail Ridge Meclical!nvf!stors. et al
Bannock County Case No. CV-2012-5289-0C

Dear Mr. Gaffney:
We received the court's Minute Entry and Order today ordering Quail to post the bond in this matter.
I realized that the court did not enclose a specific deadline on this. Please let me know when you
expect to have the bond posted or a cheok deposited. It seems reasonable that this should be
accomplished within 14 days of the court's ruling so it could be done by March 20. Please let me
lcnow if that is going to be a problem.
Sincerely,

Kent L. Hawkins
KLH/gs/5975
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03-20-2013

Miebael }}. Gaffney
2105 Coronado Street • Idaho finlls, ID 83404
Phone (208) 557~5203 • Fax (208) 529-9732

Beard
St. Clair
Gaffney

Assistant (Jessica) (208)557-5223
E:mail gaffhe...x@beardstclair.com =·-·
Admitted in Idaho, Wyoming & Oregon

Attorneys

-D

un•e-•

. Mul.ft-MIUQI<~~FaioU>t
. '""'Top 'lltol "-in

VIA FACSIMlLE: (208} 232-:!499

March 20, 2013
Kent L. Hawkins
Merrill & Merrill
P0Box991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

RE: PMC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor&
Delli' Kent:

I am in receipt of your :March 12, 2013letter. With regard to the bond requirement in this
matter, my client will most likely be posting a cash deposit with the clerk of.tbe collrt and we
will keep you apprised of the status of the deposit.
Additi
ying with the Court's order requiriug the po~ting of a bond, we are not
acknowl
mt' s pre judgment order is con-ect.

Attomty•ll.,.,.d in ldoho Colonulo O!ogoo W"hingl<lll
WlmJtnn v. B~rd '
J.:lfl't'y D. Brunao11
Lindsay M- Lo(gr.m.

1ohnG. St. Clair
Doll C. Dflrmn31'
!U.rlow J, M~Namnrn.

ofC'O!.In~

Michael D. Chtmc::y
laNd W. AJicm
ODRJon S. l'Qalchcr

~fCO!RIHI

W~amios

Gn:::soJYC.Caldllr
Johfi M. Ava•ldct
Qlair J_ Grover

Dille: P. Thom9QR
Micbul W. &own
13- $CQU. ho:

ai'CtiiJMIII

DFCoonNII

Utah
JArinO. Himtner
J11lie Stornpcr

Latl¢e:J_ SdnlliJct

Canird.
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William Hancock
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

John Avondet <javondet@beardstclair.com>
Friday, Aprill2, 2013 2:11 PM
William Hancock
20130412 PMC v. Quail Ridge <To: Quai!Ridge_PMC>

I will follow up. But please understand that my ability to be responsive to you Is dependent on others being responsive to me.
Have a good weekend.
JMA

John M. Avondet
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Tel. (208) 557-5208
Fax(208)529-9732
e-mail: javondet@beardstclair.com
This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be privileged and confidential.
If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately.
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any
attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not intended to be used, and cannot be used or
relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for
promoting, marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein.

- - - .••. _________, ____________ _
_,

From: William Hancock<bhancoc~@merrillandmerrill.com>

Date: Friday, Apri112, 2013 2:11 PM

To: John Avondet <javondet@beardstclair.com>
Subject: RE: 20130412 PMC v. Quail Ridge <To: QuaiiRidge_PMC>
Thank you John. If you can just assure me that you will follow through on this issue, I will try not to hassle you too much
while you work on an answer.

Thanks,

/s/
R. Williarn Hancoclc, Jr.
Merill & MerrlJI, Chtd.
111
109 N. Arthur. 5 Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204

P: (208) 232-2286
F: (208) 232-2499
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From: John Avondet [mailto:javoadet@beardstclair.comJ
Sent: Friday, April12, 2013 1:46 PM

To: bbancock@merrillandmerrill.com
Subject: 20130412 PMC v. Quail Ridge

<To: QuaiiRidge_PMC>

Bill:
Rick McAfee is out of the office until next week. Sa unfortunately, I don't have an update on the bond issue yet. 1will try and
touch base with him early next week and get back to you.

Thanks.
JMA

John M. Avondet
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Tel. (208) 557-5208
Fax (208) 529-9732
e·mail: javondet@beardstclair.com
This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be privileged and confidential.
If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e"mail and notify us immediately.
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any
attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not intended to be used, and cannot be used or
relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for
promoting, marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein.

EXHJBI'J1

,
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__
_.________________________________________________________,___
William Hancock
To:

John Avondet <j<~vondet@beardstcfair.com>
Friday, April 26, 2013 4:00 PM
William Hancock

Subject:

20130426 Bond Inquiry

From:

Sent:

Bill:

I owe you a response to your inquiry about the status of the bond. Let me at least say that it is being worked on. We're
exploring the option of depositing the required amount Into a restricted account that would be FBO Quaill{idge and PMC,
with the restriction being the funds can only be released upon proper court order or something to that effBct. We're working
on that portion. So, it's in progress.

•.........................................,....,, .. ,,.,,,,.,,.,,,,,,,,,,...._,

John M. Avondet

__

,,._____ ,.,,,,,,,,,,,___..............,,,.,, ... .,,,,..,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,..,....................................,..,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.........................

...............................................

.....,,.,, ...... ,. ..............................

I Attorney

2105 Coronado St 1 Idaho Falls, ID 83404
DIRECT (208) 557-52.06 I MAIN (208) 523-5171

~:

Tl1is e-mail is sen I; by a law firm and contains infomMtion t11at may bE> privil<~9ed and conf"iclential. lf you arn not the
int~nded recipient, please clelete t.:M e-mail and notif\r us immecliat·ely .
...................,.,.,.............,.,........................... ,. ..........................................................................................................................................................,..,.,,.,....,,,,.................................................................. ,,..........................
.. ...................,.,,.
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MEl:UULL & MERRILL
Ci!Ail'l'lmlltl

OOVWBQJ.Olta AMl A.'I"KKMl!IY&A.It' t.A'W
, lll:ltN.~mrulf.. rtm.IJILOOlt
P.O.qfj~U,

J>OOAmJ,O,IOOID 882D4·1lll91

lll!le 10,2013
~Ph! VIa

~~~01ioiS2·~M6
ll'~RDM32.:l4JD

Fb~tf.l:niO.t.!l

Faeim%l (l9B) S29-Q73l

JohnAvi>TJilct
11...-.1 St. Clair
210> COIOnodo S!nocl
!doho F.Uo, J'l) 834\\4
Ro:

l'MCIQ••il Rl<l&•- 2m3 Rent A<\iU8tmont
Bnnm>Oi: Caunty C~•• No. CV-2012..5289

Donrlohn:

I lim writing Ulisl<Mer in follow up liJ t11o vol-.il Jb4t 1loft tbr rou Clllflior todny. Without
l1i\vins; co mob lfD. in·dcpth mcitation tJ'f our r®ent ~unl~:~nt:i,Qna. sufflCb it to say that our
finn hao lriod to work with you fur'""""" mo~tb• now I<> hnvo your •li"111 com)!ly wltk tho
Comt'o Ol'dorifl !ha ooove referonct<l m~tlor by 40positins tbo neeooo!U)I fuodo il:i oocurily for
tbo stay .,.,.,od by U~t Court. Evon !housh ~our client wos rlminded of its obli~tion 1<1 oarnply
with !hi• Court'• Ofdar over I:W~ montlm ago, tD tbo dato oftb!s lotiO!' no dopoSit hqs boon modo
with tho Collrt'" ~d by Iq41!o Nafu:. W•lllo boyobd tho point ofwonons to 4isouss this
matttr furl:bet,
Iii lh,.nd,lt io re~~Uy quitooltnp!o. Yollr oli""t W.. to comply with llio Cnt~~t'• Ordar. Your
client h~• not done so, ond w• will filo a Motion to Compel 04 tld• ~o... byth;s 'fhul'•duy, Juno
13, 20!3, You oan lot your ollent know thot wa orono! fn!.,..tod in ~ymoro cl""er ld•" for

bo!f·hoa®iloomplianoo with tho Collrt'; Order. Rlllhor, wo wont olrict oomplillllco wiUllbo
Colllt'• Ordc;r. lfl!lloh bBB not o01n""od byTh1lmllly, JIU!Oil, 20!3, we w\11 promptly fil• our
Modon. to Compo!. Your ollont ohou!d koow th~t wo will sook •!tomoy fc., I'd 4!ed to thio
MQfion 1<> Compel. Wo bcliOliO !!J•I wo""' ..~~l:d tolh<Bo a!l<lmoy foos .....,.. Wll havo lrl•d
in &ood lllirl> !!lr two mont!"' i!OW to ooop..-.rivoly wor~ with :vour client to bovo it comply with
the Court's Or4or.

Slnooroly,

MlliUULL lit. Ml>IUULL, CHTO.
+S~m~ Witb.DIIE l(tnJI1~RI

ta avoid dlfil\y

R. Will!om HllllllOcl:
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DAVE R. GALLAFEJ\IT
KENT L. HAWKINS•
BRENDON C. TAYLOR
!Oi:NT A. IiiGGINS'"
J.AllJijD A. S'l'liADMAN
R. WILJ,IAM HANCOCK
TYLER H. NEILL

•u... nnlL.L.
,-"'··.

u

JIL..l\1\ll..l..

MERRILL & MERRILL
CHARTERED

P. 16/16
A.L.li4ERRILL (1B8ii-1961l
R.D. MERRILL (lB9H972)
W.F. MERRILL (1919-2005)

COUNSELORS AND A'l'TO!l.NEYS AT LAW
109 N. AR'rHlJR- 5'1'H fLOOR
P.O. BOX991

POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991

June 10, 2013

TELEPHONE:208·232·2286
fA.lC:208·232·2499

Found•d ill 1913

Sent Via Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
John Avondet
Beard St. Clair
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Re:

PMC/Quail Ridge- 2013 Rent Adjustment
.Bannock County Case No. CV-2012-5289

Dear John:

I am writing this letter in follow up to the voicemail that I left for you earlier today. Without
having to make an in-depth recitation of our recent communications, suffice it to say that our
finn has tried to work with you for several months now to have your client comply with the
Court's Orderin the above referenced matter by depositing the necessary funds as security for
the stay entered by the Court. Even though your client was reminded of its obligation to comply
with this Court's Order over two months ago, to the date of this letter no deposit has been made
with the Court as required by Judge Naftz. We are beyond the point of wanting to discuss this
matter further.
·
In the end, it is really quite simple. Your client has to comply with the Court's Order. Your
client has not done so, and we will file a Motion to Compel on this issue by this Thursday, hme
13,2013. You can let your client know that we are not interested in anymore clever ideas for
half-hearted compliance with tlle Court's Order. Rather, we want strict cornpliallCe with the
Court's Order. If such has not occurred by ThlU'sday, June 13, 2013, we will promptly file our
Motion to Compel. Your client should know that we will seek attorney fees related to this
Motion to Compel. We believe that we are entitled to these attorney fees because we have tried
in good faith for two months now to cooperative'ly work with your client to have it comply with
the Court's Order.
If you have questions on any of this, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.
*Sent without signature
to avoid delay

R. William Hancock
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~.D. Ol!l'llley, fSB No. 3559
John M. Awndt~~, ISB No. 7431.1
Bellld St. CJ~ ~y PA
2!05 Coronl!do Stre«
Idaho Fa&, IdaOO 83404·1411:5
Teliepmllll: (20S) S23·S11!
Fllil!limile:: (208) $2~•9732
Email: ~Jllffuey@~tclllir-

jnvo~.tl)ta

Al.lmley fllr ~hi! Defol!dan11>

Pwa~eilo Hospillll, LLC dbil fortin
Media~~ Cimlw, LLC,

Pllllntiif,

Otse No.: CV·l2.Sli!J.OC
~ms· Memwol!dmn m~mioo
!)) Modem ro

Coropd

vs.
Q~mil l!.idge Medical mwsrom, LLC, and
FOO'I!lll' L.l'alstcm,

'f1le de:foodalllll {wlleclively Quail ~) through cot~~~sel of reoord, Belm:l St. C!~ ~
l'A, respectmlly sllllmlt !he mil~~-~~~ Oppooltloo ro th11 Motion m Coropelllll!d
by !he plamliff, l'lleatel!n Hospihll, LLC dba l'!l~Med!ail Cel!mr, LLC (l'MC),

bond u ll!lnrollled mtlw Mmute f!mry llfll:l Ord~~r enlenld cm Me::lt 6,. 2013. QUill! ~
!WI~ tbal: this will be ll!km Qlll'e !!fin !he nexl.few days. and Ideally ·~!he~

siilll!duled thr July 8, 2<113. Thure is !Ill tiutell~m ~ thr peMg the band llfll:l Quail
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LU~JL'1'115L ;-f',.:liax
(
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Rldi~~~llu, 111 all tinws, ~~~~lit~ willllll.e C®rt's order evtn if i,lllu lm:11 a r~· munlhs
sm llle hemng 00. Q~~all R.idil(l's reqlli:SI b: asl!iy.

Qnall ru~ oijoots ro !he rei:J:llesl for alklrney fees lmlllCiallod wilh filmgllle m.olloo ~
~L ~ JIQ 1m:!! :00 ~lle to I'MC dw to:> llle ullltd i>ise, l!s rights llsw ill M way

lle!m abrosawd hi!Ca-llle illsw. lo s1wrt, thi!Ce ill oCt •~ fur i~ ~ m GfJllliWOOitl or
IIWmd of llllllmey f - !llld I'MC ei~es 110 !!iUioority fer ils rll!J.IICSI m ~ OOil(lrd.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG
I certifY lama l~d a!mmey ln !he !Jlale ol'ldia.lw aad ooJ~ !,2iiiJ,I !l(l!VW alrw

aud. eo~~Uctoopy of 1M DBF.l!NDANTS.' MEMO!ti\N.OUM IN Ol'l'~ITION TO MonON TO
COMPI!L on !he !b!klwi~ by 1M~ of delivery de~d below:
Bll!moilk Cmmty Q.)mtl!IJD:'i
6'241l.CM!Ilr
Pocatellll, m 83201

l"u: {208} Zlii-7(!12
04~ It Oabillllt
It William Hllllllook
Memli & Merrill
PO llo.-< 991
l'IJM!Ililll, m113204

Fu: (203) 23:&.2<!9'!'

OfEII:a'id St. Clair ~y l'A
Atromeys !br Dll!lmdaat;
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

)

vs.

)

MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC, )
and FORREST L. PRESTON, an individual,
)
)

Defendants.

)
)
)

The Plaintiffs Motion to Compel came before this Court for hearing on the 8th day of July,
2013, with attorney R. William Hancock, Jr., appearing for the Plaintiff and attorney John Avondet
appearing for the Defendants. Upon considering the Plaintiffs motion and Defendants' objection
thereto, together with oral arguments made at the time of the hearing, and with the Court otherwise
being fully informed in the premises of this case;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is granted;

2. By 5:00p.m. on July 22, 2013, the Defendants are required to either post a bond in the
amount of$416,812.50 or to deposit with the Clerk of Court funds in the amount of
$416,812.50;
3. If Defendants fail to timely post the bond or deposit the funds as outlined in Paragraph 2

5975: Minute Entry & Order
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immediately above, the stay previously entered by this Court will b~ al,!tomaiiQally lifted at
that time; and,
4. Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff all of its costs and attorney's fees associated with bringing
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. Plaintiff shall Sl!bmit to th~ (;ourt and serve on opposing
counsd an affidavit outlining its costs and attorney's fees associated with its Motion to
Compel.

DATED this li_ day of July, 2013.

Honorable Robert C. Naftz

CLER.T{'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Clerk of Court, does hereby certifY that a true, full and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry & Order was this

Jl day of July, 2013, served upon the following in the

manner indicated below:
John A vondet
BEARD ST. CLAIRGAFFNEYPA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

LJ/u.s. Mail

R. William Hancock
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.
P. 0. Box991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

6u.s.Mail
U Hand Delivery

[_] Hand Delivery
[_] Overnight Mail
[_] Facsimile

[ ] Overnight Delivery
U Facsimile

Deputy Clerk

5975: Minute Entry & Order
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Dave R. Gal1afent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
) Case No. CV-2012-5289
)
Plaintiff,
)

)
)

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical Center, LLC
("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P.
56( a), and hereby moves this Court for an Order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff as a matter of law. The grounds for this motion are set forth more particularly in a
supporting brief and the supporting affidavits, which have been filed contemporaneously herewith
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c). Plaintiff requests oral argument on this motion.
DATED this S-tlday of September, 2013.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

By~~~~----------------
j'R. William Hancock, Jr.
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
5975: Motion for Summary Judgment
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(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby
certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this lf:>ifb day of
September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIRGAFFNEYPA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Honorable Robert E. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
(Chambers Copy)

[ij U.S. Mail
[J Hand Delivery
[J Overnight Mail
[J Fax: (208) 529-9732

[29 U.S. Mail
[J Hand Delivery
[J Overnight Delivery
[J Fax: (208) 236-7290

-·

B(f~
R. i1fli1Il Hancock, Jr.

5975: Motion for Summary Judgment
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to LR.C.P. 56( c), the Plaintiff submits the following Brief in supports of its
motion for summary judgment:
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

This case arises from Quail Ridge Medical Investor's ("Quail Ridge") failure to pay
Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC ("PMC") adjusted rents for the 2010
rent adjustment period.
Specifically, on or about October 16, 2012, after a two day court trial, the Honorable
Mitchell W. Brown issued his Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision
and Order in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C ("Memorandum Decision"). 1 The
1

See generally, Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Memorandnm Decision and Order, dated October 16, 2012
(Bannock Connty Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C; Mitchell W. Brown, District Jndge) ("Memorandum Decision"),

5975: Motion for Summary Judgment
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primary issue before Judge Brown in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C was the
interpretation of a January 27, 1983 Ground Lease Agreement ("Ground Lease") 2 to which PMC
and Quail Ridge are successor lessor and lessee respectively. 3
Among the issues that Judge Brown was asked to consider in his interpretation of the
Ground Lease and subsequent documents was whether PMC was entitled to adjust rents for the
2010 Rent Adjustment Period outlined in the Ground Lease and, if so, what that adjusted rental
rate should be. As to these specific issues, Judge Brown concluded in relevant part:
PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in
the amount of $148,500.00 annually. Therefore, for the three (3) year period
applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combined annual rent for these three
years is $445,500.00 by January 31, 2013, assuming that Quail Ridge remains
current on its annual rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 toward the annual rent for
this three (3) year period. As such it is entitled to a credit in this amount against
the $445,500.00. This credit results in Quail Ridge being obligated to PMC in the
total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period of February 1, 2010 through
January 31,2013. 4
On or about November 26, 2012, Judge Brown entered an Amended Declaratory Judgment
in that case consistent with his findings. This Amended Declaratory Judgment states that "Quail
Ridge is obligated to promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' [January 27,
1983] Ground Lease Agreement." 5 The Amended Declaratory Judgment entered by Judge
Brown in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C is a determination of the amount of
adjusted rent that Quail should have paid during the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period.
Upon receipt of this Amended Declaratory Judgment, Quail Ridge had the following
contractual responsibility under Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease:

****
attached as Exhibit I to Affidavit of Counsel filed simultaneous herewith.

3

Id. at p. 12, ~~ 5-7.

4

Id. at p. 36, ~ 45.

5

See Amended Declaratory Judgment, dated November 26, 2012 (Bannock County Case No. CV-20 I 0-0002724-0C;
Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge) ("Amended Declaratory Judgment"), attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel
filed simultaneous herewith.
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If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment
date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period
until the adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the
determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 6

****
Quail Ridge has not paid to PMC the $416,812.50 determined by Judge Brown to be due and
owing for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period. 7 By failing to promptly pay these outstanding
adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period after a determination of such rents was made
by Judge Brown, Quail Ridge is in breach of its obligations under the Ground Lease.
PMC, as the successor in interest to IHC for this hospital property, is the successor
guarantee, beneficiary, of a certain Guaranty in Payment and Performance ("Personal Guaranty")
executed by Forrest Preston ("Preston"), an individual, on or about June 1, 2011. 8 As guarantor,
Preston personally guarantees payment and performance of any and all of Quail's obligations
under the Ground Lease. 9 Even though on November 27, 2012, PMC made written demand on
Quail Ridge and Preston for payment of the $416,812.50 in outstanding adjusted rents for the 2010
Rent Adjustment Period, 10 Preston has not personally paid to PMC these outstanding adjusted
rents. 11
In its November 27, 2012 demand letter to Quail Ridge and Preston, PMC notified both
parties that if the outstanding balance of$416,812.50 was not paid within ten (10) days of the date
of the letter, then PMC would proceed with this breach of contract action. 12 Despite such written
demand and notice, neither Quail Ridge nor Preston has paid to PMC the adjusted rents for the
6

See Ground Lease Agreement, dated January 27, 1983 ("Ground Lease"), at p. 3, Section 1.3(b), attached as Exhibit
4 to Affidavit of Counsel.
7

See Affidavit of Don Wadle.

8

See Guarantee in Payment and Peiformance, dated June I, 20 II ("Personal Guaranty"), attached as Exhibit 3 to
Affidavit of Counsel; see also Memorandum Decision, at p. 19, '1!37, attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel.
9

See Personal Guaranty, attached as Exhibit 3 to Affidavitof Counsel; see also Memorandum Decision, at p. 19, '1!37,
attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel.
IO

See Letter dated November 27, 2012, attached as ExhibitS to Affidavit of Counsel filed simultaneous herewith.

II

See Affidavit of Don Wadle.

12

Id.
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2010 rent adjustment period. 13

A comparison of the Defendants' Answer in this present action and Judge Brown's
Memorandum Decision reveals that the Defendants are raising the same affirmative defenses in
this action as has already been raised and adjudicated by Judge Brown in Bannock County Case
No. CV-201 0-0002724-0C.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Idaho law, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw." 14 Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law of the
case. 15
Although the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
rests with the moving party, once that burden has been met, the bmden shifts to the nonmoving
party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. 16

Under Idaho

law, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the
pleadings. 17 Instead, the nonmoving party must come forvv·ard with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue of fact to be resolved at trial. 18
If there is an absence of evidence on a dispositive issue for which the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof, then the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by ...
affidavits, or by the deposition, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

13

See Affidavit of Don Wadle.

14

IRCP 56( c). Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).

15

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

16

Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. #2, 128 Idaho 714, 719,918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996).

17

IRCP 56( e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267; Meridian Joint School Dist. #2, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at
588.
18

Id.
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 19 Summary judgment is mandated
against the nonmoving party who thereafter fails to present sufficient evidence to establish a
genuine issue offact for tria!. 20
Finally, a nonmoving party's case must be anchored in something more solid than mere
speculation or conjecture. 21 A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue
of material fact.

22

There is no issue for trial unless there is evidence favoring the nonmoving

party which is sufficient for a jury to return a verdict in favor of that party. If the evidence is
"merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."23

ARGUMENT
Summary judgment in favor of PMC is appropriate in this case because there are no
genuine issues of material fact that: (1) by failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent for the 2010
Rent Adjustment Period determined by Judge Brown in Bannock County Case No.
CV-201 0-0002724-0C, Quail has breached its obligations under the Ground Lease; (2) By failing
to pay Quail Ridge's outstanding obligations under the Ground Lease, Preston is in breach of his
obligations under the Personal Guaranty; and, (3) Defendants are collaterally estopped from
raising their affirmative defenses in the present action because such defenses were already raised
by Quail Ridge in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C and have been decided by
Judge Brown after a full evidentiary hearing on the issues.

I.

By failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent for the 2010 Rent
Adjustment Period determined by Judge Brown in Bannock County
Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C, Quail has breached its obligations
under the Ground Lease.

Despite Quail Ridge's attempts to murky the waters, this breach of contract case is really
quite simple and straight forward. It is governed by the following language found in Section

19

Celotex Com. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548,91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
20

Id. at 322, 324-25.

21

Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., Ill Idaho 851,853,727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986).

22

!d.

23

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

5975: Motion for Summary Judgment

Page 5

108 of 447

1.3(b) of the Ground Lease:

****

If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment
date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period
until the adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the
determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 24

* ***
There is no doubt or confusion in this case that Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory
Judgment entered on November 26, 2012, was a determination of the adjusted rents for the 2010
Rent Adjustment Period. Indeed, after finding in his Memorandum Decision that PMC was
entitled to a rent adjustment in 2010 and that the amount of the adjusted rents still owing for that
rent adjustment period was $416,812.50, Judge Brown entered an Amended Declaratory Judgment
wherein he declared that "Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the
terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement."25
Under Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease, once the determination of adjusted rents was
made for the 2010 Rent Adjust Period, Quail Ridge was then obligated to "promptly after the
determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment." In this case, Judge
Brown declared that the difference was $416,812.50 and, therefore, Quail Ridge was required to
promptly pay that amount to PMC.
More than 9 months has now passed since Judge Brown declared the adjusted rental
amount for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period and Quail Ridge has still not paid the outstanding
adjusted rents due and owing to PMC. ·By failing to promptly pay this amount, Quail Ridge has
breached its Ground Lease with PMC. This Court should find that Quail Ridge is in breach of the
Ground Lease and thereafter enter a summary judgment against Quail Ridge and in favor ofPMC
in the amount of $416,812.50, plus PMC's costs and attorney's fees associated with brining this
breach of contract action.
To the extent that it is anticipated that Quail Ridge will argue that it did not pay the
24

See Ground Lease, at p. 3, Section 1.3(b), attached as Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of Counsel. It is worth noting that
Judge Brown found in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C that this specific paragraph in Section 1.3(b)
of the Ground Lease contained clear and unambiguous language as to the parties' respective rights and obligations
under the Ground Lease.
25

See Amended Declaratory Judgment, attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel filed simultaneous herewith.
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$416,812.50 to PMC because it is appealing Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment, this Court
should first recognize that the tenant's agreement with a declared adjusted rent amount is not a
condition precedent under Section 1.3 (b) before the tenant is obligated to pay the adjusted amount.
Further, this Court should take judicial notice of the fact that it temporarily stayed this present
action at Quail Ridge's request on the condition that Quail Ridge pay the $416,812.50 declared by
Judge Brown as currently due and owing into the Court during the pendency of the stay. Not only
did Quail Ridge fail to deposit the necessary funds as ordered by the Court, but then Quail again
refused and failed to deposit the necessary funds or submit the necessary bond even after the Court
gave it additional time to do so.

Under these circumstances, this Court should have little

sympathy in this case with Quail Ridge's failure to abide by the clear and unambiguous terms of
the Ground Lease even in light of Quail Ridge timely appealing Judge Brown's decision.

Quail

Ridge was given an opportunity to secure these funds and stay this action during the pendency of
the appeal and it elected to not take the necessary steps to do so. As such, it should now be subject
to a judgment against it for its failure to pay the outstanding adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent
Adjustment period.

II.

By failing to pay Quail Ridge's outstanding obligations under the
Ground Lease, Preston is in breach of his obligations under the
Personal Guaranty.

Once Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment
Period as it was required to do under the Ground Lease, Preston became personally liable for the
outstanding rents in the amount $416,812.50. Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the
Personal Guaranty executed by Preston, he personally guaranteed payment and performance of
any and all of Quail Ridge's obligations under the Ground Lease, including but not limited to
Quail Ridge's obligation to pay rent. 26 Once Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay the adjusted
rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period after the determination of those rents was made by
Judge Brown, Preston became personally responsible to pay such outstanding adjusted rents. It is
undisputed in this case that Preston has not paid the outstanding adjusted rents for the 201 0 Rent
Adjustment Period even though demand was made upon him to do so. Because he has not

See Personal Guaranty, attached as Exhibit 3 to Affidavit of Counsel; see also Memorandum Decision, at p. 19, ~
37, attached as Exhibit I to Affidavit of Counsel.
26
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personally paid the $416,812.50 in outstanding adjusted rents now due and owing to PMC, Preston
is in breach of his personal guaranty and summary judgment against him personally is appropriate
in this case.
As discussed in this previous section of this Brief, Preston was given an opportunity to
either deposit the necessary funds with the court or post a bond to stay this present action. Even
when the Court gave Preston, as a defendant to this action, additional time to either deposit the
necessary funds or post an appropriate bond and stay the action, Preston elected not to do so. In
light of this case history, the Court should find no issue with enforcing the clear and unambiguous
terms of the Ground Lease against Quail Ridge and the Personal Guaranty against Preston even if
such Defendants disagree with Judge Brown's interpretation of the Ground Lease and Declaratory
Judgment. There is no clause in either of these agreements which state that either party has to
agree with a declaration of adjusted rents before they become liable to pay such rents. Rather, the
Ground Lease is clear that once such declaration is made, Quail Ridge, a8 tenant, was obligated to
promptly pay the amount of outstanding rents for the adjusted Period to PMC, as landlord,
Similarly, the Personal Guaranty is clear that if Quail Ridge fails to fulfill its obligations under the
Ground Lease, PMC, as landlord, is allowed to look to Preston to personally fulfill Quail Ridge's
obligations. Both defendants have failed to fulfil their contractual obligations to PMC in this
instance and, therefore, a grant of summary judgment against both defendants is appropriate at this
time.

III.

Defendants are collaterally estopped from raising their affirmative
defenses in the present action because such defenses were already
raised by Quail Ridge in Bannock County Case No.
CV-2010-0002724-0C and have been decided by Judge Brown after a
full evidentiary hearing on the issues.

Under Idaho law, the doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion, sometimes
referred to as true res judicata, and issue preclusion, sometimes. referred to as collateral estoppel. 27
While claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or
claims "relating to the same action ... which might have been made,"28 issue preclusion protects
27

Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803.805 (2002).

28

Id.
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litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or the party's privv. 29 Separate tests
are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. 30
In this case, the doctrine of claim preclusion, a.k.a. collateral estoppel, applies to bar the
affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants in this action. A comparison of the Defendants'
Answer in this present action and Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision reveals that the
Defendants are raising the same affirmative defenses in this present action as has already been
raised by Quail Ridge in the prior action and adjudicated by Judge Brown. Under Idaho's well
established law, the Defendants are collaterally estopped from raising those same affirmative
defenses in this subsequent action.
Whether collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in a prior action
between the same party or a the party's privy is a question of law for the court. 31 Idaho courts
have found that five questions must be answered in the affirmative before the collateral estoppel
doctrine can be applied: (I) did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?; (2) was the issue decided in the prior
litigation identical with the one presented in the action in question?; (3) was the issue actually
decided in the prior litigation?; (4)was there a final judgment on the merits; and (5) was the party
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 32
All five requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied in this case. First, a review of
Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision demonstrates that Quail Ridge and, therefore, its principal,
Forest Preston, were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate their affirmative defenses in
Barmock County Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. Indeed, the Memorandum Decision reveals
that Defendants were provided an opportunity to present any evidence in support of their
affirmative defenses at trial.

29

Rodriguez v. Dep't ofCorr., 136 Idaho 90, 92,29 P.3d 401,403 (2003).

30

D.A.R. Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605 (2000).

31

Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, U.S. Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 222, 814 P.2d 952,
954 (Ct. App. 1991), citations omitted.
32

Id., 120 Idaho at 223, 814 P.2d at 955 (citing Accord Anderson v. City ofpocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183-84, 731
P.2d 171,178-79 (1987)).
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Second, a comparison between Defendant's Answer in the present case and Judge Brown's
Memorandum Decision in the prior case clearly reveals that the issues decided in Bannock County
Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C are identical with the ones presented in the present action.

Both

cases revolve around the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement that governs the rights and
responsibilities of the parties. The Defendants' allegations of modification, waiver, lack of a
meeting of the minds, lack of real party in interest, failure to join necessary and indispensable
parties, laches, and unenforceability in the present action are the exact same issues that were raised
and adjudicated by Judge Brown in Bannock County Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. Also,
there can be no doubt that consideration and adjudication of these defenses was necessary for
Judge Brown to issue his final declaratory judgment in that prior case. As such, under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, Judge Brown's final decision is conclusive on these issues and
Defendants are precluded from relitigating these same identical issues in the present action.
Third, a review of Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision reveals that these defenses were
actually decided in Bannock County Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C.

Because these

affirmative defenses have been previously heard, considered, and decided by Judge Brown, they
cannot be relitigated in the present action.
Fourth, it is undisputed that there was a final judgment on the merits in Bannock County
Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. This Court has not only been provided a copy of Judge
Brown's Memorandum Decision, but it has also been presented with Judge Brown's Amended
Declaratory Judgment in that action, which judgment is consistent with his Memorandum
Decision. Indeed, it is this Memorandum Decision that gives right to the present breach of
contract claim against these defendants.
Finally, it is undisputed that Quail Ridge was a party to the prior action. Although Preston
was not a named party to the prior action, it is undisputed that Preston is the primary principal of
Quail Ridge. Indeed, when Preston was deposed during the discovery phase of Bannock County
Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C, Preston testified that he is a ninety-nine percent (99%) owner
of Quail Ridge. 33 Because Preston was the principal owner of Quail Ridge during the litigation of
Bannock County Case. No. CV-201 0-0002724-0C,1 there can be no doubt for purposes of the
33

See Forest L. Preston Deposition Transcript, at 4:20-23, attached as Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Counsel filed
simultaneous herewith.
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present analysis that Preston was in privity with Quail Ridge during the litigation and trial of the
prior action. Because Preston was and still is in privity with Quail Ridge at all times material
hereto, this Court should find that Preston is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from
raising affirmative defenses in the present action that were already resolved against his company,
Quail Ridge, in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-00002724-0C. Such a finding in this case
would certainly support the policy behind this doctrine which is to "relieve parties of the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial recourses, and, by preventing inconsistent
decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. " 34
CONCLUSION

Because the undisputed evidence in this case establishes that both Defendants are in breach
of their respective agreements governing their relationship with the Plaintiff, PMC, this Court
should enter summary judgment in favor of PMC. Similarly, because the evidence before the
Court demonstrates that the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants in the present action are
the same defenses raised by the Defendants and conclusively decided by Judge Brown in Bannock
County Case No. CV-2010-00002724-0C, this Court should find that, as a matter of law, these
defenses are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because there are no issues of law or
fact remaining in this case, this Court should grant summary judgment in favor of PMC.

~::.*' of September, 2013.
DATED this _..;_day
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

34

See Richardson, 120 Idaho at 222, 814 P.2d at 954 (citing Vnited States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. !54, 158, 104 S.Ct.
568, 571, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984)).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby
certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this

c:,11o day of

September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffuey

["iJ U.S. Mail

BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA

[J Hand Delivery
[J Overnight Mail
[J Fax: (208) 529-9732

2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Honorable Robert E. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
(Chambers Copy)

L.fl U.S. Mail
[J Hand Delivery
[J Overnight Delivery
[J Fax: (208) 236-7290

/

/

/

/

,. Willi m-Hancock, Jr.
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
CountyofBannock

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
:ss
)

I, R. William Hancock, Jr., being first duly sworn on this oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and make

the statements herein of my own personal knowledge and belief.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order, CV-2010-2724-0C, dated October
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16, 2012.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Amended Declaratory

Judgment, CV-201 0-2724-0C, dated November 26, 2012.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Guarantee in Payment

and Performance, dated June I, 2011.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the 1983 Ground Lease

Agreement, dated January 27, 1983.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs demand letter

to Quail Ridge and Preston, dated November 27, 2012.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the cover page, and page 4

of Forest L. Preston's deposition transcript.
Further your affiant saith naught.

1h

DATED this 5- day of September, 2013.

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

R. William Hancock
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this~ day of September, 2013.

;Po(
}0§(/L{;c l ~
Otary Public for Idaho

(SEPJL) DEBORAH LAFANA
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

'PD«t

Residing at:
fdlpt ID
My Commission Expires: 12.-'5-1]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, R. William Hancock, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this

k

day of September, 2013, served upon the following in the marrner

indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffuey
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

~U.S. Mail
[_] Hand Delivery
[_] Overnight Mail
[_] Facsimile

Judge Robert C. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, ID 83201
(Chambers Copy)

[29 U.S. Mail
[_] Hand Delivery
[_] Overnight Delivery
[_] Telefax 547-2147

(}w~

~~~- .

. William Hancock
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OCT·IT·ZOIZ 02:03PM

FR0~8annock

zoe-zas-ro1 2

Sth Dlit.Crt

T-425

P.OOI

F·SIO

)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
)
POR1NEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, )
) Case No.
)
Plaintiff,

CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

vs.

)

) F1NDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM
LLC and CENTURY PARK
)
DECISION AND ORDER
ASSOCIATES,
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

This action came before the Court for a two (2) day court trial commencing on May 14
and continuing through May 15, 2012. The Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf

Medical Center, LLC (PMC) was represented at trial by C01111sel, Kent L. Hawkins and R.
William Hancock. Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century
Park Associates, LLC (Century Park) were represented by Michael D. Gaffuey and 1obn M.
Avondet. At the conclusion of trial, the Court set forth a post-trial briefing schedule. The parties
agreed tO share the cost associated with the preparation of a transcript of the trial in advance of posttrial briefing. See Minute Entty and Order entered on May 17, 2012. The Court entered an order

regarding remitting payment to the Caurt Rep<?Iter and prepaw.tion of the transcript of the trial. See
Order entered on June 5, 2012. The parties were instructed to submit post-trial arguments along
with their proposed findings of fact and conclusiOJl$ of Jaw. There were four (4) depositions which
were submitted to the Court for its review as part of the trial record. Pursuant to stipulation of the
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ANU MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORD&R- l
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process contemplated by the Lease Agreement. Memonmdwn in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
for Sununary Judgment, p. 3. PMC also requested that the Court enter summary judgment in its

favor and declare that Quail Ridge owed PMC back rent for the yeai'S 2007 through 2011 in the
amoWlt of $735,187.50 and rent in the swn of $148,500.00 for 2012. ld. at p. 5. PMC argued
that this result was justified under the clear and \lr\ambiguous language of the parties' Lease
Agreement. Quail Ridge also filed a counter-motion for summary judgment, Quail Ridge
argued that the Court should deny PMC's motion for summary judgment and grant summary
judgment on its behalf. Quail Ridge argued that in 200 l, "the ability to adjust rent was removed
from the patties' agreement." Defendants' Motion for SUlllllllllJf Judgment, p. I. The Court
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment finding that the patties' Lease Agreement
contained ambiguities that would require extrinsic evidence conce.r:tUng the parties' intent,
specifically as it related to Article I, section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement.
Numerous pre-trial motions were filed in anticipation of trial. Two (2) of these are
procedurally significant. The f1rst was PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint and the second was
FMC's Motion to Enforce

Jlll'y

Waiver Clause

m 2001

Landlord Consent !Uld Estoppel

Certificate. PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted without objection by Quail Ridge.
See Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintifrs Motion to Amend Complaint. The

Colln likewise granted PMC's Motion to Enfurce the Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate!
PMC's Amended Complaint sought damages that were not requested in the original
Complaint, based upon an updated appraisal. The' Amended Complaint also asserted a claim for

'Quail Ridg,:. in its Initial NISWer, demanded a jury ttial u ""'uirad by Rule 38 of lbc: Idaho Rules of Civil Prooodllte. It ~so
made a jury demand In ;,. AMWerto the Amo;ndl;<l Complaint PMC's MotiOn to Enlim:c Juey: Waiver was gnntod by 1lle Coun
on grounds different than argtiM by PMC, ~was noncthsleos gn,n1od and the Court 'll'dcred' diat the trial would proce<d to the
Court rarlu~r than the jury. The b:sstS fotlhiS dt:~OQ-was s~c-'fotat· in dctailliUilf's!# m:oJd· em May -t 201~
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2. De\)ositiou Testimony- Guy P. Kroesche.4
PMC submitted the deposition of Guy P. Kroesche (Kroesche) as part of its case
on rebuttal. PMC submitted the following with regard to Kroesche's testimony: (I)
During Quail Ridge's eross-examillation of Kroesche the following question was asked:
Okay. But you would agree that that language could have been easily inserted in
the 2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates as it had been in the 1996 certificate, right.

Depo. Kroesche, p. 34, LL.ll-14. The propounded question does require a yes or no response.
Further, Kroesche's response is non-rcspollSive. Instead, he eKplaillS that typically estoppel
certificates are not identical from transaction to transaction. However. Kroesche fails to respond
to the specific question, that being that certain language could have easily been inserted in the
2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates just as it bad been in the !996 certificate. Quail Ridge
moved to strike this response as non-responsive. ld. at p. 3S, LL. 10-11. PMC argues Kroesche
was entitled to explain his reasons for not being able to answer ''yes" or "no." The Court will
SUSTAIN Quail Ridge's objection and find that Krriesche's answer was non-responsive and will
strike the same.5
PMC also addresses an objection made by Quail Ridge during PMC's re-direct
examination as being beyond the scope of Quail Ridge's cross-eKamination. This exchange
centered on the following questions:

First of all, there was a question about whether if there had been a modification
to the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement, wQU]d it have been included in the estoppel

certificate. Can you ariswer that?
<~pMC withdn:w any of' the abJections to que$~ions asked

by Quail Ridge duTing Kroeschc._s deposition. PMC's Objections to
Deposilion TtStimony. p. 3. Therefore, the Court wiJI address anty 1:110~ issues raised by PMC ln PMC's Obj~OM to
Depositillll 'l'..mmony,
'Tlic Com has CllllsOd through lh>tpol'lion ofKrncoohe's response whiCh bas liccn sulakcnily tba ~ Su Ol'iSina! ~·
dcpnsltion ar p. 34, LL. 15•25. p. 3S. LL.1..6. "!llo-. quCSiion ilo ~ on p. 37 ofKroescho's 4eposi1iml when he ill,asked
")roU·could hilve, whoa you prepan:d the '01 CS!Oppel cetlilieate llllll !h.: '1)2 ~ c:ertif....., or ~-you ~~~MeWing
them. inoerted lansoasollkc tha1 fbund In !he 199/i ~o! C!:!fltlcue reJa!Oil 10 tilt renuulJ~ provi$ion, ~· The
response was "lYles, I could have put many di:ff'e=t words in !his ~ ~ ... fno!udl\lg I ~d have wrilfon.thar
[refertlng 10 lhe language fi'om tho 1996 estoppelcmifico.tc] in as well.'" Thi• response will be ADMITTED over lit• objeotions
of eounsel as stlltl!ld in !h~ depos:ldon.
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PMC next argues that Quail Ridge's objection to the following question, on leading
grounds, should be overruled because the question is not lcadi!lg:
[a]t any time did you ever promise or make a representation to a Quail Ridge
representative, or representatives from the Pocatello Medical Investors that you
would waive or limit the rights under the 1983 contract to limit or increase the
rent provision - the amount of rent under that agreement?
Goodwin Depo. p. 18, 11.15-21. The Court will OVERULE this objection and allow the
EIIISwer to stand. 7 The Court concludes that this questio11 is not leading because it does not

suggest the answer.
Quail Ridge reasserts all of the objections made during the course of Goodwin's
deposition. The only objectiol1 asserted by Quail Ridge that has not been addressed above is its
objection, on the ground oflack offoundation. to the following question:
What I want to know is if during the period from 1983 to 2003 you were aware of
this adjustment provision in the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement.
Goodwin Depo., p. 15, LL.l8-2I. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. The question
asked if Goodwin was aware of the adjustment piovision found in the Lease Agreement. He
answers that he "was not specifically aware of this arrangement." The Court will allow this
answer. Obviously Goodwin lacks foundation to answer any further questions abo11t the so

called "adjustment provision" of the Lease Agreement based upon his admission, but he certainly
can testify to what he testified !11 response to this question.

Goodwin•s answer to this q,~stion w.s ~o) sir.'" However~ Goodwin tb.~:n adds "this l,lllSOlicitcd rC~paose "ln fact. in paragraph .5
oftbat docun\..., ti>ola.<~. " " - oflhol Pllf8&lllllh 84YS. '8,""t has been paid throut:h and includ~ Februey 28. 1996. Under
s..,don 1.3(b) of the 1..... dto ri:nl slulll bud)usr#d on llu,iQXi l'e]ltlll!il!Stm.mtdal<; M- 1, 1999-199$.·~ Thi&RSponso is
non·rcspanslveand-cwm bdTIUCKEN by lheCoUJL PMC's queR!!ilt was ~ li1 scope to whed!er (;Qodwill ever Diode lillY
promi~.s or r<pmt:lllliiiOIIS to Sterling or Quail Ridge. The question <Hilod fur a yes or no ICSP""""· GoodWin'~ "Do. sh"
tdlpOIUC will boallowo4; tholnlan"" is non·mponsive and will be !llrUOk. The Court l>as oro""'d through tho stric:k<:n ponlon af

1

lhc testimony In the original deposition ofGoodwjn_
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ld. at p. 6, LL.l6-18. Again, Quail Ridge objects on the basis that the question assumes
facts not in evidence, lack of foundation of the witness to answer, and speculation.
The Court will OVERRUU: both objections. The answers are really

oJ no evidentiary

value. Amon responds generally that he is sure that he would have seen the Lease Agreement
and the reason he believes this is that he was the CEO of PMC from 1981 through 1984. Anton
Depo., p. 5, LL.l0-11. This is sufficient foundation to take the matter out of the realm of
speculation. Further, the Lease Agreement is in evidence. The balance of Anton's deposition
establishes that he has little or no recollection, surrounding the Lease Agreement or the facts or
circumstances leading to its creation.
Quail Ridge next objects to the following question and answer:
Q. Da you know what involvement he [Gerald OlsonJ had, if any, in the drafting
of this Agreement?

A. I do not, but he may have c!rafted the Agreement.

/d. at p. 7, LL.6-8. Quail Ridge objects to this response as being non-tespcnsive. The Coun will
OVERRULE as it relates to Anton's response that he docs not know what involvement Olson
may have had in drafting the Lease Agreement. The balance of the answer and the objection
based upon non-responsiveness will be SUSTAINED.

The balance of this response is

speculative and apparently beyond Anton's PerSOnal knowledge and/or recollection. Therefore,
it will be STRICKEN.8

Next, Quail Ridge objects 10 the following exchange on the basis of vagueness, lack of
foundation, and assumes facts not in evidence: · '
Q. Do you have any recollection of that language in this Agreement at all :trom
1983?

'"I'he Court ha.~ crossed lbrough lh.:: portion of ttl is response \hat has been stricken 1n the original depOSition on file with the
Coutt.
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that the call of the question, seelcing Anton's understanding as the CEO of what specific
language meant, is suggestive of an answer. It is therefore, overruled on leading grounds. The
Court has previously found that adequate foundation has been laid, establishing Anton's status as
CEO at the time the Lease Agreement was entered and created, to allow him to testify regarding
his recollection of this Lease Agreement and the circumstances surrounding its creation.
Therefore, the objection is overruled on the foundation objection. Finally, the Court overrules on
the speculation basis. Although Anton is being asked to recall matters that occurred nearly thirty
(30) years ago, that will go to weight.

To the extent he remembers the circumstances

surrounding the creation of the Lease Agreement, his testimony will stand.

FINDINGS OF FACT
To the extent that any· of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of
Law, they are inco!Jlorated in the Court's Conclusions of Law.
( l) PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in the state
of!daho. PMC's principal place ofbusiness is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. Amended
Complaint, p. 1, ~1, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. I, ~1.
(2) Quail Ridge is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in

the state of Idaho. Quail Ridge's principal place of business is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland
Tennessee. Amended Complaint, p. 2, 1[2, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. l, ~1.
(3) Quail Ridge operates an assisted living center located in Pocatello, Idaho.

The

assisted living center is located on a 4.25 acre piece of real property which is currently owned by

PMC.
(4) Tne building from which the assisted living center is run and operated is owned by
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PMC and Quail Ridge are successors in interest to a certain Ground Lease

Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into on January 27, 1983.
(6) The Lease Agreement was origirial!y entered into between IHC and Sterling whereby
IHC leased 4.25 acres of real property, as Lessor, to Sterling, as Lessee.
(7) PMC is the successor in interest to lHC and Bannock County as it relates to the Lease
Agreement and occupies the role as lessor. Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to Sterling
and occupies the role of lessee.
(8) The Lease Agreement is for a thirty (30) year term of years conunencing on February
1, 1983 and concluding on January 31, 2013. However, the Lease Agreement provides for one
(1) ten (I 0) year option to extend the term of the lease. This option is to be exercised, if at all, by
"giving Lessor written notice ... not later than 120 days prior to the expiration date of the
Tenn."9 (Lease Agreement, p. 2, §1.2)
(9) The Lease Agreement also provides that rent shall be paid on an annual basis as

follows:
An initial annual rental [sic] shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent
(1 5%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the fust three (3) years

from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the
rate of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($1 5,000.00) per acre. 10
(Lease Agreement, pp. 2·3, §1.3(a)).

(10) The total acreage of leased land was 4.25 acres. Therefore, the annual rent for the
first three (3) years ofthe Lease Agreement was $9,562.50.

'Tht: opt.ion ~ppe!!,t:$ to be personal to Str:rling.

However~ this does nuL appear 1.0 be an Issue between the pcmics. despite the faP:t

that then: wilS no tvidortc:a t!t trial c:onccrning: the pt.-rsonal nat~ of the optton and Ute option having been exercise-a. the parties
seem to ~e rhat the: Oplion bas be.!n exerolsed, that it is a.ssi,gnablc to Quail Rid~ and tl'itll the LB:L,~ Agra.!m~t. is anti will be
In place throug.'1 Januwy 31, 20;!3. '!'his ....,. of ofl'airs soems to be futthor conlim1ed by 1he lAndlord Consent and Es<oppel
Certifiome entered in 2001 wh""' the ~attiess!a!e that lhe !:.ease Agreement has bc<m extend~d 1hrouah and including J<tlluoty 31,
2023. Therefore. rhe!C Issues will ncn be addressed or eonsidered .J))"lbe Court.
1
"rhc Comm•noemont Dare of the Lease Agn:cmont is dctlncd llli tho 1" doy ~fl'•bruary, !983, or on or before thirty (30) d•r•
after a building; pmnil is issued whichever is later. Sec LCZISC Ag,rc:cmcnt. p.2. § 1.2. No evid~rtce hi!! beef\ la\tl"Oduced rt&al'dlng
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(15) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever submitted this matter to arbitration

as mandated in the Lease Agreement. Further, the parties freely admit that there has not been
any attempt to arbitrate. 11
(16) The Lease Agreement next provides that in arriving at the adjusted rent every three
(3) years, the parties shollld consider the following:
The rent as adjusted shall be eqlllll to fifteen percent (15%) percent [sic] of the
fair market value of the leased ll'!nd, exclusive of the improvements on the
premise. Determination of fair market value shall be based 011 the highest and

beSt use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the
leasehold into account The determination shall take into account the parties'
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to
a fair market value ofFifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre
and shall also take into accowtt my determinations of market value made under
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent
adjustment date.
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §J.3(b)).

(17) The evidence at trial established that the parties have never followed the provisions
contained in the Lease Agreement to effectuate an adjusunent in the rent.
(18) Finally, the Lease Agreement provides that "if the determination of adjusted rent is
made after the applicable rent adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate
applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined." (Lease Agreement, p. 3,
§1.3(b)).

(19) Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's designated representative at trial, testified that

Quail Ridge has paid rent, annually, in the

origi~

and unadjusted amount of $9,562.50 and is

currant on its annual obligation.

11
Whe:n the Coun inquired of the partie! concemlnt this maner lhey both advised tl1e COth't Utat lhey were waiving this
requirement of the Lease Agreement. "fhe Court telied upon whul. lh~ Court doh:rmined 10 ~a mandalory arbltradoll provl:!lon
when ;, gnnted PMG's motion "'!Ue.!ling 1!1111 Q..UIIIidi• bo d<uiod 1m jury dCIII8Ild,
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(24) Finally, the I 996 Estoppel Certificate provides !hat !he "Landlords consent to the

Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) a waiver or modification by
Landlord of Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or (b) excuse Tenant's
perfonnance of any term or condition ofthe Lea.lle (Agreement)." (1996 Estoppel Certificate,

(25) No evidence was introduced that IHC attempted to proceed with the three (3) year
annual rent adjustment in 1998 as referenced by the 1996 Esmppel Certificate. 14

(26) Between 1996 and 200 I the relationship between the parties and Lea.lle Agreement
remained static. IHC was the Lessor, Sterling was the Lessee, and PM! was the Sub-tenant or
Sub-Lessee. In 2001, the relationships changed.
(27) Sometime between 1996 and 2001, Sterling determined that it wanted to sell the
building located on the leasehold and Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their
personal guarantees associated with the financing of the building located on the leasehold.

Likewise, PMI wanted to purchase this building.
(28) Richard Faulkner testified that for a nwnber of reasons, not particularly germane to

..

this litigation, in on;ler to facilitate the 1ranssction between Sterling and PMI wherein PM! would

purchase the building located on the leasehC?ld, a new entity WllS created. This entity was Quail
Ridge Medical Investors (Quail Ridge). Quail Ridge then purchased the building located on the
leasehold from Sterling and PMI continued on as a subtenant of Quail Ridge.
(Z9) Richard Faulkner testified that !he t:tan$action was complex and involved a number

of parties (IHC, Sterling, Qwul Ridge, PMI, and the Public Employee Retirement System of

'"'The only evidence introduced at trial regarding a. dcmlllld by IHC or any of it! SUQ'ccs.sors in intcrcsr: was in Oaober of 2009
whm PMC mado a d.:mand fbr a. rent Adjumn~n" whiwh led to the prcKnt controv~ and lldau.~Jon.
FINDINGS OF FACf, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ME MORAND VIII DECISION AND ORDER • 16
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Under the Lease (Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent at the rate of
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND
FIFTY CENTS ($9,562.50) per annwn. Rent has been paid through and
including FEBRUARY 28, 2001.
(2001 Estoppel Certificate, ~5). This provision contains two (2) dramatic alterations from the

19915 Estoppel Certificate. First the 1996 Estoppel Certificate states that Sterling (the Tenant) "Is
obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." The term "cUITently" has
been deleted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and reads Sterling (the Tenant) "is obligated to
pay rent at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." Further, while the 1996 Estoppel Ceni.ficate
provides that ''under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease (Agreement], the rent shall be adjusted on the

next rent adjustment date"; this language is glaringly absent from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate.
(35) Richard Faulkner discusses, from his perspective and that of Ql!llil Ridge, why the
language of 2001 Estoppel Certificate differs

from the 1996 Estoppel Certificate.

At trial, the

following dialogue occurred:
Q. If you'lllook at exhibit 228 [2001 Estoppel Certificate] again, going back to
paragraph five, it says that "under the lease tenant is obligated to pay rent at the
cUitent rate of $9,562.50 per annum. The rent has been paid through and
including Februaty 281\ 2001."

Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that appears in the '96 estoppel
certificate is not in this certificate here?
A. That's can:ect. I did not include it in the first draft.
Q. And why was that left out?

A. Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for
the five years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent acljustment
m~chanism had never been raised. A,nd then I spoke with the folks from Sterling
Development Group and understood tliat in the entire 13 years preceding our
involvement no one had ever raised the section of the rent adjUstment in Order to
increase or change the rent. So I wanted to confirm in the cow-se of dealing that
that had been waived.
Faulkner Tria! Testimony, p.I6S,LL.22·25, p.l66, LL.l-17.
nNDINGS o•· >"Acr, C:ONCLUSIONS OF LAW ANP MEMORANDUM D£CJSION AND ORDER- 18
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(40) In 2009, shortly after PMC acquired and became successor in interest to the Lease
Agreement, as part of its larger purchase of the hospital operated and known as Pormeuf Medical
Center, Don Wadle was asked to review the Lease Agreement. He was informed that a previous
adjustment had not taken place and asked to detennine the appropriateness of making an
adjustment to the annual rent
(41) Don Wadle determined that an adjustment to the annual rent would be appropriate
and that !here was a process in the Lease Agreement to obtain an adj11Stment.
(42) In 2009, PMC began lhe process of having the: 4.25 acre leasehold appfllised and
following the appraisal PMC made Quail Ridge aware of its intent to increase the annual rent in
accordance with the Lease Agreement.
(43) At trial Brad Janoi.ISh, a principal with Integra Realty Resources in Boise, Idaho
·.

testified regarding the market value of the 4.25 acres of property which is the subject of the
Lease Agreement.
(44) Mr. Janoush was admitted to testify at trial as an expert real estate appraiser and
consultant.

(45) Mr. Janoush opined. after discussi.Ilg his methodology, that the 4.25 acres of
property that are the subject of the leasehold had a value of $1,080,000 on January 27, 2007. He
further testified that on Januai-y 27,2010, the value of this 4.25 acre leasehold had declined in
value from the January 27, 2007 date to $990,000. 17
(46) Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) testified, by way of deposilion introduced at trial,
that he "assumed" that the $15,000 per acre figure utilized by the parties as the "filir market

11
PMC has argued l!lat the appllcoblc modff!Clll1on date Is Janu..y 2.3. The Court is not sure where this dOie comes from. The
copy of tho: Lease Agreeme:Pt ;tdmitted. into evidence at trial reflectS a signature: date of 1anuaey 27, 1983. How~cr. lh=.: Lease
Ag=mo:ntlu•:lr provid<s thlll the applicable date for lbe rent .qjusuncnt i• Fcbrulll)' I. See Coun's Findillp of Fact Nwnbor 9

Md foolnoL<llQ,
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affirmative or negative in fonn and effect, and such declarations shall
force and effect of a :final judgment or decree.

have~

(2) Idaho Code §10·1202 provides as follows:

person interested under a deed, will, writteu contract or other writings
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, statUS or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have detennincd any· question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, statos or other legal relations thereunder.
·
Any

[Bold Emphasis Added by the Court]

(3) Finally, Idaho Code §10-1203 provides as follows:
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.

(4) Porsuant to the foregoing, the Coun has authority and jurisdiction to declare the rights
ofPMC and Quail Ridge as the successors in interest to the Lease Agreement.
(5) In 1983, lliC and Sterling entered into a legally binding and valid Lease Agreement
whereby Sterling leased 4.25 acres of property from IHC.
(6) PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreement PMC is
the Lessor and Quail Ridge is the Lessee.
(J) In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337

(2005), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed contract interpretation, in doing so it stated as follows:
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of!aw. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a COI!tract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. Jf a contract is found
ambiguous, its interpretation is a queStion of fact. Whether a contract is
ambi~ous is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject
to conflicting interpretations.
(8) This Court, upon review of the Lease Agreement concludes that section 1.3(b} of the
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Therefore, the Lease Agreement called for

footnote l 0 to the Court's Findings of Fact.

adjustments to the =ual rent on the following dates:
February I, !986
February I, 1989

Febt'uaty 1, 1992
February!, 1995
February 1, 1998
February 1, 2001

February l, 2004
February 1, 2007
February 1, 2010
It also calls for adjustments to the amlual rem on the following prospective dates:

February 1, 2013

FebrUary;, 2016
February 1, 2019
February I, 2022
(13) No adjustment to the annual rent under The Lease Agreement was effectuated pursuant
to the terms of the Lease Asreement between 1986 and 2010. Further, no party to the Lease
Agreement even attempted to adjust the annual rent wttil September and October of 2009 when

PMC attempted to invoke section L3(b) of the Lease Agreement to effectuate a modification in the
annual mt! amotlllt.
(14) The Court concludes that the second paragraph of section 1.3(b) is clear and

'
unambiguous. It provides the procedure whereby the tent adjUStment process is implemented. It
allows for the parties to negotiate and ·submit
concerning the "fair market value" of the 4.25

by

way of ''written agreement'' their agreement

~re

leasehold for the upcoming three (3) year

adjusnnent period. This period in which the parties are to negotiate and arrive at an agreed upon

''fu.ir ~IU~tket value" of the 4.2S acre leuehold is to oecur withln ninety (90) days of rent adjustment
· date. If tlw plttrles are successful in this

en~vor,

their agreed upcm value is "a conc:lusive

determination ... of fair market value for the period to which the aqjustment applies." If the parties
FINDINGS OF FAcr. COI'CLIJSIONS OF I.AW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDII'R- 24
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v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 224 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2009). "The
determination of a parties' intent with respect to a contract p{ovision 'is to be determined by
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstmccs under
which it was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any construction
placed upon it by the contraming parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus,
!51 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011).

(18) The Collrt concludes that "fair market value" is a term of art in the legal and real estate
fields. Black's Law Dictionary <iefines fair market value as "the price that a seller is willing to

accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open llllll'ket and in an arm's-length transaction." Black's

Law Dictionary, Seventh Editio11. In Logan v. Grand Junetion ksociates, Ill Idaho 670, 671, 726
P.2d 782 783 (Ct.App.l986), the Idaho Court of Appeals

consid~

a case where the trial court

applied a nearly identical definition of fair market value (the legal defirutio11 of fair market value is
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller). Although the Idaho Court of Appc:als did not
rule on the correctness of this definition, neither did it indicate that this was not the correct
definition. Rather, it reversed the trial judge on the basis that the methodology it applied in arriving
at fair market value was in error. Brad Janoush, ,PMC's real estate appraiser expert, testified thllt
fair market value is an antiquated temt that was <ltellted and used back in the 1980's. He testified

that the term now used is "market value." He defined market value as "the property's most
probable sales price." He :tilrth.er testified !hat although the term "fair mlllket value" "is hardly ever
used currently, [it] ... may be thought of as being synonymous with IIIIIIket value."
(19) The Court concludes thar these two (2) definitions of market value and fair market
value are consistent and appear to be manageable definitions for the rent adjustment provision of the
Lease Agreement if standing alone. However, they are not left standing alone.
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County, and forgotten in its entirety except at times when ownership changed hands. It appears that
there was no colll'Se ofdealing between me and Sterling as well as their successors dealing directly

with the three (3) year adjustment provision. Christison's testimony seems to intimate tbat IHC
never sought a rent adjustmentbecause it determined that the value ofme leasehold acreage had not
increased in value. Therefore,

iiii

adjustment process would have resulted in no change in the

annual rent or a decrease. However, good management practices and compliance with the Lease
Aareement would have rt:quired that they advise Sterling that they did nor believe the value of the

leasehold justified an increase in rent rather iliiiii just ignoring or forgetting about the rent
adjustment provision.
(23) As stated in BellS v. BellS, supra, unde.r Idaho law the parties' intent is to be determined
by the express language of the document and reviewing the document as a whole. This is an issue

of law. If there are ambiguities, then it becomes a question of fact concerning the intent of the
parties. In ascertaining that intent, the fact finder may conside.r extrinsic evidence touching upon the
parties' intent. In this case, the Court is the finder of fact. In discerning the intent of the parties, by
way of extrinsic or parol evidence, the Court can consider the circumstances under which the
Lease Agreement was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings.

Beusv. Beus, 151 Idaho235,238,254P.3d 1231, 1234(20ll)(Beus).
(24) As stated and discussecl above, there is almost no credible or relevant evi<:lence on
these issues. The Court, in researching this issue, can find. no controlling case law in Idaho that
discusses how the Court should procee<i when the record is entirely lacking extrinsic evidence of
prior course of dealings mtdlor !he parties' original intent.
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is that there were no cou:rse of dealing for the following reasons: (1) Sterling, and later Quail
Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of speaking if Sterling or Quail
Ridge "rocked the boat" they had no!bing to gain and only increased rent to lose if they initiated
a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) IHC and Bannock County, through poor
management arullor ha¥ing forgotten about the rent adjustment provisions, never sought a rent
adj ustment.

10

(28) Therefore: (1) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to establish a
course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to the language
related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions of the Lease
Agreement.21
(29) The Court will apply the current m;u:ket value to the 4.25 acres of property which
make up the leasehold. The Court accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current market
value of the 4.25 acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February l, 2007 as being $1,080,000.
The Court further accepts Janoush's opinion with xespect to the C\ll!ent market value of the 4.25
acres, exclusive ofimprovements, as of February!, 2010 as being $990,000.
(30) In 2009, when PMC attempted 10 invoke section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement for
purposes of modifying the annual rent, PMC had become the successor in interest to the original

"Again tho Court re<ogni,.. !hat Christison !I:Sriflcd !hat he n.-vlcwcd all of IHC's oxooutor l"'lltroc!S on61hor <luring his tl"""c
no incn:allic: in rcmt was sought because he believed that the value in:tb~ property was 1'10t tho:re to support a rtnt increase. Wh.Ue
Ill is may bellll ao:outat~>lillltc of arraits d•nng Chrillison's tenure at IIIC. I ~891brou;h.ZOOO; as ianousb'stestimony ostablisbod.
in recent YCU'S\ this ane8t cwu or l-lS, ha,q became a hot-bed o_f commercial d~clopmcn\ in Poc5ltello, Idaho. For thcst" r~ns.
the Coon concludes '!:hQI: there is no course of dealing with rcspc;t to IHC and Bamtock County in their capaciey as lessots due
solely to mismartt\gement and the fact that the provisions of the Lcec: Agreement wet'$ forgotten on two (2) occasio11s in 1083
a:ftor the Lease Agr=m~nt was created lind in 1996 after JHC agreed to f'MI becoming a $\J.brenant.
;nCcrtainly 1h~ fatlQI'S may play a. role in future rent adjustments under tb-c- Leese Agteement, but there Is no evidoenc~ In the
ro:ord to allow them to pla.)l a role in the acUustmcnt proce!! this Court is being o.sked. to consider a..q pan: of the d~laratory
judgm.:nt proceedinQ. Por eM.amptc. itdlc parties were. by written agn:·cm.;nt., abl.: to a~ 1o rent adjusnnertt that was based an
a value lcsslhan 15% or market v:llue as that term was defined by Jmoush or Blat:k's Law Dictioruzry, thfLt would certainly ben
rclcvtt.nl COUr:'iC': f,)( dealirtg IWid~ncC going. forward.
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(1961). As with all modifications, tbe terms of a contract cannot be altered by
one party without the other party's approval. ld. at 296, 362 P2d at 386.
Additionally, the minds ohhe parties must meet as to the proposed modification.
Jd. "The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one
part)' ill accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other." !d.
Whether an alleged modification is proven "is one for the trier of the facts to
decide." Res. Eng'g, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935,938,500 P.2d 836,839 (1972).
This Court, as the finder of fact, determines that the evidence at trial does not support a finding by
this Court of a modification to the terms of the Lease Agreement. Both the 1996 Esroppel

Certificate and the 200 I Estoppel Certificate recite as follows:
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. The Lease constitutes the

only agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord a11d the Ten.an.t relating
in any way to the Demised Premises.
1996 Lei!S~ Agreeme11t, '112 and 2001 Lease Agreement, 1\2. Both the 1996 Estoppel Certificate and
the 2001 Estoppel Certificate also provided as follows:
Landlord's CO!lSent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not ccmstitute or be
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tena11ts performa11ce of any
term or condition of the Lease [Agreement], or (b) a waiver or modification by
Landlord to any rights, under the Lease [Agreement], i11cludillg without
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement.
1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~1 0, am:! 2001 Estoppel Certificate, 'lJl 0.
(35) The only svidence in the record ~garding the modificatio11 of the Lease Agreement is

the subjective inte11t of Faulkner. Faulkner, testified as the individual drafting the 2001 Estoppel
Certificate that he purposefully left out certain language that existed in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate
because he "wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that that had been waived." The Court
would suggest that removing language thet was present in an earlier doc~~ment and not discussing
the same or making the other party aware of its deletion does not establish "murual assem." In fact,
some might question the prop&:ty of mch conduct. The Court finds that this unilateral act of
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(38) The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the doctrine of waiver in Knipe Land

Co. v. Roberrsen, !51 Idaho 449,457-58,259 P.3d 595, 603-04 (2011). In doing so, it stated as
follows:
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or

advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered hi$ position to his
deuiment." Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006)
(internal quotation omitted). "Waiver is foremost a question of inlent," Seaport
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.I987):
A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established.
Margaret H. Wayne Tnm v, Lip.sky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907
(1993). "Waiver will not be inferred except ftom a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estOppel." ld.
(39) As the Court previously ruled with respect

to Quail Ridge's claim of conlillct

modification, the Court, as the finder of filet, finds no facts to support the claim that lHC or
Bannock County voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right. Rather, what the Court has
found is that lHC and Bannock County, through poor management and oversight, neglected

and!or forgot about the rent adjustment provision of the: Lease Agreement. Such conduct does
not establish the requisite intent to voluntarily Waive the rent adjustment provision of the Lease
Agreement.
(40) Finally, Quail Ridge a.sserrs that the Collt! should apply the equltable

d9ctrine of

laches to the rent adjustment provisions and not allow PMC to modizy the rent either
retroactively or prospectively. The CoUrt will' IIICcept Quail.Ridge's laches defense in part and
finds it to be inapplicable in part.

(41) In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 PJd 1241, 1248
(2002), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the defense of laches. In addressing this affirmative
defense, the Supreme Court noted that the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proving
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two (2) years and over seven (7) months into the

current rent adjustment period. This was not reasonable, nor was it compliant with the express
provisions of the Lease Agreement, nor was it reasonable to expect Quail Ridge to have its

llllllual rent adjusted two (2) years and seven (7) plus months into the current period.
(44) However, the Court does not find the same impediments to a prospective rent

adjustme,nt. ht October of2009, PMC notified Quail Ridge that it was seeking tO adjust the rent
in accordance with section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. The Court concludes that this was

consistent with the intent of obtaining a written agreement within the ninety (90) window set by
section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. These attempts were unsuccessful, and in June of 2010
litigation was initiated. The Court does not believe the doctrine of laches applies to PMC's
attempts to effectuate a rent adjustment for the 291 0 rent adjustment period as well as future rent
adjustment periods. The Court concludes that although both parties failed to comply with the
mandatory arbitration provision of the Lease Agreement, that PMC has complied with the
provisions of the Lease Agreement sufficient to justifY an adjustment to the annual rent.
(45) Therefore, the Court concludes !4at PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for
the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the amount of $148,5'00.00 annually. Therefore, for the three
(3) year period applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combirted annual rent for these three (3)

years is $445,500.00 by January 31, 2013, li$I!Uilling that Quail Ridge remains current on its annual
rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 towards the arurual rent for this three (3) year period. .As such it is
entitled to a credit in this amount against the $44S,500.00. This credit results in Quail Ridge being
obligated to PMC in the total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period ofFebrua!y 1, 2010
through January 31, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

J-y!"h
The undersigned certifies that on the

X' day of OctOber, 2012, she caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Findings ofFaet, Conclusions ofi..aw and Memorandum Decision and
Order to be served upon the following persons in the following manner.
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawlcins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-099!
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffney
21 05 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

X Faxed
0 Hand Delivered

• Mailed
)(Faxed
0 Hand Delivered

• Mailed
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)
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, )
) Case No.
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
)
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

..

~:-.;..._'

.

'

.. · ..

Following a two (2) day bench trial conducted before the Court commencing on May 14,
2012 and concluding on May 15, 2012 and the Court having rendered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order the Court hereby enters this

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 through 10-1203. This
Declaratory Judgment declares the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect those
issues. This Declaratory Judgment deals specifically with the rent adjustment provisions of the
parties' Ground Lease Agreement (Section 1.3(b) and generally with sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3(a) of
the parties' Ground Lease Agreement.
The Court hereby ORDERS ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
(I) Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf Medical Centers (PMC) is entitled to an
adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail
Ridge) under the parties Ground Lease Agreement from $9,562.50 annually to
$148,500.00 annually.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- 1
141 of 447

(2) This rent adjustment is for the three (3) period commencing on February 1, 2010 and
concluding on January 31,2013. Therefore the total rent due PMC from Quail Ridge is
the amount of$445,500.00 for this three (3) year period.

(3) Quail Ridge has already paid PMC $9,562.00 armual rent on or about February I
each year during that three year period for a total amount paid of $28,687.50.
(4) Therefore, based upon the rent adjustment, Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay
PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement.
(5) The rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease Agreement, dated January 27,
1983, of which PMC is the successor Lessor and Quail Ridge is the successor Lessee
remains in full force and effect. The next rent adjustment, which is scheduled to take
effect February 1, 2013, shall proceed consistent with section 1.3(b) of the Ground
Lease Agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day ofNovember, 2012.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

DECLARATORYJUDGMENT-2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day of November, 2012, she caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Form of Judgment to be served upon the following persons
in the following manner:

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:

)(Faxed

Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
(208) 232-2499

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:

)(Faxed

Michael D. Gaffuey
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 529-9732

(
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GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE

By the· exeeufioii hereaf, and as a condition precedent to, and as inducement for, the
execution and delivery by me Health Services, Jnc., a Utah nonprofit corporation ("JHCHS"), of
that certain Landlord Consent and Estoppel, dated as of June 1, 2001, and the foregoing
Amendment, FORREST L. PRESTON, individually, wtconditionally guarantees the payment and
performance of any and all obligations of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, a Tennessee
limited liability company ("Quail Ridge'') and/or Pocatello Medical Investors Limited
Partnership, a Tennessee limited partnership ("PMI"), under the "Ground Lease" and the
"Sublease" (each as defined in the foregoing Amendment). To the fullest extent possible, the
undersigned expressly waives notice of the acceptance of this Guarantee, notice of demand for
payment, notice of nonpayment, notice of other default, notice of suit, and all other notices to
which the wtdersigned might otherwise be entitled in connection with this Guarantee. Further,
the undersigned waives any responsibility or duty lliCHS may have to the undersigned to
proceed against Quail Ridge and/or PMI or to pursue any other legal remedy available. Upon any
default, lliCHS may, at its option, proceed directly, and at once, without notice, against the
undersigned without proceeding against Quail Ridge and/or PMI or any other person. In
addition, the undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for
all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this
Guarantee.
DATED as ofthe 1stdayofJwte, 2001/

A
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Thisj1ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into this
day

lKJ.-?t--tU~,

of

ftc,,

CARE,

1983,

~h

a

business

in

the

Regional

Medical

by

and

non-profit

State

of

lNTERNOUNTAIN

corporation,

Idaho. under

Center

STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO.,

between
the

(hereinafter

HEALTH

authoriz.ed
name

called

of

to

do

Pocatello

"Lessor").

and

a Washington partnership authoriz.ed

do l:>usiness in the State of Idaho,

to

(hereinafter called "Lessee"),

!)_~£!_!_A~S

1-IHEREAS, Lessor owns certain real property located within the
City of Pocatello, Bannock County,
WHEREAS,
acres,
1•

Lessor

more

or

Psychiatric:

wishes

less,

Hospital

to

Idaho: and

lease

of ·said

to

Lessee

property

building

(the

for

approximately

construction

"hospital")

and

to

of

4
a

impose

certain restrictions on the use of sucn parcel of real property
and Lessee wishes

to lease said parcel of real property for such

purpose, subject to Lessor's restrictions; and
WHEREAS,
ground

Lessor

lease

restrictions

and

agree·ment

Lessee
setting

wish
forth

to
the

enter
terms,

into

a

""ritten

conditions

and ·

under which said parcel of real property is to be

leased;
NOW,
covenants,

THEREFORE,

for

and

in

consideration

conditions and promises

of

the

contained 'herein,

mutual

Lessor and

Lessee agree as follo""s:
ARTICLE 1
DESCRIPTION, TERM AND RENTAL
1.1

Real Prooerty Leased.

Lessor hereby

leases

to Lessee

and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property described
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i,n E.x.hibit "A" attached hereto and hereby ~:~ade a part hereof,
cluding

all easements,

right-of-way

interests

with whether granted or by prescription,

in-

associated there-

and any

and all

other

interests or rights appurtenant to the property and in adjoining
and

adjacent land,

public

or

highways,

private,

roads,

which

streets

are

and

lanes!

reasonably

whether

required

for

installation, maintenance, operation and service of electricity,
gas,

s·ewer, ·telephone,

water

to and

driveways and approaches
and

bene·fi t

of

improvemetlts
··leased

the

to

fand").

be

and

above

real

thereon

in

utility

lines

from abutting ways

described

erected

situated

other

the

for

and

for

the

use

incl~ding

property,

(hereinafter· called
of

County

the

State

Bannocks

of

Idaho.
~-

l. 2

thirty
before

years

(30)

commencing

on

ter~:~

(30)

ia ter,

of this Lease shall be for a period of

(hereinafter

the ·1st

thirty

whi-chever i-s
·(10)

The

cay

days
(the

referred

the

as

of

or

1983,

after

permit

~·commencement

Date~~),

"Term"),

i·s

on

or

issued, /
(l) ten \

with -one

vear option to extend such term to be exercised as pr-ovided

in A.:rticle 14,

Paragraph 14.1, hereof.

Such option :to ext·end the

term is per•onal to Lessee and may not be.assigned or convefed in
any manner whatsoever to anothe:r party.

Lessee shall be entitled

to possession of the lea.sed land on the Commencement Date.

1.3

Rent and Pavment Thereof.
(a)

Lessee

Rental.

shall

pay

the

following

ann·ual

rental amount:
An initial annual r.ental shall be calculated
on the basis of fifteen percent
value of the
the first

ment
sha1·1

three

Date
be

leased

of

land.

( 3) years

this

valued

Lease,
at

the

(l5t) of the

For purposes

of

from the Cor.wence=

the
rate

leased
of

land

Fifteen

(
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I

Thousand and No/100 Dollars

($15,000.00) ·per

acre.
(b)

Adjustments Based on Property Value.

net rental as
(3) years

annual

set forth above shall be adjusted every three

beginning on the Commencement Date of this
adjust~ent

referred to below as the rent
The parties'
before

The

the

conclusive

date.

written agreement within ninety

applicable

rent

determination

adjustment

between

the

Lease,

date

parties

(90) days

shall
of

be

the

a

fair

market value for the period to which the adjustment applies.
If the parties have
adjustment

date,

not

so

agreed

the determination

by

the

applicable

shall be made as

rent

in the

paragraph on Arbitration in Ar.ticle 13.
The rent
(15%) percent

as adjusted shall be· equal to fifteen percent
of the !:air market value

exclusive of the

of

the

leased land,

improvements on the premises.

Determina-

tion of fair market value shall be based on the highest and
best use of the land·on the applicable rent adjustment date
'-'ithout ta'ldng the leasenold into

account.

The det errnina-

tion shall take into account the parties' agreement that the
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied
to

a

fair

Dollars
account
1 ease

market

value

($15,000.00)

of

per

any determinations

for

t_he

Fifteen

acre

and

Tnousand
shall

also

and

No/100

take

into

of market value made under this

purpose of aojustments

for

perioos preceding

tne applicable rent adjustment date.
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the
applicable
pay

rent

until
shall,

the

rent
at

the

adjustment
rate

adjusted

date,

applicable

rate is

lessee
to

shall

the

oetermined.

continue

preceding

to

period

The party indebted

promptly after the determination,

pay any difference

for the period affected by the adjustment.
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Definition of Lease Year. l\ ;l.e;:.se year is either a

a

calendar year or
~ation

1.4

(~

fiscal year, as selected 'by Lessee.

of Pa:rtne..-shio..·

Nothing- .in

this

'

Lease

shall

'be construed to render_ the Lessor in any '-1ay or for a,ny purpose a
partner,

joint

venturer,

Lessee other than

that

of

landlord

Lease be construed to autho-riz.e
other,

except

as

in any relationship with

or associate

expressly

and

tenant,

nor shall this

either to act as

to

provided

the

agent

for

in

contrary

the
this

Lease.
P~mera.s.

!'lllc:e of :Rental.

1.5

.All

payments

of

Rental

required to be paid to Lessor under the terms of this" lease shall
be made in lawful .money of the United· States which at time

of

such payment shall be legal tender for the payment of public and
private~debts,

free

from

all

claims,

demands,

deductions,

a.b;;.tement;s, se-t-off-s, .prior notices or c:ounterc:laims of any l<ind
or character against Lessor and shall be payable at the follo..,ing
address or at such other place or places· as may· be from time to
time desi9_nated by Lessor by written' notice given to ·Lessee:

Pocatello Re9ional Hedic:al Center
777 i:iospital Way
Pocatello, Idaho 83201

1.6
T+ust

or

Lessor

fee Mortoaoes.
O-ther

s.ecurity

subordination agreement,
Deed-s of Trust

o.r

may

grant

i·nterests

related

note

provided,

to

however,

security

leased

Deeds

of

land

by

that such mortgages,
subject

interests. shall· be
de~iver

to this

a copy of any such

Deed of Trust or other security interest and
Le,ssor
th<~t

:i'a>r

such

prior

examination

examination and

accomplished by Lessor in a diligent

G~OUKD

the

provided, however,

lease and further provided that LesSee

proposed rnortga.ge.,

in

mortgages,

and

approval;

approval

shall be

~anner.
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ARTlCLE 2
USE OF LEASED LAND AND TITLE TO IMPROVEMENTS
2.1

Use of Leased Land.

Lessee shall use

the

leased

land

solely for the purpose of constructing, maintaining ~nd operating
the hospital for psychiatric care and substance abuse treatment;
provided that Lessee may at any time use the leased land for any
lawful

purpose.

Lessee

shall

hospital within forty-fiv·e
of· this Lease and the

(45)

commence

construction

of

the

days after the commencement date

issuance of' a

building permit.

lf Lessee

is delayed in commencing construction or receivins the permit by
any

cause

or

causJOs

including but
strikes, war,
day

period

not

beyond

necessarily

insurrections,

to

Lessee's

commence

being

and

the

control,

lir.lited
li)te,

construction

to

said

shall

be

such
Acts

causes
of

God,

forty-five

(45)

extended

for

a

period e~uivalent to the time lest by reason of any such cause or
causes;

provided,

however,

that

no

extensions

shall

be g::anted

for any such delay which commences more than ten {10) days before
Lessee notifies Lessor of .. such
Once construction
diligence,
ments •

is

begun,

delay and
Lessee

the

shall,

:reasons therefor.
with

reasonable

prosecute to completion all construction of

additions,

or

alterations

and

shall

have

completed construction of the hospital within
after date of

this

lease.

"&?t(

improve-

substantially

(_/___ )

"Substantial completion"

years

shall mean

that the hospital is ready for occupancy and use as a hospital as
evidenced by a

Coo.rtificate of Occupancy or other

issued by an appropriate governmental authority.

like
If

document
Lessee is

delayed in substantial completion of the hospital by any cause or
causes beyond
necessarily
insurrections,

Lessee's
being

control.

limited

to

such

causes

1\.cts

of

including

God,

but

strikes,

not
'-'ar,

and the like, said cate for sub~tantial completion

of the hospital shall be extended for a period e~uivalent to the
time

lost

however,

by

that

reason

of

any

such

no e>:tensions will

be

cause

or

o;:;:anted

causes;
for

provided,

any such delay
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which commences more

- .

(""
not~f~es1

ten '(-lO) t:·ay·s ·befo·re 't:e:'ssee

than

I

Lessor of such delay and. the reasons thereforv
performed in a
comply

with

good ind workmanlike manner,

plans

required by this
p&rmits,
bring,

laws,

and

specifications

and

lease,

ordinances

shall

submitted

substantially
to

shall comply with all

a.nd

cause to be brought.,

All work shall be

regulat.ions.

Lessor

as

govenlmental.

Less-ee

shall

not

or permit t.o be brought or kept

on

the leased land anything which will in any way conflict with any
law,

ordinance,

rule,

or regulation,_

COT.ll'!litted any waste upon
.leased land or hospital

the

leased

or commit or
land 1

Or

suffer

to be

use or a'! low the

to be used for any immoral .or' unlawful

P,u.r-pose.
2.2

l t is understno<!

Architectural Compatibility,

and

agr.eed that the hospital will be architecturally compatible witn
the

~1ed

Center

accomplished,

hospital.

ln

Lessee shall

order

to

insure

that:

this

be

submit its site plan, .. elev-ations, and

architectural plans and specifications

for

the

hci'spital

to

the (

Boa.rd of Directors of the tied Ceni;.er hospital for approval before
commencing construction.
shall

not be

The approval of the Board of-Directors

unreasonably withheld and

w-ithin forty-five

(45) days

following

response

snall be· given

the submission of Le!<see's

plan;s and specifications.
2. 3 · · Requ'ired Parking.

Lessee agrees that in oesigning the

site plans and' t'he plans and specifications for
the

it

hospit'al,

will

include

sufficient

constn.iction of

off-_street

parl;ing

spaces to ·accommodate the minimum required by, local codes.

2.4

Title

a}:>purtenan.ces

tb

Builcincs.

thereto

and

Title

all

at.'h!::!r

to

the

h'ospital

improve-ments

and

and

fixtures

located on the leased lane or con'structec or placed on the le»sed
laoO

·oy

during

Lessee

the

or

Term.

its

tenants

Lessee

shail

shall

be

'have

and

the

renain

right

alterations, changes and repairs as provided herein.
in any builcings, per::;anent improvements,

GROUND LSASE hGREEMENT -
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in
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to
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,
to

(

Lessor

until

the

expiration

of

the

Term

or

the

prior

termination of this

lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the

right

this

to

terminate

Lessee coven<.nts
will

and

yield up

buildings,

deliver

permanent

any kind,

and

Lessor.

In

pursuant.

to

hrticle

10

hereof.

agrees that upon expiration of_ the Term i t

and

land at such time

lease

the

leased

improvements,

land

and fixtures

vith

any

upon the

such
leased

free and clear of all liens and encumbrances of

upon
the

such

event

expiration
of

title

earlier

therein

termination

of

shall

be

in

this

lease,

Lessee covenants and agrees that it ,,,.ill yield up and deliver the
leased land '-'ith any suc:b buildings,
fixtures upon the

permanent improvements,

leased land at suer: time free and clear of all

liens and indebtedness of any kind.
obligation to deliver the
clear

of

all

and

liens

and

leased

Provided, however,

land

that such

and improvements

indebtedness

shall

not

free and

apply

to

the

original lien of first encumbrance represented by the mortgage or
Deed of Trust or other security interest referred to in Article 6
hereof given to secure the- financing for the construction of t!-:e
original buildings,
leased

land.

buildings,

permanent improvements,

Upon

permanent

suc:b

earlier

ir..provements

and fixtures upon the

termination,

and

fixtures

title
upon

in

the

the

leased

this

lease,

land shall be in Lessor.
2.5
Lessee

Deed at Termination.
shall·,

satisfactory in
title

to

any

Upon

subject

to

£-orm and

content

buildings,

termination of

foregoing,

the

to

permanent

Lessor

execute

a

confirming

improvements,

deed

Lessor's

and

fixtures

therein, upon the leased land at the time of termination.
2.6
require
hospital,

hdditional Real Propertv.
add.it.ional

real

property

At such time as Lessee shall
for

the

expansion

of

the

Lessee shall so notify _Lessor and Lessor shall in good

faith consider the

leasing of acditional real property to Lessee

for such purpose.

-'~ROUND

LEASE AGREEMENT - 7

Hn~' ,.'j Tf

, ..... , .."'\~-...:~. n •ct.·~o .... a. SlOI.!:~."4'
AIIOt ... f\,,U,•K

1!::"t• .. ,.,,._,, • \\..,.U XI\

rn -o~ •""

, ...,, rn"' • t

"~., .......

c,o...·•J..-

155 of 447

..
Upon
requests
other

being

public

only

the

made,

shall

grant

service· corporations·,

property,

property

Lessor

for

electricity,

rights

poles

wat.er,

of

or

way

for

or

public

or

entities

the ·-purpose

or easements

conduits

sanitary

to

on .or

both,

for

storm sewers

of

or

or

serving
over

the

telephone,

both,

and

for

other utilities and municipal or special district services.

The

cost. of utilities,

are to be assumed,

their installation and maintenance,

fully paid and satisfied by Lessee.

ARTICLE 3
CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
3.1

General Maintenance.

Throughou:t

shall, at Lessee's ·sole_ cost and
and all

Term,

ordinances,
municipal,

h;;>ving

or

underwriting

and

claiming

departments,

ordinary wear

and in' accordance with all applicable
orders and regulations of

county,

Lessee

maintain the premises

improvements in good condition and repair,

.and .tear .excepted,
rules,

expense,

the

other

gover·nmental

jurisdiction

bureaus,
board· or

and

and

insurance

(l) federal, state,
agencies and boclie s

all

officials:
companies

lak'S,

their

(2)

respective

the

insuring

ins1,1rance
all or

any
·;.-

part of the premises or improvements or both; and {3) Lessor, as
shall be in effect froni time

to

operate the hospital ·and the

surrounding grounds in a

and professio·nal "n~anner.

time·.

Lessee shall

r.~anage

and

competent

Lessee s·ha.ll maintain the sidewalks and

roadways giving access to the hospital free and clear of ice and
snow~

E:t.cept

as

provided

diligently repair,

below;

Lessee

she.ll

.oromotlv
- -

ana

restore and replace as requirecl to maintain or

comply as above, or to remedy ail damage to or

C~st.ruction

of all

or any part of the improvements resulting "-'holly or in part from
causes required by this lease
coverage insurance,

to be covered

if the cost of the

~ork

b~·

fire

or el<tended

so required does not
(

\
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exceed seventy-five per_cent

(75\) of the replacement value of all

of

the

the

improvements.

If

cost

Lessee may nevertheless repair,
may by

snall

Lessor's
furnish

to repair,

not

notice

raze

al~erations

restore

until

the

of election.

any services ·or

improvements damaged or

and

expiration

Lessor

facilities

sha 11

or

any

obligation

failure

or

of

refusal

Lessee
to

do

to

of

make

promptly

reimburse,

defend,

and

and

time

for

be required

to

any

or

repairs

Lessor

this

sball

above,

the

not

under

so

as

replace

not

indemnify

1

election

S

provision

on

constitute

waiver o~ ~ny _right or remedy for LessJ'e • s. default,
shall

percent,

replace as above or

of any kind in or on the premises.

perform

Lessee's

that

Within thirty (30) days after such notice, Lessor may

by notice elect
Lessee

exceed

restore and

notice elect instead to raze the

destroyed.

to

does

a

and Lessee

Lessor

a9ainst

all liability, loss, cost, and expense arising from it.
In

determining

whether

Lessee

required under the foregoing paragraph,
considered· is
proceeds.

the

Nothing
maintenance

shall

elsewhere in
replace

any

this

availability
in

this

be

construed

lease to alter,

improvement,

years of tbe Term-.
resulting

from

or as

paragrapb

shall

reduction
Term.

in

3.2

entitle

rent

nor

Lessee

to

defining

limiting

limiting

destruc~ion

event
any

or

promptly

applicable

modify,

No deprivation,
any

any

as

acted

as

one of the criteria to be

provision

condemnation or to damage or
use

of

has

insurance

the

duty

righ~

any

demolish,

of

given

remove,

or

provisions relating to
during the final year or

impairment, or limitation on
wor'lo:

to

any

contemplated
offset,

termination

or

Relief for Substantial Less of Area.

by

this

aba ter:>ent,

ex~ension

of

or
the

lf any dar..age to

or destruction of tbe premises or the improvements is such that
75\ of the floor

the

Lease,

area is rendered unusable for purposes stated in

Lessee

may,

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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Nothing

cont.ainec'f in

moCify

this

paragraph

eny provision

shall

this

-of

be

"lease

construed

to

negate

or

relating

to

dai.i.age

Ot""

approval

is

alterations.,

or

c··

destruction during the final year ( s) of the term.

3.3
:net

~ajor

required

additions.

and Minor Distinquished.
Less~e•s_:minor

fo.r

..Minor'

1

Lessor's

repairs,

means a construction cost not. exceeding Five

is

Thousand ana No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00.), none of which
:from funds advanced
leasehold

or

the

on

the

security

property.

o£

an

hConstruction

costs that .,auld constitute the basis of a

derived

encu"'brance
cost•

on

the

includes

all

valid claim or c.labns

under the mechanics'

lien laws in effect at the time the work is

c·ommenced

demolition

for

an_y

a!jy

and

r!'moval

of

e:<dsting

improvements_or parts of i~pr~Jements as well as for preparation,
construction and- completion of all new improvements

The dol~ar amount. stated above shall be ad just.ed

improvements.

by

or parts of

the percentaae
chanae
in the index k~o~~ as the United States
""
...
,-. - .

De·part•nent

of

published

in

Department of
discontinued

Cornme~:ce

the

Survey

Commerce,
and

Composite

thezce

Cotost.-uction

Current

of

or

successor

is

no

Cost

Business

If

index.

successor

by

index,

the

U.S.

index

the
'the

-

·--·

~s

lnde:x

~

is

refe::ence

figure shall be determined bY the senior officer in the closest.
office of the U.S.

or ageney ..

Department of Commerce or successor department

,,M.a jcr ~ re.pairs,. alt-e-rations,

not cefined as mi-nor a.bove.
additions,

Lessee

shal·l

Fozc major rep01irs,

receive Lessor·s

~re

or additions

t'ho~e

alterations,

approvals

o:r-

of the plans

as set forth .above in Paragraph 2. 2.
3 .. 4
with all
ana

Go.ver.nmental. i\ut~orities.
applicab1e

orders

of

laws,

Lessee shall pro~ptly comply

ref;!ulaticns,

orainances,

governmental authorities,

requirements

in-clueing,

but ru»t

limited to, the ~e:};.ing, at. its sole ex?ense,. of any insta~_ l.a t.Lon,
alteration,

roodification,. change

or

repair,

structu:ral

or

ot.her.,..,ise; .firovided, ho~ever, LeSsee 'has the right to contest by·

!

'',

1:.:-••;.u,N}" ,.

~"1U

..,.

,.(\ 110~1:><1(

\

·~<t>t

\fe:
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appropriate judicial or administrative proceedings, withoct

cos~

o.-

l "'"',

expense to

ordinance,
called

Lesser,

order,

"Lav")

validity or application of any

regulations or requirement

rule,

that Lessee repair, maintain,

improvements

in vhole

default

failing

for

following

the

final

to

do

such

o:'leterrnination

gives

notice

of

bond,

satisfactory

guaranteeing

or in part,

request,

to

until

Lessee's

Lessee

by

alter or. replace

Lessee

work

of

Lessox-

compliance

and

sh<>ll

i"n

shall
a

not

for~,

furnish

amocnt

the

lf

and

contested

the

be

reasonable

contest.

first.

Lessee with

(hereinafter
in

time

Lessor

Lessor

a

insurer,
law,

and

indemnifying Lessor against all liability that Lessor.rnay sustain
by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law.
Lessor

may,

but

is

not

required

Lessor may,

independently o:f Lessee.

cont<>st

any

such

Law

and on Lessee's notice of

join in Lessee's contest.

request shall.
3.5

to,,

Damage or Destruction During Final Years of 'l'errn.

In

the event of substantial damage or destruction to the nospital or
any

part

thereof

durin9

Lessor shall have the
days

following

terminate

this

delivering

to

termination,

the

the

right,
date

lease·.
date

five

(5

exercisable

of

such

Lessor

Lessee

which

last

"'ritten
shall

l

during

damage

shall

years
or

o:f

such
date

than

entitled

to

right.
of

thirty

days following the date of Lessor's not.ice of termination.
exercise of such ...right, Lessor snall be

( 90)

destruction,

the

not be earlier

Term,

the ninety

exercise

notice

of the

by

such
(30)
Upon

to recover the

full proceeds of any policy of insurance coverin9 any such damage
or destruction
Lessee's

loss

except
of

such

proceeds

as

may be

personal

property

and/or

to

attributable

to

interruption

of

Lessee's business.
If

Lessee

Lessor

shall

oestroyed as

GROUND

LE~SE

the

the

not

responsible

be

replacement of

does

hospital

or

case may be.

AGREEMENT - 11

elect
for

to
the

any part.

tenninat.e

this

lease,

rebuilding or

repair,

so damaged or

thereof

All such repairs,

rebuilding or
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to the condition -it
~n

itrmediately prior tO the event giving rise to the vo~k~
3 .. 6 Last Year of Term~
~1\.. nyt'.hing her~in
to the contrary

notwithstanding,

Lessee shall not have the right during the last

3'6S days 9f the 'l'el:l11 to alter, remove or demolish, in wl-;ole or in
part, any buildings, st.rut:tures or other improvements :which exist
upon

the

leased

land

365

days

pn.. or

to

the

except with the writ ten consent of Lessor.
not impair. tbe

right o·f Lessee t.o" remove

of the

end

Term,

This provision s1'.all
any moveable

items

of

personal prqperty ·.from the leased land as prov.iqeq in, 1\.rticl.·e 3
hereof.
ARTICLE 4

' "'"

LE1'.SE!l:OLD LIENS
~ht

4.1
Lessee

shall not

in d e·.f iHll t

be

ho.wevex:-,

that not"Wi.thstanding

lien

security

obligat~on;;

forth

in

and

this

any

interest,

enjoys all
l.ease.

long

term11 .of. this lease',
lien ,upon or a see.urity

instruo~nt

such

Lessor

rights

is

provided,

lease;

this
bound

granting

on.ly

by

hereinafter

Jmy mortgage

Oesigna:ted

and

such
those

end privile$!;!S vhich ""'"'
or

referred

set

Deed of '!'rust "Or other

security interest executed by Lessee pursuant to this
i.s

as

under the

Lessee shall have the right ·to grant. a
interest in its leasehold· estate under
or

So

to Grant Lien ·on Leasehold Estate.

to

as

tf\e

auth<:l>rity
"ledse:'h.Old

mortgage" and thenolder or owner of such lee!fehold morts:;age upon
the

leasehold est.ate of Lessee,

including the benef:i,eiary .of a

Deed of Truf\t, if such mortgage be in the for.m of a Deed of '!'r,u.st
or . othe~

-~ecur-ed

"leasehold mortgage.e".

is

hereinafter

designated

.as

Any leasehold mortgage sha.l.l not be for a

period 'llxce.edi·ng "e..he Term.
Lessor agr~es, at any time an<;'! from
time to time, upon receipt of not less than ten (10) days. pFie>r
written request therefor by Lessee or by the leasehold r.tortgagee,
to

e~ecute~

c.c:kncwledge

and

deliver

to

Lessee

or

to

leasehold

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 12
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t

mortgagee a stl!ltement_ in
case,

that this

"'riting,

.

certifying.

.,

such

.l..

is

lease is then unmodified and unamended,_that i t

is not in default,

and that it is in full

force and effect.

there have been modifications and amendments to this· lease,
statement shall,

such is

the

case,

not then in default· and· is

in

full

if

forth

fur~;her

in

state

certify t;ha t
force

and

the

:lf

said

same

effect

as

is

then

Said modifications and amendments shall l:>e

modified and amended.
set

the

full

in

said

the

dates

statement.

to

which

Said

the

basic

statement

rental

shall

or

other

charges have been paid, and whether or not there is any existing
default

by

Lessee

agreement on the
this lea!"e( and

with

part of Lessee
also "'hether a

served by Lessor.
non-perfonr.ance,

respect

If

any

to

covenant,

promise

provided to be performed
statement contains

a

under

claim of

actually known by Lessor,

summari:z.ed in said statement.

of

notice of such default ha" been

such

insofar as

any

shall

be

Lessee shall. make payment. "'hen due

and before delinquency of all principal, interest and other
charges for \-lhich Lessee may be or l:>ecome obligated under any
leasehold mortgage upon the leasehold estate.
4.2

Foreclosure of Lien.

foreclose a leasehold mortgage.

Prior to

com~encing

the lel!lsehol.d

any action to

mor~;gagee,

or any

assigns of such mer toaoe,

shall notify Lessor in writing of t.he

default by Lessee

"'it.h a

statement. of

offer to withhold

any acceleration of mat.u:-ity of the promissory

no~;e,

the

amount

then

due

payment of which is secured by the leasehold mortgage.

and
In

the event Lessor shall., within thirty (30) days o: the

~eceipt

of

said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in

arrea~s

on

said mortgage,
state the

then

~ortgage

Lessor may, at.

its

and t.he amounts of
rental due Lessor

upon said payment. said mortgagee shall rein-

in all respects as if no default had occurred.
option. make such
such payments

payr:~ents

on said mort;age,

shall be consioered additional

:f rorr, Lessee under this

lease.

Su":>s~quent.

and

successive defaults by Lessee in makin9 paynents required by any

GRO\JI':D LEASE AGREEMENT -
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leasehold rr.ortgage

subject t:C;- the

shall be

foregoing previsions

each time any -such default occurs.

Lessee s;hall

provisions contained--in this

reguirirtg action by parties

lease

insure that all

n·ot a party hereto shal-l be incorporated into docur:>e'nts to whi.ch
such

parties

documents

are

be

a

party

delivered

and

to

that

Lesser

executeD

copies

within -ten

of

such

days

(10)

of

execution thereof.
ARTICLE 5

?ROTECTlON OF MORTGAGEE
Lessee shall 9ive notice to Lessor of any leasehold morta<;~e
which Lessee-grants as provided for in Article 4 hereof ~nd shall
deliver along with said notice a copy of· the -rr.ortgage instrument.
So

long as any_ surr. remains owi:ng on

any obligation

sect: red by

such a leasehold 'mortgage, Lessor' and Lessee agree:
(a)

That no

rnodification

or

termination of

this

lease o.r

surrender of the leased la~d may be made by tpe Lessor or Lessee

(

without the prior written consent of the mortgagee;
(b)

That the

Lessor will give· to the

rnortg.osee al.l

notice

-··-

of oefault simultaneously with any notice given to the Lessee:
(c)

That

the

mortgagee will have

thi::-tx

(30)

days

a!ter

notice of default delivered

to i t "·ithin which to cure Lessee's

default; provided, 11-owever,

that said ·period. in which default may'

be corrected may be extended to ~o more than ninety {90) days in
the event the mortgagee requires such a period as a condition for
granting

a

loan

to

notice of default

Lessee
the

anC.

t:~prtgag

if wH:.hin
ee

forty

notice

(40)

to

days

after

it

Lessor

intends to cure Lessee·s default within said extended period;
(d}

That

the

Lessor

will

accept

performance

by

the

mortgagee in lieu of performance by the Lessee;
{e)
defaults,

'!'hat the Lessor 'Will not terminate the lease for thos"
the

possession

cure

of

provided

wnich
that

GROUND LEASE .1\.GREE::MENT -
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requites
the

said

that

the

rnortgasee be in

mortgagee

( i)

promptly
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commences

foreclosure

diligence,

and

charges

(ii)

required

continues

continues

to

-..hicn become due

and

be

paid

payment

by

Lessee

and payable during

its
of

action
rent

which

the

and

have

period

with
all

due
other

accrued

the

and

foreclosure

proceeding is pending;
(f)

That the Lessor

shall not have

the

rignt

to terminate

this lease solely on account of any of the events enticipated by
subdivision {d)
consent of the

of paragraph 1 of Article 10 without the written
leasehold mortgagee,

provided that such mortgagee

promptly commences foreclosu•e if it has

tne right to do so and

thereafter continues its action "'ith due diligence;
(g)

That

lease shall be

in

the

sold,

event

tne

assigned or

Lessee's

interest

other~ise

under

this

.transferred FUrsuant

to thE! exE!rcise· of any rignt, power or rE!medy of any mortgagee or
pursuant

to judicial proceedings

or pursuant

to paragraph 1 of

Article 10, and i f no rent or othE!r charges snall then be duE! an
payable

under

arranged

this

to the

lease,

reasonable

curing of any default
sixty

(60) days

and

if

such

satisfaction

mortgagee
of

the

Lessor

susceptible of being cured,

after

receiving

incident thereto, -..ill execute and deliver such

assignment

or

may

other

be

expenses,

required

transfer

of

incl•Jding

to

confirm

Lessee's

for

the

therefor and

fees,

as

its

.,..ritten request

receiving
instruments

of

have

Lessor within

upon
or

payment

a

shall

attonoeys'
instrument
such

interest

sale,

under

tne

lease; or
(h)
mortgage
right,

That
shall

in

the

have

event

occured,

a

default

the

under

mortgagee

anj'

may

leasehold

exercise

any

po"'er or remedy of the mortgagee under the mortgage \olhich

is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease.

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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ARTICLE 6
SUBORDHlAT!ON
The Lessor- shall,

prcmpt:.y after

notice of request of Lessee,

e~ecute and deliver a mortgage,

of Trust or other

instrument

sufficient to

security

subordinate,

tO the

represented by the mortgage,

·considered to

include fee

Lessorf s

title

part or parts of the l¢ased premises.
• appurtenances)

first

encumOra-nee

title

{which shall be

leased

premises or any

fee

in the

Deed

call eo roortgase)

{herein

lien of a

the

includin;

all rights

and

to any mortgage lender who is prepared to make a

mortgage loan to Lessee to be secured by a first mortgage or Deed
of

Trust

covering

said

fee

Lessor's

interest

pe

premises..,. (o~:suc'h
part thereof as may
.
..
provided that l'iaid mo~:-tgage is

on

in

the

demised

d!3signat.ed by !Jessee}

te~:-ins not more onerous tnan the

following;
Principal~

Not more t'han s~Jenty-five percent· (75·1!;)
of

the

value

mo;t.tgaged

of

as

institl:lt.i"or~al

to

be

(

any

by

lender _propt:?s.~n_g --~o make
as independently ·appraised

loan,

-c.-

if

the

lender

other .than
be
a.n
An insti.t.utional lender is

·institution.
bank,

property

appraised.·

the

a

the

insurance

company.

charitable

institution, c·ollege or other institution
of

learning,

f~ncl,

o~

retirement

any

institution

foregoing.

other

similar

The

self-liquidating

system,

welfare

organization

t.o

any

of

principa~

by

the

mu.st

periodic

or

be

payments

over the term of tbe mortgage;

Kat.uri t.y •

Not

more

than

thirty

{30)

yet:.rs

or

alternatively not more than the period of
the

unex9ired

the

mortgage

GROUND LEASE AGRE£KENT - 16

term be!\o.'eeti

and

the

end

the

of

date

the

of

(

term,
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whichever
means

is

the

exercise

the

shorter.

original

of

the

The

term

rene...,al

"term"

herein

options

or

herein

provided for.
6. 2

ExPenses.

All

expenses

in

connection with the making

of said mortgage or Deed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee,
Lessor will execute

any and all

with respect thereto.

documents

However,

that

:may be

required

Lessor shall assume no personal

liability for the underlying indebtedness,

but the mortgage note
s~lely

or other evidence of indebtedness shall be executed
Lessee.

and

by the

e~tend

The foregoing provisions of this Article shall

to

any construction mortgage loan applied for by Lessee, as well as
any permanent mortgage loan,
in

replacement

and any mortgages in substit\ltion or

as

and

thereof,

as

often

during

term

the

such

loans are applied for by the Lessee.
6.3

Non-Mortgage by Lessor.

Lessor agrees not to place any

mortgage on the preroises' _or permit the same to be encumbered in
\

any manner, without the prior written consent of the Lessee ..

6.4

Limitation on Subordination.

subordinate

any

given

portion

of

Lessor's

the

fee

agreement

title

to

a

to

first

mortgage is limited to one such mortgage on the given portion of
the

fee

title

for

the

purpose

of

enabling

Lessee

to

obtain

financing for the improvements as contemplated herein and located
on the given portion of the leesed land: provided that,

for this

purpose, mortgages securing separate construction and take-out or
permanent

loans

considered to
securing

it

be

for

the

same

one mortgage.

shall

obligor,

of
or

any
any

"'ithout Lessor's
grap"h

of

Both the

expressly

extension of the due date,
alteration

work

provide
in

refinancing

that

the

mortgagee

17

ana
there

of

the

documer.ts,
unpaid

prior "''ritten approval.

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -

note

shall

be

the mortgage
can

be

no

addition to the balance of the loan,

provision

shall prohibit

improvement

from

release

principal

of

any

balance

Nothing in this para-

paying delinquent. taxes

or
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e.ss.essments or providi:>9

insurance

Le~;sor

cure such detaults of Lessee.

subordinate Lessor's

fee

title

a construction

securing

presentation of
notices, of a

or

evidence,

if Lessor fails

coverage

to

to (

shall not be required

the

lien

interim

loan

delivered

as

cf

an

t.o

encumbrance

Lessee's

exc:ept. ·on
provided

for

giving

firm--and-enforceable commitment. for a taKe-out or

permanent loan ..

6. 5
the

Curing of Defaul t.s.

mortgage~

Tne

mortgage

shall

provide
da~e

ox:- trustee may not. accelerate the due

balancoe· outstanding on

any

loa..n

reason

py

of

any

that

of the

default

by

Lessee without having first. given Lessor wri'tt.en notice of such

in

default and without having permitted Lessor thirty

(30) days

which to.._..c:ure
such default or,
..

(30}. ~ays is

necessary

to

cure

adequate ·time · to

such

cure

if more .'than. <:.r.irty

default,

sl.lch

without

default.,

'!'he

having

given

mortgage

Lessor

and related

documents shall further provide t")lat. ·.the performancre of any and
all o·bligatio·n·s .of Lessee thereunder shall be accepted i f
tendex:-ed by Lessor.
Neither Lessor's right to cure any default

(

<.

nor any· exercise of such a

right shell constitute an assumption

·-

--

of liability under the note or rnortgase.
6. 6

:nde:tnnificat.ion.

indemnify Lessor

On

request ·by

from any and all

Lessor,

liability and

Lessee shall
expense caused

Lessor as a result of any .action of Lessee in connection with t.he

mortgage or Deed

o~ Tru~t~

ARTICLE 7

INSURANCE
7.1
Lessee

Liability and Property Damace.

comme~t:::es

From the time when the

construction on· the demised .premises or anr

par~

thereof, the Lessee will cause to l>e wri'tten a policy or _policies
of insurance in the form and contents '"generally Y.no·~·n as pub,lic
liability

and/or

owner • s, landlorcl and te·nant policies a no boiler

insurance policies a nO elevator insuranee pOlicies,

GROUND LEASE AGRE.E:ME:NT -

1$

~·hen

there be

i

\
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boilers and elevators i:>cluded in any imp::ovements located on the
demised premises,

inscring the Lessee against any and all claims

and demands made by any person or ·persons whomsoever for ·injuries
received in connection with t.he operation and mainte·nance of the
premises,

itr.provements,

and

buildings

located

on

the

demised

premises or for any other risk insured against by such policies,
each

class

of

which

policies

shall

have

been

written

within

limits of not less than Five Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($500,000.00) for damages incurred or claimed by any one person
for bodily injury,
No/100
less

Dollars

tr.an

One

{$100,000.00)
Million

~n~~\rretl

damages

or othendse,

or

Dollars

($100' 000. 00)

name

No/100

plus

One

c'lanages

to

·otherwise,

and

Lessee

the

interests may app.,ar,
;

damages

One Hundred Thousand and
to

property,

Dollars

or claimed by more .than

injury,
shall

and

plus

as

for

not

($1,000,000.001

for

Thousand

All

property.
Lessor,

the persons

~dily

one person for

Hundred

the

and

as

such policies
respective

their

assured by

Na/100

and

such

policies;

and the original or duplicate original of each of such policy or
policies shall be delivered by the Lessee to the Lessor promptly
upon

the

writing

of

such

policies,
pre~iums

evidence of the fact that the
7.2

together

with

adequate

are paid.

Fire and Wind Damaoe Insurance.
( 1)

agrees
lease

with

Lessor that. from

comrnen~s,

buildings

and

all

or

loss

improvements
damage

termed

coverage",

which

which

said

will

which

by

in

interest from being
the risk,

and

Lessee

after

the Lessee will keep

generally
amount

The

Lessee's 0Dlioation.

be
or

a~ount

upon

fire

the

the

19

the

insured

said

insurance

insurance

"'ill

sufficient

to

any and all

premises against

trade
be

and

time when the

~.<indstorm,

and

and
as

what

"extended

maintained

prevent

is

any

in

an

party

in

becoming a co-insurer on any part of
shall not

b~

( 80%) of t..he full insurable value,

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -

covenants

less than eighty percent
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of insurance shall include th-e··name of.the''Lessor as one of(.
the parties insur~d thereby and shall fully protect both the
Lessor ana
appear.
or

the

ln the

their

respective

by

ins·urance

fire,

shall

windstorm,

be

payable

or

other

and

as

said

may

sums

so

paid

shall

be

Bannock County,

!daho,

and

shall be

Lessee foi- the construction or repair,

in

bank

made

as
a

the

joint

located

available

as

su.ch

Lessor and

deposited

account of the Lessor and the Lessee in a

for

casualty

often

insurance money shall have been paid to the
Lessee,

interest

event of destruction of the said buildings

improvements

which

as

Lessee

to

in
the

the case may be,

of any building or building.s damaged or destroyed by fire,
windstorm, or other casualty for which
money shall
. insurance
.
be 'l?a:)iable

arid

.Lessee from

shall

said

be

joint

paid

out by

account

from

the

Lessor
to

tit:1e

and

the

on

the

time

estimate of any reliable architect licensed in the State of
Iclaho having jurisdiction of such reconstr-uc.tion and repair,

(

certifying t:.h.at t".iu:~ arilount. of such estimate is being applied
to

the payment

reasonable

of

the

reconst.ruction

cost therefor;

provided,

or

repair

however,

and

a

at,

that :i.t

first

be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Lessor that the
total

amount

of

money

reconstruction or
destroyed

or

the~for,

purpose

and

the Lessee

repair

injured,

aclopted

its

by

application

part· thereof,
f.ire,

to

provide

a.ny buii'€-ing

or

for

for

and agrees

according to the plans

as

for such

such purpose assured; and
that

in

the

of the buildings a·nd
and

often

as

event

or

other

casualty,

of

the

improvements or

any

buildil')g

said prewises shell be Oestro:;ed or

windstorm,

the

buildings

has been provided by the Lessee

covenants

improvement on

of

as aforesaid,

destruct'ion or damage
any

necessary

the

or

.dar:t~ged

Lessee

shall

rebuild and repair the sarne in such manner that the building
or

it:tprovernen't

so

G!l.O.\lND LE:AS:E; AGREEMENT -
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property upon the .demised premises prior to
destruction,

such damage

or

and shall have the same rebuilt and ready for

occupancy "'i. thin fi £teen 115) months from the time •ihen the
loss or destruction occurred.
for reconstruction

shall

The fifteen

be

enlarged

(15) ·month pe::-iod

by

delays

caused

without fault or neglect on the part. of the Lessee by act of
God,

str i k"'s,

lockouts,

or

other

conditions

beyond

the

The originals of all

such

Lessee's control.
(2)

Delivery of Policies.

policies

shall

be

delivered

to

the

Lessor

by

the

Lessee

along .,.ith the receipted bills evidencing the fact that the
premiums

therefore

are

paid;

but

nothing

herein

shall .be construec as prohibiting the l;essee

contained

from financing

the premiums .,.here the terms of the policies are for three
(3)

years

or

more

and

in

such

event

the

receipts

evidence i t to be the fact that the installment
ment or

payments

Where,

maturities~

premises

are

created
upon

policies to be
shall deliver
policies.

at

however,

pursuant

this lease and if,
obligatory

paid

or

before

there

to

the

is

pre~ium

their

a

shall

respective

mortgage

provisions

on

Lessee

to cause

the

the

contained

under the terms of such mortgage,

the

pay-

in

it is

c.;riginals of. the

delivered to the mortgagee,

then the Lessee

to the Lessor duplicate certificates of such

The policies or duplicate certificates thereof,

as the case may be,

shall be delivered by the Lessee t.o the

Lessor at least ten (10) days prior to the effective date of
the policies.

(3)

Effect of Mortcaae Subordination.

All of the pro-

visions herein contained relative to the disposition of payments from insurance companies are subject to the fact that
if any mortgagees holding a mortgage created pursuant to the
provisions of

this

lease hereof elects,

the terms of such mortgage,

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 21
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the insurance 'be paid
-mort.saCJe,
event,

then

it

such

to the
payment

shall· stiJ.l

create the

complete

be

£uno

mortgagee

on account of sueh

shall

made,

'be

cb:..igatory
in

the

but

in

.such

upon· ·the·" Lessee

manner

set

section t.o assur.e and .:or.oplete the payment

forth

to

in this

for the work

of

reconstruction and r.e-pair .•
Damaoes: Inst.~rance Proceeds: Joint. Bank l\ccount.

{4j

I"t is agreed that any excess. cf rnoney received from insurance remaining in the

joint bank account after the recon-

struction or repair of such building

or

buildings, if there

be no default on t.he part of the Less'ee in t'he

perfort'"~nce

of the covenants herein, shall ·be paid to the Lessee, and in
case. . of the Lessee: not·: enterittg. into the

reconstruction or

repair of the building er buildings withi:> a period •of six
(fi)

months

damage

from

or

after

date -of

payment

destr1lction · occNa-sioned

other cause for
prosecuting the
necessary

the

the

fire,

after

windstorm,

or

(

sam~

insurance --money shall be payable. and
t.heiTeaft.er with !<uch dispatch as may be
sa~.e

the

occurr-ence

occasioned as

lo~s,

the

~hich ..

coit~.plet.e

to

by

of

of

aforesaid,

\.Tith:i.n

'such

then

the

fifteen

dam'age
<?.:mount

the balance there,pf_ re-maining in the

or

(15)

n:ont.'hs

aestruction

so collectetl,

joint account,

or

as the

case may be,

sha~l be paid to :the ·Lessor and it will be at

the Lessor • s

cpt.~_on

___to terr.1ina te the

lease a-nd retain stJch

·amount as li.quida!:,ed. and agreed upon damages

resulting from

the· failure of the Lessee to promptly, ~ithin the time spec-

ifiedi complete such worK

reconstruction and repair.

The

fift.-e_en ( ~5) month period herein provided for reconstruction
shall be enlarged by delays caused wit.hout. fault. or neglect
on the part of th.e Lessee by act ·of God,
or ot'her

conditions

str~kes,

lockout,

(other than matters of finance.)

beyond

the control of Lessee.
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(5)

(

Direct Repavment.

in the event

the

The

insurance

foregoing notwithstanding,

proceeds are

Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars
such proceeds
the

($25,000.00) or less,

then

shall be paid directly to the Lessee Without

necessity

hereinabove

the sum of Twenty

of

creating

set forth,

the

joint.

bank account
Lessee shall use such funds

and

~ake

the replacements or repairs as required hereunder.

7.3

Lessee's Covenant to Pay lnsurance Premiu."'s•

as
to
The

Lessee covenants and agrees with Lessor that the Lessee will pay
premil.lr.ls for a 11
obligated
deliver

to

to

of the

carry
the

insurance policies which the Lessee

under

Lessor

the

terms

evidence

of

of

this

such

lease,

payments

payment .:;f_any. such premiums become i.n.default,
will

cause renewa 1 s

policies or

copies

of

and

will

before

and

is
the

the Lessee

expiring pal icies ·to be w:ri tten and the

thereof,

as

the

lease

may

:require,

delivered to Lessor at least ten {10} days before the

to

be

expira~ion

date of such expiring poli:ies.
7.4

Indemnification.
Lessee agrees

Defense and Pavment of Claims.

(a}

to

defenc, indemnify and hold Lessor harmless together with all
of its servants, agents, or el:lployees,
liability

or

loss

for

injuries

from and against all

to or deaths of

persons or

damages to property caused by Lessee's acts or omissions
act,

use

result of

of.

or

occupancy

of

Lessee's operations

party hereto

shall

give

to

the

leased

on said

the

other

land,

leased
parties

or

as

land.

to
the

Each

prompt and

timely notice of any claim or suit instituted coming to its
kno..,ledge

which

in

any

way,

contingently or other,.,ise,
party,

directly

or

indirectly,

affects or might affect another

and all parties shall have the ri<;!ht to participate

in the defense of the .same to the

extent of each

parties'

own interest.
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Mechanic's Liens.

(b)

·ether liens

filed

or

orders

ln the event any mechanic's or (

f.or

the

against

land

~hereon

improvements

payment

reason

by

of
any

or

of

money

or

shall

be

building

arising· aut

of

any

labor, material furnished or alleged to have been furnished,
or to be furnished to or for Lessee on the

for or by reason of any change,

alteration,

the

or

cost

thereto.,

•

leased land,

or
or

e:Kpense
against

shall, within thirty
'knowledge

thereof,

thereof,
the

Lessor

any

as

or addition of

contract.

owner

or

relating

thereof,

Lessee

days after i t receivo::s notice or

00}

ei t.her pay or bond

the· sal1\e qr

provide

for t.he discharge thereof in ·s·uch manner as may be provided

-

by law.
..

-Lessee shall

also defend· on -\::.ehalf of Les:so:r at

e~pense,

any action, suit or proceeding wnich

Lessee's sole
may

brought

be

lien~,

o·r

orders,

discharg~ any
Lessor
to

direct

Les<."e

attorney • s

any

and

Lessor
the

shall

and

judgrne':'t

from

therefrom.

thereon,

fees,

the

enforcer-lent

Lessee

shall

entered

tnerein

reser~es

all

for

all

defense

pay

or

of

claims

pay

any

and

of

damage

save

or ·dar.\ages

{c)

~r

the right,

ho~ever,

to defend or

any

suit

ptoceedings.

expenses

such

!.uch

of

inol·~cling

ca:fense,

·dama~]e

and shall pay any

or

and dischaq;,e any

Resistin\01 C;i,S+1"'!!·

on account. of building,

In

tne

rebuilding,

other>dse·.improvins
z:ight. t.o do so,

funas into escrow in an
or lien,

from any

darnag·es resulting ·therefrol:l ..

event

Lessee . shall

l,i eps.,

any 'other claim l!!gainst the hereinabove described

have the

I

\

resulting

desire to resist. any mechanic's or r..eterialmen • s

tion or

and

harmless

judgment entered therein and save Lessor harmless
and all clairas

sucb

the

leased

land,

premises

:reconstrucLessee shall

provided Lessee shall first. place

amoun~

with said escrow

repairing,

or

sufficient to pay said

direc~ed

clai~

to pay such claim or lien

in the event of a result adverse to Lessee.
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7.5

Insurer Qualified.

The insurer

authori:z:ed through the· Department of

shall be qualified and

Insurance of the State

of

ldaho.
AR'I'lCLE 8

ASSESSMENTS, LIENS AND ENCUHBPANCES

T~~ES,

Lessee shall be responsible to pay and discharge all existing and
lien

taxes

and assessments which are or may become

upon or "'hich may

other

tax

the;:-eon
also

future

levying

body

levied

upon

responsible

for

liabilities, .charges,
associated· with
land

or

all

fees,

the State,

leased

the

land

leased

insurance
to

but

the

not

County or

any

improver:~ents

or

land.

Lessee

premiums,

obligations,

relating

including,

by

the

or property located on

be

leased

be

and

shall

for

all

liens and encumbrances

existence

lirr.ited

to,

and

use

all

of

the

assessment

installments due or payable after the date of this lease.
pa~ents

of

taxes

or

installment payments,

assessments
shall

year and for the year in

be

~hich

or

a

both,

prorated

for

except
the

All

permitted

initial

the lease terminates.

lease

Lessee

~ay,

in its own name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name,
contest in_good faith by all appropriate proceedings, the amount,
applicability

or

validity

of

any

tax,

assessment

pertainir.g to the leased land, or to any building,

or

fine

structure or

improvement upon the leased land, and in the event Lessee does in
good

faith

contest

assessment

or

the

fine,

applicability

Lessor '-'ill

whenever possible with

Lessee:

or

validity

cooperate

provided

that

in

of

any

such

tax,

contest

such contest "'ill

not subject any part of the leased land to forfeiture or loss,
except that,
such ta:x,

i f at any time payment of the

~hole

or any part of

assessment or fine shall bec:one necessar:r in order to

prevent any such forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or
cause the same to be paid in

tit:~e

to prevent such forfeiture or

loss.
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ARTICLE 9
·CONDEMNATION
9~

l

P_rioritye

In the event .of the

taking or condemnation

by any competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or

purpose of the whole or materially all of the demised premises at
any time during··the term and .after any outstanding first mortgage
indebtedness ha·s ·been

paid and

satisfied,

then

the

rights

Lessor and Lessee to share in the net proceeds o.f any awards
land,

bu il.dings,

o£
for

impro•.ie:n\ents and da.';'ages u;ron. a11-y such taking,

shall be as .follow., and in the following_ order of priority:
. (a l Lessor,

at all titnes, regardless of w'nen the taking

occur>;, shall be entitled to receive, with interest thereon,
that
of
··- ..porticon
'
..

the

aw-ard

as

shall

represent compens'.ltion

for the value of. t·he demised premises,
and unimproved· land,
to as. the

considered as vacant

such value being hereinafter

"land val.ue•.

referred

Lessor shall also be entitled to

(

costs awarded in the cdtidemnation proceed,ing. -proportionately
attribu.table .to such larid value.
(b} (1)

During all the term herein demised, e>::cept the

last five years of the term, Lessee shall .be -entitled to the
entire balal'lce

of

the award,

which

balance

is hereinaf-ter

referred to as "award balance•.
(2)

If·

the

taking

or

condemnation

as

above

set

forth shall occur at any time during the last five years of
the

term,

Lessee

shall ·be

entitled

a"'ard, With intere··st ···thereon,
{a.n(l

in

proportion

elapses from the

for

receive out

of the

the a'-"ard bslan.ce. diminished

by twenty. percent ·po%) ·of such
year

to

a

aw~rd

bal.a.nce for

fraction

firs·t day of said

five

of

a

eacn full
year)

that

year period to the

date of the vesting of title in the condemnor; the remaining
award balance and interest thereon,

as well as the a1.>ard for

la.nd value and intere.st thereon, shall belong to the Lessoro

GROU!:l!) LEASE AGREE:MENT -
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For

(3)

years of the
and

(2)

the

purpose

term within

above,-.it--i-s

of

computins

the meaning

agreed

that

the

last

five

of- subparagraphs

said. "last

( l)

five

years"

shall mean the last five years of the original ·term,

or if,

at or prior to the date that the award or the first partial
payment thereof
payable,

the

(if there be such partial payments) becomes

parties

shall have

duly

agreed

to extend

the

term of this lease pursuant to the options to renew herein
contained or by a written instrument executed in the manner
required for

recording,

deemed to mean

the

then said last

last five

(5)

five years s'hall be

years of the term as

so

extended•
, (_c) Lf the values of the respective interests of Lessor
and Lessee shall be determined accor-ding
of

subdivisions

(a)

ceeding purscant

and

(b)

to which

been taken or c::mdemned,

of

the

this

to the provisions

Section

in

the

pro-

demised premises shall have

the values

conclusive upon Les.sor and Lessee.

so deter-mined shall be
lf such values shall not

have been thus separately determined,

such values

shall be

'....

fixed by agr-eement between the Lessor and Lessee or- if they
are unable to agree,

then the controversy shall be re3olved

by arbitration under the procedure to gove!'n in Arbitration
as set forth in this lease hereof under Article 13.
(d) In the

event.

of the taking J.n condemnation of less

than the whoie of the demised premises but materially all of
said premises

as

premises

remains

that

IJas

t'hat

taken,

hereinbelow defined
then

improvement only,
shall endeavor

to

but

includes
as
not

to

the

any

agree on

a

and

part

the

of

untaken

remaining
then

the part
the

the

improvement

:.-er.~ainder

lana,

of

the

of

the

pa::-ties

fair oa.r'ket value of

such remainder of the improvement, and if they fail to agree
then the

controversy shall be resolved by arbitration.

The

value so agreed upon as the then fair market value of

such
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remainder

of the

tion, but

diminished in the same manner as provided for

·~(b)" above

Lessor to

improvement or

as

balance~·,

relative to an ''award

Lessee,

share of the

determined

c-

in

shall be paid by

and until paid shall be a

a~o~ard

in arbitre-

charge on the

for land val(Je to which Lessor shall be

entitled in the condemnation proceeding.
(e) If

title

demised .premises

to

the

shall

whole

be

or

materially

taken or

all· of

condemned,

this

the

lease

shan cease and terminate as to the provision so taken
shall

terminate

as

judgment the taking

to

the

entire

:r:~aterially

parcel

if

in

and

Lessee's

and substantially affects the

use and value of the rePainder of the demised premises,
ARTICLE: 10
DEFhULT PROVlSIONS; REMEDIES; :>..TTORNEY' S FEES

10.1

Each

Default by Lessee.·

of

the

following

shall

be

deemed an event of defau.lt by Less•ee and ii. breach of this lease:
Rent or Other Payments.

(a)

(,.

If Lessee shall default

in the payment of rent or ot.her payments hereunoer whe.n due

tO the terms of this lease

according
correct

the

same

within

thirty

and

does

days

(30)

not

after

fully

Wt"i~.t.en

notice thereof to Lessee.
default

in

the

performance

coven·Q.nt

or co"ndition

mortgage,

Deed of Trust,

financing

of

Lessee,

If

Otf\er C9ve.nants or Conditions.

(b)

or

not

ana does

not

this'

lease

or

of

any

other

of

any .note'

or ·other document relating to the

the hospital

whether

documents,

of

observance

·Or

Lessee shall

to be
Lessor

fully

performed
is

a

correct

or

party
the

observed
to

same

any

by

such

within

30

days afte.r notice the;reof to the Lessee.
(c)

Abandonment.

Abandonment of the premises.

(d)

Bankruotcy )"·ro:ceedings.

ll: during the Term of

this lease, Lessee shall:

(

·,.
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(i~

(

Ancointment of Receiver.

Apply

for

or consent in writing, signed on behalf of Lessee
or

its

duly

authoriz.ed

appointment of a receiver,

attorney.

to

the

trustee or liquidator

of the Lessee or of all or a substantial part of
Lessee~s

assets~

{ii)

voluntary

or

Voluntary Bankruptcy.
petition

File

a

in

bankruptcy or admit in
writing its· inability "to pay its debts as they
become due; or
(iii)

Assignment for Creditors.

a
general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
or
{iv)

a

Ma"l<e

Reoroanization or Arranoement.

File
reorganization or arrangement witb creditors to

take advantage of any insolvency law; or
(vl Admit Insolvency.
File an answer
admitting tbe material allegations of a petition
filed

against.

Lessee

in

any

bankruptcy,

reorganiz.ation or insolvency proceeding, or
during the Term of this lease, an order, judgment
or

decree

competent
creditor,

shall

be

entered

jurisdiction,

by

any

court

of

on the application cf a

adjudicating

Lessee

bankrupt

or

a petition seeking a
reorganization
of Lessee
appointing
a
or
receiver, trustee or liquidator of Lessee, or of
all or a substantial part of its assets.

insolv.&nt

10.2
this

lease

Remedies.
by

or approving

!n the

Lessee,

then

event of any breach or default of
Lessor,

besides

other

ri9hts

of

re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of
the hospital and use o! the property upon the premises for these
purposes.

GROUND
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re-e~ter

Should Lessor elect to
should Le'ssor taice

possession pursuant to legal proceedings.

pursuant to any notice provided
terminate t.his
t~>nninating

for
such

ether

such

this lease,

Lessor

may

by

and

r:epairs to the

conditions
wit~

premises.

sha~l

la'-",

from

or

Lessor may either

time

to t.'imer

-without

relet said premises or any part thereof

deem advisable,

reletting

for

te.-ms and at such

terms
m~y

discretion
and

lease or

such term or

(,
as herein provided, or

be

rental or rentals and

as

Lesser

in

upon

Lesser's

sole

the right to make alterations

Rentals

applied'

received by Lessor
to

first.,

payment

from

of

any

indebtedness, other than rent, due Lessor hereunder from Lessee;
second,

to the paj~.ent of rent due'and unpaid hereunder; third,

to the payment· of ·any costs
payment

of

the

cost

of

of

any

such

rel ett"ing;

alterations

and

fourth,

to the

repairs

t.o

the

premises made necessary by Lessee's breaeh of the provisions of
this lease; and the residue,

if any,

shall be ·held by. Lessor and

applied in payment of future rent as the_ same may become due and

payable

hereunder.

s~ch

such
reletting be less than the rental agreed to be paid that montb by
Lessee hereunder,
then Lessee shall pay such deficiency to
Lessor.

Should

rental

rece·ived

from

Such deficiency shall be calculated. an.S paid monthly.

t<o such re-er,try or taking possession of the premis.es by Lessor
shall. be construed as an election on Lessor's part to terminate
this lease unless a written notice of such intention is given to
Lessee or unless the termination thereof be cecreed by a
competent

jurisdiction..

without termination.

cou~t

of

Notwithstanding any such relettin'ii

LeS$Or may at any time thereafter elect to

terminate this lease for such previous breach.
Sho~la Lessor at any ti~e terminate this lease

fOr any

breach, in addition to any other remedy Lessor may have, Lessor
may recover from Lessee all eamages Lessor may incur by reason of
such breach,
including

including the costs of recovering the premises, ana

the

worth

at

the

ti,-,e

of

such

termination

of

the

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 30,
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•·
excess,

if

any,

of

charges

equivalent

the
to

amount
rent

:remainder of the Term over

of

:rent,

:reserved

the then

additional

in

this

reasonable

the premises for the remainder of the Term.

:rent

and

for

the

lease

:rental value of

The

remedies herein

given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the exercise of any one
remedy by Lessor shall not be to the exclusion of any other
remedy.

With previous written notice or demand,

separate actions

may be maintained by .Lessor against Lessee from
recover

any rent

or damages

which,

at

the

time to time to

commencem.,nt

of

any

such action, has become due and payable to Lessor without waiting
until the end of the Term of this lease.
10.3

Attorney's Fees.

In the

event suit

shall be brought

.for an unlawfui detainer of the said premise.;,

for the recovery

of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, or because of
the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or
performed,

the

prevailing

party

shall

be

paid

a

reasonable

attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee shall
be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and

shall

be

paid

whether

or

not

such

action

is

prosecuted

.·

to

judgment.
J'.CTICLE 11
COVENANTS AND WARRANTIES

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this lease, lessee
agrees

to

take

condition,

posses,.,ion

of

provided hO"-'ever,

the
that

leased
Lessor

land

in

an

covenants,

"as

is"

represents

and warrants as follows:
11.1
the

Title.

leased

That Lessor has

land

Lessor's right,

and

title

said
and

title

interest

good and
is

free

in

and

marketable title to
and
to

unencumbered.

the

leased land,

except for this lease and :for any lien or indebtedness incurred
pursuant to

Article 4,

sha~l

not be

subordinated

to any other

clairo or interest of Less!"e or to any other claim or interest of

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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...
any mortgagee or other .creditor in connection with the financing (
of the improvements to be constructed on the leased premises.
11.2 .. 1\iaht-·to Execute.

has

That· Lessor

full

right.

and

power ·to execute and pex:-.form tnis lease and to grain the estate
leased

herein

and

the

rights,

easemen·t.s,

privileges,.

appurtenances and heredi tarnents belonging or pertaining ther~to,
·including. air-rights.

11.3
herein

Feaceful.Enjoyment.

reserved

That Lessee,

perforr.~ing

and

the

on ·p·aying the ..r;:;nt

covenants 'and

provisiol)s

hereof on its part to be. performed, shall peacefully and qu"ietly
have ·and enjOy the leasad __ ,~and,
required

rights,

p r i vi l e·g e s ,

easements,

:tu:redi ta.rn.e.nts- belonging

and ·all such existing or .future

or

appurtenances
·<thereto,

pertaining

air-rights·, during tne Ter;n; provided, however,
net

wan:·ant

t'hat

governmental

during' the Terml without
·pass

ordinances

or

authority

t.ne con.sent

perform

a<ot.s

may

or

which

including

that Lessor does
not

at

permission
may

and

):le

some time
of

Lessor,

prejudicial

to

(

Les·see ·thl:"ci.;gh no £ault of Lesso:r; provided, however, that Lessor
agrees

join "".. it.h

·t.o

ordinances·· or acts,

'L~ssee

in

protest.

or

opposition

to

such

the expenses of such opposition to be borne

by Lessee ..
. . .JI.ll:'l'l CLE 12

ASSl.GNM.:E;N'l', SU$LE;I:TlNG AJ:lD SALE

·12 .. 1

-

.

A.ssionmen.:t,.,

sv..blett.ing a,nd

·Sal~~

Lessee

may

not

assign or sublet this lease agreement "-'it.hout. the' prior written
consent
Lessor, whictn consent shall
not. be unreasonably
withheld; provided, however,

that in t:he

event LessD'r gives its

consent. for tbe assignment or sublettin.g .of this
bourili.

only

by

priv·ileges li.s

such
are

set

enjoys ·such rights and
·..
lt
is
el<presssly
:f;orth in this. leas·e.

obligations

and

ag'reed t'hat Lessor may requ!.re, as a ctDndition of such consent,
that tr.e officers of the Lessee corporation agree
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<.

ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants
of Lessee's assignee(s} or subtenant(s)
event Lessee shall determine to sell

this Lease.

un~er

all or

any

ln the

portion of

the

hospital, and/or any additions or expansions thereto or thereof,
gran~ed

:erni.:t:Xt<e:~[

Lessor s;<all be

market value which,

firsc

to purchase

righ~

r~f~sai

cf

tne hospital as

the

unless agreed upon by the parties,

fair

shall be

determined by an M• .A.I. real estate appraiser appointed and paid
by Lessor.

If Lessee is not satisfied "ith the fair market value

appraisal submitted by the appraiser selected by Lessor,
roay,

at

its

own

expense

and

receipt of the appraisal,

within

twenty

(20)

days

Lessee
of

tbe

select an M.A. I. real estate appraiser

who, together with the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose
a

third_ such

appraiser

Lessor and Lessee.

whose

the sole appraiser
as

to

sha,ll be

sno.red e·;p.lally by

lf Lessee fails to select a

within the time allowed,
hospital.

fees

and

second appraiser

the single appraiser appointed shall be
shall set

the

fair

market value of the

lf Lessee does timely act, and a majority cannot agree

the

fair

market

"ppraisals shall
three (3).

be

value

added

of

the

hospital,

together and

their

the

three

(3)

total divided by

The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value

of the hospital for the purpose of this purchase option.

ARTICLE 13
~~BITAATIO}l:

13.1

Arbitration.

of any matter

arising

AP?~!-qTH~

Either party may require the arbitration
under or

in connection

'.lith this

lease.

Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice spec:i£yin9
the matter to be arbitrated.
matter

concernin9

ineffective

w'hich

unless

given

If ac.tion is already pending· on any

the

notice

before

the

is

given,

expiration

the
of

notice
thirty

is
(30)

days after service of process on the person g·iving the notice.
E:<.cept
arbitration,

CROOND

as

provided. to

the

the contrary in these provisions on

arbitration shall be in conformity and subject
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to applicable

rules

Association.

and

T'ne

procedures

arbitrators

of the

shall

be

American

bound

Ar~itration

this

by

lease.

Pleadings in any action pending on the same matter shall, if the
arbitration is

required . or

Each

be

deemed

to

amended

to those contemplated by the rules prescribed

l_imit the issues
above.

consented to,

party

shall

pay

including arbitrator • s fees.

half

the

cost

.l>.t. torneys • fees

of

arbitration

shall be a'"'arded as

separately provided in this lease.
13.2
required

hJ;POir>t:nent.
for

the

provided to the

Appointment shall be made in the manner

appointment

c:o>;1trary

of

arbitrators

in the applicable

unless

expressly

provisions

of

this

leas e.
·The!e shall be three {3) arbitrato:::s appointed as t:o;l.lows,
Within

(a)

twenty

(ZO)

days

after

not.ice

req,.iring

each party shall appoint one (l) arbitrator and

arbitration,

give notice of the appointment to the other party.
(b)

The

t'Wo

{2)

arbitrators

shall

c:hoose

(

a. third

arbitrator 'Nithin thirty (30) days after appoint:ro.ent of the
second ..

lf either party fails to appoint an arbitrator,

(c)

·or if the

two

(2)

arbitrators

fail

to choc;se a

third,

the

appointment shall be made by the then presiding judge of the
Superior

Court.

for

the

county

in

which

located,

acting in his individual and

the

premises

nonofficia.l

are

capacity

on the ap_pli"ca tiOn of either party and on ·(30) days' notice
to

the

other

party;

provided

that

~i ther

party

may,

by

notice 9 i ven before, commencement of the arbitr'>tion hearing,
consent to

arbitration. by t'he

other party.

arbitrator

In
shall

that
be

event,
oade

arbitrator
no

and

further
any

appoint~d

by the

appointi:lents

other

of

arbitrators

previously appointed snall be dismissed.
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ARTlCLE: 14
Ml SCELLAHEOUS PROV! S! ON S
E~ercise.

14.1

of Rene..,al Ot>tion. ___Les~_e"!._ !"e:Y exercise

its

option to extend the Term granted under Article I, paragraph 1.2,
hereof,

by giving

Lessor written

notice

thereof

net later than

120 days prior to the expiration date of the Term.
exercised shall

extend the

lease

on

the

same

A.ny option so

terms

as

effect at the time of the exercise of such options,

are

in

subject to

adjustment and notification in accordance herewith.
14.2
leased

Inspection bv :.essor.

land at

any

reasonable

Lessor

time

for

may

enter

any purpose

upon

the

necessary,

incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance
of Lessee's obligat5.ons her-eunder, but subject to any provisions
-.

0

M

'

with respect thereto

14.3

'

other~ise

Partne~shi~.

Necation of

..

•

contained herein.
Nothing

in this lease shall
a~y

be construed to render the Lessor in any way or forpartner,

joint

venturer,

:..essee other than

or associate

that of

landlord

lease be construed to authorize

in any

and

purpose a

relationship with

tenant,

nor

shall this

either to act as agent for the

other except as expressly provided to the contrary in this lease.

14.4

Controllin~

made and shall

Law.

This

1 ease

shall

be

deemed

<;.n

be

be construed in accoroance with the laws of the

State of Idaho.

14.5
deliver

to

Leon:or

termination of

this

good

and

condition

provided herein,
shall

execute

possession
lease
in

of

or as

the

with

agrees

demised

other"ise

accoroance

the

to yield and
lane

provideo

and

deliver

Succes!lors.

to

Lessor

a

ell:press
good

at

herein,

the
in

obligations

except for reasonable wear and tear,

document of relinquishment,
14.6

Lessee

Surrender of Possession.

and

and Lessee
sufficient

if and When requested.

This lease

shall bind and

inure to the

benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors
or

assignees

G~OUND L£~SE

of

Lessee

AGREEME~T

'<~hether

resulting

frorn

any

mer'i!er,

- 35
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•...

(
reorg~nilation,

con so 1 ida tion,

assignment,

foreclosure

or

\

otherwise.
14.7

Headinqs.

contained herein

are

The
for

article

and

paragraph

convenience and reference' and

itnended to define or limit the scope of any

headings
are

not

pr.ovision of this

lease.
14.8

Notices.

All notices required to be given to Lessee

under the terms of the lease shall be given by certified mail,
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed to Lessee as
follo'-'s:

·-.. ..

STERLING DEv~LOPMENT CO., a
Washington partnership
1906 Eroad..-ay
Vancouver, Washington ·98563

"it.h copy to:

HORENSTEIN, WYNNE, FERGUSON & STOUMBOS
12.20 Main Street, s.uite 300
p. 0. Box 694
Vancouver, ~ashington 98556
or at

such other addresses as

delivered to Lessor.

Lessee may

(

designate in writing

Similar notice shall be aOdressed to Lessor

as follows: ·

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
Suite 2200, 3S South State Street
Salt Lake City, Ut~h 94111

. -·

with <;!opy to;

POCATELLO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
177 flospi t a l Way
Pocatellot !daho 83201
Attention:

Chris hnton,

Ad~~nistrator

or at. such other address as Lessor may desi<;~nate in· writing
delivered to Lessee.
Notices shall be sent in a similar manner
to any

r.~ortgegee

of Lessee at such address as may be designated

(

in '-'rit.ingo
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14.9
/

~.lT\endment.

of Lease.

Lessor and Lessee shall cooperate

and incLlde in this lease by suitable amendment from time to time
any provision that

may reasonably

be

requested by any proposed

Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing
protection provisions contained

~he

Mortgagee

in this lease and ello..,ing

such

mortgagee reasonable meens to protect or preserve the lien of a

.

~

··.~

Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of
this lease.
and

to

Lessor and Lessee each agree .to execute and deliver

acknowledge

if

necessary

agreement necessary to effect

for

recording

purposes,

any

such a.>nendment; provided, ho,.,ever,

such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent under
this

lease

nor

otherwise

in

any

respect

adversely

affect

the

execute

and

rights of the Lessor in this lease.
l4.J.O ·~ecording.
ha·~e

ackno,.,ledged,

and

Lessor

and

Lessee

Lessee

agrees

to

agree

to

deliver

to Lessor,

a

rnemorandu:11 o£ this lease in the form attached hereto as Exhibit
"B"

for the purpose of recol:ding such memorandum with the County

Recorder of Bannock County.
IN WITNESS !><"HEREOF,

the parties have set their hands

the day and year first above written.

LESSOR:
INTEF~OU~TA!N

HEALTH CARE, INC., a

Utah non-profit corporation
authorized to do business in Idaho,
dba Pocatello Regional Medical
Center

By
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DEVELOP~IENT

STERLING

co~

1

Washington partnership

~~--H-.--L-.-~--C-E_L_O_S_l________~-------

Sy ___

:ey - /

?.

.'\'l:!~ST:

.
w~-

JO!!N l\. Yl!DlTSKY

·.· . .

~/~W'L--_
7
.

'

..

?

-~.

-·

.

~

STATE OF

)

&M~ ss ..

County of

/l

;;v-

~ 1 l~r

On .this 2._Cday of

undersigned,

a

19.{3 , be:t;ore l:'le, the

PUJ?lli in~-- for said State, personally
odua,/£ th.,;t;:;;.
~=:!: -=---~-----=~,.---------.
.
l.

.a

"~~......,._.. ..___._~

P~es:I:dent

tpt

INTERMOUNTAIN HEJ\.L'I'H CARE:,
Medical

,

(

Notary

appeared
known to me to Oe
aut~v~ized

.

to

Center,

a~

business
th~

INC. ,

in

ana Secrgtary,

a

Utah

idaho,

corporation ·that

re:spect:i"<e Yr

non-pro 'fit
d~a

corporation

Pocatello

executed

of

the

Regional
foregoing

instrument, -and acknowledged .to rne that such corporation executed
the same.
IN WITNtSS WHtREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
\/ritter. ..

/NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State
of Idaho
, residing at Pocatello

(
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(

STATE OF
County of

)
:

IDAHO
Bannock

ss ..

)
Januat"y

On this .2!.Ehday of
undersigned,

a

Notary

Public in

a'ppeared M. L. CANGELOSI
General

Partners

par~nership,

the

of

19~,

and

for

and JCH< P... YU0111iKY ,
STERLING

partnership

said

that

State,

k.nown

DEVELOPHENT

before me,

to me

CO.,

executed

a
the

the

personally
to be the
Washington
foregoing

instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I have hereunto set rny hand and affixed

my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above

--.

written.-

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State
of Idaho
, residing at Pocatcello

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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Merrill & Merrill
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Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
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208-529-9732

Number of pages in addition to this cover sheet: 2
To:

Michael D. Gaffuey

Of:

BEARD ST. CLAIR

From:

Dave R. Gallafent/Gayla

Client/Matter:

Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge, et al
Bannock County Case No. CV-10-2724-0C

Date:

November 27, 2012

COMMENTS:

Attached hereto please find my letter dated November 27, 2012 pursuant to the
above-referenced matter. Please contact our office with any questions, thank you.

THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO WHICH IT IS
ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL, AND EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED
RECIPIENT OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO THE INTENDED
RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, OR COPYING OF THIS
COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR,
PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE
ABOVE ADDRESS VIA THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. THANK YOU.
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DAVE R. GALLAFENT
KENT L. HAWKINS*
BRENDON C. TAYLOR
KENT A. IDGGINS*
JARED A. STEADMAN
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK
TYLER H. NEILL
*ALSO ADMI'ITED IN UTAH

MERRILL & MERRILL
CHARTERED

A.L. MERRILL (1886-1961)
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972)
W.F. MERRILL (1919-2005)

COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW
109 N. ARTHUR-

5TH

FLOOR

P.O. BOX991

TELEPHONE:208-232-2286
FAX:208-232-2499

POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991

Founded in 1913

November 27, 2012

Via Facsimile: 529-9732
Michael D. Gaffney
Bread St. Clair
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Re:

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC
(Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C)

Dear Mike:
We are in receipt of Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment entered yesterday in the
above-referenced action, which judgment declares that your client "is obligated to promptly pay
PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement." Accordingly,
formal demand is hereby made on Quail Ridge and/or Forest Preston, individually, to "promptly"
pay that amount to PMC.
Although we acknowledge receipt of your Notice of Appeal, we do not believe that the filing of
such appeal has any impact on PMC's right to immediate payment of the past due rent which has
now been declared by the Court as currently due and owing. Quail Ridge is obligated to make
prompt payment of this amount under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement and
Forest Preston, individually, is liable for this past due rent amount pursuant to the 2001
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him.
As such, Quail Ridge and Forest Preston, individually, are hereby put on notice that if payment
to PMC in the amount of$416,812.50 is not made within ten days, then PMC will consider Quail
Ridge in breach of its rent obligations under the Ground Lease Agreement and Forest Preston in
breach of his payment obligations under the Guarantee of Payment and Performance. If you do
not consider yourself as legal counsel for Mr. Preston and are not authorized to accept this
demand for payment on his behalf, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can make
direct demand upon him. Quail Ridge and Mr. Preston should be aware that if full payment is
not received within ten days, PMC will seek all legal remedies available to it under Idaho law,
including but not limited to filing a legal action for collection of this outstanding rent. If such
legal action becomes necessary, PMC will seek attorneys fees pursuant to Section 10.3 of the
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Michael D. Gaffuey
November 27,2012
Page2

Ground Lease Agreement; pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee of Payment and Performance;
and, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 to 12-121 and 12-123. Quail Ridge should take
particular note that Section I 0.3 of the Ground Lease Agreement provides that "such attorney's
fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and shall be paid
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment." Forest Preston should take note that the
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him specifically provides that "the
undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for all costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this Guarantee."
Additionally, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, interest is accruing on the amount due at 12%
perarmum.
For your information, PMC is in the process of appraising the Quail Ridge Property to determine
the rental rate for the 2013 rent adjustment period. We will share the appraisal with you as soon
as we receive it.
In the meantime, if you have questions or if you wish to make additional arrangements for the
payment of the remaining rent due for the 2010 rent adjustment period, or if you have any input
regarding the market value ofthe property for the 2013 rent adjustment period, please do not
hesitate to contact me or Kent Hawkins.
Sincerely,
M~RRILL & ME~LL, CHTD.

(,
,
4
J./ /
/\ VitJ__ ~ ·~ /il!tv~
l·'j•

;l • 1j

'

/_."

VI

r.Yave R. Gallafent

.0f,

,

f

DRG/R WH/5975

cc:

Client (via e-mail)
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1

FORREST L. PRESTON,

2

called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff,

3

having been first duly sworn, was examined and

4

testified as follows:

5
6

7

EXAMINATION
BY MR. HAWKINS:
My name is Kent Hawkins.

Q

I'm one of

8

the three attorneys representing the Pocatello Medical

9

Center in this case.

10

If the witness would please state

your full name for the record.

11

A

Forrest L. Preston.

12

Q

And what is your, what is your address

13

there?

14

A

Business address?

15

Q

Business would be fine.

16

A

Okay.

17
18

3001 Keith, K-E-I-T-H, Street,

Cleveland, Tennessee.
All right.

Q

Tell me a little -- and

19

let's just briefly-- a little bit about yourself

20

starting with -- well, we're hearing it in a little

21

different order.

22

in this suit.

23

Quail Ridge and Century Park,

24

two entities that I'm speaking of?

25

A

I understand there's two corporations

I'm going to -- if I refer to them as
is it clear to you of the

Yes.
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY
(423) 267-6000
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

1
2
3

-----------------------------------------------------POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

4
Plaintiff,
5
6
7
8

vs.

NO:

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

9

Cleveland, Tennessee
April 11, 2012

10

DEPOSITION OF FORREST L. PRESTON

11

12

CV-10-2724 OC

APPEARANCES:

··~,

13

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

14

17

KENT L. HAWKINS, ESQ.
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
109 North Arthur, 5th Floor
P. 0. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
( 2 0 8 ) 2 32- 2 2 8 6
(Appearing via Skype)

18

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

19

MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ESQ.
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, P.A.
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 557-5203
(Appearing via Skype)

15
16

20
21
22
23
24

ALSO PRESENT:

Richard D. Faulkner, Jr., Esq.
Richard J. McAfee, Esq.
Joanna Crooks
Aaron Webb, Esq.

25
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY
(423)
www.wilsonreporting.com

267-600
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1
2

And do you hold positions in both of

Q

these corporations?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

What are -- what lS your position ln

5

6

each, each of those companies?
Quail Ridge is the ownership entity of

A

7

the actual building itself and operation.

8

is a management company that I formed about six years

9

ago with my youngest son, Bryan.

10
11
12
13
14
15

Century Park

So when you say that you formed

Q

Century Park, are you the sole owner of Century Park?
A

I share an ownership with my youngest

son, Bryan, yes.
I missed that.

Q

Who do you share

ownership with?

16

A

My youngest son, Bryan.

17

Q

Just the two of you?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

All right.

20

Quail?

Who are the owners of Quail?

21

A

B-R-Y-A-N.

Would the same be true of

I have not reviewed that recently, but

22

I believe that I am a 99 percent owner, and there is a

23

one percent ownership of which --

24
25

By the way, our video went off here,
so I don't know if that's meaning -- can you still hear
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY
(423)
www.wilsonreporting.com

267-6000
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF DON WADLE

)
)

)
)
)

Defendants.
)
_______________________
)
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
Don Wadle, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.

I am currently a vice-president of Portneuf Medical Center, LLC (PMC), the

plaintiff herein, and I have personal knowledge of the facts stated below
2.

Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail"), has not paid to PMC the

$416,812.50 in unpaid adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period.
3.

Forrest L. Preston has not paid to PMC the $416,812.50 in unpaid adjusted rents for

the 2010 rent adjustment period.

5975: Affidavit of Don Wadle
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;;{
DATED this

p

dayofSeptember,2013.

Don Wadle

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Don Wadle on this

day of

September, 2013.

(SEAL

DEBORAH LAFANA
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

5975: Affidavit of Don Wadle

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO

Residing at: ?o~.e.Llc, . I])
Commission expires:.~Uc,..:-_,;5~-~0+-------

Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, R. William Hancock, the undersigned, on~ of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this 5~

day of September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner

indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffuey
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

[:if U.S. Mail

Judge Robert C. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, ID 83201
(Chambers Copy)

[~U.S. Mail

[J Hand Delivery
[J Overnight Mail
[J Facsimile
[J Hand Delivery
[J Overnight Delivery
[J Telefax 547-2147

R Wilham Hancock

5975: Affidavit of Don Wadle
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Michael D. Gaffuey, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorney for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment

Plaintiff,
vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Farrest L. Preston,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through counsel of record and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, respectfully move
this Court for summary judgment dismissing the above-entitled case. The basis for this motion is
set forth in the memorandum and affidavit filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested.

Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment PAGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on September 23, 2013, I
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT on the following by the method of delivery designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
POBox 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499

U.S. Mail

U.S. Mail

~

Q

~('Hand-delivered

Q

·. ·' Hand-delivered

.· Facsimile

Facsimile

2
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Sunnnary Judgment PAGE
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•

\
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
JohnM.Avondet,ISBNo. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorney for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Farrest L. Preston,
Defendants.

The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge) through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney
PA, respectfully submit the following Memorandum in Support of their Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, LLC (PMC), has
already sued Quail Ridge for breach of contract. PMC lost its case for breach of contract. In fact,
PMC voluntarily agreed to dismiss its claim for breach of contract when Barmock County Civil
Case No. I 0-2724 was tried to Judge Brown. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral

·1
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment PAGE
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estoppel forestall PMC's claims in this litigation. Quail Ridge is entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the case.

Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." IDAHO R.
Crv. P. 56(c) (2011); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851,
853-54 (1991). It is recognized that the court must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. G&M Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna
Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Safeco Title
Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 121 Idaho 463, 825 P.2d 1119 (1992).

The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of an issue of material fact. If the
moving party fails to show this then summary judgment should be denied. Tingley v. Harrison,
125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). The non-moving party is entitled to show a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the moving party's motion. Olsen v.
J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990), citing, Celotex v. Catrett,

477U.S. 317(1986);seealsoBadellv. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102, 765P.2d 126,127 (1988).
If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the
motion for summary judgment should be denied. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 900, 876
P.2d 595, 598 (1994); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986). "The
fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the
applicable standard of review[.]" Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. #I v. City ofLewiston, 264 P.3d 907,
911 (Idaho 2011).

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment PAGE 2
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Statement of Facts
1. PMC filed a Verified Complaint against Quail Ridge and Century Park on June 28, 2010.
(Avondet Aff. Ex. A.) The case was assigned the Bannock County Civil Case number of 102724.1 The Verified Complaint alleged facts and the legal claim that Quail Ridge and
Century Park were successors-in-interest to a certain Ground Lease Agreement that had been
entered into by Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co.
(Sterling) in 1983. (!d.) The Ground Lease Agreement pertained to real property located
within the City of Pocatello. (!d.) The Verified Complaint attached a copy of the Ground
Lease Agreement.
2. PMC sought relief from both Quail Ridge and Century Park for breach of contract.
Specifically, PMC alleged that Quail Ridge and Century Park had breached Section 1.3(a) &
1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement. (Id.) Section 1.3(a) of the Ground Lease Agreement
provides:

An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent (15%) of the value
of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years from the Commencement Date of
this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($15,000.00) per acre.

(Id.)
3. Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement provides:
The annual net rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) years beginning on
the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to below as the rent adjustment date .... The
rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value ofthe leased
land, exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Determination of fair market value
shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date
without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall take into account the

parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applies to a
fair market value ofFifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($15, 000.00) per acre and shall
also take into account any determinations of market value made under this lease for the
1 CV -10-2724 will hereafter be referred to as PMC l
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Sununary Judgment PAGE 3
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purpose ofaiijustments for periods preceding the applicable rent aiijustment date. (emphasis
added)
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, lessee
shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate
is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference
for the period affected by the adjustment.
(!d.)
4. In PMC I, PMC alleged that Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease Agreement by not
paying adjusted rent pursuant to Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement for the
adjustment periods of2007 and 2010. (Id.)
5. Quail Ridge and Century Park filed an Answer and Jury Demand to the PMC /Verified
Complaint on August 2, 2010. (!d. Ex. B.) Trial was subsequently scheduled by Judge
Brown to commence in May 2012.
6. PMC filed an Amended Complaint in the PMC I case on May 4, 2012, just days before trial.
(Avondet Aff. Ex. C.) PMC added a count for Declaratory Relief; however, PMC continued
to assert a claim for breach of contract against Quail Ridge and Century Park for the 2007
and 2010 adjustment periods. (!d.)
7. Paragraphs 14 through 34 of the Amended Complaint articulate the grounds that PMC
believed gave rise to a claim for breach of contract against Quail Ridge and Century Park.
(!d.) Those paragraphs generally identify the failure of Quail Ridge and Century Park to pay
adjusted rent as set forth therein as the basis for the breach of contract claims. (!d.)
8. Ultimately, Judge Brown held a court trial inPMC I on May 14-15,2012. (Avondet Aff. Ex.
D.) After the close ofPMC's case-in-chief Quail Ridge and Century Park moved for a
directed verdict on Count I of the Amended Complaint. (Id. Ex. D.) Count I was the breach
of contract claims for both the 2007 and 2010 adjustment periods. (Avondet Aff. Ex. C.)

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment PAGE 4
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9. After hearing some argument in support of the directed verdict motion, counsel for PMC said
the following the Judge Brown:
MR. HAWKINS: I can probably stipulate on this and save a little time. I agree exactly with
what Mr. Gaffuey is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the trial. We feel that the way
we have alleged the complaint, and especially with the amendment for the declaratory
judgment, which effectively becomes the adjustment process that we're alleging, then that
adjustment process itself results in the payments of the fair market value on the property for
the years 2007 to current. So we would withdraw the first count regarding a breach of
contract and damages from a breach.
(Avondet Aff. Ex. E; FMC !Trial Tran. Vol. II, 86:1-12, May 15, 2012.)
10. During trial, Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's corporate representative, testified about a
restructuring of the parties' arrangement in 2001. (Id, 153:8-11.) Sterling sought to sell the
building. Forrest Preston, PMI and Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the building. (Id.,
153:12-21.) Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their guarantees of the Ground
Lease and also wanted Sterling released from the fmancing on the building. (Id.) Sterling
owed approximately $2.8 million on the building. (ld., 154:1-4.)
11. The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into Sterling's shoes vis-a-vis the
Ground Lease. (ld., 154:18-155:4.) The parties amended and restated the old sublease with
Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and PMI remaining as subtenant. (Id., 155:9-16.)
12. Among other various additions to the parties' relationship, Forrest Preston's personal
guarantee was executed attendant to the 2001 restructuring. (Id., 165:19-21.)
13. Judge Brown granted Quail Ridge and Century Park's motion for directed verdict on breach
of contract for both 2007 and 2010. (Id. Ex. D.) Century Park moved to be dismissed
entirely from the FMC Ilitigation. That motion was also granted. (Id.)
14. On November 12,2012, the Judge Brown entered an Order on Form of Judgment. (Avondet
Aff. Ex. F.) The order stated that during the first trial there had been "no evidence that Quail
Ridge was in violation or had breached the terms of the Ground Lease Agreement." (Id.)

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Sununary Judgment PAGE 5
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The Court concluded that there were "absolutely no facts in the record that would justify this
Court entering a money judgment in favor of the Plaintiff." (!d.)
15. Judge Brown ultimately denied PMC's request to adjust rent for the 2007 adjustment period.
(Hancock Aff. Ex. 1, ~~ 40 & 41.)

Argument
1 Res judicata bars PMC's claim for breach of contract
1.1

Res judicata bars PMC's claim against the Quail Ridge entity
PMC I involved claims for breach of contract for 2007 and 2010. Those claims were fully

adjudicated by Judge Brown and dismissed. (Avondet Aff. Ex. D.) Since PMC previously sued
for breach of contract and lost it should not be allowed to come before this Court and relitigate
the issue in an effort to reduce the 2010 adjustment period to a money judgment.
Res judicata "includes two legal concepts-issue preclusion or collateral estoppel and claim
preclusion." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (Idaho 2012). "Claim
preclusion 'bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon
claims relating to the same cause of action."' !d. In Berkshire Investments, LLC, the Court
wrote:
Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original action ended in
final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as the original
action, and (2) (sic) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 125-27, 157 P.3d 613, 618-20 (2007)

!d.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue when:
(1) The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was
identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was
actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment PAGE 6
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prior litigations; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the litigation.

!d. Both doctrines apply to this case and, specifically, res judicata bars PMC's claim against
Quail Ridge in this lawsuit.
In this case, the parties are the same as those involved in PMC I PMC sued Quail Ridge in

PMC !for breach of contract. (Avondet Aff. Ex.

A.i Thus, the res judicata prerequisite of

identical parties is present here.
The claims asserted are identical. The factual allegations contained in the Amended
Complaint alleged that there was an adjusted rent that Quail Ridge failed to pay for the 20 10 rent
adjustment period. (Avondet Aff. Ex. C.) PMC asserted that claim through trial and had every
opportunity to present evidence in support of the breach of contract. However, after PMC' s
evidence closed, Quail Ridge sought to have the claim dismissed and PMC remarkably agreed
that it had not presented any evidence of breach of contract for the 2010 adjustment period.
Judge Brown dismissed the breach of contract claim for the 2010 adjustment period. (!d. Ex. D.)
This case involves a claim for breach of contract for the 2010 adjustment period. (See Compl. pp.
1-5.) The alleged failure to pay adjusted rent for 2010 forms the basis for both lawsuits. Thus,
the claims are the same.
The present claim for breach of contract does involve the same transaction that was at issue
in P MC I and is nothing more than relitigating issues that were previously decided. Res judicata
relates to claims that were actually litigated and those that could have been raised in the earlier
case. Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. The allegations in the two cases are the
same. InPMC I, PMC sought to recover adjusted rent in the amount of$445,500.00. (Avondet
Aff. Ex. C, ~ 34.) After offsets, PMC claimed that Quail Ridge owed "PMC a sum of not less
2

Though PMC did not sue Preston in PMC I, the application of the doctrine will be discussed,
infra.
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than $416,812.50 for unpaid adjusted rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period" in PMC I. (Id.)
PMC actually litigated that claim through trial, which resulted in the

Claim being dismissed by

Judge Brown after FMC's case-in-chief.
Nothing required PMC to assert the breach of contract claim in the prior litigation. PMC
could have limited its relief requested to a declaration of the parties' rights under the Ground
Lease Agreement. In Harris v. Cassia County, 681 P.2d 988 (Idaho 1984), the Idaho Supreme
Court held "that the right sought to be protected by declaratory judgment 'may invoke either
remedial or preventive relief; it may relate to a right that has either been breached or is only yet
in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened or endangered; but, in either or any event, it
must involve actual or existing facts."' Id. at 991-92 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. State Bd of

Educ., 52 P.2d 141, 144 (Idaho 1935)). However, PMC pressed its breach of contract claim and
that claim ultimately failed.
Alternatively, PMC could have bifurcated the claims and had Judge Brown first declare the
rights of the parties after a trial. He then could have had a separate proceeding to decide the
breach of contract issue. PMC could have requested Court implement this type of procedure in
PMC I and probably should have asked for a bifurcation in order to avoid having the breach of

contract claim fully adjudicated by the Court in the prior litigation. A bifurcation would have
allowed PMC to adjudicate the parties' respective contract rights and then pursue a breach of
contract claim following the declaration. As it is, however, PMC sought to recover damages for
the 201 0 adjustment period, Judge Brown held a trial on the issue, and PMC failed to present any
evidence of breach and actually stipulated to Quail Ridge's motion following the presentation of
FMC's evidence. (Avondet Aff. Ex. F.) Thus, there is a fmal adjudication of the breach of

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment PAGE 8
210 of 447

contract claim and PMC is precluded from relitigating that claim against Quail Ridge. See, e.g.,

Silver Eagle Mining Co. v. State, 280 P.3d 679, 682-83 (Idaho 2012).
Thus, the elements of res judicata are satisfied in this case. PMC has already litigated its
breach of contract cause of action and PMC lost. It should not be allowed to come before this
Court and assert a claim that a prior court ruled to lack evidence.

1.2

Res judicata applies to PMC's claim against Forrest Preston
Claim preclusion also applies to PMC's claim against Forrest Preston (Preston) on the

guarantee. Because PMC originally sued Quail Ridge for breach of its obligation to pay rent
under the Ground Lease Agreement PMC should also have sued Preston for breach of the
guarantee. The guarantee claim was a claim that should have been brought in the prior litigation.

It was not asserted at any point by PMC. Thus, claim preclusion applies not only to the parties
of the original action but also to their privies. "To be a privy, 'a person not a party to the former
action must deriveD his interest from one who was a party to it."' Berkshire Investments, LLC,
278 P.3d at 951.
Here, Preston signed the guarantee as a part of the 2001 restructuring of the parties
agreements. (Avondet Aff. Ex. E.) Indeed, PMC's own claims against Preston assert that he is a
privy because PMC seeks to enforce the rent obligation vis-it-vis the guarantee. (Compl. pp. 15.) Thus, by suing Quail Ridge in PMC I for breach of contract PMC should have also sued
Preston under the guarantee. PMC I did not involve a claim on the guarantee when it should
have. Claim preclusion applies to claims brought or those claims that could have been brought
in the prior litigation. Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P .3d at 951. Thus, res judicata bars
PMC's present claim against Preston on the guarantee.
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2 Issue preclusion applies to the guarantee
Even if the Court finds that Preston was not a privy as defined in Berkshire Investments LLC,
it should still dismiss PMC's claim under the guarantee on the basis of issue preclusion. The
elements of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion are:
1. The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue decided in the earlier case;
2. The issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present
action;
3. The issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation;
4. There was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and,
5. The party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the
litigation.

Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. Each element of collateral estoppel is met in this
case.
First, PMC could have, and should have, included its claim on the guarantee in the prior
litigation. PMC had sued Quail Ridge for breach of the Ground Lease Agreement for the 2010
rent adjustment period. If Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease Agreement for that
period then PMC should have invoked the guarantee and sought to recover by enforcing the
guarantee against Preston. PMC chose not to do so.
Second, the issue of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment
period is the same in both cases. Both cases asserted that Quail Ridge breached the Ground
Lease Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period by refusing to pay $416,812.50, after
offsets.
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Third, the issue of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement was decided in the prior litigation.
Judge Brown dismissed PMC's claim for breach of the agreement. (Avondet Aff. Ex. D.)
Fourth, a fmaljudgment was entered and the claim was dismissed.
Finally, as discussed supra, Preston is in privity with Quail Ridge and PMC. Judge Brown
found that PMC had not presented any evidence of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement. (Id.)
By dismissing the breach of contract claim the Court disposed of any basis that PMC would have
had for invoking the guarantee against Preston.

Conclusion
As a result of the foregoing, the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Sununary Judgment should be
granted.
DATED: Septe ber 23,2013

Micha I .
John . vondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on September 23, 2013, I
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the method of delivery
designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
POBox 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499

U.S. Mail

Facsimile

U.S. Mail

""-/
D
;Ji
Hand-delivered
, ,/ Facsimile

"f'"''t-'· affii.ey
John . 1<\.vondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Defendants
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorney for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support of
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment

Plaintiff,

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants.
STATEOFIDAHO )
)ss.
County of Bonneville )
I, John M. Avondet, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and state:
1. I am an attorney with the law firm, Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, and counsel of record for
Defendants in the above-entitled action.
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge.

Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
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3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Verified Complaint dated June 28,
2010.
4. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Answer and Jury Demand dated
August 2, 2010.
5. Attached as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the Amended Complaint dated May 4,
2012.

6. Attached as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of the Minute Entry and Order dated May
15, 2012.
7. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of excerpts of Volume 2 of 2 of a Bench

Trial dated May 15, 2012.
8. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Order on Form of Judgment dated
November 12, 2012 .

. A ondet
d St. Clair Gaffuey PA
Attorneys for the Defendants
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 23'd day of September, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on September 23, 2013, I
served a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN M. AVONDET IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the
method of delivery designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499

U.S. Mail

U.S. Mail

~and-delivered

Facsimile

0'""'

Facsimile

John
~vondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Defendants
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ll,j

Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
I 09 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB # 1745, 7938
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MITCHELL W. BROWN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

~-

Case

NG~ 10- 272; 4 OC

)
)

)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,
LLC,

)
)
)
)

FEE CATEGORY
FEES$
~ o

0

J

Pr

_________________________ )
Defendants.

)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center,
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, complains
and alleges as follows:
I.

Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"),

is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock
County, Idaho 83201.

EXHIBIT

I _--~...&.~___

Complaint
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2.

Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
3.

Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
of business is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
4.

This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27,

1983 ("Lease Agreement").

PMC's copy of this Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit

" I " and is iocorporated herein by this reference.
5.

The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health

Care, Inc. ("lliC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original
lessee.
6.

The Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello,

Barmock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal description for the
Leased Land is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated herein by this reference.
7.

On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to

Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limited partnership
authorized to do business in the State ofldaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 Keith
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
8.

On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their respective interests

in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge thereby became the
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement
9.

On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease

Agreement to lliC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., thereby became the
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement.
10.

On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in

the Lease Agreement to Barmock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby
Complaint
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became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its
name to PortneufMedical Center.
11.

On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC (then known as PortneufMedical Center),

assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the successor lessor
to the Lease Agreement.
12.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or

related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement.
13.

Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of

"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land.
14.

When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27, 1983, IHC and

Sterling, as original lessor and lessee respectively, agreed upon a basis for calculating the initial
armual rental. Specifically, in Article 1, Section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis for calculating the initial annual rental:
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis offifteen percent
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3)
years from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00)
per acre.
15.

The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and

unambiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 x 4.25 = $63,750; $63,750 x 15% = $9,562.50).
16.

The armual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic basis pursuant to the

Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.3(b), which states in relevant part:
. . . The annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3)
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to
below as the rent adjustment date.
17.

The above language in Article 1 of the Lease Agreement concerning when each

rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled for January 27, 1986 and the rent was, and is, subject
Complaint
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to adjustment every three years thereafter until the termination of this Lease Agreement.
18.

Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent adjustment date was

January 27,2010.
19.

Although the Lease Agreement provides for period rent adjustment dates as

outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the
specified rent adjustment date.
20.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part:

If the determination of adjusted rent

is made after the applicable rent

adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to
the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined. The party
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the
period affected by the adjustment.
21.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC becoming a successor

lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither lliC, lliC Health Services, Inc., nor BRMC exercised its
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article I of
the Lease Agreement.
22.

Sometime in the summer of2009, PMC became aware of the fact that the armual

rental rate for the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article I of the
Lease Agreement.
23.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides the

following clear and unambiguous formula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the
Leased Land:

The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the
premises. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the
highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date
without taking the leasehold into account. ...
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24.

In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation

("Bowman") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land on the prior three rent
adjustment dates.
25.

On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC,

which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007
rent adjustment dates was $1,297,371, $1,371,507, and $1,464,176, respectively.
26.

On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants ofPMC's intention

to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article I of this Lease Agreement.
27.

As evidence in support ofPMC's request for an adjustment of the annual rent rate

pursuant to Article I of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the Leased Land for the
prior three rent adjustment periods.
28.

Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual

rental rate pursuant to Article I of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land.
29.

Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement

30.

Based upon Bowman's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $658,879.20 in annual rents for the 2007 rent
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,686.00 in annual rents during the
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $630,193.20
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period.
31.

Although Bowman has not yet determined the fair market value of the Leased

Land for the 2010 rent adjustment period, to the best ofPMC's knowledge and belief, the current
fair market value of the Leased Land is not less than the fair market value of the Leased Land for
the 2007 rent adjustment period. Therefore, in January of 2010, Defendants should have paid
annual rent in an amount of not less than $219,626.40. Instead, Defendants paid $9,562.00 in
annual rent. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $210,064.60 for unpaid
current adjusted annual rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period.
Complaint
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32.

Furthermore, the adjusted ilnnual rental rate for the remaining years of the 2010

rent adjustment period should not be in an amount less than $219,626.40 per year.
33.

To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill,

Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§
12-120(3) and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor and
against the Defendants as follows:

i.

That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plaintiff for the 2007 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $630,193.20;
ii.

That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for the 2010 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $210,064.40;
iii.

That Defendants be ordered to pay an annual rental rate for the remaining years of

the 20 I 0 rent adjustment period in an amount not less than $219,626.40 per year.
iv.

That Defendants be ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associated

with bringing this action; and
v.

For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances of this case.

DATED

this2~fJune, 2010.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

By~
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC
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DAVE R. GALLAFENT
KENT L. HAWKINS'
THOMAS J. LYONS
BRENDON C. TAYLOR
KENT A. HIGGINS*
IAN C. JOHNSON
JARED A. STEADMAN
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK
*ALSO ADMITI'ED IN UTAH

MERRILL & MERRILL
CHARTERED

A.L. MERRILL (1886·1961)
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972)
W.F. MERRILL (1919-2005)

COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW
109 N. ARTHUR • 5'" FLOOR
P.O. BOX991

POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991

TELEPHONE:208-232-2286
FAX:208-232-2499

Founded in 1913

June 28, 2010

Winston Beard
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Re:

PMC I Quail Ridge & Century Park

Dear Winston:
It is our understanding from you that your clients have authorized you to accept
service of our Complaint in the above-referenced matter. As such, please find
enclosed conformed copies of our Complaint and Summons along with an Acceptance
of Service for you to complete. We ask that you please execute this Acceptance of
Service and return to us in the self-addressed stamped envelope as soon as possible.
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely,
~ERRILL, CHTD.

Dave R. Gallafent
DRG/rwh/5975

cc:

Norm Stephens
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,-~dave

R. Gallafent

R. William Hancock
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Idaho State Bar #1745,7938
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL,LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,
LLC,

)

Case No.

&V 10- 2 72: 4 OC

)

)

SUMMONS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

NOTICE:
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF(S).
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.
TO:

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate
written response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 days after service of
this Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter a judgment against you as
demanded by the Plaintiff(s) in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice
of or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule IO(a)(l) and other
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
I.
The title and number of this case.
2.
If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or
denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.
Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature,
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney.
Summons
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4.
Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs attorney,
as designated above.
To detennine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk
of the above-named court.

DATED this~ day of June, 2010.
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By _ _ _~~~~~?J.l~~....
.,---DeputyCle~

Summons
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GROUND

LEA.S~

AGREEMENT

This ~ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into this ~
. day of

CARE,

lkvn.-1~,

Po"..

business

1983,

a~h

in

the

Regional Medical

by and

non-profit

St.ate

bet...,een

cor,I>oration,

of' Idaho. under

the

Center.· ('heri:d.nafter

STtR.LING DEVELOPMENT CO.,

lNTER.I-IOUNTAIN

ijEALTH

authorized
name

called

of

to

do

:Pocatello

"Les10.or"),

and

a Washington partnership auth.oriz.e,d to

. do b:t.~siness in t.he State of Idaho,

(hereinafter ~allec3 "Lesse.e •).

R~C.!,TALS

'1-IHEREAs,. Lessor owns certairi real property located ...,i thin the
City of Pocatello, Bannock Count·y, Idaho: and
·.., WHEREI>.S, .Lessor

wishes. to· le'ase

to

Les11ee

approximately 4

-:.J '(

(

acres,,

more

or. less;· ·of ·said

Psyehiatric · FJospi tal

property

for

con!;tructj,cm

building · (the · "hospital")

c~r,tain restrictions on the. use of such parcel

.ard

of

to

of

a

impo!>e

real property

.and·:. Lec&see wishes to l1!ase sai'd ·parcel of real propertY for such
PUFpGSe,.' subject to· Lessor. s restrictions: and
h'HERJ;:AS, . Lessor

enter '• into a. written
ground. lease . agreement setting f·orth tl1e terms, c;:ondi tions · and
restrictions
leased:
NOW,
c;:ovenants,

·and

under whic;:h

THEREFORE,

Lessee

wish

to

said parcel of· 'Teal property is to be

for

and

in . c;:onsideration

of

the

c;:onditions ·and promises contained herein,

mutual

Lessor and

Lessee agree ··as follows·:
ARTICLE 1
DESCRIPTION, TERM
1.1.

Real Prooerty Leased.

~D

RENTAL

'Lessor hereby leases

to Lessee

and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property desc;:ribed

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1
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... , -Tho,~~ana
a~~..c.~~£.,!.22.-~C:~-~~Es
... <H~i900. 00) ·per
.
.
..acre.•.
'

Adjustments @asep .on. Property Val·u·e.

(b)

The

annual

net rental. as. set for·th above shall be a'cijusted every three
· ( 3.) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease,
·.
ref.erred to b.~ low as . the r.ent a~just~:~ent date.
The pa,rties'
before

the

.~:~ar'ket
,.

.

determination between

the

date

parties

( 90) days

shall
of

be· a

the

fair

value .f.or the period. t'Q ,,which· the a':dju·stment applies •
'·~

•

.

'2< •

.

. the parties have

H

ag):eement. within· ninety

rent c adjustment

applicable

conclusive

•

writ~E!n

adju!'tment date..

not s.o . agreed by· the

applicable

:tAent

the det.ef'mination sha.ll be' made as in· the

paragr;\ph, O!l 1\.rbi tration in' ~ticle .13.

-

The rent, as ad::just~d shall •be· equal to fifteen percent
(1.5%) p,E!;rcent. of tf!e fair ma~'ket value of the lea$ed 'land,
. ex,c;lusiye of. the improvements on ·the· 'premi:ses.

Oet~rinina

tion
of
market.
value shaoll
be based on· the highest arid
. . .
. . fair
·.
:.

(

be.st. ,use of..tl}e land. on, 1;.he. app)..icable rent adjustment date
without taxing the leaseh()lci ;Jl:\:1(.
.
. . ac;po.unt.
·;;

tion shall take into account t1te' palt'tie•s •

The determina-

agree~:~ent

that the

initial minimum rent is .the aboiie-st.ated percentage applied
to

a

fai:z;-

Oo.llar.s
.'

.11\arket . value
per

($15,000.00)

o~.

Fifteen· ·Thou·s·ang, .and

acre

and

sha;ll

also

No/100

t'<!<'ke'int.o

. "I

account
leas.~

any determina1;.i.ons· .of ,market ·value made under· t'his

for

the pu.rpose. of adj1,1stments for periOds preceding

the applicable rent adj,u.stment d·ate.

·-. --

. If the det.erm,ination o·f adjusted rent ·is !:lade a·fter the
applicable
pay rent

rent
at

the

adjustment.· date,
rate.

applicable

lessee
to

shall

the

until· the adjusted. rat~ is determined.

continue to

preceding

period

·The party indebted

shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference
for the period affected by the adjustment.

(
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ARTICLE 2
•

.

OF ·:J.£A:St:!f

;'l'"""'"";.

.

• /;!".

-~~ ......

..

=--~

,

·•·· .l

LMD. AND. TITLE TO IMPROV!;ME!lTS.

Use of Lea~ed.Land~

.2.1

:'>1~-"ii

' •·f··· •

Lessee shall,. use

:the

leased

land

solel-y fo+ toe purpose of cohsttuetin·~, maintaining a.nd opcer~rting
the hp~pital. f.or psychiatric· eare ·and. substance... abuse· tre·atment;

provide~ that Lessee may at any time use the. leased land~ for ·imy
lawful .purpose.
Lessee shall commence
. constructiqn of· the
· ... ,.hOspital within forty-fiv-e '(45) days ·after ,t.'he commencement d\H.e
of. this Lease and the·. issuance. of~ a buildins ...Permit..

~f

Lessii!e

is delayed .in commencing corn\truction or rec~iving t:.,qe :·permit by
a.ny . c;.ause. or

causes

inc11i~ing. but

not

s'trikes, war,
day . peri'ad

~eyond""Les~:~e' s ...

necessarilY' ''bei.h9

insurrections,

to

commence

cont,rol,

lirni ted

cau·ses

S•UC'l)

to

Acts

of ..Gt;d.,

and the li}te,. !Said forty-five

c6n!i·truc·tion. ·shall . l:;l,e

extend!i!d·

(4S)

f•or

.a

J?eriod equivalent to the'tiine lost by reason of. any such cau·se·or
cause~:

provided.,

however,

that

.

.

rio

extensions

. ' ·····"•i;·

. :·

'

s)1all pe

..·

.

gra·nted

.

for a.ll:Y .su~;:h dela}' which comnences mo're than t~n (.1.0) days before

9 . ·. '·
L~ssee notifi~~:.s

..

~.

(

Lessor of'' such delay.
reasons . the·refoi"''
.
.· and. tl;e
.
Oric;e constru. c·tion is· begun;'" Lessee shall, . with. reason.able

diligent;:~,
men:ts,

,•

co~st;ucticm

. presecute to completion all

additions,

or

alterations

and

shall.

have

S\lbsta·,ntie:lly·

comple~ed construction of the hos:pital 'within. '(tlr.(
after <late of this

lease.

•. ..

;

.. .

.

that the, hospital is ready for o·c-cu:pancy a!la
evidence9, by a

Ce.rti.:ficate of b'ccupimcy.

.( .} . 1

compl~ti,on"

"Substantial

•

. .·

:-·... ..

tis.e

,··

causes ..be:yon.CI · Lessee • s

control,

i,l'lsurrections,

bein9

limited

to

other li:K~., ·<;ipc;:ume·nt

OI;'

ho~;r,'i t'?l

such · causes
Acts

of

.$hall. mean

as,~' .hospital. as

If .. L¢ssee is
by. an;r C!!Use or

inc~uding
"

neces.sarily

year's:

. :. ;<:·· .'

issued by an <;~ppropriate governmental ·authority.
delaye<l i.n .subst<antial comp'1e'tion · ~f the

of io.mprove-

God,

.

.·'

but:· not

strike.s, '.war,

a·nd the like·;: said date fo:- substant~al completion

of the hospita.l shall be extelidi!.d f'or a period eq\l~ valent to the
tirne lost by. reason of any· ·subn cause or cause~: pperv id ed.·,
however,

that

no exten·sions will

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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'

to
'(_,-._:

Lessor until

the
...

T,erm· ,or·· the· prior

t.he

termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the
right

to terminate

Lessee covenants
will

t,his

lease

pursuant

to

krticle

hereof.

10

and agrees that upon expiration .of. the Term it

yield up

and

deliver

the

leased

buildings, permanent improvements,

""ith

and fixtures upon

·-

.

land

any
the

such
leas.ed

land at such time free and clear . of all liens and encumbrances of
any kind,
Lessor.

and

upon

In the

such

event

expiration
of

title

earlier

therein

shall

be

t.errnination··. o:f · thi·s

in

lease,

Lessee covenants and agrees that it ""ill yield up and deliver the
leased land 1dth any such buildings,

permanent improvements,

and

fixtures upon the leased ,land at .such time. free and clear of all
liens and. irideb~edness of any kind.

Proyided, how.ever, that such

,._

obligation to deliver the leaseO. land. ;;.nd imp;ro.vernents. free and
cl.ear of all liens and indebtedness shall not apply to the
or'i:gihal lie.n of first encumbrance repr-esented by the mort-gage· o'r

(

De'ed of Trust or other security ;interest referred to in Article 6
hereof g·iven to secure the' financing .for thE! construction of the
orf'ginal builcHngs, permanent improve~:~ents,
leased

land.

Upon ·such

bu':i.idings, permanent

earlier

improvements

and fixtures upon the

terminati•;m,

and

fixtures

tit-le

in

upon. tne

·the

leased

l'and shall be in Lessor.
2~ 5
L~ssee

Deed at Termination..
shall~

satisfactory in
title

tO

any

Upon terrnin<;ltion of

subject

to

£orrn and

c.ontent

bUildings 1

the

forego-i:ng,

this

e,xecute

lease,
a

Ciee·a.

to Lessor. confirming Lessor's

permanent

improvements, . and

fixtures

therein, upon the leased land at the time of termination.
2.6
require

Additional Real Propertv.
additional

real

property

At such time as Lessee shall
for

the

e~pansion

of

the

hospital, Lessee shall so notify Lessor and Lessor shall in good
faith consider the. leasing of additional real property to Lessee
for such purpose.
•..
~~OUND
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ot'au
..
percent,

exceed seventy-five percent ('15\J. of th'e tE!!Hacemertt-'v~lue·
of· 'the

improvements.

If. the

cost

Lessee may nevertheless repair,

does

exceed

that

.. '

res-tore and repiace as above or

may by notice elect inst,ead to raze the improvements damaged or
destroyed.

Within thirty (30) days aftei'. such notice, Lessor may

by notice elect to repai.r.
Lessee

shall

Lessor''s
furnish

not

raze

restore· and

until

the ·-expiration

notice of election.
any serv,ices -or

repla;d:e

I..essor

facilities

as

of

to

an(!

time

for:

the

shall · not

or

above,

make

be

required

to

any

re})airs

or

alterations of any kind .,in ,or on the premises'·.- Lessor's election
•• · '

to

• •!

obli~ation

perform - any

Lesse-e's

.' ..

faiiure

.

or

of

Les-11ee

refusal. to

co

under

so

this

•shall

p-~ovision

on

riot. · d:msti tut;.~.•:<. - ···,a

waiver of- any _right or remedy. for Less~e' s. Cle-f'ai.Jlt,

and Lessee.

~hall' prom~tly reimbu_rse, defend,

and indemnify Lessor agi!in5t
al-l- liability, ·loss, cost, an(! expense arising ·from it.
·,>,

.

. •

In determining whet;.her . Le.ssee has act~d promptly _a~
required under the foregoing_ par-agraph, one of _the ·criteria to b~,-

(

cons-idered
pro.ceeds.

is

the a:vaila'l;>ility

Nothing
maintenance. shall

in
be

of

any

applicable

··..

insurance_

this provision defining the dut;.y of
construed_ as. limiting any right given

elsewhere· in thi~- lea_se to alter_,.· modify·,· deinoiish,

remove,

or_

replace 'any improvement,
or ,as limiti·ng provisions relating to
.
.
.
cond emna'tion or to damag_e or dest-ru_ction during the final year or
yeats-- of the TeriTI".
No deprivation,. impairmj!nt; or limitation-on
,-

use

resulting· from any
paragraph shall entitle
reduction
Term.3. 2

in

rent

nor

wo.rk• · aoritemplat.ed

event
Lessee

to

aJ:Jy

to

any -.-of-fset,

te.:t:~T!ination

by

aba:ter:tent,

or -·ext·e·ri's{O-ri

Relief .for Substantia.l_ .Less of Area.

this

of

or
the

If any dar..age to

or destruction of 'the pre111i,ses or -the improvements is such that
7 S%- of the floor area is rendered
. unusable
for ..our·ooses
stated in
.
.
'
.
...
the

Lease,

:Lessee

may,

at

Lesst;~e's

election •. delay

the

"'ork

(
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appropriate judici;!.l or admin.i,strat3,ve proeered'itigs: 'i.if1;hout cost
(-··.

or expense to Lessor,

ordinanc~. order,

the

validl. ty or application of any

regulations or re~uire~~nt

rule,

law,

(he~einafter

called "Law") that Lessee repair,. maintain• ·alter or.· replace the

or

improv·ements in whole
default

fOr

failing

in pa):'t,

to

do

SUCh

following· final determination
g~ves

notice

bond,,

of

satisfact·ory

to

Lessee- shall

wor.k

until

of L.essee' s

Le.s~.ee

request,

and

s't!all

Lessor . in

indemnifying

LE!~sor'

~ll

agains·t'

contest.
amo.unt

the

be

re·asonable

a·nd

in

time

Lessor

If

fir.st ·furnish

form,

guaranteeing complh.'nce b::( Lessee .with

a

not

Lessor

... ·

- --

a

insurer_,

Ci:ontest'ed . law,

and.

SUS~<~.in

liability that Lessor. may

by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law.
Lessor

may,

but

is

not

independently of Lessee.
request shall,

required

contest

any

such

Law

Lessor may·, a.nd on Lessee's notice of

Lesse~'

join in

to..

s c;ontest, ..

3.5

(

bal:!age 6r Destruction Durirl$ Final. Years of Term:
In
the event of· subst:cimtial' 'damag~.. or dest,ruction to 'the hospital or
an-y· part thereof' auring the l<).st five (5·) years of 'the Term,
Lessor ·shall ha'Ve the right,
da;Ys

following

tlie

date

exe_):'cisable during the ninety

·of

S!J.9h

terminate· this

lease·.

Lessor

deliveri-ng· to

LEis.see

written

damage

s_hall

or

exerci:se

notice

of

( 90)

d'estruction,
such

the ·date

to

·t-i.ght
o£

by

such

termination,· which date shall not be e<).rlier than 'thirty' (30)
days fcidlowing the' dat; of Lessor's notice of tertnination; · 'tip~n
exercise ·of su·ch ..right,· Lessor shall be entitled tro tec'ove·:r· the
ful:). proc;eeds of . any pol icy of insurance covering any suCh damage
or destruction ex·cept such proceeds .as may b-e attributable to
Lessee's
Lesse~·s

loss'·

of

personal

property

and/or

to

interru:ption ·of

busiriess.
If

Lessor

does

te:rminate this lease,
Les.l;e·e shall ·be responsible fo.r the repair, rebui'lding or
repl.acernent of the hospital or any part thereof so damaged or
destroyed as t'he case may be.
All such repairs,. tebuilding or

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - ll
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mortgagee a statement. in writing,
case,

certifying,

if

such

is

that this lease is then unmodified and unamended, _thi!lt i t

is not in default,

and that. it is in full

force and effect.

there have been modifications and aJnendments to this· lease,
statement shall,

if such. is the ·case,

not then in default· and· is
forth

further

in

full

state

the

in

said

dates

by Lessee

full. force

wi ti<.

statement.

to

• charges have been paid, and·
default

in

certify that
and

the

I.f
said

same is

effect

as

then

Said modifications and ar:~endments shall be

iiiodified and amended.
set

the

which .. the

~het'her

respect

Said
basic

statement
rental

or

shall
other

·-

or not there is any existing

to

a.ny

agreement on the part of Lessee provided

covenant.,

promise

of

to· be performed under

this lea~P.! and also "''nether a notice of such default·· h-a~ been
sei:'ved by Lessor.

I.f any

such

non-performance,· insofar as

a

claim of

actually kno"m 'by Lessor,

summarized in said statetnent.

(

statement· contains

Lessee shall

~ake

shall

pal~ent

be

when due.

ana before delinquency of
all principal, interest and other
...
cha.rges for which Lessee may be or become obligated under any
leasehold mortgage upon the leasehold estate.
4.2

Foreclosure of L.ien.

foreclose a leasehold mortgage,
assigns of such mortgage,

P:-ior to com:nencirig any action to
the leasehold mortgagee,

or any

shall notify Less·or in wd,ting of the

default by Lessee w:i,th .a. statement· of the

al'ilount

then

due and

offer to withhold any acceleration of maturity of the promissory
note, payment of which. is secured by the leasehold

r:~ortgage.

ln

the event Lessor shall, within thirty (30) d~ys of the receipt of
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrears on
said mortgage,

then upon said payment said mortgagee shall rein-

state the mortgage in all respects as if no default had occurred.
Lessor may,

at its option, ·make such

and the amounts of
rental due Lessor

payr:~ents

on said mort;age,

such payments shall be considered additional
from Lessee under this

lease.

·s u=>s equ ent. and

successive defaults by Lessee in making payl':\ents required by any

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 13
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c

commences

foreclosure

diligence,

and

charges

( ii)

required

arid

continues,. payment
paid

to be

which become due

cont·inues

action

its
of

rent

with

and

other

by Lessee which have accrued

and payable .during the period

<~nd

the. foreclosure

proceeding is pending;

(f)

all

due

.,

•'

That the Lessor .shall not have ·the right to terminate
. : .
.

this lease solely on account of, .any of• the· events ant.ici.pat.ed by
subdivi'sion (d) of p~ragraph 1 of Article 10 without the wri1;ten
consent df the lea~ehold mortgagee, provitded that such mort,gagee
promptl'y eominences forec:losure if it )\as the right to' do so and
.· ,,. :
thereafter continues its action with due diligence:'
(g) · 'that

in

the

event . the

Lessee's · intere.st

this

lease sh~l~. be_ sold, assignE!!C). or othervise· .transferred FUr.suan~
.
to the exerci'se of any right, power or remedy of· any mbrtgagee or.

'

pursuant

to· judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragraph 1

of

Article 10, and if no rent or other· charges shall t'hei"i' ~e due an
• "1.

(

''

•

•

pa;Y'iible · under· this lease,
arran<ged to· 'the· reasonable

and i:f such mortgagee shall have
satisfac.tion of the Lessor for the
.~

curf·ng of any d~f~ult susceptible· ,q_f being cured,
si,Xty
upon

Lessor within

( 60) days after recei vipg a .wri ttei:l request therefor and
payme~t

receiving

of. its

expenses,

incl•Jding

atto!'neys'

fees, incident ·thereto, will exec)-lte and "deliver such instrument
or

instruments

a·s·sii:gnment
lease; or'
(h)
mortgage

or
That

as

may

other
in

requir·ed.

trans.fer

the

shall·· ·have

be

event

occured,

of
a

to . confirm

Lessee's
default

the

such

interest
under

mortgagee

any

may

sale,

under

the

leasehold

exercise

any

right', power or remedy of the morts;agee under the mortgage which
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease.

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 15
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whichever
means

is

the

exerc-ise

the

shorter.

original

of

·~

·'·

The

term

the 'renewal

.

"term"

herein

options

or

herein

provided for.·
6. 2 txpenses ~
All expenses in connection with the making
of said mortgage or De.ed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and

Less·or will execute any and all

documents that may be ·required

with respect thereto.

Les·s·or shall assume no personal

. However,

.

liability for the underlying indebte'dness; but the mortgage note
• or other evidence of .indebtedness shall be executed solely by t'l:le
Lessee.

'The foregoing
provisions of· this Article shall, extend to
,.
'

any construction mortgage .loan applied for by Lessee,
loa~,.

any perman:nt mortgage,
in

replacimient

thereof,

as well as

and any mortgages in substitution or

a.nd

as

often

as

during

the

term .such

loans are applied for by the Less•ee.
6.3

(

Non-Mortgage ,by Les.sor~

Lessor agrees not to place any

mortgage On the prelt);ses I pr permit the same to be encumbered. in
any marmer, without .the: prior wr.itten c6n·sent of the Le.ssee •
. .. 6:4

Limitation on Subordination.

subordinate

any

given

portion

of

'Leiser's

the

fee

agre.ement

to

title

to a first
., '
mortgage is limited to one such mortgage 'on 'the given ,pcrtion of

·- ::,...

:

·~

the

fee

title

for

t(1e

purpose

of ·ena·bling

Lessee

to

obtain

financing for the impro.vements as con'tetriplated herein and located·
on. the given portion of the leased land; provided that,

for this

purpose, mortgages securing separate construction and take-out or
permanent

loans

considered to be
securing

it

for

obligor,

of

or

shall
any
any

without Lessor's

same

work

one mortgage.
expressly

extension of the due
alteration

the

de~te,

of

shall

Both the note and the
provide

that

there

be

mortgage

can

_'be

no

addit·ion to the balance of the loan,

provision

in

refinancing ·of

the
the

docur.~ents,

unpaid

prior "'ri.tteo approval.

graph shall prohibit mortg,agee from

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 17
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boilers ana elevat.ors. inel·ude'd'' 'iri any' impiovements loc:ated on the
(.

demised premises, insuring the Lessee against any and all claims
and demands made 'by any person or -persons whomsoever for. ·injuries
received in c~nnection with the operation and mainte·nance of the
premises,

improvements,

and

'buildings

located

on

the

demised

premises or for any Other risk insured against by SUCh policies 1
each

class of

which

policie·s

shall

have

been

,..ri tt.en· within

limits of n6t less than Five Hundreid Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($500,000.00) for damages incurred or cla~mea. by any one person
• for bodily injury,. or other-..•ise,
No/100
l•ess

Dollars ($100,000.00)

than

~illion

~ncurred

cilamages

or

and 'No/160

Dollars

( UOO, 000.00)

·Otherwise,

name

the

aam:ages

Hunarea. Thousand and

to property,

bollars

and

for

not

($1,000,00.0.00)

for

for ::iodily

or claim.ed by . more .than one per9on

injury,
sha11
(

One

plus One

plus

Orie

Hund'red

dar:~ages

· to

property.

the

Lessor,

Lessee

and

Thousand
All
as

No/100

and

such policies

their,

respective

interests may appear, as .!-he persons assured by such ·policies;
and the original or 9uplicate orisinal of each of. such .policy or
polf:cies shall 'be delivered by t'he Lessee to the Lessor promptly
upon·· the

writing

of

s.uch

policies,

with

together

·- -·

adequate

evidence of the tact that the prel".itims are paid.
7.2

Fire and Wind Darnaoe Insuran6e.
( l)

agrees with Lessor that from
commen~s,

lease

'buildings

and

all

or

loss

improvements
damage

termed

coverage",

which

which

Lessee

and after

the Lessee will keep

generally
amount

The

Lessee's Oblioation.

will

'by

in
said
be

upon

fire

the·

tne

and

in.surance ""ill
sufficient

interest from 'being or becoming a

the .time when the

insured any. and all

said

premises against

~o.•indstorm,

insurance
to

covenants· and

trade
be

and
as

~o.•hat

"extended

maintained

prevent

is

any

in

an

party. in

co-insurer on any part of

the risk, which amount shall not be less than eighty percent
(80%) of the full insura·ble value.

and all of such policies
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property upon the .demised premises- prior to such damage or
destruction,

and shall have t.he same rebuilt and ready for

occupancy within fifteen. (15) months from the time when the
-loss or destruction occ;ur.red.

The fifteen· (15) ·month. period

for reconstruction shall be enlarge·d ·by del,ays caused
without fault or neglect on the .part of the Lessee by act ofGod,

strikes,

loc:ko!lts 1

or

other '':con·di tions

!:esse~·, s c6ntrol •

(2)
policies

folicies~

Delivery of
shall

beyond

the

The original~ of al.l

such

'.···.

~elivered

be

to

the

!,;essor

by

the

Lessee

along with the· receipte¢1 bills · evidencirlg the fact th;~t the
premiums

therefore

are . paid: ·but ·nothing 'herein contained

shall.be ·construed <~s. prohibiting the Les;;ee from finC~.ncing
the premiums where t'he teJCms of. the policies are for .three
(3)

yeai:s

or

more

and

in

suc'h

event . the

receipts... shall

•evidence i t to be the. fact
t,hat the installment-premium
pay.
.
...
riient or payments are' . paid at dr before their respec.tive
~

~..

maturities.
premise·~

Where,

created

however, ·there

pursuant

t'his lease and if,

1:>0

the

is

mortgage

a

provisions

on

contained

the
in

unde.r the terms of such mortgage, i t is

CilHigatory upon the Le;s.see

to

cause

the

oi:igi~als of the

policie·s to be delivered to the liiortgagee,

then the Le,_ssee

shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate eertific(lte~· of. such
policies.

The

. ''

policies or duplicate certificates thereof'

as the case may be, shall be delivered l:iy. the Lesse~ to the
Lessor at ·:least ten (10) :days prior to the. effective date of
the policies.
(3)

Effect of Mortcaae

~ubordini!d:ion.

All of the pro-

visions herein contained relative-to the disposition of payments from insuranc_e companies are subject to the f_act t,hat
if any mortgagees ·holding a mortgage created pursuant. to. the
provisions of this

lease hereof elects,

in accordance ,.i th

the terms of such mortgage, to require that the proceeds of

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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(5)

Dire.ct Repayment..

The foregoing notwiths.tanding,

in the event the. insurance. proceeds are the sum of T"'enty
Five Thousl!,~d and No/100 Dollars

( $25, 000.00) or . l.e.ss,

then

such proceeds shall be paid directly· to the Lessee without
the necessity of creating the joint bank account
hereinabove set. forth, and Lessee shall use such funds

as
to

make the rel?lacements or repairs as required hereunder.

Lesse~' s Covenant t.o Pay Insurance Premiu'rns ~

7.3

The

Lessee covenants and agrees with Lessor that the Lessee W:ill pay
• p:t~miums for all of the insurance policies which the Lessee is
obligated to
·aetiver

to

carry
the

under

Lessor

the ··terms

evidence

of

this

of · such

lease,

payments

payment .._,of •·..any. ;such
premiums become .in; default.,
•.

and

will

before

and

the

the Lessee

will cause renewals of .expirin.g policies to be written imd the
policies

or

copies

thereof,

as

the

lease

may

require,

to

be

de'live.red to Lessor at least ten (10) days before the expiration
ai!lte

(

such e~piring policies.
'7.4 Indemnification.
(a)
Defense a_nd Pavrnent of Claims.

o'f'

Lessee a.grees to

ci'elend, indemni~y and hold Lessor harmless together with all
of itsservants, .c;s,ents, or employees, f'rom and against all

liabilit~ or lo.ss . for injuries. to o·r de~ths of per.sons or
damages to p~o~erty
caus.ed by Lessee's acts .;r omi~sions
to
.
'
.
.
act,

use

result of
part~

of,

or

Liiss~e'

hereto

occupancy of the
s

leased

land,

operations on said lea·sed

shal;l._ give

to

the

other parties

or as

land.
promJ?t

the
Each
and

tiinely notice of any claim or suit instituted coming to its
knowledge

which

in

any

contingentlY.. or ot(lerwise,

"'ay,

directly

or

indirectly,

affects or might affect another

party, and . all parties shall have the r'ight to participate
' .
.
•
t
in the defense of the ._same to· ·the extent of each partl.es
own interest.
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7.5
("'·

Insurer Qualified.

The insurer shall be qualified and

authorized through the· Depart.Jnent of

Insurance of the State of

Idaho.
ARTICLE

a

LIE:~S.

·TAXES, ASSESSMENTS,

1.\ND ENCUMBRANCES

Lessee shall be· responsible to pay. and discha-rge all
ing and

future taxes and assessments which are or may become a

li.en upon or which may be
other

tax

levyi·ng body

levied by the

upon

the

thereon· or property located on

(

land

or

County

l.eased .. land ·or

the leased

1 iabili ties, .cl'liu:·ges, · fees, . obligatj,o.ns,
associat-ed•. WitH

State,
lend.

relating

i•ncluding,

to

but

the

not

or any

improvements
Lessee

for ·'all insuranc;e premiums,

elso. be . respo·nsible

lei1,sed

exist-

and

shall

for

all

liens ·and encumbrances

exi,stence

&rid

limite.Q· to,

all

USe

Of

the

assessment

installments due ·or payable after
the date of this lease.·
All
.
.
payments · of taxes or assessments or both, except permitted
insta:),lment :··payments, sha 11 be prorat; eedd-....cf~GG'L'r~tt::fll'l-ee----cl<:tc".nn±~·-:teas e··
year and for the year in which the lease terminates.

Lessee may,

in. its own. name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's
con.test .in :good faith by all
applical;>ility

or

appropr~ate

validity

of

an;:r

name,

proceed-ings,· the amount,

tax,

ass.essment·

or

fine

pertaining to the leased land,

or to ,. any building, structure or
improvement upon tne leased land, and in the event Lessee does in
good

f_aith

contdt

·assessment or
wheneyer

the

fine;

applicability

Lessor

possible with

Lessee;

will

sr

validity

coppeJ;Oate

provided

not subject any par·t of t))e leased land

that

in
such

of

any

such

tax,

contest

contest

to f.orfeiture or

'Will
loss,

except that, if at any time payment of the whole or any part of
such tax,

ass~ssment

or fine shall becol:le neces·sary ·in order to

prevent any such forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or
cause the· same to be paid in time to prevent such forfeiture or
loss.
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(.3)

FQr.. the purpose

of

computing

years of the term within the me·aning
and

(2) above, -.it .. i-s

agreed

that

the

'

..rp<.. "·

last

five

of subparagraph_s

said" "last

( 1)

five

years"

shall mean the last .five years of the original ·term,

or if,

at or prior to the date that the award or the first partial
payment thereof

(if there be such partial payments) becomes

payable, the parties. shall. have duly agreed 'to extend the
term of this lfi!ase pursuant to the options to ·renew herein
contained or by a ... written instrument executed in the manner
•

required for r~cording,

then said ·last five years shall be

·deemed to mean the. last. :five

(5} · ye·ars ·of the

term

as

so

extended.
,·· (_c). I..f th!;! values of the respective interests of Lessor

and Lessee shall be determined. ac~ording to the provisions
of

subdivisions

(a)

and:z (b)

of

this

s'ection

in

ceeding· :purs4ant · to . which .. tbe demised I:'remises

the

pro-

shall have

been taken or condemned,
the· ·valJJes ·so determine·d shall be
..
con·clusive upon Lessor a..n.d Le"S.see.·
If s.uch values shall not
·'

have been thus separately. de-termined'

such vaiues shall be

f.i.';ed by agreement pe;tween the Lessor and Lessee or if they
are unable to agree, then the controversy. shall be resolved
.

'::}-:. ::.

.

by arbitration under the procedure to govern iri' Arbitration
as set forth in this lea.s,e hereof ·under.. Artic::le l.3.
'(d) In the event.of the ta'lcii:l'g in cO'n'demnation of less
than the whoie of tbe
de111ised
premises but materially all of
..
.
said premises

as

premises

remains

tba:t was

that

taken,

hereinbe.low defined
then as

improvement only,
shail

endeavor

includes . a
to

but not

to

agree

part

the

any

anc

op. the

of

l.intaken

remaining

the
the

part

the

improvement

rer.iainder
land,

of

the

of

the

parties

t'hen ·fair r:iarket value of

such remainder
of the improvement,
.,.
.

and .if the-y fail to agree

then the controversy shall be resoly·e·a by arbitration.

The

value so agreed upon as the then fair market value of such

(
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(i)

Appointment of Receiver.

Apply

for

or consent in writing, signed on behalf of Lessee
or

its

duly

authorized

appointment of a receiver,

attorney,

to

the

trustee or liquidator

of the Lessee or of all or a s.ubstantial part of
L~ssee's

assets: or

(ii)

File

. a

or

admit

i·n

debts

as

Voluntary Bankr\Jptcy.

voluntary .petition

in

bankruptcy

writing its· inability "to pay its

they

becoll)e due; or
(iii)

Assignment for Creditors.

Make

a

general assig!lll\ent for· the benefit of creditors:

·-

.

or
(iv}

File.

Reorganization or Arrangement.

a reorga\"lization or arrangement with creditors to
take advantage .. of any insolvency law: or
(v} Admit Insolvency.
File an

(

answer

admitting the material allegations of a petition
filed

against_

reorganization

Lessee
or

in

any

insolvency

bankruptcy,

proceeding,

or

during. the Term of this lease, an order, judgment
or

d.ecree

shall ·be

entered

competent jurisdiction,
creditor,
in~olv-ent

approving

reorganization

o£

any

court

of

on the application of a

adjti~icating

or

by

Lessee

bankrupt

a

or

petition. seeking
or
appointing
Lessee

a

receiver, trustee or liquidator of Lessee, or of
all.or a substantial part of its assets.

10.2
this

lease

In the event of any breach or default of
Lessee, then Lessor, besides other rights of

Remedies.
by

re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of
the hospital and use of the property upon the premises for these
purposes.

c·
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excess,

if any,

charges

equiva.l!!nt

of

the
to

amount
rent

of

rent,

reserved

'

remainder of the Term over the then
the

premise~,

additional,

in

tnis

r-easonable

.for the remainder of the Term.

rent

and

for

the

lease

rental va.l.IJe . of

The remedies he;:ein

given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the. exercise of. anY.:-:one
remedy by Lessor shall not ·be to the exclusion of a,.ny, ot;her
remedy.

With previous written notice or demand,· separate actions

may be maintained by Lessor ag'ain.st Lessee from ,,.,,_._time
to ti'l'e, to
.
.,, .
recover any rent or damages which,

at the · commencement

of. any

such action, ha.,s be.come •due and payable'· to Lessor without wai t:i,ng
until the end
of .this· lease·.
. ,. .· of t:he. .Te.rm
.
10.3 ·Attorney's. Fees.
Iii· the event suit shall. 'l::!e . bro\lght
-

.for an unlawfu1 detainer of the said ptemise.:>,

for the. recovery

of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, o:~;: ,,because. ·of
o£ ~ny o,.ther covenant. herein
pe.rfo~~ed, the prevailing party shall
thl

(

brea~h

con't~ineci

to b~ 'kept· ·or
paid a ·reasonable

be

at.torney' s fef!l by the other party ana such attorney'$ .f·ee shall
be d't{emed to nave a<:cl;'ued, at the conilhencement o:t; such a.cticm <~.nd
1

shhi .· be

paid

whether

or

not

such

action

is

prosec;;utea .

to

:

-

:\udgment.
ACTICLE 11
COVENAN.TS

MII:!

WARRANTIES

Except as otherwise expressly prov·ided 'in this lease .• lessee
agrees

to

ta'ke

ccindi tion,

posses:sion

of

prov·ided ho"'·ev er,

the 'lei!'sed
that 'Lessor

land

in . an

covenants,

"as

.is~.

represents

and wai~ants as follows:
li.i
the

TitJ..e.

leased

l~nd

That L£i'Ssor has good 'and marketable titl,e
and

said. title

is

free

and

to

unencu~jtbet:,ed·

Lessor's right, . title. and interest in arid to the leasl1!d land,
except for tnis lease and for any· lien or indebtedness incurre,d
pursuant to Arti.cl.e 4, ...shall

not· be

subordinated to any ot.her

clai~:~ or interest of Less~e or to any other claim or interest of
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ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants
of Lessee's assignee(s) or subtenant(s) under this Lease.

In the

event Lessee shall deteJ;"mine to sell all or ·any portion

of the

hospital, and/or any additi.ons or expansions thereto or thereof,
.

..

..

· .

granted first right of refusal.

L_essor shall be le!ttUJOxE!IA/ to purchase · t:he· hospital
market value which,

as

the

unle,ss agreed upon by the parties,

fair

shall be

determlned by an M.A. I. real. estate appraiser appointed and paid
by Lessor.

If Lessee is not satisfied with the fair market value

appraisal submitted by the appraiser selected. by Lessor,
may,

at

its

own

expense

and

within

s~le.ct

receipt of the appraisal,

twenty

days

(20)

Lessee
of

the.

an M.A. I . real estate appraiser

who, together with. the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose
a

third_ s~ch

appraiser whose

Lessor and· Lessee.

fees

sha·ll

be

shared

If Lessee fails to select' a

e·.:rually by

second appraiser

within· the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed. shall be
the sol'e appraiser and

shall set the fair market value of the

hospital. If Lessee does timely e~ct, and a majority cannot agree
as to the fair market value of the hospital, the three (3)

(

appraisals· shall
three {3).

be

added

together and

their

total

divided

by

The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value

of the h·ospital for the purpose o:t; this purchas2 option.
,kRTICLE.l3
ARE!ITRAT.ION: APPOINTMENT
13.1

Arbitration.

of any matter

arisin9

Either party may require the arbitration
under or. in. connec.tion with

this

lease·

Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice specifying
the matter to be ar~itrated.
matter

concerning

ine.ffective

unless

which
given

If action is alrea~y pending·on any

the

notice

before

the

is

given,

expiration

the
of

notice

is

thirty. (,30)

days after service of process on the person g'i ving the notice.
Except as
arbitration,

provided. to

the contrary in these

the arbitration shall be

provisions on

in conformity and subject

~ ..
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ARTICLE 14

MISCELWU,EOUS PROVISIONS
14.1

Exercise. of. Renewal O?tion. __ .Less.elt !:!'a.Y exercise

it_s__ -.

option to eli:tend· the Term granted under Article I, paragraph 1. 2,
h~reo£,

by giving Lessor written notice

thereof not la·ter

12() days prior to the expiration date of the Term.

exercised shall

extend

the

lease

on. the

same

than

Any option so

terms

as

effect at the time of the exercise '?f such. options,

are

in

subject. to

adjustment ana notification ·in ac~ordance l:!erewith •
. 14.2

leased

Inspection by Lessor.

land at any reasonable

.Lessor

tim~

for

may

enter upon

any purpose

the

necessary,

incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance
hereunder,
but
to. any previsions
.of Lessee's
.... . . obligations
.
.
. subject.
.
.
~ith

respect thereto otherwise contained herein.
14.3

Negation of Partnership.

Nothing in this lease shall

be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for any purpose a

(

partner,

joint venturer.,

or associate in ·any relationship with

Lessee other than that of landlord

and

tenant,

nor

shall

this

lease be construed to authorize either to act as agent for

the

other except as expressly provided to the contrary in this lease.
14.4

Control line Law.

This

1 ease

shall

be

deemed·

'::O·

·be

made and shall be construed in accordance with. the laws of the
State of Idaho.
14.5

deliver

to

Les-sor

termination of

this

good

and

condition

provided herein,
shall

Lessee

Surrender of Possession.

execute

possession
lease

or

of

as

the

demised

otherwise

in accordance

with

agrees to :y:ield

the

land

provided

deliver

to

Lessor

a

express
good

and

the

herein,

in

obligations

except for reasonable wear and tear,
and

·at

and

and Lessee
sufficient

document of relinquishment, if and when requested.
14.6 Successors.
This lease shall bind and inure to

the

benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors
or

assigne.es

of

Lessee

""hether

resulting

from

any

merger,

..
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14.9

l\m~nqrol!nt

of L.ease .•... Les-sor and Lessee shall cooperate

and include in this lea:se by suitable amendment from time to time
any provision th"at may reasonably. be

x'equested by any proposed

Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing ~he Mortgagee
protection provisions contained in. this

lease and allowing

such

mortgagee reasonable tn,l!ans. t9 protect or preserve the lien of a
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of
this lease.
.and

to

Lessor and Lessee each agree .to execute and deliver

acknowledg.e

if

necessary

for

recording

purposes,

any

agreement necessary to effect such amendment: provided, howevEit;· ·
such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent tinder
this

lease nor

otherwise

in

any

respE!.(;it

adversely affect

the

agree

and

rights of the Lessor in this lease.
14.10 'Recording.
have

acknowledged,

and

Lessor

and

Lessee

Lessee

agrees

to

to

d·eliver

execute
to Lessor,

a

memorandum of this lease in the form attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" for·.the purpose of recording such memor<jndurn with the County

(

Recorder of Bannock .county.IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

the P.art,ies have s·et t!J.eir hands

the day and year first. above written ...
LESSOR:
INTERJ,IOUN'l'AIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a
Utah non-pr_ofi t cQ:;:poration
auth~ri:t.ed to do business in Id.;aho,
dba Pocatello Regional Medical
Center

By_5;=7L~~__!~..a..>::YUV?::=.:..OJI:--n.::-•~~:«~-:::;:-·

:;;::-r_-·

...:.-..J·

By__~--------------------------
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STATE OF

)

IDAHO

: ss.
County of

Bannock

On this

)

27thday of

January

19_!!, before me,

undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
appeared M. L. CANCELOSI
General Partners of
par~nership,

the

said State,

the

personally

and .xHI R. YIIDI'ISKY , kno\ol!l to me to be the
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a '1\'ashington

partnership

that

executed

the

foregoing

instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed
•

the same •
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
written .. ·
.... ·-·~.
NOTARY PUBLIC
of Idaho

and for the State
residing at Pocatello

~n

(

(
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EXRIBJTA
LEGAL DESCRIPTION

A parcel of land in the State ofJdaho, CoUnty ofBarmock, located in the NE Y. of Sec. 25 T. 65.,

R. 34 E., B.M., more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the NE Y. of Sec. 25. Thence South 0 degrees Ol' 58" East along the·East·Jine of
Sec. 25, 1461.67feet, thence West 509.89 to the True Point of Beginning. Said point on the
Westerly right-of-way of the hospital.
Thence, Sou"th 0 degrees OJ '50" along Westerly right-of-way 160.64 feet to.the Point of curvature
of a 488.37 foot radius cUTYe having a central angle of33 degrees 43'35"
Thence, Southeasterly along srud curve to the left 287.47 feet
Thence, South 88 degrees 42'58" West 488.91 feet
Thence, North 442.14 feet
Thence East 406.35 feet to the True Point ofBeginning.
Contains 4 .25. acres

·
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Attorney for Defendants

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC,

Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC

Plaintiff,
ANSWER AND WRY DEMAND

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

The defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates,
LLC (Quail Ridge, collectively), through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA,
respectfully answer the plaintiffs' complaint as follows:

1. Admit paragraph 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7.
2. The answering defendants have insufficient information to admit or dert~------•
paragraphs 4 and 5. It is admitted that PMC has attached a Lease Agreement to
the Verified Complaint; however, the answering defendant cannot authenticate or
otherwise admit the specifics of the Lease Agreement. The answering defendant
does admit that a Lease Agreement was entered into a lease dated January 27,
Answer and Jury Demand Page 1
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1983 between Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development
Co.
3. Deny paragraphs 8 through 33, inclusive.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
I. The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its unclean hands.
3. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
4. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel.
5. The plaintiff's claims are barred from recovery by the doctrine of laches.
6. The plaintiff has failed to mitigate its alleged damages, if any.
7. The plaintiffs claims, some or all of them, are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations
8. The plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
9. The plaintiffs claims are barred on the basis that they lack a legal basis.
10. The plaintiffs claims are barred because they are not based in fact.
II. The plaintiff has failed to join necessary or indispensible parties.
12. The defendants are excused from performance by virtue of breach of the lease
agreement on the part of the plaintiff.
13. The plaintiff has waived, through its conduct or course of dealing, any retroactive
or prospective claims for rent adjustments.
14. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
15. The plaintiff has failed to give required contractual or statutory notices to the
defendants for alleged rents due.

Answer and Jury Demand Page 2
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16. The plaintiff has failed to perform a condition precedent to enforcement or
imposition of any rental adjustment, including, but not limited to, compliance with
section 1.3(b).
17. Any determination offair market value must exclude consideration of
improvements and the lease. Improvements include roads, utilities, buildings and
improvements to surrounding lands that affect the value of the land in question.
18. Any determination of fair market value must include consideration that the initial
value was an agreed $15,000 per acre, and all determinations of value were made,
accepted, agreed to, or relied upon by the parties at each adjustment date since the
inception of the lease. Thus, adjustments, if any, are limited to changes in value during
the period since last acceptance or acquiescence of fair value by the parties.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray for the following relief from this Court:
1. Dismissal of the plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety;
2. Awarding the defendants their full, reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. Granting such other relief as the court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND
claimants demand a jury as to all triable issues.

Answer and Jury Demand Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on August 2, 20 I 0, I
served a true and correct copy of the ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND on the following
by the method of delivery designated below:
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Fax: 232-2499

0·

U.S. Mail

Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center, Rm 220
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: 236-7012

Answer and Jury Demand Page 4
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- Sth Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 8320+099!
(208) 232·2286
(208) 232·2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDrClAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
.

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

vs.

'

.

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

'

Case No. CV-10·2724

)
)

) AMBNPED COMPLAINT

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY P. ARK ASSOCIATES,

LLC,
Defendants.
______________________

)
)
)
)
)
))

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center,
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, cc:mplfl,in$
and alleges as follows:

1.

Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC (''PMC"),

is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of!dalio, whose
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 6St Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock
County, Idaho 83201.

Amended Complaint
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Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"),·is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
3.

Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place ·
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
4.

This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27,.

1983 ("Lease Agreement"),

PMC's copy of this Lease Asreement is attached to Plaintiff's

original Complaint as Exhibit "l" and is incorporated herein by this reference.
5.

The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health

Care, Inc. ("IHC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original
lessee.

TI1e Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello,
Bannock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal descriptipn for the
6.

Leased Land is attached to Plaintiff's Original Complain.t as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated
herein by this reference.
7.

On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to

Pocatello Medical· lnvestors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limited

p~ership

·

authorized to do business in the State ofldaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 Keith
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
8.

On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their resp.ective.interests

in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridl,le and Quail Ridge thereby became the
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement
9.

On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest .in the Lease

Agreement to JHC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., the1·eby

be~arne

the

successor lessor to the Lease Agreement.
l 0.

On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in

the Lease Agreement to Bmmock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby
became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its
Amended Complaint
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name to PortneufMedical Center.
11.

On or about February I, 2009, BRMC (then known as PortneufMedical Cen'ter),

assigned its iuterest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the Successor le~sor
to the Lease Agreement.
12.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or

related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement.
13.

Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of

"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land.

COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT

14.

PMC real!eges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 13 above

as if they had been set forth fully herein.
15.

When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27,1983, !HC and

Sterling, as origina11essor and lessee respectively, agreed ~tpon a buis for calculating the initial
annual rental. Specifically, in Article I, Section !.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis f'or calculatirig the initial annual rental:
0

0

I

0

An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis qffifteen 'percent
(15%) ofthe value ofthe leased land. For purposes of the .first three (3}
years from the Commencement Date cifthis Lease, the leased land sha./1 be
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00)
par acre,
16.

The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and

wuunbiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 X 4.25 "'$63,750; $63,750 x 15%"' $9,562.50).
17,

The annual rental rate is subject to acijustment on a periodic buis pursuant to the

Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section l.3(b), which states in relevant part:

. . . The annual rental as set forth aboveshall be a4fusted every ihree (3)
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to
below as the rent adjustmlilnt date.
• I''

. 18.

The above language in Article I of the Lease Agreement concerning when each

Amended Complaint
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rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled fur January 27, 1986 and the r~nt was, and is, subject
to adjustment every three years thereafter until the tem1ination of this Lease Agreement.

19.

Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent. adjustme~t !late was

January 27,2010.
20.

Although the Lease Agreement provides fqr period rent adjustment dates as

outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the
'

'

'

specified rent adjustment date.
21.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part:

. ..
'

If the determination of ar,jjusted rent

iS made qfter the applicable rent

ar,jjustrnent date, lessee shall contl»ue to pajf rent at the rate applicable to
the preceding period until the a4fusted rate is det~rmined. The party
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any dtfferencefor the
period qffected by the adjustment.
22.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC 'becoming a successor

lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither IHC, IHC Health Service$, Inc., nor BRMC ~ereised its

right as lessor under this Lease Agreement t'O adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to 'Article 1 of
the Lease Agreement.

23.

Sometime in the summer of 2009, PMC became aware of the fact that the annual

rental rate fur the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article I of the

Lease Agreement.
24.

Specifically, Article I, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement proVides the

following clear and unambiguous fonnula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the
Leased Land:
t t ••

The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of 'the fair
market value of the lea$ed land, exclusive of the imprrJVements on the
premises. Determination of fatr market valuii! shall be based on the ·
highii!st and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date
without taking the leasehold into aacount. ...

Amended Ce~mplalnt
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25.

In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation

("Bowman") to detennine the fair market value of the Leased Land ori the priot three ~nt
adjustment dates,
26,

On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC,

which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007
rent a(ljus1ment dates was $1,297,371, $1,371,507, and $1,464,176, respectively. ·
27.

On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants ofPMC's intention

to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of this Lease Agreement.
28.

As evidence in support ofPMC's request for.an adjustment of the annual rent rate

pursuant to Aliicle 1 of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time

.

with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the LeaSed Land for. the
prior three rent adjustment periods.
29.

Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual

rental rate pursuant to Article I of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land.
30.
31.

Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement
.
.
After tllis litigation had commenced, PMC retained Integra Realty Resourc!'ls

("Integra") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land for the Januatj 23, 2007 rent
adjustment period and the January 23, 201 orent adjustment period.
32.

On or about December 15, 2010, Integra provided its appraisal report, which

states that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2007 rent adjustment period
ls $1,080,000.00 and that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2010 rent
a(ljustment period Is $990,000.00,
33.

Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $486,000.00 in annual

~nts

for the 2007 rent

acljustiDent period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe .PMC a sum of not ~ess than $457,312.50
.
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjU$tment period. The 2007 rent acljustment
Amended Complaint
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period includes the years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
34.

Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2010 rent' adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $445,500.00 in annual rents for the

im 0 rent

adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the
2010 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $416,812.50
for unpaid adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period. The 201 o rent adjristment period
includes the years 2010, 2011, and 2012.
COUNT II
IN THE AL TER.NATIVE, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
35.

PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through .34 above

as if they had been set forth fully herein.

36.

Defendants deny that ~Y are obligated to pay additional rent for the 2007 and

2010 rent adjustment periods; claiming that Plaintiff failed to apply the following language from
Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement when Plaintiff calculated its proposed rent adjustments:

The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial·
minimum rent ts the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value qf
Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00_per acre and shall also take
tnto acapunt any determlnatton.r of market value made under this lease for the
purpose ofadjustments for periods preceding
. the applicable rent adjustment. date.
.

37.

The court has found that the above-identified la.nguage in Section 1.3(b) of the

Lease Agreement does create an ambiguity in the fonnula to aqjust the rent and, therefore, a
dispute has arose between the parties over the interpretation and construction of the rent
adjustment language contained in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement.
38.

Section J.3(b) of the Lease Agreement pro~des that if a dispute arises between

the parties as to the detennination of fair market value of the Leased Land ~or the period to which

any rent adjustment applies, then "the detennination shall be made as in the paragraph on
Arbitration in Article 13.''
39.

Although multiple attempts have been made, the parties to this action have been

unable to reach an agreement for determining llle fair market value of the Leas~ Land for llle
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2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.
40.

lnstead of arbitrating this controversy over the determination of fair market value

under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, the parties have instead proceeded. with this civil
action in the District Court for Bannock County, Jdaho.
41.

. '.
An interpretation of the rent adjustment language in Section L3(b) of th.e Lease

Agreement is necessary to deciding the relative rights and obligations of the parties to this action
under this 1983 Ground Lease Agreement.
42.

Until a detennJ:nation of fair market value under Section· 1.3(b) .of the Lease

Agreement is made, it is impossible for the parties to caiQulate an. adjusted rental rate for the
2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.
43.

Pursuant to Id!1ho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, this Court is authorized and has

power to enter a declaratory judgment on the construction of this written contract.
44.

An actual controversy exists between the parties to this action over the

interpretation oftbe rent adjustment IMguage in Section U(b) of the Lease Agreement. ·
45.

Entry of a declaratory judgment by the Court on how fair market :..alue is to be

determined under Section l.J(b) of Lease Agreement is consistent with the original contracthig
parties' agreement that such disputes over a determination of fair market value would be
arbitrated.
46.

Once this Court has adjudged and declared how fair market :value is to be

determined under Section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, this Court should further enter a
judgment declaring the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 2010 rent
adjustment periods and the appropriate adjuSted rent for each such period based upon the Court's
fair market value determinations.
47.

Finally, the last paragraph of Section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement requires the

Defendants to "promptly after the determination [of adjusted rent], pay any difference fur the
.'

period affected by the aqjustment."
48.

PMC has not been paid an appropriate adjusted rent for the 2007' and 2010 rent

adjustment periods and, as such, the Defendants are obligated under Section J.3(b) of the 1983
Ground Lease Agreement to promptly pay PMC any difference between the actual rent owed and
Amended Complaint
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the actual rental paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods after this Court h!ls
determined the at\iusted rent for these periods.
ATTORNEYS FEES
49.

To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill,

Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to idaho Code §§
12-120(3) and 12·123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays. that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's
favor and
'
against the Defendants as follows:

i.

That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plabltiff for the 2007. rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $457,312.50;
ii.

That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for

th~

20 lO rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $416,812,50;

iii.

In the alternative, that the Court enter a decl~atory judgment on the fair market

value of the leased for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods;
iv.

That after the fair market value of the leased land for the 2007 Md 2010 rent

~ustment periods

has been determined by the court, that the Court atljust the rent for each suclt

period and enter an order directing Defendants to promptly pay any difference in the actual rent
owed and the actual rent paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent atljustment periods.

v.

That Defendants be ol:'dered to pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associ11ted

with bringing this action; and
vi.

For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable \lnder the

circumstances of this~~~·_
·
DATED this _!f. day of May, 2012.

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

By

~
~
,
.
~~~'*~
R:WUiil11llii(; k, TrO

Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC . ,
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CERTIFICATJl; OF SERVICE

1,·~~~~,

undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the

above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct oopy of the foregoing
document was this
below:

l..f~ay of May, 2012, served upon the following in the mann.er indicated

Michael 0. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Judge Mitchell Brown

P.O. Box 4165
Soda Springs, 1D 83276
(Chambers Copy)
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U Hand Delivery
U Overnight Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

___________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 14th day of May, 2012 for Court
Trial. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins, and R. William Hancock.
Defendants appeared by and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney and John M. Avondet.
Rodney M. Felshaw was the Court Reporter.
At the outset, counsel for the Plaintiff placed a stipulation on the record as to severd! of
Plaintiff's exhibits. Pursuant to the stipulation, Plaintiff's Exhibits #101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,
I 08, and 115 were admitted by the Court. Exhibit #I 07 is withdrawn at this time.
Plaintiff's counsel, Kent L. Hawkins gave an opening statement, followed by Defendants'
counsel, Michael D. Gaffney.
Plaintiff called Don Wadle who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hawkins
conducted direct examination of the witness. Mr. Gaffney cross examined the witness.
Plaintiff called Brad Janoesh who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hancock

EXHIBIT

conducted direct examination. The Court took its morning recess at 10:50 a.m. Upon

I
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reconvening at 11:10 am., Mr. Gaffney conducted cross examination of the witness. Brief redirect examination was conducted and the witness was excused. Plaintiff advised that it had no
further witnesses for today and the Court adjourned at 11:40 a.m. for the day.
Trial reconvened at 9:00a.m. on Tuesday, May 15,2012. At the outset, counsel for the
Plaintiff informed the Court they were resting their case. Mr. Gaffney then made a number of
oral motions to the Court. A Motion for Directed Verdict as to the breach of contract claim of
the Complaint was made and stipulated to by Plaintiff's counsel. The Court GRANTED the
Motion for Directed Verdict as it related to Count I of the Complaint. Mr. Gaffuey moved to
dismiss Defendant Century Park Associates, LLC from this litigation. Again, Plaintiff stipulated
to this motion and the Court GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss Century Park Associates, LLC
from this litigation.
The Court heard further argument from counsel as to Defendants Motion to Strike the
Testimony of Mr. Janoesh and Motion for Directed Verdict as to the declaratory relief claim of
the Amended Complaint paragraphs 46, 4 7, and 48. Additionally, Mr. Gaffney made an oral
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court recessed to give counsel time to confer with clients before offering additional
argument to the Court.
Upon reconvening, the Court ruled on the pending Motions as follows: Defendant's
Motion to Strike Testimony of Mr. Janoesh is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Directed
Verdict as to paragraphs 46, 47, and 48 of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. The Court stated on the
record the basis for denying each of these motions. .

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2
265 of 447

Defendant's counsel then called its first witness, Earl Christison whose deposition was
published and accepted by the Court. Mr. Gaffney then called Richard Faulkner, who was
administered an oath and testified. Direct examination was conducted by Mr. Gaffney.
Defendant's Exhibits #256, #257, and #211 were offered and admitted without objection. Exhibit
#228 (pages 1-8) were offered, objected to and admitted over objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #218
through #224 were offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Exhibit #227 was also
offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Plaintiff Exhibit #242 was offered, objected
to and admitted over objection. The Court took an afternoon recess at I :05 p.m.
Court reconvened at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff counsel had no cross examination of Mr.
Faulkner and the witness was excused. Defendant's counsel then called Brent Thompson who
was administered an oath and testified. At the outset, Plaintiff's counsel renewed their Motion in
Limine as to this Mr. Thompson's testimony and the Court again DENIED the motion. Direct
exam was conducted by Mr. A vondet. No cross examination was conducted and the witness was
excused. Defendants then rested their case.
The Court took a brief recess waiting on the arrival of Plaintiffs rebuttal witness. The
Court reconvened with Plaintiff rebuttal witness Tracy Farnsworth who was administered an oath
and testified. Direct examination of the witness was handled by Mr. Hawkins. Cross examination
was conducted by Mr. Gaffney. The witness was excused and evidence was closed.
The Court and counsel then discussed preparation of the trial transcript in this matter and
submission of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel would like the
transcript prepared prior to the submission and agreed the costs associated with the preparation
of the transcript shall be shared by the parties. Upon receipt of the transcript, the Plaintiff shall
have 14 days to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court with a
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separate document containing closing arguments. Defendant will then have 14 days to submit
the same. Counsel for Plaintiff shall then have 7 days for any reply argument (but no additional
findings of fact or conclusions of law) they may wish to submit. At that time the matter will be
taken under advisement by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 15,2012.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the(1 day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

0 Faxed

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffuey
21 05 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

0 Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

0 Hand Delivered
•

Mailed
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

3

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC,

4

d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL

5

CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,

6
7

Case No. CV-2010-2724

vs.

8

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL

9

INVESTORS, LLC, and

10

CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,

11

LLC,

12

Defendants.

13

14
15

May 15, 2012 - Volume 2 of 2 of a Bench Trial.

16
17

The Honorable Mitchell

w.

Brown presiding.

18

19

20
21

REPORTED BY:

22

RODNEY FELSHAW, C.S.R. No. SRL-299

23

Notary Public

EXHIBIT

24

I - - £- - -

@COPY

25
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1 finder. He doesn't get you art} cioser to how to
2 incorporate those additional criteria that are in the
3 lease. I mesn, he didn't even talk about it. Basically
4 what they want In do, Your Honor, is say he did an
5 appraisal and throw out that million dollar nwnber
6 because they needed In get a number out there. I guess
7 that would be my response. I do think it's an
8 admissibility issue rather than a weight issue. I mellll,
9 if you took like aDaubert analysis, which I know the
10 state courts don't do in Idaho, but in essence he hasn't
II followed the proper methodology.
12
Since I've moved to strike his testimony,
!3 I'd also like to move for a directed verdict first on
14 count one of the amended complaint, which is breach of
15 contract. There is no evidence in the record, by virtue
16 of testimony, oral testimony, or depositions, that even
17 suggests that a demand was made upon my clients for a
18 rent adjustment. How can we be in breach of this
19 agreement if they never put on evidence yesterday that
20 they were requesting and demanding a rent adjustment?
21
What we've got here is back in -- we know
, 22 that in 2007 they did not do anything. In 2010 they
1 23 decided that they wanted to seek a rent adjustment, but
24 Mr. Wadle did not testify at all about that. They
25 haven't put any documents in --

85
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I evidence that was introduced yesterday was deficient in
2 establishing that there had been a breach of contract
3 associated with this matter. Tn fact, Mr. Wadle's
4 testimony to that effect was that he had no information
5 concerning whether or not there had ever been -- whether
' 6 or not the hospital had ever invoked the nrhitration
7 provision of the Grouad Lease Agreement So I think
8 that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on
9 count one of the complaint is in proper form and order.
10 And I note that the plaintiffs have indicated here that
II they have not attempted to establish breach of contract
12 based upon the amendment to the complaint and are
13 withdrawing that claim.
14
So at this point in time the eourt will
15 enter a direeted verdict as relates to count one of the
16 breach of contraet, or count one of the complaint filed
17 in this matter, and will dismiss count one pursuant to a
18 directed verdict motion in this matter.
19
With that, then, Mr. Gaffney, that motion
20 being granted, do you have any additional motions?
21
MR. GAFFNEY: Yes, Your Honor. fd also like to
22 move for a directed verdict on paragraphs 46, 47, and
23 48, which are in part of the declaratory relief claim.
24 Paragraph 46 says that unce this court has adjudged and
25 declared how the fair market value is to be determined

87

(

MR. IiA .v'KINS: I can probably stipulate on this
2 and save a little time. I agree exactly with what Mr.
3 Gaffney is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the
4 trial. We feel that the way we have alleged the
5 complaint, and especially with the amendment for the
6 declaratory judgment, end then as a result of a
7. declaratory judgment, which effectively becomes the
8 adjustment process that we're alleging, then that
9 adjustment process itself results in the payment of the
I0 fair market value on the property for the years 2007 to
II current. So we would withdraw the first count regarding
12 a breach of contract and damages from a breach.
13
THE COURT: All right.
14
MR. GAFFNEY: I'll shut up on that issue.
15
THE COURT: I agree with both counsel for the
16 hospital and counsel for Quail Ridge in this matter. l
17 did not hear any evidence yesterday that in my mind
18 would have supported a breach of contract claim
19 associated with this matter. It appears as though the
20 plaintiffs have withdrawn that here today ll!ld have opted
21 not to attempt to establish any breach of contract by
22 way of their case in chief in this matter. At this
23 point in time they appear to be seeking only declaratory
24 relief with respect to that matter.
25
I would agree with Mr. Gaffney that the
86

I under seetion 1.3(b) of the lease agreement, this court
2 should further enter ajudgment declaring the fair
3 market value of the leased land for the 2007 and 20 I0
4 rent adjustment periods in the appropriate adjusted rent
5 for each such period based upon the court's fair market
6 value determinations. Then the next two paragraphs talk
7 about basically that same issue.
8
It seems toJile that in essence what they're
9 asking for is exactly the same relief they were asking
10 for under the eontract theory. In other words, for you
II to determine that there is a deficiency from 2007 going
12 forward. Ifs ju>i kind of another way to try and get
13 damages. I don't think that that is appropriate for a
14 dec action claim. I think at most what the court could
15 do, if the court found that there had to be an
16 adjustment, the court would have In order the parties
17 into arbitration per the agreement, because that is the
18 way that that is supposed to be determined. In fact, I
19 would suggest that these parties are -- the plaintiffs
20 are in breach because rather than coming to us and
21 seeking an adjustment and allowing os to dispute that
22 adjustment and then going through the arbitration
23 process, they short circuited it and carne into court.
24
THE COURT: Well, I'll be honest, that has been a
25 troubling issue to the eourt. l seem to recall one of

88
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I lhe fonn of testimony and-

2

3

THE COURT: And leading. Sustained.
Q. (BY ti.R. OO'!NEY) lbl, fran 1996 to 2001, did

4 Pocatello rfliical lllV"cStors stay as a subtenant to the
5 building?
6
A. They did. They operated the building as a
7 subtenant.
8
Q. Now, in 2001 did that·· did ovmership of
9 lhe building change?
l0
A. It did, yes. The whole transaction was
!1 restructured in 200 I.
12
Q. Okay. I wantto walk you lhrough lhat
13 restructure. First of all, what was the reason that lhe
14 transaetion was restructured in 2001?
!5
A. Sterling Development Group wanted to sell
16 the building. Mr. Preston wanted to purchase the
17 building. And by the building I mean lhe bricks and
!8 sticks, not the land. In addition, the Sterling
19 Development Group principals wanted to be released from
20 their individual guarantees. And lhey wanted to be
21 released from the financing on the facility.
22
Q. Okay. So Sterling owed mooey on lhe
23 building at that point?
I 24
A. That's correct. Sterling had a loan with
, 25 PERSI, the Public Employees Retirement System of Idaho.
I

!53

I the operator licensee of the facility. What happened in
2 2001 was that Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC,
3 stepped into the position - stepped into the shoes of
4 the Sterling Development Group.
5
Q. All right.
6
A. So we just aroended and restated the sublease
7 agreement and Pocatello Medieal stayed in as the
8 subtenant.
9
Q. What was the arrangement between Pocatello
10 Medical Investors and Quail Ridge since Pocatello
II Medical Investors stayed us the subtenant?
12
A. We had a sublease agreement.
13
Q. Was this a second sublease?
14
A. Well, we either had a substitute sublease
!5 or, my recollection is, that we aroended and restated tbe
16 old sublease.
17
Q. All right. The next question is during the
18 2001 restructure did you deal with any attorneys
19 representing tbe hospital?
20
A. I did, yes.
21
Q. And was there any specific attorney that you
22 dealt with?
23
A. Yes. Guy Kroesche, although I may be
24 mispronouncing the last naroe.
25
Q. And he's with Stole Rives dovm in Salt Lake

155

I
Q. Di! 1 Jhrecall,atthetimein2001 when this
2 transaction occurred, what the aroount owing oa that note
3 was?
·4
A. I helieve it was approximately 2.8 million.
5
Q. All right.
6
A. Although I'm sure its in the documents here
7 somewhere,
8
Q. I'm sure it is, but it's not necessarily9
A. It was a lot of money.
I0
Q. An estimate is good enough. So if I
Jl understand, why did Pocatello Medical Investors not just
12 purchase the building directly from Sterling?
13
A. Because PERSI, tbelender PERSI, had a
14 policy of not making loans to operators of care
15 facilities. So we had to create a new entity, Quail
16 Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, to assume the loan.
17
Q. All right. And at that point I assume that
18 Pocatello Medical Investors basically dropped out of the
19 picture once that transaction was completed?
20
A. I'm sorry, but did you say Pocatello
21 Medieal?
22
Q. Did I say somelhing else?
1
23
A. I might have misheard you. Pocatello
24 Medieal never dropped out. Pocatello Medical stayed in
25 as lhe subtenant, stayed in that·· by subtenant I mean
154

I City?
2
A. Yes.
3
Q. Was he in essence the·· I gness I'll use
4 the counterpart lawyer assisting with this transaetion
5 on behalf of the hospital?
6
A. He was. He was representing ••
7
MR. HAWK!NS: Objection. Leading.
8
THE COURT: Sustained.
9
Q. (BY MR. GILIIIN!:f) What was his role with regard
10 to the hospital?
!I
A. He represented as couosel for the hospital.
12
Q. Allright. Wasthereanexcbaogeof
13 documents during that- first of all, how long did this
14 transaction take to cumplete?
15
A. Gosh. I think the documentation took
16 virtually a whole year back and forth.
17
Q. Back and forth between whom?
18
A. !twas a four-way back and forth between our
19 group and Sterling Developmen~ involving PERSI and its
20 couosel, and the landlord and its counsel. The landlord
21 being the hospital, of course.
22
Q. Would you take a look at exhibits 218,
23 219-- 2181hrough 224, please. Have you had a chance
24 to look through those?
25
MR H.I\WKJNS: Your Honor, I forgot exactly which

!56
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1 guarantee of the ground lease'!
2
A. It was, yes.
3
Q. All right Why was that?
4
A. The original Sterling Development Group, the
5 original tenan~ the principals of lhat entity had
6 guaranteed the ground lease and lhe landlord wanted a
7 personal guarantor to stand behind the entity, Quail
8 Ridge Medical Investors, llC, which at lhat time was a
9 newly formed entity.
I0
Q. Now, when Pocatello Medical Investors became
11 a subtenant in 2006 to the ground lease, did the
12 hospital request any personal guarantees from Quail
13 Ridge at that point?
14
A. No. Mr. Preston did not have to personally
15 guarantee the sublease in 1996.
16
Q. So as part of the restructuring lhere was
: 17 this additional requirement that was stipulated by the
18 hospital?
19
A. Yes. The hospital required numerous changes
20 and numerous amendments here, including that Mr. Preston
21 personally guarantee lhe ground lease.
22
Q. If you'll look at exhibit 228 again, going
23 back to paragraph five, it says that "under the lease
24 tenant is obligated to pay rent at the current rate of
25 $9,562.50 per aonum. The rent has been paid through and

J
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1 don't believe it was objected to concerning why he did
2 not include that in the first draft. I'm going to
3 sustain the objection as to did lie view that as a
4 significant modification to the ground lease. That
5 would be sustained.
6
MR GAFFNEY: I understand the second part. I
7 did not uuderstand the first part.
8
THE COURT: The first part was he previously
, 9 stated why he did not include it in the first draft that
I 0 he prepared. There was no objection to that That I'll
II let stand and allow lhat
12
Q. (BY t•IR. GAF!NEY) In QJail Rid]e's willingness

13 to provide a[:<lrs:lr~ guarantee of the groJnd lease,

14 what was the s1gni£1car~ of that ~t related to
15 provision five of the estorf€1 certificate?
16
MR HAWKINS: Objection. Legal conclusion.
17
MR GAFFNEY: Ifs not a legal conclusion, it's
I 18 why lhey agreed to a personal guarantee, Yoor Honor.
., 19
MR HAWKlNS: Also an objection that this
20 document has been declared unambiguous and now we're
21 looking into outside circumstances in order to interpret
22 it.
23
MR GAFFNEY: We're not interpreting lhe
24 document. Iwant to know what the relationship is
25 between the two documents.

1 including Febiluuy 28th, 2001."
2
Now, the language talking about rent
3 adjustment that appeara in the '96 estoppel certificate
4 is not in this certificate here1
5
A. That's correct I did not include it in the
6 frrst draft.
7
Q. And why was that left out?
8
A. Beenuse I had looked at what the parties had
.1 9 been doing since 1996, and for the five years that our
; I 0 group had been involved in the facility the rent
II adjustment mechanism had never be<ln raised. And then I
12 spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and
13 understood that in the entire 13 yeara preceding our
14 involvement no one had ever raised the section of the
15 reot adjustment in order to increase or change the rent
16 So I wanted to confirm in the coarse of dealinglhat
17 lhat had been waived.
18
Q. Did you, on behalf of Quail Ridge, view that
19 as asigoificant modification to the grouud lease?
20
MR. HAWK!NS: Objection. Conclusion.
21 Particularly in light of the court's previous ruling
22 that lhis particular document is unambiganus and that
23 parol evidence about the document is not going to be
24 admitted.
25
THECOURT: l'mgoingtoallowtheanswer. I
166

I
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection
2 and allow the question.
3
THE WITNESS: We wanted to uail do\'m once and for
4 all what the rent was. This document made numerous
5 provisions and amendments to lhe ground lease. As part
6 of that negotiating process we wanted to put to bed once
7 and for all what the •• confirming what the course of
8 conduct had been, but put to bed once and for all what
9 the rent would be under the ground lease.
10
MR. HAWKfNS: Your Honor, I move to strike the
11 response. It wasn't responsive to the questioo that was
, 12 asked and it did exactly what was previously barred by
13 the court as giving an opinion as to the intent and
14 purpose of the 200 I estoppel certificate, which is an
15 unambiguous document and we don't need the attorney to
16
come in and tell us what was dooe in that document or
1
1 17 why it was done.
18
MR. GAFFNEY: Yoor Honor, only the party asking
19 the question can move to strike as nonresponsive. The
20 other party has to live with the answer.
21
MR. HAWKINS: Then I'm renewing the objection to
22 the question, having heard the answer.
23
THE COURT: Just aminute. Only the party
24 moving •• only the party asking the question can move to
25 strike?

1

'

I•
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IN TilE DISTRICT COURT OF TID£ SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAB:O, IN AND tOR Tim COTJNTY OF DANNOCI<:

FIL1ID IN CHAMBERS

HOV 1.2 .2012
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
)
POR'I'NEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, )
) CaseNo.
Plaintiff.
)

CV-2010..0002724-0C

)

vs.

)

) ORDER ON FORM OF JUDGMENT
QUAIL lUDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
LLCandCENTURYPARK
)

ASSOCIATES,

)
)

Defendants. ·

)
)

This action came before the Court for a two (2) day ~urt trial coiiUilenclng on May 14,
2012 and continuing tbrol.lgh May 15, 2012. On October 17, 2012, the Court issued its Findings

oU'aot and Cono.lusions of Law. On October 22, 2012, the Cc>urt issued its Order Correcting
Conolusions of Law. Pu:r&uant to the Court's Findings of Flll.lt and ConclUsions of Law, the
Court Orde)'ed that 'th& Pl.atirti:ff p.re.Jtare a Declaratory Judgment consistent with the Court's

Conclusions ofLa.w.
Consiatent with the COl.l.rt' s order, Plaintiff subndtted a proposed Judgment.

The

p;coposed Judgment was In a different .fotm than antioip11ted by the Court. Plahl.tiff' s propo$ed
Judgrnetit was in the fom1 of a money judgm.e.nt against Defendant, Quail Ridge, in the sum of
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$416,812.50 and a dec!SJ:ation that the rent adjustment. provision relative to the parties' Clround

Lease Agreement remains in full force and offeot and is subject to adjustment in 2013.1
Due to concerns that the Court had regSJ:ding whether · a money judgment was
appropriate, the Collrl

~chedul.ed

a oonferenoe oall witll counsel

fo~

both parties. The Court

expressed its concerns and advised 1he patties that they should submit briefing in support of their
respective positions on the natw:e and form. of judgment the Court should enter in this matter.
Conmtent'with the Court's request, the parties :filed simultaneous briefs on this issue. The Court

has considered the submissions and now enters its Order.

DISCUSSION

Plai.ntl£f"s Initial. Complaint was couched in terms ofa complaint for breach of contract.
During the course of pre-trial motion practice, the Court advised that it was not certain relief
could be granted to the' Plaintiff on a breach of contnwt theory and opiruld :tlu¢ perhaps "the relief
Plaintiff' was seeking wa.s a declaration of the parties' rights p'LitSUII1lt to I. C. §§10-1201 through
10-1203.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to assert a claim for
decla:tatory relief. The motion was granted, without objection from Quail Ridge. Thetefore, this
matter proceeded to trial on two (2) sepatate clain:ul: (1) Bree.oh of Confl:aot. and (2) I>eclaratory
Relief. At tbe conclusion of Plllirrtift' s casc-4n-obief, Quail Ridge moved for a directed verdict
on Plaintiff's breach of oontract .claim, Plaintift' did not oppose Quail Ridge's motion and the
Court granted the same.
llowever, had Plaintiff opposed Quaill.Udge Motion for Directed Verdict on Plaintiffs
Bteaoh ·of Colltract Claim, the

Court. would

have be@l CO!lStrained to grant the motion because

1l'I.Oli>U!I' oWed. tb• dale tbr ~CI)t lO b&Ianumy 27, 2013. l!owov.,., 'lbo Court's Plndlng! of Fact and Cooolua!on of Law
e.smbl!sh lhftl1llecflt:ctlvo date furthc rcatadjustmentdal&ls l'llbruary 1, 2013 not1atl\lall' Z7, 201!,
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there was no evidence in the trial record to support a claim that Quail Ridge was mbreach of
contract. Rather, Quail Ridge had paid rent each month in the orig!Dal ar;nount of $9,562.5 0. See

Court's Findings ofFact No. 18 anti 19, Findings ofFact, Co:o.clusiona ofLaw 11\l.d Memonmdum
Decision apd Order, p.14,1f118-19.

As such, thore was no evidence that Quail Ridge was in violation or had breached the
terms of the Ground Lease Agreement. Similarly, the Court would also have concluded, had the

Court been asked to make findings of :filet and conclusions of laW on this issue, that Quail Ridge
had not violated the Ground

Less~> A~t

in failing to cooperate in the rent adjustment

provisions.
Fortheso reasons, the Court concludes that thero are absolutely no facts in the record that
would jlistlfy this Court entering a money judgxnmt in Jkllot of the Plaintiff. AU the Court's

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law lllld McmorandUtn Decision cltll properly be utilized fur is
to declare the parties' l'!lspec1ive ri.ghts in relation to the Ground Lease Agreement. There has

bee.n no breach established to the Court as of the time of1rial in this matter.
The parties' Ground Lease ~t provides that ''the paxty indebted shall, ptOmptly
after the determination, pay any c:liffermce for the period affected by the acljustment." Ground
Lease Agreexnent, p.3, §1.3(b). Now that the deten:ni.nation has· been made

il$

contemplated

llll.der the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground Lease Agreement requin:s ''prompt" payment of
the balance due under the Ground Lease Ag:rc=nent? Although theo Ground Lease Agreemen:t

~oes not define the term prompt fo:r purposes of the parties' agreement, .a fllilure to pay this
amount in a reasonable time certamly would give rise to an action for breach of contract.

'h tho\l[d be noted

illal the partie$' OroUild Leaso Agrocu!flllt conteii\PIIIW. llllt ~on bolDg mod• by lfblttalion.
However, both p~.. clearly 8)ld ""Prot!1y waived tbfl requirement, lnstold opting to ~~ in this forum.
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because there has been no breach and the breach of contract claim was
the Court will decline Pla:inti.ff"s request for entry of a. money judgment.

'I

· certaihl.y if''prompt" payment is not nw!c consistent with tbis Court's determination, Plaintiff is
entitled to avail itse>lf of the courts in ordet to seck redress for this breach. However, this Court
will limit its judgment to one of declaring the respective rights and obliptions \ll;ldet the Ground

Lease Agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 12th day ofNovembeJ:, 2012.

ORDER ON FORM Ol' JUIIGM!.N'I' -4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAlLtNG/SER.VICE

The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day o:fNovember, 20 l.2, slw caused a true and

correct oopy of the foregoing Order on Fonn of Judgment to be served upon the following: :Persons
in the :fOllowing tnaMer:

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O.Box991

Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
{208) 232-2499
DEFENDANT ATIOR.NEY:

Michael D. Gafflley
21 OS Coronado State

· Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
(208) 529-9732

DALE HATCH. Clerk

YvnrJ&

By: Deputy Clerk

~irM

OliDltl! Olll fOliM 011 Jll))GIItENT • S
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
· Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants.

The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge), through counsel of record Beard St. Clair
Gaffney P A, respectfully submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center,
LLC (PMC). This memorandum in opposition to PMC's motion for summary judgment is
supported by Quail Ridge's cross-motion and memorandum for summary judgment; the second
affidavit of John M. Avondet, counsel for Quail Ridge; and other pleadings and affidavits in the
record.

Ill
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INTRODUCTION
This action is the second lawsuit between the parties. PMC previously sued Quail Ridge
for breach of contract in Bannock County Civil Case No. 10-2724. At the trial for that matter,
and upon the conclusion ofPMC's case-in-chief, Quail Ridge moved for directed verdict. The
Court in PMC I granted the motion. In fact, PMC voluntarily agreed to dismiss its breach of
contract claim against Quail Ridge pursuant to Quail Ridge's directed verdict motion.
PMC now argues it is entitled to summary judgment in this action for its breach of
contract claims against Quail Ridge and Forrest Preston. In so arguing, however, PMC ignores
the limitations of res judicata and collateral estoppel, both of which preclude it from obtaiuing
sununary judgment over Quail Ridge as a matter oflaw, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c). Because PMC has not met its burden in showing that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter oflaw, one of the requirements for obtaiuing sununary judgment under Rule 56(c),
the Court should deny PMC's motion for sununary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R.
CJV. P. 56(c) (2013); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851,
853-54 (1991 ). It is recognized that when assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court
must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. G&M Farms, 119 Idaho at
517, 808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156
(Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Saftco Title Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 121 Idaho 463, 825 P.2d 1119 (1992).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment- Page 2

279 of 447

/

fact. If the moving party fails to make this showing, then summary judgment is inappropriate.

Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). The non-moving party is
entitled to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the
moving party's motion. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299
(1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho lOi,
102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988).
If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence,
the motion for summary judgment should be denied. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 900, 876
P.2d 595, 598 (1994); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,470,716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Quail Ridge references and incorporates its Statement of Facts contained in its crossmotion for summary judgment as if set forth fully herein. (See generally Defs.' Mem. Re: CrossMot. Summ. J. at 3-6.) 1

ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is only appropriate in situations where the moving party meets its
burden in showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56(c) (20 13). Quail Ridge does not
concede PMC's argument that there are no genuine issues of material fact to bar PMC from its
requested summary judgment. But because PMC has already brought these claims against Quail
Ridge in PMC I, the general principle of res judicata, including "true" res judicata, or claim
preclusion, and collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars PMC from a summary judgment as a
matter of law under Ru1e 56(c). See Pincockv. Pocatello Gold and Copper Mining Co., 100

1

Submitted on September 23, 2013.
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Idaho 325, 328, 597 P.2d 211, 214 (1979) ("It is well settled in Idaho that a trial judge should not
grant a motion for sunnnary judgment if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion ... presents a genuine issue of material fact or shows that the
respondent ... is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If either condition is satisfied,
summary judgment [is] improper.") (internal citations omitted).

I.

Res judicata precludes PMC from an entry of summary judgment as a matter of
law.

"True" res judicata, or claim preclusion, '"treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full
measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same 'claim' or cause of
action."' Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,256,668 P.2d 130, 132 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting

Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978)). Res
judicata "bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims
'relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made."' Kootenai Elec. Coop.,

Inc. v. The Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120,219 PJd 440,444 (2009) (quoting Ticor Title v.
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007)). Res judicata exists to preserve the
integrity of judicial dispute resolution, protect the courts against the burdens of repetitious
litigation, and provide refuge from the harassment of repetitious claims. Aldape, 105 Idaho at
247,668 P.2d at 133.
Res judicata bars a party from asserting a claim in a subsequent action when three
requirements are met: "(1) same parties, (2) same claim, and (3) final judgment." Kootenai Elec.

Coop., 148 Idaho at 120, 219 P.3d at 444 (quoting Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 PJd at 617).
All three requirements for res judicata are satisfied in this case.
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First, the parties from PMC I are the same parties to this litigation. In PMC I, PMC sued
Quail Ridge for breaching the Ground Lease Agreement. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex.

C.i In this

litigation, PMC is again suing Quail Ridge for breach of contract under the Ground Lease
Agreement. This satisfies the first requirement for res judicata.
Second, and as set forth in Quail Ridge's memorandum in support of its cross-motion for
sunnnary judgment, the present claim for breach of contract is the same breach of contract claim
litigated in PMC I. In determining what constitutes a claim for purposes of res judicata analysis,
the Idaho Court of Appeals turned to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24:
When a valid and fmal judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs
claim ... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction ... out of
which the transaction arose.

***
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" ... [is] to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or
business understanding or usage.

Aldape, 105 Idaho at 258-59, 668 P.2d at 134-35 (quoting REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)) (omissions in original). See also Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119
Idaho 146, 149, 804 P.2d 319, 322 (1990) (Idaho Supreme Court citing with approval Aldape's
analysis of Restatement (2nd) of Judgments§ 24).
In analyzing what constituted a separate claim under res judicata standards, the Aldape
court looked further to the Restatement:
Having been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts
another action seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a
different substantive law premise or ground. This does not constitute the
2
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presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the
same transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the second action
should be held barred.

Aldape, 105 Idaho at 259, 668 P.2d at 135 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 25
cmt. d (1982)).
Under this pragmatic framework, PMC's present breach of contract claim against Quail
Ridge stems from the same transaction- the parties' Ground Lease Agreement - and is therefore
not a new claim, but instead the same claim, rehashed, from P MC I. Because the same claim
from PMC I is at issue in this litigation, the second requirement of res judicata is satisfied.
Finally, there is no dispute that a final judgment was issued in PMC I or whether Judge
Brown granted directed verdict to Quail Ridge. (pee Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. I 0 ("[I]t is
nndisputed that there was a final judgment on the merits in [PMC 1].").) The final judgment
rendered in PMC I satisfies the third and last requirement for res judicata.
In PMC I, Judge Brown granted directed verdict to Quail Ridge on PMC's breach of
contract claim. Now, in this case, PMC has "decided to seek more favorable relief in a different
court. In essence, it sought to split its cause of action so as to obtain a further bite at the apple."

Kootenai Elec. Coop., 148 Idaho at 122, 219 P.3d at 446. Res judicata exists to avoid such a
result. Id Because this action shares the same parties and claim as those in PMC I, and because
Judge Brown entered a directed verdict and fmal judgment. in P MC I, res judicata bars PMC
from a judgment as a matter oflaw under Rule 56(c). PMC has failed to meet its burden in
showing that summary judgment would be appropriate, and the Court should deny summary
judgment.
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ll.

Collateral estoppel precludes PMC from an entry of summary judgment as a
matter oflaw.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "bars the relitigation of issues actually

adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties." Aldape

v. Akins, 10 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc.

v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530,535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)). "Collateral estoppel serves
the purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the
same party or his privy, of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation, or
preventing inconsistent decisions, and of encouraging reliance on adjudications." Anderson v.

Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 178 (1986)(internal citations omitted).
For collateral estoppel to bar a subsequent claim, five requirements must be satisfied: (1)
the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the earlier case is identical to the
issue in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was decided in the earlier action;
(4) there was final judgment on the merits in the earlier case; and (5) the party against whom the
issue is asserted in the present case was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.

Kootenai Elec. Coop., 148 Idaho at 120,219 P.3d at 444 (citing Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 124,
157 P.3d at 618 ). As outlined previously in Quail Ridge's memorandum in support of its crossmotion for summary judgment, all five requirements for collateral estoppel have been satisfied.
First, PMC had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its breach of contract claim against
Quail Ridge. At trial, PMC presented its case-in-chief on its breach of contract claim against
Quail Ridge. (Avondet 2d A:ff. Ex. D.) After PMC concluded its argument regarding its breach
of contract claim against Quail Ridge, PMC voluntarily agreed to dismiss the claim. (Id Ex. E;
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FMC /Trial Tran. Vol. II, 86:1-12, May 15, 2012.) PMC was not deprived of its opportunity to
fully and fairly litigate its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge.
Second, the issue to be decided in this action- PMC's breach of contract claim against
Quail Ridge - is identical to the issue decided in P MC I. See supra. Both cases asserted that
Quail Ridge breached the Ground Lease Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period by
refusing to pay $416,812.50 after offsets.
Third, the issue of Quail Ridge's alleged breach of the Ground Lease Agreement was
decided in the earlier litigation, with Judge Brown dismissing PMC's breach of contract claim
against Quail Ridge. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. D.)
Fourth, Judge Brown entered a final judgment in the earlier case. See supra.
Finally, Quail Ridge, the party against whom PMC's present breach of contract claim is
asserted, was a party to the earlier litigation. See supra.
Because all five requirements for collateral estoppel have been satisfied in this action,
collateral estoppel bars PMC from pursuing its present breach of contract action against Quail
Ridge. PMC is not entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56(c), and the
Court should deny PMC' s motion for summary judgment.

III.

Res judicata precludes PMC from an entry of summary judgment against
Forrest Preston as a matter oflaw.
As argued in Quail Ridge's memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary

judgment, res judicata bars PMC from pursuing its breach of contract claim against Forrest
Preston, owner and principal of Quail Ridge. (Avondet 2d Ex. C.) Once again, PMC's present
action shares the same parties and the same claim asPMC I.
As addressed by Quail Ridge in its memorandum in support of its cross-motion for
summary judgment, Preston is a privy of Quail Ridge. (Defs.' Mem. Re: Defs' Mot. Summ J. 9.)
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This point is undisputed, as in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, PMC
notes that "[a]lthough Preston was not a named party to the prior action, it is undisputed that

Preston is the primary principal of Quail Ridge." ((Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 10
(emphasis added).) Because Preston is privy of Quail Ridge, the parties of PMC I are the same
parties to this present litigation.
PMC' s breach claim against Preston is also the same claim at issue in PMC I. Claim
preclusion applies to claims brought, as well as those that could have been brought, in the prior
litigation. Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012). As noted by the

Aldape court, "the transactional concept of a claim is broad, and ... the bar of claim preclusion is
similarly broad." Aldape, 105 Idaho 254,259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1982)). PMC has no excuse for its failure to bring a breach
claim against Preston in PMC I. It is now estopped from doing so because of res judicata.
Because PMC is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56(c) regarding its
breach claim against Preston, PMC has failed to meet its burden to show it is entitled to summary
judgment under Ru1e 56(c). This Court shou1d deny PMC's motion for summary judgment.

IV.

Alternatively, the Court should fmd that there are triable issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment.
In the event that the Court does not agree that PMC's claims are barred by res judicata

and/or collateral estoppel, the Court should still deny the motion for summary judgment. PMC's
claims are fundamentally based upon Judge Brown properly construing the Ground Lease
Agreement's terms, conditions, and language. If Judge Brown erred in his application of the law
to the facts of PMC I, the basis for this second lawsuit will be extinguished. Quail Ridge has
appealed Judge Brown's findings and the Amended Declaratory Judgment that he entered on
November 26,2012. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. A.)
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Therefore, there are two grounds for denying the summary judgment motion in addition
to those articulated supra. First, there are triable issues whether Quail Ridge has failed to have
"promptly paid" the amounts Judge Brown found were owed under the Ground Lease Agreement.
The second basis is that the issue is not ripe and there is a risk of reaching inconsistent results in
two interrelated lawsuits.
a. Triable issues exist whether there has been a breach.

Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment stated that Quail Ridge was to "promptly
pay" the amount identified in the Amended Declaratory Judgment. Judge Brown did not
articulate a specific time period when payment was to occur. Quail Ridge does dispute whether it
has failed to promptly pay the amounts Judge Brown held were owed under the Ground Lease
Agreement. Quail Ridge submits that the determination of whether Quail Ridge has breached the
contract is an issue offact.
PMC pins its argument on the fact that it made a demand for payment following Judge
Brown's issuance of the Amended Declaratory Judgment and that Quail Ridge did not meet the
terms of the PMC demand letter. (Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. at 5-7.) PMC's argument,
however, is flawed because the demand letter did not comport with the terms of the Amended
Declaratory Judgment. The Amended Declaratory Judgment provides, in relevant part:
(4) Therefore, based upon the rent adjustment, Quail Ridge is obligated to
promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease
Agreement.
(Hancock Aff. Ex. 2.) The phrase "promptly pay" is ambiguous. Though the promptly pay
language is found in the Amended Declaratory Judgment, the document purports to set forth
contractual obligations. Thus, if the duties of the parties are ambiguous, the general rules of
contract construction should apply.
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Juries are arbiters of contractual ambiguities. Potlach Education Ass 'n v. Potlach School

Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633,226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). Judge Brown did not state a
specific time period for performance of the payment obligation. He ambiguously described the
obligation as one to "promptly pay" the $416,812.50. He did not parse the terms any further.
Whether Quail Ridge has not promptly paid PMC is a question of fact.
The term "promptly pay" is subject to differing interpretations and is based upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "promptly" as follows:
Adverbial form of the word "prompt," which means ready and quick to act as occasion
demands. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. MissouriPac. Ry. Co., 103 Kan. 1, 175 P. 97, 103.
The meaning of the word depends largely on the facts in each case. Irvin v. Koehler,
C.C.A.B.Y., 230 F. 795, 796; Stovall & Strickland v. McBrayer, 20 Ga.App. 93, 92 S.E. 543.
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1379 (4TH ED. 1968). In Rierson v. State, 614 P.2d 1020, 1023
(Mont. 1980), the Montana Supreme Court stated that the meaning of"promptly" was "ready and
quick to act, depending on the circumstances." Id The Court has sufficient evidence before it
that generates triable issues of material fact whether Quail Ridge has acted consistent with Judge
Brown's findings.
There is no dispute that the amount identified by Judge Brown has not been paid by Quail
Ridge. The fact that there has not been payment, however, does not mean that when Quail Ridge
does tender payment that the payment will not have been promptly made at that point in time.
This case is unique because the rights of the parties were declared by a Court oflaw and those
findings have been appealed to a court of appellate review. Thus, the rights of the parties remain
in flux and could be altered in the future by the Idaho Supreme Court. There is no agreed upon
statement of what is owed under the Ground Lease Agreement because of the appeal in Barmock
County Civil Case No. 2010-2724. Whether Quail Ridge has acted promptly vis-a-vis the
Ground Lease Agreement is subject to the appeal's outcome and carmot be determined now.
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In the PMC I appeal, Quail Ridge has asserted that the judge made errors of law and fact
in reaching his conclusions in PMC I and in calculating the rent owed for the 2010 adjustment
period. (Gaffney Aff. Ex. A; see also Avondet 1st Aff. Ex. A, submitted on February 6, 2013.) If
Quail Ridge prevails before the Idaho Supreme Court, then the Amended Declaratory Judgment
will be vacated and there would be no obligation to pay PMC the adjusted rent amount set by
Judge Brown. If the Supreme Court affirms Judge Brown, then the obligations of the parties for
the 2010 adjustment period will likely be settled. It is only after the appeal has been adjudicated
that the jury or the Court could even decide whether Quail Ridge has promptly made payment.
At this point, however, a jury could reasonably decide that Quail Ridge has acted properly and
that a payment made following the appeal would constitute a prompt payment under the
Amended Declaratory Judgment.
PMC suggests that its I 0-day demand establishes what would constitute prompt payment
as a matter of law. However, whether payment has been promptly made is a determination based
upon the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case. See Rierson, 614 P .2d at I 023. The
correct outcome in this case is intrinsically tied to the outcome of the appeal in PMC I. The
Court cannot decide as a matter of law that Quail Ridge's refusal to pay pursuant to PMC' s
demand qualified as a failure to promptly pay the amount outlined in the Amended Declaratory
Judgment. It is a disputed issue that a jury could find that Quail Ridge properly waited until after
the appeal to pay any obligation.

b. The issue is not ripe and there is a risk ofreaching inconsistent results in two
interrelated lawsuits.
The interdependent nature of the two cases was the reason why Quail Ridge asked for a
stay in March 2013. The propriety of this lawsuit depends on the outcome of the appeal in PMC
I. Judge Brown found in PMC I that there was no basis for awarding PMC a money judgment
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that could be executed upon by PMC. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. D.) Because there was no money
judgment to execute upon in PMC I, there was no requirement for an Idaho Appellate Rule 16
supersedeas bond.
Quail Ridge's prior motion was also improperly construed as a motion for stay for a new
trial or for judgment under Rule 62(b). Quail Ridge did not seek a stay on any motion for a new
trial or a stay of an effort to enforce a judgment. The judgment received by PMC in FMC /was
not a money judgment that could be enforced. (/d.) It merely declared rights. Thus, there was no
legal justification for requiring the posting of a bond or securing PMC against its eventual
collection efforts. This proceeding is not "any proceeding to enforce a judgment" because PMC
only asserts (a) breach of contract and (b) enforcement against a guarantee. (See Compl.

'If~

14-

24.) Rule 62(b) is limited to staying proceedings only when a motion for a new trial or to alter or
amend a judgment has been made pursuant to Rule 59 in the underlying proceedings. See IDAHO
R. C1v. P. 62(b) (2013). The grounds for staying execution of a money judgment are simply not
met in this case. The entire premise of Quail Ridge's prior motion for a stay was because the
validity of any outcome in this case is inherently based on the outcome of the appeal in PMC 1
No security should ever have been required in connection with a stay in this case.
Quail Ridge submits that the Court should defer this matter until such time as the appeal
has been decided. There is a risk of inconsistent results in the two cases. Staying the matter,
without the requirement of a bond, will not prejudice PMC because (a) it does not have a
judgment that it can enforce anyway at this point and (b) the outcome of the appeal will, for all
intents and purposes, determine the outcome of this case.
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V.

'

Quail Ridge is not collaterally estopped from asserting its affirmative defenses
against PMC.
In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, PMC argues that Quail Ridge

is collaterally estopped from raising its affirmative defenses against PMC in the present action.
(See generally Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 8-11.) Specifically, PMC argues that because

Quail Ridge's affirmative defenses relate to the parties' Ground Lease Agreement, which was at
issue in PMC I, Quail Ridge cannot raise them in this action. See id This argument is completely
incongruous with PMC's position as plaintiff in this second lawsuit. As PMC notes in its brief in
support of summary judgment, "[b]oth cases revolve around the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement
that governs the rights and responsibilities of the parties." !d. at 10. PMC is essentially arguing
that while it should be granted summary judgment on its current breach of contract claims
against Quail Ridge, which are based on Quail Ridge's alleged breach of the Ground Lease
Agreement, Quail Ridge carmot assert affirmative defenses it raised against PMC's first breach
of contract claim in PMC I. PMC cannot have it both ways.
Further, PMC makes a blanket argument that Quail Ridge's affirmative defenses to this
action have already been adjudicated by Judge Brown in PMC I. (Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J.
9.) However, this is not an accurate representation. Quail Ridge did not raise all of its affirmative
defenses to this present claim against PMC in PMC 1. Later in its collateral estoppel argument,
PMC only lists a select number of Quail Ridge's affirmative defenses to this claim as having
been addressed inPMC I Id at 10. Arguing that Quail Ridge is collaterally estopped from
asserting all of its affirmative defenses in this present action is therefore an incorrect
overstatement at odds with PMC's litigation posture in this action. The Court should therefore
disregard PMC' s argument that Quail Ridge is collaterally estopped from asserting its
affirmative defenses in this claim.
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CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment should be denied. Alternatively, the Court should
stay this matter until the Idaho Supreme Court has determined the appeal in PMC I.
DATED: October 7, 2013

Mic el . Ga fney
Jo M Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
No. 40566·2012
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC;
Plaintift7Respondent

v.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC; Defendan1JAppellant
and
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES; Defendant

APPELLANT BRIEF
Appeal from the Dish·ict Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge, presiding.

Michael D. Gaffuey
John M. Avondet
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Kent L. Hawkins
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O.Box991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Quail
Ridge Medical Investors, LLC
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I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE
A. Nnture of the Case.

The plaintitf/respondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a .Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC
(PMC), filed a Vel'ified Complaint alleging breach of a Ground Lease Agreement against two
defendants: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century Park Associates,
LLC (Century Park). PMC subsequently sought, and received, leave to amend its Complaint and
added a claim for declaratory relief. The defendants tiled an Answer and Jury Demand. The
case was tried to the Court on May 14-15,2012, in Bannock County District Court. The Court
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 17, 2012, and entered an
Amended Declaratory Judgment on November 26, 2012. This appeal followed.
B. Course of Proceedings

PMC tiled a Verified Complaint against Quail Ridge and Century Park on February 28,

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

2010. (R Vol. I, pp. 1-51.) The Verified Complaint alleged that Quail Ridge and Century Park
were successors-in-interest to a certain Ground Lease Agreement that had been entered into by
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co. (Sterling) in 1983. (Id.)
The Ground Lease Agreement pertained to real property located within the City of Pocatello.
(Id.) The Verified Complaint alleged that both Quail Ridge and Century Park had breached the

Ground Lease Agreement and had failed to pay an adjusted amount of rent. (ld., pp.l-51.) Quail
Ridge and Century Park filed an Answer and Jury Demand onAugust2, 2010. (!d., pp. 54-57.)
All parties filed dispositive motions. The district court heard argument on the motions on
August 5, 2011. (Id., p. 60.) The district court took the motions under advisement. (/d.) The
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district court orally announced its decision regnrding the dispositive motions on January 7, 2012.
(/d., p. 62.) The Court denied the motions. (ld.)

PMC asked lbr and received leave to amend its complaint. PMC tiled an Amended
Complaint on May 4, 2012. (ld., pp. 96-1 04.) Quail Ridge and Century Park answered the
Amended Complaint on May 7, 2012, a week before trial. (!d., pp.lOS-09.)
The case was tried without a jury on May 14-15, 2012. (!d., pp. 128-29.) During trial,
Quail Ridge and Century Park moved for directed verdict on Count I of the Amended Complaint.
(ld., p. 129.) Count I alleged breach of contract against the defendants. (/d. pp. 96-104.) PMC

stipulated to dismiss its breach of contract claim and the district court granted the defendants'
motion. (!d., p. 129.) Century Park moved for a dismissal of the remaining declaratory relief
claim and PMC also stipulated to the motion. (!d.)
Tile parties submitted post-trial briefing to the district court. (!d., pp. 135-63.) The
district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 17, 2012. (!d., pp.
166-203.) The district court found that PMC was not entitled to adjusted rent for 2007-09 but
also found an entitlement to adjusted rent for 2010-12. (Id., p. 201.) The district court entered a
Declaratory Judgment on November 13, 2012, and an Amended Declaratory Judgment on
November 26,2012. (R VoL II, pp. 214-18.) Quail Ridge timely appealed. (Jd., pp. 219-226.)
C. Statement of Facts.

PMC is a Delaware LLC licensed and authorized to do business within the state of Idaho.
(R Vol. I, pp. 96-104.) Quail Ridge, the sole defendant/appellant, is a Tennessee LLC licensed
and authorized to do business within the state ofldaho. (Jd., pp. 105-09.)
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Quail Ridge is an assisted living facility located in .Pocatello, Idaho. (Trial Tr. Vol. II,

I
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139:7-13, May 15, 2012.) The assisted living center facility is located on approximately 4.25
acres in Pocatello, Idaho. (lei., 139:14-18.) Quail Ridge owns the facility. (!d.) PMC owns the
4.25 acres oft'eal property. (Jd., 139:21-140:1; Trial Tr. Vol. I, 36:1-3, May 14, 2012.)
In .January 1983, IHC and Sterling entered in a Ground Lease Agreement (Ground Lease)
pertaining to the 4.25 acres ofproperty involved in this case. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 140:2-22; Pl. Ex.
10 I.) The Ground Lease governs, in part, the current parties' relationship. There is no dispute
whether PMC is the successor-in-interest to the lessor's (IHC) interest in the Ground Lease.
Quail Ridge similarly acknowledges that it is the successor-in-interest to the lessee's (Sterling)
interest. Section 1.3(a) of the Ground Lease establishes the initial value for determining rent.
The section provides:
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of :fifteen percent (15%) ofthe
value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years from the
Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the rate of Fifteen
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre.
(Pl. Ex. 10 1.) Section 1.3(b) discusses adjustment of the rent value and provides, in part:
The annual net rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) years beginning
on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to below as the rent adjustment date ..
. . The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (1 5%) of the fair market value of
the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Determination of fair ·
market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent
adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall take
into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated
percentage applies to a fair market value ofFifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($15, 000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market
value made under this lease for the purpose ofadjustments for periods preceding the
applicable rent aqjustment date. (emphasis added)
(Jd.) The last paragraph of Section 1.3(b) states:
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If the determination of adjusted rent is made atler the applicable rent adjustment date,
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the
adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after tl1e determination,
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment.
(!d.) Under the Ground Lease, Quail Ridge paid PMC rent in the amount of $9,562.50 per

annum. (Trial Tr. Vol. U, 141:14-15, De f. Exs. 256, 257 .) No one ever adjusted the rent amount
during the intervening years and once Quail Ridge became subject to the Ground Lease it paid
the rent every year in the amount of$9,562.50. (Trial Tr. Vol. n, 144:17-24; 150:5-15, 20-24.)
Earl Christison, former Pocatello Regional Medical Center (PRMC) 1 CEO/administrator
from 1989-2000, reviewed all PRMC contracts including the Ground Lease during his tenure. (R
Vol, II, pp. 308-1 0.) Christison testified during his deposition that PRMC would have gone
through each contract and "either renegotiated them or re-evaluated how they existed" on a local
and corporate level. (ld.) Christison testified that the hospital would have tried to "squeeze
every nickel and dime out of what [the hospital] could have got from them at the time[.]" (Id.)
The land values from 1989-2000 would not have supported an adjusted rent and so PRMC did
not adjust the rent. (Jd., pp. 308-10.) Don Wadle, vice-president of clinical support for PMC,
confirmed that rent had not been adjusted since 2002 when PMC took over the IHC facility.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, 38:14-39:10.)
In 1996, an entity named Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership (PMI) began

operating tile facility knoW!l as Quail Ridge. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 145:9-18.) PMI subleased the
building from Sterling, the original tenant. (ld., 145:9-18.) PMI transitioned the facility from a

1

PRMC was the name of the IHC facility in Pocatello.
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psychiatric hospital into an assi&ied living tacility. (Jd., 147:20-25.)
In 1996, l'MC's predecessor, IHC, signed a Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate
(the 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate) certizying to PMI that the rent was
$9,562.50 per annum and that the rent would be adjusted at the next adjustment period. (Def.
Ex. 21 I, ~!5.) Counsel represented IHC during the 1996 transaction. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 152:2-11.)
Neither PMI nor Quail Ridge's records evidence a request by the landlord to adjust the rent. (!d.,
150:25-151 :23.) PMI continued to sublease from Sterling from 1996-2001. (Id, 153:3-7.)
In 2001, the parties substantially restructured their relationship. (!d., 153:8-11.) Sterling
sought to sell the building. Forrest Preston, PMI and Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the
building. (Jd., 153:12-21.) Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their guarantees of
the Ground Lease and also wanted Sterling released from the financing on the building. (Id.)
Sterling owed approximately $2.8 million on the building. (Id., 154:1-4.)
The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into Sterling's shoes vis-a-vis the
Ground Lease. (Id., 154:18-155:4.) The parties amended and restated the old sublease with
Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and PMI remaining as subtenant. (!d., 155:9-16.)
IHC retained Guy Kroesche, an attorney with Stoel Rives in Salt Lake City, Utah, to
represent it during the restructuring of the parties' arrangement. (Id., 156:9-11.)
Kroesche negotiated terms of the 2001 restructure with Richard Faulkner, in-house
counsel for PMI/Quail Ridge. Kroesche made changes to the documents of the restructure and
many of his changes were "crafted towards rewriting the existing agreements." (R Vol. II, p.
291.) Kroesche received all of the documents involved in the restructure and commented on

Appellant Brief 9
306 of 447

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

many of them. {Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:8-17; Def. Ex. 228). The documents included a new
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate (the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel
Certilicnte). (/d., 164:13-23; Def. Ex. 228.) Kroesche specifically edited the 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate to add provisions that required a guarantee of the payments
under the Ground Lease. (See id.) This addition constituted a new term to the parties'
arrangement. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:22-23.) Forrest Preston's personal guarantee also constituted
another new tenn for the 2001 restructuring, in addition to other changes and amendments in the
deal. (Id., 165:19-21.)
The 200 I Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is different than its 1996
counterpart. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate never makes reference to the
ability to adjust rent at the next adjustment date under the Ground Lease. (Def. Ex. 228, ~ 5.)
Instead, the language about rent being adjusted at the next adjustment date is conspicuously
absent in the 2001 iteration. Faulkner, who acted as Quail Ridge's corporate representative
during trial, testified about why the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate differed
from its 1996 counterpart. Faulkner said:
Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for the five
years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment mechanism had
never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and
understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our involvement no one had ever raised
the section of the rent adjustment in order to increase or change the rent. So I wanted to
confirm in the course of dealing that it had been waived.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17.) Per Faulkner's testimony, in 2001, Quail Ridge "wanted to put to
bed once and for all what the rent was going to be. So in Mr. Preston agreeing to personally
guarantee the lease, he wanted to know what the rent was. This served to confirm what the
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course of dealing had been for all that many years before this." (!d., 170:8-16.) Neither IHC nor
IHC's attorney ever asked Faulkner to change the 200 I Landlord Consent and Estoppel
Certiticate's language in paragraph 5. (Id., 170:21-24.)
After 2001, Quail Ridge paid off several million dollars in debt associated with the loan
related to the Quail Ridge .tacility. (ld., 171 :20-172:4.) Quail Ridge made the decision to pay off
debt because it relied on knowing that the Ground Lease rent had been set at a fixed amount and
was no longer subject to the rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease. (!d., 172: 11-20.)
Quail Ridge also decided to invest more than $1 million in building renovations due to its
understanding that the rent had been fixed at a set amount (ld., 174:2-7.) As Faulkner testified,
no one had invoked paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease at any time during its existence. (Id.,
178:8-19.) One of the critical roles the 2001 restructure played was to "nail down what the rent
under the ground lease was going to be going forward." (Id., 182:14-19.)
In 2002, PMC became the successor in interest to IHC's interests in the Ground Lease.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, 39:6-9.) It did not immediately seek to adjust the rent. (Id., 36:7-37:20.) In
2008, PMC began researching the Ground Lease and claimed that it had made a mistake in
managing the Ground Lease and that it had failed to adjust the rent as set forth in paragraph
1.3(b). (Id.) The lawsuit is the first time that any party sought to adjust the rent.
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II.JSSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the district court erred by not finding modification.
B. Whether the district court erred by failing to find waiver.
C. Whether the district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim.
D. Whether the district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease' language.
E. Whether the district court erred by not finding a course of dealing.
F. Whether the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Brad J anoush.

III. ARGUMENT
A. Stand11rd of Review

When reviewing a district court's decision after a trial without a jury, the Court's review
of the decision:
[I]s limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact, and
whether the findings offact support the conclusions oflaw. A district court's findings of
fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered,
in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. It is the province of the district judge
acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. We will not substitute our view of the facts for the view of
the district court. Instead, where findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even
if the evidence is conflicting, those findings will not be overturned on appeal. We
exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions oflaw, however, to determine
whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions
are sustained by the facts found. Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 706-07,
52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002) (quoting Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Wash Fed. Sav.,
135 Idaho 518, 521, 20 P.3d 702, 705 (2001)).

Clayson v. Zebe, 280 P.3d 731, 735 (Idaho 2012). Substantial evidence is that which a
reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining fmdings of fact. Duspiva v.

Fillmore, 293 P.3d 651, 655 (Idaho 2013).
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B. The district court erred by not finding a modification.
The district court erred when it ruled that the parties had not modi!ied paragraph 1.3(b) of
the Ground Lease in 2001. Quail Ridge raised this issue in a pretrial motion in limine, which the
district court denied on May 4, 2012. (R Vol. I, pp. 123-25; Hr'g Tr. 15:20-19:22, May, 4,
2012.) Quail Ridge also argued post-trial that the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel
Certificate modified the GrOLmd Lease, constituted a waiver, and barred PMC from adjusting the
rent (R Vol. I, pp. 153-63.) The district court misapplied the law governing estoppel
certificates and reached an incorrect result. The Court should reverse the district court's findings
and rule that the parties modified the terms of 1.3(b).
Contracts may be moditied by mutual consent of the parties. Watkins Co., LLC v.

Storms, 272 P.3d 503, 508 (Idaho 2012) (citing Ore-Ida Potato Prods., Inc. v. Larsen, 83 Idaho
290,293,362 P.2d 384,385 (1961)). The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one party in
accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other. Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 272
P.3d at 508. Consent to a modification may be implied from a course of conduct consistent with
the asserted modification. Res. Eng'g. Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935, 938, 500 P.2d 836, 839
(1972). Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with
knowledge of the nature of the performance and the opportunity to object to it by the other, any
course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the
interpretation of the agreement.

RESTATEMENT(SECOND) CONTRACTS§

202(4).
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The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate establishes a modification of the
Ground Lease. "An 'estoppel certificate' is a common device used in real estate transactions. It
consists of a 'signed statement by a party (such as a tenant or mortgagee) certifYing for another's
benetit that certain !acts are correct, as that a Lease exists, that there are no defaults, and that rent
is paid to a certain date."' Lakeview Mgm/., Inc. v. Care Realty, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28171, *54 (March 30, 2009). "A party's delivery ofthis statement estops that party from later
claiming a different set of facts." /d.; .vee also K's Merch. Mart, Inc. v. Northgate Ltd P 'ship,
835 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. 2005). "A party who executes an estoppel certificate should not be
allowed to raise claims of which it knew or should have known at the time the certificate was
executed.'' K's Merch. Mart, Inc., 835 N.E.2d at 972. "An estoppel certificate binds the
signatory to the statements made and estops that party from claiming to the contrary at a later
time." Plaza Freeway Ltd. P 'ship v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616, 626, 96 Cal.
Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000). In Plaza Freeway Limited Partnership, the Court found that "the
estoppel certificate served to set forth the key terms of the lease agreement, as understood by the
tenant at the time of the plaintiffs purchase ofthe property." !d. at 628, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at 873.
No party disputes that the Ground Lease originally provided a mechanism for adjusting
rent. (Pl. Ex. 101.) Also, no one is arguing that rent was adjusted at any time from 1983-2009.
(R Vol. I, p. 179.) The lawsuit is the first attempt to adjust the rent in approximately twenty-

seven years. Two transactions, in 1996 and 2001, demonstrate that a modification occurred and
that the ability to adjust rent was removed from the parties' arrangement by mutual assent. The
district court failed to accurately apply the law to the facts and erred as a consequence.
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In 1996, PM! became Sterling's subtenant and operated a facility known as Quail Ridge.
(Trial Tr. Vol. 11,145:9-147:5, May 15, 2012.) PMI and Sterling entered into a sublease
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of the 1996 transaction was a Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate signed by Everett

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Goodwin, Chief Financial Officer for IHC. (Det: Ex. 211.) Paragraph 5 of the 1996 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate states;
Under the Lease, the Tenant is obligated to pay rent currently at the rate ofNINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 50/XX CENTS
($9 ,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and including February 28, 1996.
Under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease, the rent shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment
date, March 1, 1998.
(Jd.) Paragraph 5 ofthe 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate contains two items that

are of note: (1) it clearly states the annual rent to be paid under the Ground Lease, atftrrning that
the rent had not been adjusted in the years since 1983 and (2) it provides that rent shall be
adjusted in March 1998. (Jd.) Because the rent remained static in 1996, the parties agreed that
the fair market value was $15,000.00/acre. According to the language of paragraph 1.3(b), this
agreement should have been taken into account when deciding subsequent rent adjustments. (Pl.
Ex. 101.) The district court did not take the transaction into account in its findings.
Additionally, the 2001 transaction contains different terms than the 1996 transaction
because it constitued a significant restructuring of the parties and the agreements. (Trial Tr. Vol.
I, 153:8-11.) Sterling sold the building to Forrest Preston. (!d., 153:12-21.) Quail Ridge
assumed the Ground Lease. (Jd., 155:9-16.) The parties amended the sublease between Sterling
and PMl. Quail Ridge could become the sublessor with PMI remaining as the sublessee. (ld.,
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155:9-16.) Sterling took itself completely out ofthe picture in 2001 creating a new agreement
between the parties.
IHC, PMC's predecessor, remained a vital party to the transaction. IHC continued to
own the real property where the Quail Ridge building is located. Attorney Guy Kroesche
represented II-IC during the 2001 transaction. (!d., 156:9-11.) Kroesche received copies of every
document associated with the 2001 transaction. (R Vol. II, p. 291.) Kroesche and Faulkner
negotiated over the substance of the transactional documents, including the 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certilicate. (/d.)
Many of the changes suggested by Kroesche were "crafted towards rewriting the existing
agreements." (R Vol. II, p. 291.) As counsel for IHC, Kroesche received all of the restructure
documents and commented on many of them. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:8-17; Def. Ex. 228).
Importantly, Kroesche edited the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and added, for
instance, terms that required a payment guarantee of the Ground Lease. (See id., 164: 13-23; Def.
Ex. 228.) There is no dispute whether Kroesche recommended changes to the estoppel
certificate and that many of his suggestions were incorporated into the final version. Kroesche's
involvement in the 2001 restructure demonstrates that the terms of the 2001 Landlord Consent
and Estoppel Certificate were negotiated at arms-length.
New terms were added to the parties' relationship in 2001. For instance, Forrest Preston
was to sign a personal guarantee as a part of the 2001 transaction. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:22-23.)
The personal guarantee constituted a new, additional term for the 2001 transaction. (ld., 165:1921.) The parties made other changes. Thus, the 2001 transaction created a new arrangement
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mnong all of the remaining parties.
The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is substantively di:tlerent than its
1996 counterpart. In the 2001 version, paragraph 5 omits the statement that rent would be
adjusted tm the next rent adjustment date. (Def. Ex. 228, '1f5.) Faulkner, Quail Ridge's corporate
representative during trial, explained the change during his testimony at trial. He testified:
Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for the tive
years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment mechanism had
never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and
understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our involvement no one had ever raised
the section of the rent adjustment in order to increase or change the rent. So I wanted to
confirm in the course of dealing that it had been waived.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17 .) Faulkner testified that Quail Ridge:
[W]anted to put to bed once and for all what the rent was going to be. So in Mr. Preston
agreeing to personally guarantee the lease, he wanted to know what the rent was. This
served to confirm what the course of dealing had been for all that many years before this.
(!d., 170:8-16.) IHC never objected to the substantive change in paragraph 5. (!d., 170:21-24.)

Kroesche reviewed the substance of the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and
Everett Goodwin signed the document on IHC's behalf. (Def. Ex. 228.)
The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate modifies paragraph 1.3(b) of the
Ground Lease. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate evidences mutual assent or
acquiescence to the elimination ofthe rent adjustment provision found in 1.3(b). The district
court's finding that "the only evidence in the record regarding the modification of the Lease
Agreement is the subjective intent of Faulkner'' stands in stark relief next to the substance of the
2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate which is an express, written modification of the
parties'lease arrangement and the fact that additional terms were added to the parties'
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arrangement. (R Vol. l, p. 197, emphasis added.) The additional requirement of a personal
guarantee of Preston demostrates that this signiticant mod iii cation of the lease was supported by
additional consideration. The district court's finding ignores the totality of the admitted
evidence, which leads to only one reasonable conclusion: that the parties' expressly tixed the rent
amount at the historical per annum amount and, in consideration thereof, the CEO of Quail
Ridge personally guaranteed the lease payments lor the duration of the lease.
Idaho law allows course of conduct or written agreements to constitute a modification of
a preexisting contract. Watkins Co., LLC, 272 P.3d at 508. The 2001 Landlord Consent and
Estoppel Certificate evidences mutual assent to a new written agreement. The certificate
contains terms that are substantively different from the Ground Lease. The document plainly
provides for fixed rent starting in 2001. (Def. Ex. 228.) All of the parties signed the 2001
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. The district court, therefore, erred when it concluded
that the only evidence supporting modification was Faulkner's subjective intent because the
document itself was evidence of the modification.
Quail Ridge recognizes that the following language also appears in the 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate:
Landlord's consent to the assignment and assumption and/or to the sublease as set forth
herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) an acknowledgement or consent to any
other assignment, assumption and/or sublease, (b) a waiver or modification by Landlord
of the Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease, or excuse Tenant's performance of
any terms or condition of the Lease, and/or (c) a waiver or modification by Landlord of
any of its rights under the Lease, including without limitation Landlord's rights pursuant
to Section 12.1 of the Lease.
(Def. Ex. 228.) This language is not dispositive of the modification issue. Instead of finding this
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language dispositive, the district coutt should have looked at how the parties behaved following
the 2001 transaction to determine the parties' intent. Wcllkins Co., LLC, 272 P.3d at 508. During
the years immediately !allowing the 2001 transaction, IHC acted in a manner consistent with
modification. It never sought lo adjust rent. PMC, when it assumed IHC's position in 2002,
never sought to adjust the rent until2009. The district com'! failed to analyze the subsequent
conduct of the parties in light of the 200 l Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate's terms.
Faulkner testified that the change to paragraph 5 was intended to accomplish a
modification of the original Ground Lease. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17; 170:8-16.) PMC failed
to refute Faulkner's testimony. Had PMC done so, the district court would have cited and relied
on that testimony. It did not. (R Vol. I, p. 197, 1f35.) Faulkner's intent to modify the 2001
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is not the type of "subjective intent" discussed in

Beus v. Be us, 254 P.3d 1231 (Idaho 2011 ), the case relied upon by the district court. This case is
distinct because the document fully disclosed the intent to K.roesche and IHC. Faulkner left out
the adjustment language from paragraph 5, submitted it to Kroesche for additional changes and
received none. The parties ultimately agreed to the terms as set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 228
and negotiated at arms-length.
The district court improperly criticized and dismissed Faulkner's testimony in paragraph
35 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district colll't wrote that "removing
language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing the same or making the
other party aware of its deletion does not establish 'mutual assent."' (R Vol. I, p. 197.)
However, the district colll't cites no evidence for its conclusion that Quail Ridge had somehow
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order for them to be upheld on appeal. Clayson v. Zebe, 280 P.3d 731,735 (Idaho 2012). The
district court, in this case, ignored the guidance of Clayson and erred when it failed to to rule that
the Ground Lease had been modified and the rent adjustment provision changd. In essence, the
district court exercised its powers solely to restore PMC to "rights that they have, for a
consideration, deliberately, or even negligently, waived." Travers v. Stevens, 145 So. 851, 855
(Fla. 1933). The district court should be reversed and the matter remanded.
C. The district court erred by failing to find waiver.

The evidence also established that PMC waived its right to adjust rent. PMC never
invoked the rent adjustment provision prior to the filing the lawsuit. IHC had never exercised
the rent adjustment clause. PMC did not invoke the clause in the wake of it stepping in for IHC.
The failure to act and adjust the rent constitutes a course of conduct that the district court should
have relied upon to fmd waiver.
"A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established." Knipe
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Land Co. v. Robertson, 259 P.3d 595,604 (Idaho 2011). "Waiver will not be inferred except
from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or fi·om .conduct amounting to
estoppel." Id. at 604. For waiver to be found tl1e court must lind whether the facts alleged to
constitute waiver are tn1e. The court must also decide whether, if true, these facts suffice as a
matter of law to show waiver. !d. Waiver may be evidenced by conduct, word, or acquiescence.

Ewrton v. Blair, 576 P.2d 585, 587 (Idaho 1978).
The Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the failure to act could waive certain legal
rights. In the criminal context, for example, the failure to request appropriate jury instructions
would waive the associated defenses a criminal defendant may otherwise have been able to
assert. State v. Peregrina, 2010 Ida. LEXIS 21 *7 (March 24, 20 I0). In yet another example, in
appellate practice, if a party fails to support a position with argument and authority in the
opening brief then it waives those issues. Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Idaho
March 23, 2012). In Maclay v. Idaho Real Estate Commission, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 35 (Idaho
January 26, 2012), the Court declined to hear arguments that were not supported by argument or
authority in the opening brief. ld. at *24-25 (citing Hoggv. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130
P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006)); see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,500, 198 P.3d 128, 138 (Ct.
App. 2008). The logic of these holdings appears to be that a party's failure to act constitutes a
course of conduct demonstrating waiver.
The situation is no different for parties waiving contractual rights. If a party possesses a
particular right under a contract and fails to assert that right, then the failure to assert the right is
a course of conduct. As noted, supra, the evidence supporting waiver is undisputed, No party
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ever tried to adjust the rent before 2001 or in the years immediately lbllowing the 2001
transaction. PMC conducted itself in a manner consistent with waiving the right to adjust rent
under the Ground Leuse. Quail Ridge relied on PMC's failure to act and paid down debt on the
Quail Ridge building because it believed that the rent had been changed from an adjustable
umount to a tixed amount. (ld.,

171:20~172:4,

11-20; 174:2-7.) Quail Ridge detrimentally relied

on PMC's conduct vis-a-vis the rent adjustment provision. Detrimental reliance may establish
waiver. Clearwater Minerals Corp. v. Presnell, 729 P.2d 420, 425 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). In its
discussion of waiver, the district court never considers Quail Ridge's reliance on the failure to
adjust the rent by PMC or its predecessor, IHC. (R Vol. I, pp. 198-99.) Again, the district court
ignored the evidence that it had before it in order to fashion a remedy and result that it desired
rather than one supported by the evidence.
PMC acquiesced to the rent being tixed at $9,562.50 per annum. It never sought to adjust
the rent before the 2001 transaction and it never sought to adjust the rent in the years
immediately following 2001. The course of conduct between the parties evidences waiver and
the district court erred by failing to tind a waiver in this case.

D. The district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim.
The district court erred by not finding that PMC was estopped from claiming that it was
owed rent other than the amount set forth in the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate.
The representations made by PMC in the estoppel certificate should have been binding on PMC
and the district court erred by allowing PMC to assert claims that contradicted the plain language
ofthe estoppel certificate.
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The fundamental role of estoppel certificates is to make binding representations for a
party in order for other parties to make informed, reasonable decisions. K's Merch. Mart, Inc. v.

Northgate Lttl P ilhip, 835 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. 2005). "A party who executes an estoppel
certificate should not be allowed to raise claims of which it knew or should have known at the
time the certificate was executed." K's Merch. Mart, Inc., 835 N.E.2d at 972. "An estoppel
certificate binds the signatory to the statements made and estops that party from claiming to the
contrary at a later time." Plaza Freeway Ltd. P :rhip v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th
616, 626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000).
Here, IHC represented that the rent due under the Ground Lease Agreement was
$9,562.50 per annum. (Def. Ex. 228, ~ 5.) Quail Ridge, Sterling, PERSI, PM!, and IHC all
signed the document. (Id.) The representation contained in paragraph 5 does not contemplate a
future adjustment to the rent. (!d.) The 1996 estoppel certificate contains fundamentally
different language than the 200 I version insofar as it expressly contemplates adjusting the rent
during the subsequent adjustment period. (!d.; see also Def. Ex. 211.) The district court erred by
allowing PMC to seek a declaration of its rights related to adjusted rent when PMC made
specific representations about the rent owed under the Ground Lease Agreement in the 2001
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. The district court should have bound PMC to its
representations and dismissed the claim for adjusted rent. The district court erred by failing to
apply the law governing estoppel certificates and the district court should be reversed.
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E. The district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease's language.

Quail Ridge asserts that the issues of modification, waiver, and estoppel are dispositive
and should result in PMC's claim being dismissed. However, if the Court disagrees, Quail Ridge
submits that the district court erred when it interpreted the Ground Lease's terms. The district
court's tindings that Quail Ridge owed PMC adjusted rent for 2010-12 in the total amount of
$445,000.00 is based on an improper reading of the Ground Lease. The district court
misunderstood, or entirely missed, the point of the Ground Lease language and failed to correctly
interpret the contract consistent with the evidence and the law.
The issue tried to the district court, at its core, was one of contract interpretation. Idaho's
case law controlling contract interpretation cases is not complex. The law provides that courts
should begin with the document language when analyzing or interpreting a contract. Potlach

Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (201 0),
Courts should "seek to give effect to the intention of the parties." Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v.

Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443, 446 (2005). "To determine the
intent of the parties, the contract must be viewed as a whole and in its entirety." Id.
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument.
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation
of that contract is an issue oflaw subject to free review. A contract term is ambiguous
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term
is an issue of fact.

Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 454-55, 259 P.3d 595, 600-01 (2011).
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A fundamental rule of contract interpretation is that the court should not rewrite the
parties' contract. The Court has held that courts lack "the roving power to rewrite contracts."

City ofMeridian v. Petra, Inc., 2013 Id. LEXIS 98, *17 (April I, 2013) (citing Shawver v.

fluck/eheny Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,362,93 P.3d 685,693 (2004)). In McCallum v.
Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 349 P.2d 986 (1960), the Court wrote:
We must construe the contract according to the plain language used by the parties. While
a court may interp.ret agreements voluntarily entered into, a court cannot modify an
agreement to as to create a new and different one, nor is the court at libertY to revise an
agreement where its interpretation is involved. Courts cannot make for the parties better
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, and by a process of
interpretation relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to;
nor can courts interpret an agreement to mean something the contract does not itself
contain.
!d. at 166, 349 P.2d at 990. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently applied this ruie. In the

context of arbitration, the Court has held that "arbitrators are, of course, not free to disregard the
terms of the contracts they are reviewing-their powers derive from the parties' agreement."

Storey Constr. Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,409,224 P.3d468, 476 (2009).2
Here, the district court focused on paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease. Paragraph
1.3(b) contained the terms related to rent adjustment. PMC initially sued Quail Ridge for breach
of contract and argued that PMC was entitled to an increased rent based on that paragraph. (R
Vol. I, p. 1-51.) The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim after PMC rested its
case. (/d., p. 129.) Once the breach of contract claim had been dismissed PMC only had a claim

2

The context of arbitration is especially appropriate since the district court essentially acted as the arbitrator of the
dispute as required by Section 13 of the Ground Lease Agreement.
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for declaratory relict: (ld., pp. 101-04.) Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement
provides:
Adjustment Based on Property Value. The annual net rental as set forth above shall be
adjusted every three (3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease,
referred to below as the rent adjustment date.
The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days betbre the applicable rent
adjustment date shall a conclusive determination between the parties of the fair market
value lbr the period to which the adjustment applies. If the parties have not so agreed by
the applicable rent adjustment date, the determination shall be made as in the paragraph
on Arbitration in Article 13.
The rent adjusted shall be equal to frfteen percent (15%) percent (sic) of the fair market
value of the leased lm1d, eKclusive of improvements on the premises. Determination of
fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable
rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. TI1e determination shall
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated
percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market value
made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable
rent adjustment date.
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date,
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the
adjusted rent is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination,
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment.
(Pl. EK. 101.) The Court found that the s01ne of this language ambiguous. (R Vol.I, pp. 62-63;
Hr'g Tr. 4:1-13:18, March 26, 2012.) Specifically, the Court found the following portion of
Section 1.3(b) ambiguous:
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum
rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and
No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations
of market value made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods
preceding the applicable rent adjustment date.
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does not mean that it is not helpful

to understanding the contract or that the district court should

just ignore the language when interpreting the contract document.
The district court concluded that it should disregard or ignore certain language in the
Ground Lease Agreement. That decision was wrong. Specifically, the district court wrote:
(26) The Court will give no weight to the language contained in the Lease Agreement
that when adjusting the rent 'the determination shall take into account the parties'
agreement that the initial minimum rent is above-the stated percentage applied to a fair
market value ofFHleen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre.' The
reason the Court will give no weight to this language is that there has been no credible
evidence which this Court accepts concerning whether this. $15,000.00 per acre figure
was the result of a market analysis conducted by the parties in 1983, or whether it was a
figure higher or lower than market value as discussed in the Court's Conclusion of Law
number21.
(27) Likewise, the Court concludes that there is no course of dealings between the parties
to assist the Court in determining what construction the parties placed upon this provision
of the Lease Agreement by observing and construing their conduct or dealings. The crux
of the matter is that there was no course of dealing for the following reasons (1) Sterling,
and later Quail Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a maaner of
speaking if Sterling or Quail Ridge 'rocked the boat' they had nothing to gain and only
increased rent to lose if they initiated a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2)
IHC and Bannock County, through poor management and/or having forgotten about the
rent adjustment provision, never sought a rent adjustment. [footnote omitted]
(2 8) Therefore: ( 1) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to
establish a course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to
the language related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions
of the [Grouod Lease].
(R Vol. I, p. 195.) The act of ignoring, giving no weight to contract terms, or disregarding the
contract language, necessarily creates a new contract with new terms. The creation of a new
contract is not the goal of contract interpretation. See Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140
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Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004). The district court should have interpreted the contract
language without fashioning a new agreement. Id.
The district court reasoned that since no parole evidence was admitted during trial about
the terms it found ambiguous that it could not interpret the contract as written. That rationale is
inherently tlawed and entirely misses the point. The issue in the case was not "how" the parties
initially reached the $15,000.00 Ugure. The process for deciding the original value given to the
real property does not matter when adjusting the rent. The tact that IHC and Sterling originally
agreed on the $15,000.00/acre value is relevant; how they reached that figure ultimately does not
matter. The Ground Lease clearly contemplated subsequent adjustments in rent "taking into
account" the original, agreed upon figure. The $15,000.00/acre figure, by the document's own
terms, has to be factored into subsequent adjustments of the rent in some manner. (Pl. Ex. 101.)
The district court did not take those facts into account and therefore misapplied the law to the
document. The district court's improper application of Jaw and fact resulted in its incorrect
findings because contract intent is to be derived based on the contract language as a whole. J.R.

Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006); Gem-Valley Ranches v. Small,
90 Idaho 354, 372, 411 P.2d 943, 954 (1966).
The existence or absence of extrinsic evidence does not justify willfully disregarding
contract language. Instead, the district court should have factored in the "taking into account"
language rather than just ignoring it or giving it no weight. The district court rewrote the parties'
agreement when it should not have done so. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho
354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004).
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Taking into account the original $1 5,000.00/acre agreement and the fact that there were
no subsequent adjustments to the rent results in a vastly different adjustment to the rent than the
one created ex nihilo by the district cmni. Any adjustment to rent based on the actual language
of 1.3(b) would be based on the incremental change in land values for the adjustment periods at
issue in this case. Applying the incremental change, regardless of whether it is an increase or
decrease in land value, takes into account the prior agreements as to value and rent.
The district court only awarded adjusted rent for 2010. The two experts in the case both
testified that land values decreasedfrom2007 to 2010. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 62:11-65:2; Vol. II,
202:2-7.) Janoush testified that the decrease in land values from 2007 to 2010 was -8.33%. (/d.
Vol. I, 64:11-18.) The adjustment of rent, if the any, should have factored in the incremental,
relative change in land values of -8.33% as applied to the $15,000.00/acre value. This would
have reduced the rent owed by Quail Ridge to PMC.
The justitication for this interpretation is firmly based in the Ground Lease's language.
The Ground Lease mandates that the prior value be taken into consideration. (Pl. Ex. 101.) The
Ground Lease does not, significantly, require an objective market value for the property. (/d)
Such an "objective" market value for the real property fails to take into account the Ground
Lease's language. For over thirty years, the parties and their predecessors stipulated, acquiesced,
or otherwise agreed that the land value for prior adjustment periods was $15,000.00/acre. The
parties did this through various economic upswings and downturns. That course of conduct
should have been taken into account by the district court when adjusting the rent. It chose not to
do so but by making that choice it reached a result not even remotely based on the actual
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language of the contract. Such a finding by the district court should be reversed by this Court
and remanded for a proper interpretation of the Ground Lease.
F. The district court erred by not finding a course of dealing.

The district court expressly tbund the absence of a course of conduct that would have
been relevant to the determination of any adjusted rent. However, the district court's conclusion
could only be reached by (a) ignoring or minimizing certain pieces of evidence and (b) by
ignoring certain terms in the Ground Lease.
Parties' course of dealing is relevant to determining intent when interpreting contract
terms. J.R. Simp/otv. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,614, 167P.3d 748,751 (2006). The district court
had before it evidence in the form of deposition testimony establishing IHC's mentality about
how the terms of 1.3(b) were to be carried out. From 1989 to 2000, there was a conscious
decision by IHC to not adjust the rent. (R Vol. II, pp. 309-10, Christison Dep. 10:1-11 :3; 12:2413:4.) The conscious decision to leave the rent at $9,562.50 was a course of conduct by 1HC that
should have bound PMC. At the very least IHC's conscious, deliberate choice to leave the rent
where it was at in 1983 should have been "taken into account" when deciding any rent
adjustments. The district court did not factor in IHC and Sterling's course of dealings and
instead elected to ignore it because PMC, when it stepped into IHC's shoes, failed to adjust rent
or otherwise pay attention to the Ground Lease. However, just because PMC negligently
managed its contracts does not mean that the prior, voluntary choices by IHC to not adjust rent
fails to be relevant when adjusting rent under the Ground Lease. Paragraph 1.3(b) requires that
the prior adjustments of rent be "taken into account" and the district court admittedly did not take
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into account IHC's conscious choices in this regard. (R. Vol. I, p. 195; footnote 20.)
The failure to take into account the past actions by IHC and PMC was an error by the
district court. Its linding that there was no course of dealing in this case is not supported by
substantial evidence; indeed, there is no evidence supporting the district court's conclusions.
G. The district court erred by admitting Brad Janoush's testimony.

1. Standard I?(Review
District court decisions related to the admission of expert testimony are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428, 431 (2004). "In reviewing
whether or not a district court abused its discretion this Court determines: (I) whether the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason." Kirkv. Ford Motor Co., 116 P.3d 27,30-31 (Idaho 2005).

2. Argument
The district court relied on the testimony ofPMC's expert witness, Brad Janoush
(Janoush) for reaching its conclusion about the amount of rent owed by Quail Ridge to PMC for
the 2010 rent adjustment period. Quail Ridge moved to strike Janoush's testimony from the
record and the district court denied that motion. (R Vol. I, p. 129.) The district court abused its
discretion because it did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and within the
applicable legal standard. The district court also failed to reach its decision by an exercise of
reason.
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The admissibility of expert testimony is committed to the discretion of the trial court.

Weeks v. E. idaho Health Servs., 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (Idaho 2011). The test for admissibility is
Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Jd. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qua!Hied as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
IDAHO R. Evro. 702 (2012). Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in terming
opinions or inference upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order tor the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion
or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion Sttbstantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
IDAHO R. Evm. 703. "Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by the
facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is
inadmissible as evidence." Weeks, 153 P.3d at 1184. When analyzing the admissibility of an
expert's proposed testimony, the focus of the court's inquiry must be on the "principles and
methodology" used and not the conclusions generated. Id.
Here, the district court admitted Janoush's testimony despite Janoush's suspect
methodology and his failure to consider the terms of the Ground Lease. Quail Ridge objected to
Janoush's opinions as to value during trial. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 52:18-22; 60:12-20; 61:7-16.)
Janoush testified that he had never reviewed the terms of the Ground Lease prior to performing
his appraisal. (Trial Tr. Vol.I, 63:10-15.) The Ground Lease sets forth how the parties should
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subsequently decide the value ofthe property. (Pl. Ex. I01.) It requires the parties to "take into
account" the original value of $15,000.00 and subsequent determinations of market value. By
acknowledging he did not review the Ground Lease or its terms, Janoush could not have "taken
into account" either of those factors when coming up with his values that would be relevant to
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the adjustments of rent. Janoush did not employ a proper methodology to the case. His opinion
that the land values were $990,000 for the 4.25 acre parcel was not tied to the Ground Lease at
all. Janoush's opinions Jacked foundation and were not relevant.
Admission of Janoush's opinions clearly impacted the outcome in this matter. The
district court relied on Janoush's opinions when deciding the adjusted rent. (R Vol. I, pp. 19192.) However, Janoush applied a flawed methodology and lacked the requisite foundation to

testify about how the rent should be adjusted in this case.
In reliance on Janoush's testimony, the district court incorrectly calculated the adjusted
rent based on the current land values. The district court ignored the Ground Lease requirements
to take into account (a) prior agreements regarding adjustments and (b) the initial value being set
at $15,000.00/acre. The district coutt's ignored the contractual language and should be reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

As a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and remanded.

Michel . G ey
John
:vondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendant/Appellant
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur • 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204·0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-2012·5289

)
)

) PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
) ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c), the Plaintiff subnnts the following as its Reply in Support of its
Motion for SUlllmary Judgment:

ARGUMENT
With respect to Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston's (collectively
"Quail Ridge") Arguments I, II, and III, respectively, in its Opposition to PMC's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintift~ Pocatello Hospital, LLC cfb/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC

("PMC), notes that these arguments are identical to the arguments made by Quail Ridge :in its
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. PMC has already thoroughly addressed these

arg~unents

within its Opposition to Quail Ridge's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and, therefore, PMC

simply adopts and reiterates its brief in opposition to Quail Ridge's Cross-Motion tbr Summary
5975: Rtply in Support oi'PIRiudlr• Mn~on for Summary Judgment
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Judgment as if it bad been fully set forth herein. PMC is content to rely upon those earlier
arguments for support of the fact d111t it is entitled to bring its present breach of contract action
against Defendants.
To the extent, however, that Quail Ridge has raised several new arguments in its
Opposition to PMC's Motion for Summary, PMC will address the same. Specifically, Quail
Ridge argues: (1) The phrase "promptly pay" is ambiguous; and (2) The issue of"promptly pay"
is not ripe for acljudication; and (3) Quail Ridge is not collaterally estopped from bringing all of its
affirmative defenses.
I.

The contract term "promptly pay" is not ambiguous.

As an initial matter, tl1is Court should recognize that the requirement to "promptly pay" is a
tenn of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement that governs the rights and responsibilities of PMC and
Quail Ridge. Indeed, in his Order on Form ofJudgment, 1 Judge Brown succinctly fotu1d that:
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that 'the party indebted shall,
pron1ptly after the detennination, pay any difference tbr the period affecfed by the
adjustment.' Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the determination
has been made as contemplated under the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground
Lease Agreement required "prompt" payment of the balance due under the G!·ound
Lease Agreement.

See Order on Form of Judgment (Avondet Aff., Ex. F, p. 3). Thus, while Judge Brown's
Amended Declaratory Jndgment states that Quail Ridge was to "promptly pay" tile an1ount
identified in the Amended Declaratory Jqdgment, this Court should recognize that all that Judge
Brown was really doing by the language was simply giving respect the contractual

tenJJ

that

required such prompt payment. PMC's Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon the breach
of this clear and unambiguous contractual term and not upon a violation of Judge Brown's
Amended Declaratory Judgment.
Because Quail Ridge has cited with approval to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision i.n

Pot/ach Educ. Ass'n ,,, Porlach School Dist. No. 285, 148 ldal1o 630,226 P.3d 1277 (2010), PMC
will use tl'lllt opinion to outline the legal parameters of the issues currently before the Court. In

Potlach, t11e Idaho Supreme Court summari.zed the process of contract interpretation in ldaho as
1

Attached as Exhibit F to Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support ofDefendant's Cross·Motion forSurnmary
Judgment.
5975: Reply in Support ol' .l'lnln~lrs Mo~on for Summnry Judgmunt
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follows:
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. 'In
the absence of ambig~1ity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and
proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the
instn\ment.' Interpreting 8l1 unambig1.1ous contract and determining whether there
has been a violation of that contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A
contract term is ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations
or the language is nonsensical. Wl1ether a colltract is ambiguous is a question of
law, but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of fact.
Potlach, 148 Idaho at 633, 226 P.3d at 1280 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The issue of whether the "promptly pay" tenn of the 1983 Ground. Lease Agreement is
ambiguous is a question of law for this Court. In this case, Quail Ridge argues that this term is
ambiguous, but gives no basis therefore. Certainly Quail Ridge has not argued that the language
at issue is "nonsensical." To the extent fuat Quail Ridge may be trying to rely upon Potlach to
argue that this phrase is ambiguous because it subject to "two different reasonable interpretations,"
this argument fails. A complete review of the majority opinion in Potlach demonstrates that the
mere fact that parties to a contract may disagree as to the meaning of a contract term does not, in
itself, make a term ambiguous. Indeed, the parties to the "Master Agreement" at issue in Porlach
had different interpretations of what was meant by the phrase "professional leave" as used within
that docwnent. Despite these reasonable differences in interpretation of the phrase "professional
leave," the majority of the Idaho Supreme Court in Potlach fowld no difficulty with interpreting
the contract, including the phrase "professional leave," and determining that the School District
bad not violated the contract, as a matter of Jaw.
That this Court should interpret this contract term as a matter of Jaw is even stronger in this
case than in Potlach. Here, PMC is in agreement with Quail Ridge that the words in the phrase
"promptly pay" should be construed in their plain and ordinary meaning. Further, Quail Ridge
concedes in this case that "there is no dispute that the amount identified by Judge Brown has not
been paid by Quail Ridge." Finally, PMC does not dispute that Quail Ridge is dispt1ting Judge
Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment. Thus, there are no genuine issues o:fmatedal fact in
this case.
Because there are no genuu1e issues of material fact in this case, this Court is entitled to
enter summary j~1dgment by giving the phrase "promptly pay" its plain and ordinary meaning and
S975o Reply in Support ofl'lninrilrs Morinn for 8tnnmory Judgment·
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thereafter detennining, as a matter of law, whether Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay tmder the
tmdisputed facts of this case. Quail Ridge acknowledges within its opposition that promptly
means ...ready and quick to act as occasion demands,"2 In this case, the Court should find that
once a determination of adjusted rents had been made for the 20 lO rent adjustment period, the
1983 Ground Lease Agreement demanded that Quail Ridge be ready and quick to act and make
payment in the amount declared by Jttdge Brown to then be currently due and owing.

II.
This Issue is Now Ripe for Delermination
It seems disingenuous, at best, for Quail Ridge to complain at this point that this matter
should be stayed pending a n1Jing by the Court in PMC 1. This Court should recall that it gave
Defendants two separate opportunities to stay this action by depositing the necessary ftmds into the
Court and Quail Ridge failed to comply with the Court's order on both occasions, Indeed, it was
only after Quail Ridge failed to deposit the necessary fttnds the second time, that this matter was
allowed to proceed and PMC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Further, Quail Ridge misses the mark in arguing that the Court misinterpreted rl1e rules in
ordering a bond as a requirement for this stay. Qua,il Ridge argues that no bond was necessary
because this was not tile stay of a money judgment under I.R.C.P. 62(b). In so arguing, Quail
Ridge fails to recognize the rule under which PMC requested a bond in the ftrst place, PMC did
not request a bond pursuant to I.R.C.P. 62(b), but rather requested a bond pursuant to I.R.C.P.
62(d) and I.A.R. 13(b)(l4)-(15). These rules provided this Colll't with broad discretion to require
that a supersedaes bond be posted during the pendency ofthe appeal in PMC /. Even though such
bond was required by tile Court, the Defendants ignored the Court's orders to post such bond on
two occasion and now seek the Court to give it a third opportunity to stay this action pending
appeal, Under th.e circumstances of the case, this Court should decline the offer and find tbat the
issue before it his ripe for detennination.

liJ.

Defendants Are B1lrred from Bringing Their Affirmative Defenses

Quail Ridge's arguments in this regard seem most curious. Quail Ridge doesn't seem to
dispute that Defendants should be ban·ed from relitigating the affinnative defenses already raised
and decided by Judge Brown, but rather seems to simply argue that Defendants have raised
2 See Defendant's Memorand11m in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. U (citing BLACK'S LAW
DIC'tlONARY1379 {4TH Ed. 1968).
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affinnative defenses in this action which were not raised in PMC !. Quail Ridge does not identify
for the Court, however, those affinnative defenses which it claims to be new and valid in the
instant case, PMC contends that Quail Ridge did not identify any such affhmative defenses
because there is no factual basis in support of any alleged defenses and that the defenses which
have been previously tried are the only otherwise valid affirmative defe11ses they may have had
available.
Regardless, PMC invites this Court to review Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision and
Order in comparison to Quail Ridge's Answer in this case, PMC feels confident that when the
Court does so, the Court wilJ find that the affinnative defenses raised by Quail Ridge in the present
action are akin to the afflm1ative defenses raised by Quail Ridge in PMC I. PMC further feels
co.nfident that the Com1 will flnd that these defenses were tried before Judge Brown in an
evidentiary trial and that Judge Brown has made a ruling upon each of the same, which ruling is
now binding upon these Defendants.
For each of these reasons as well as the reasons outlined in PMC's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Brief in Support of its Opposition to Quail Ridge's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, PMC respectfully requests this Court to enter summary judgment in this matter against
these Defendants and enter a judgment in favor of PMC in the amount that Judge Brown has
determined as cuttently due and owing for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period,
DATED this l,fhday of October, 2013.

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

Byi~~~~~~~~------
R. William Hancock
Attorneys tbr the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby

certify that a true, full and cmrect copy of the foregoing document was this

IS~ day of

September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

U U.S. Mail
LJ Hand Delivery
U Overnight Mail

Honorable Robert E. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, Idaho 8320 I
(Chambers Copy)

LJU.S.MaU
U Hand Delivery
U Ovemi.ght Delivery
,fSJ Fax: (208) 236·7290

S97S: Reply in Support afl'loiotifl's Malion ror S11mm•r~ Judgment

~

Fax: (208) 529-9732

----
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

)

)

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of the Plaintiff as
follows:
1.

Defendants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, unpaid current annual

rent for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period in a sum of$416,812.50;
2.

Defendants are hereby ordered to pay interest on this amount from and after the

date of the Amended Declaratory Judgment, November 26, 2012, at an annual rate of 12% until the
date of entry of this Judgment. As of October 22, 2013, the total amount of interest owed is
$45,221.30. Interest will continue to accrue in the amount of $13 7.03 per day thereafter until the
date that this Judgment is entered.
3. Interest shall accrue on the entire judgment amount from the date of judgment forward
at the post-judgment legal rate, which is currently 5.250% per annum.
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DATED this~ day of October, 2013.

Honorable Robert C. Naftz

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Clerk of Court, does hereby certifY that a true, full and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment was this J2_ day of October, 2013, served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
R. William Hancock
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD

P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

~.S.Mail

U Hand Delivery
U Overnight Delivery
U Telefax

(L{~.s. Mail

U Hand Delivery
U Overnight Mail
U Facsimile

Deputy Clerk
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR COSTS
ANDATTORNEYFEES

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a! PortneufMedical Center, LLC
("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(d), I. C. 12-121, and hereby moves this Court for an order granting PMC's requests for costs and
attorney's fees as outlined in its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees filed
contemporaneous herewith. With regard to PMC's request for attorney fees, PMC is specifically
entitled to an award of attorney fees against the Defendant Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, as
matter of contractual right under Section 10.3 of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. This motion
is based upon the Court's granting PMC its Motion for Summary Judgment, the judgment entered
thereafter by this Court, and upon PMC' s Memorandum of Costs filed contemporaneous herewith.
Oral argument is not requested.
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DATED this !2_ day ofNovernber, 2013.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

~JG--

R. William Hancock, Jr.
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby
certifY that a: true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this - - day of
September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST.CLAIRGAFFNEYPA
· 21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Honorable Robert E. Naftz
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
(Chambers Copy)
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)

. -· j

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
) Case No. CV-2012-5289
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

COSTS

Pursuant to IRCP 54(d), the Court's granting of Summary Judgment in favor ofPMC and
the judgment entered by the Court thereafter, Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), claims the following costs as the prevailing party to this action:
I.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER IRCP 54(d)(l)(C). The

following are non-discretionary costs actually paid by PMC in bringing this action:
Filing Fee
II.

$

96.00

DISCRETIONARY COSTS SOUGHT UNDER IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). The

following are discretionary costs which were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred in bringing the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
in defending the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which, in the
5975: Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
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interests of justice, should be assessed against the Defendants.
Westlaw Research

TOTAL COSTS REQUESTED PURSUANT TO IRCP 54(d)

$ 1,135.18

$ 1,231.18

ATTORNEY FEES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Pursuant to IC 12-121 and pursuant to paragraph 10.3 ofthe 1983 Ground Lease
Agreement that governs the rights and responsibilities of the parties to this action, PMC claims the
following attorney fees as the prevailing party to this action:
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES

$ 15,797.00

TOTAL COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

$ 17,028.18

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
:ss
)

R. WILLIAM HANCOCK, JR., being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am one of the attorneys representing the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a

PortneufMedical Center, LLC ("PMC"), and as such I have knowledge of the amounts of the costs
and the circumstances to their being incurred.
2.

I have reviewed the foregoing Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees. The

costs and attorney fees incurred therein are true and correct, were actually paid, and were
reasonably and necessarily incurred in the prosecution of this action. To the best of my
knowledge and belief, the costs and attorney fees shown herein are in compliance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct redacted copy of the Merrill &

Merrill, Chtd. billing statement outlining the above-identified costs and attorney fees. The time
entries shown on this billing statement are the time entries that were related to this action. All
other time entries have been redacted, however, because they relate to other actions or matters that
5975: Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
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are not relevant to this action.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the 1983 Ground Lease

Agreement that governs the rights and responsibilities of these parties.
5.

Section 10.3 of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement states:

In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful detainer ofthe said
premises, for the recovery of any rent due under the provisions of
this lease, or because of the breach of any other covenant herein
contained to be kept or performed, the prevailing party shall be paid
a reasonable attorneys fee by the other party, and such attorney's
fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement ofsuch
action and shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to
judgment.
6.

Judgment was entered against the Defendants in this matter because of a

failure to pay rents due and owing under the Ground Lease Agreement.

_0~)/{)--R. William Hancock, Jr.

' it/._
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this (JJ day of November, 2013.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: &c(j
I
I [)
Commission Expires: 12- 5 - I ]

+ean
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby
certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this 1.9-tb day ofNovember,
2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffney ·
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

i')g U.S. Mail

Honorable Robert E. Naftz

U U.S. Mail
[,Cf Hand Delivery
U Overnight Delivery
U Fax: (208) 236-7290

624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatelfo, Idaho 83201

(Chambers Copy)
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Client

Trans
Date

H Tcodert'- ~
Atty P Task C~.... }'

Rate

Hours
to Bill

145.00

0.50

Amount

ReU

Client ID 13.59t5o LHP Hospital Group. l;;c.

13.59750

12/04/2012

14 A

72.50 Finalize complaint; Attention to Appeal certification from
District Court; Conference with Attomey Gallafent on
Cross-Appeal.

13.59750

12/10/2012

4 A

13.59750
13.59750

12/11/2012
12/11/2012

1 A
4A

13.59750

12/12/2012

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

180.00

0.50

21
1

180.00
180.00

0.50
1.20

1 A

21

180.00

2.00

12/12/2012
12/13/2012
12/13/2012

4A
1 A
14 A

1
21
1

180.00
180.00
145.00

1.10
0.50
0.40

13.59750

12/13/2012

4A

180.00

1.30

13.59750

12/13/2012

1 A

13.59750

01/07/2013

14 A

145.00

13.59750

01/23/2013

14 A

145.00

56

90.00 Review and edit Complaint, meet with Dave Gallafent,
review clerk's certificate of appeal.
90.00 Quail Ridge- Draft Complaint
216.00 Edit Complaint on collection of rent, meet with Dave
Gallafent.
360.00 Quail Ridge- Draft Complaint

198.00 Edit Complaint.
90.00 Quail Ridge- Draft complaint; appraisal analysis
58.00 Edit and revise Complaint for breach of contract claim;
Conference with Attorney Gallafent
234.00 Edit Complaint and Summons, meet with Bm ar.d Dave,
correspondence to Make Gaffney

ARCr

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

96.00 Bannock County Clerk- filing fee.

ARCH

0.30

43.50 Attention to Acceptance of Service; File Acceptance of
Service with Court and cancel personal service

ARCH

0.30

43.50 Attention to Acceptance of Service and calendar
deadlines; Conference with Attomey Gallafent
regarding deadlines

ARCH
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Trans
Clie~1t

Date

H Tcode/< _,"!
Atty :_ Task Code

Client ID 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc.
13.59750
01/24/2013
4 A

DL

(------.\
Rate

Hours
to Bill

170.00

0.20

145.00

0.60

170.00
170.00
145.00

0.10
0.25
1.60

\_ ___ j

Amount

ReH

34.00 Meet with Bill Hancock on default strategy, research on
"notice of appearances".
87.00 Research rules regarding Default Judgment and
analyze whether notice required in this case;
Conference with Attorney Hawkins on Notice issue
17.00 Review Answer from Quail Ridge.
42.50 Case preparation
232.00 Conference with Attorney Gallafent on Summary
Judgment in 2012 case and 2013 Rent Adjustment;
Gather documents to begin next step in 2013 rent
adjustment

ARC I-

13.59750

01/24/2013

14 A

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

01/28/2013
01/31/2013
01/31/2013

4 A
1 A

14 A

13.59750

02/04/2013

15 A

135.00

1.30

175.50 Research res iudicata.

ARC I-

13.59750

02/05/2013

14 A

145.00

2.40

ARCI-

13.59750

02/05/2013

15 A

120.00

2.00

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

02/06/2013
02/06/2013
02/07/2013

14 A
15 A
1 A

1
1
21

145.00
120.00
170.00

6.20
0.20
0.50

13.59750
13.59750

02/07/2013
02/07/2013

4 A
14 A

1
1

170.00
145.00

0.20
3.40

13.59750

02/07/2013

15 A

120.00

1.20

348.00 Legal research from Motion for Summary Judgement
Conference with Attorney Neill on legal issues; Follow
up legal research on collateral estoppel
240.00 Discuss research with Bill Hancock; research collateral
estoppel case law; draft legal argument for brief.
899.00 Draft Motion for Summary Judgment
24.00 Research collateral estoppel case law.
85.00 Quail Ridge~ Conference with Bill re: Quail Ridge
Motion
34.00 Review Motion to Stay Proceedings.
493.00 Work on Motion for Summary Judgement Review and
analyze Quail's Motion to Stay; Conference with
Attorney Gallafent and Neill regarding rules on bond;
Posting on stay of action.
144.00 Research stays of proceeding and bond requirements.

13.59750
13.59750

02/11/2013
02/11/2013

1 A
14 A

170.00
145.00

0.25
1.50

ARC IARC I-

13.59750

02/12/2013

4A

170.00

0.90

13.59750

02/14/2013

4 A

170.00

0.30

13.59750
13.59750

02/19/2013
02/19/2013

1 A
4 A

21
1

170.00
170.00

0.25
0.20

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

02/19/2013
02/20/2013
02/20/2013

14 A
1 A
4 A

1
21
1

145.00
170.00
170.00

0.80
1.25
1.30

13.59750

02/20/2013

14 A

145.00

2.20

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

02/21/2013
02/21/2013
02/21/2013

1 A
4A
14 A

170.00
170.00
145.00

0.50
1.40
3.20

42.50 Quail Ridge - Review Quail Ridge Motion for stay relief
217.50 Draft Reply to motion to Stay; Conference with Attorney
Gallafent
153.00 Prepare "Agreed Response to Court's Request for
Scheduling lnfonnation", review Motion for Stay &
research cases on stay of one suit based on appeal of
another suit.
51.00 Edit Agreed Response to court's request for
information.
42.50 Quail Ridge - Case preparation on 2nd suit
34.00 Amended Agreed Response to Order for Submission of
Information to court, correspondence.
116.00 Revise and Redraft Reply to Motion to stay
212.50 Quail Ridge- Case preparation; e-mail Joe
221.00 Pleadings & hearing notice {motion & affidavit for stay),
memo in support of motion to stay, research on stay
rule, also research amount of bond required.
319.00 Revise and edit Reply Memorandum; Conference with
Attorney Hawkins; Draft additional arguments for
opposition to Motion to Stay and change from "reply'' to
"opposition;" Conference with Attorney Gallafent;
Revise and edit opposition
85.00 Quail Ridge- Edit brief
238.00 Edit stay memo, meet with Bill Hancock.
464.00 Draft additional arguments in objection; Gather
documentation and draft affidavits; Revise and edit
objection; Conference with Attorney Hawkins;
Conference with Attorney Gallafent; Revise Defendant's
Answer to check admission of non-payment; Forward
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1
21
1

21
1

21
1
1

ARC IARCfARCfARC I-

ARC IARC IARC IARC IARC IARC I-

ARC I-

ARC I-

ARC IARCIARC IARC IARC IARCIARCr

ARCIARCr
ARC I-

Wednesday 11/0B/2013 3:07 pn;

Page: 3

utn;au 1ransact1on I"' ne LISt
Merrill & Merrill Chartered
Trans

Rate

Hours
to Bill

170.00
170.00
145.00

0.25
0.20
0.70

42.50 Quail Ridge - Case preparation
34.00 Affidavits and memo on motion to stay.
101.50 Conference with Attorney Gallafent regarding issues

170.00

2.60

442.00 Meet with Bill, edit & finalize memo on Motion to Stay

H Tcode/

Date
Atty ~ ~
Client 10 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc.
Clienl

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

0212212013
02/2212013
02/22/2013

1 A
4 A
14 A

13.59750

02/25/2013

4 A

21
1
1

Amount

Ref#

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

with Reply; Draft changed to reply

13.59750

02/25/2013

14 A

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

02/26/2013
02/28/2013
02/28/2013

4 A
1 A

13.59750

U3/01/2013

4 A

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

03/0212013
0310412013
03/04/2013

13.59750

0312012013

1 A

1
56
56

4 A
4 A

145.00

1.20

174.00

170.00

0.10

17.00
620.40
312.07

170.00

1.30

221.00 Review Quail's reply brief, and prepare tor hearing on

14 A

170.00
170.00
145.00

0.80
3.70
0.60

A

170.00

2.30

4

13.59750

03/21/2013

1

A

13.59750

03/2212013

4

A

21

and to post a bond during appeal.
Review and finalize objection; Conference with Attorney
Hawkins
Correspondence from Court on clerk's record.
Westlaw research in February, 2013 (Bill Hancock).
Westlaw research in February, 2013 (Tyler ~eill).

170.00

0.50

170.00

2.90

motion for stay.
136.00 Prepare for hearing on Monday on Motion to Stay.
629.00 Prepare for hearing on Motion to Stay.
87.00 Review and analyze Quail Ridge's Reply Brief;
Research Judge Brown's Minute Entry and Order for
breach of contract issue; Conference with Attorney
Hawkins

391.00 Correspondence from Gaffney on posting cash with
court instead of a bond, research on cash bond with
court, continue review of record & transcripts, meet with
dave Gallafent on bond & report to clients.
85.00 Quail Ridge - Case analysis

493.00 Edit correspondence to Gaffney, review strategy for

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
AR(:H

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

ARCH

ARCH

ARCH

raising rent and effect of stay order, follow up on
cash/bond on stay order, call to administrative judge on
bond procedure, finish transcript & record review, call to
Cindy Haney, trial court administrator, e-mail.
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rue LISt

Merrill & Merrill Chartered

Clien't
T~~! Atty ~ ~==~ode
Client 10 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc.

13.59750
DL

06/10/2013

14 A

Rate

145.00

Hours
to Bill

0.50

Amount

Ref#

72.50 Follow up with Attorney Avondet on Bond and notify of
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pending Motion to Compel; Letter to Attorney
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uetan 1ransact1on rue List
Merrill & Merrill Chartered

Client

Trans
Date

H Tcode/
Atty P Task Code

--

---

06712{2013

14A

Rate

Hours
to Bill

.145.00

4.00

Amount

RaU

Client 10 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc.

13.59750

j

580.06 · oratn~~10ifCu1.tO··com·pel; o·raft Affid"avft'in suP-POrt at

ARC~

Motion

13.59750

06/14/2013

4 A

170.00

0.30

13.59750

06/14/2013

14 A

145.00

1.40

13.59750

07/08/2013

14 A

145.00

1.50

51.00 Meet with Bill Hancock on Motion to Compel and on
Quail's bond with court.
203.00 Conference with Attorney Gallafent and Hawkins
regarding Motion to compel; Draft Responses to
Attorney Avondet on Bond issue; Strategize for remedy
request at hearing

217.50 Prepare for hearing on Motion to Compel; Participate in
~earing

13.59750

07/09/2013

4 A

170.00

0.90

ARC~
ARC~

ARCH

on Motion to Compel

153.00 Meet with Bill Hancock on motion to compel and

ARCH

arbitration, finish review of appellant's reply brief, e-mail

from court, eMmail to Mike Gaffney, e-mail to client.

13.59750

07130/2013

145.00

14 A

0.70

101.50 Telephone conference with Attorney Avondet;

ARCH

Conference with Attorney Gallafent regarding recent
developments; Update Attorney Hawkins

13.59750
13.. 59750

08/01/2013
08/01/2013

1 A
14 A

21
1

170.00
145.00

0.75
2.60

127.50 Summary Judgment brief preparation
377.00 Work on Motion for Summary Judgment

ARCH
ARCH
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Merrill & Merrill Chartered
•
Client

Trans
Date

Atty

H Tcode/
Task Code

~

Rate

Hours
to Bill

Amount

Ref#

Client JD 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc.

i?o.lio

1t:OiY -a·ua-11" RidQe :-(5oiifereiice wltti~Biil oid3:iief
696.00 Work on Motion for Summary Judgment- supporting
brief
85.00 Edit Summary Judgment Brief
362.50 Finish drafting motion for summary judgment
116.00 Revise Motion for Summary Judgment memo of
Authorities; Additional legal research

ARCH
ARCH

1.60

232.00 Ed1t and revise ivlodon for Summary Judgment; Draft
additional legal arguments for Motion for Summary
Judgment

ARCH

0.25
0.30

42.50 Quail Ridge - Case preparation; e-mail
43.50 Finalize and file Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting documents

ARCH
ARCH

13.59750
13.59750

08130121i13
0813012013

1 A
14 A

21
1

145.00

0.10
4.80

13.59750
13.59750
13.59750

09102/2013
09102/2013
09/03/2013

1 A
14 A
14 A

21
1
1

170.00
145.00
145.00

0.50
2.50
0.80

13.59750

09/04/2013

14 A

145.00

13.59750
13.59750

09/0512013
09/05/2013

1 A
14 A

170.00
145.00

13.59750

10107/2013

14 p

145.00

1.30

13.59750

1010712013

15 p

120.00

0.90

13.59750

10108/2013

14 p

145.00

3.60

21
1

188.50 Work on opposition to Quail's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment
108.00 Review memo in opposition to motion for summary
judgment; research.
522.00 Legal research for opposition brief; Research
transcripts for opposition brief; Conference with
Attorney Hawkins; Revise and edit opposition
brief and
351 of 447
draft additional arguments; Conference with Attorney

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

873
892
874

13.59750
13.59750

10/31/2013
10/31/2013

p

p

56
56

103.47 Westlaw research in October, 2013 (Bill Hancock).
99.24 Westlaw research in October, 2013 (Tyler _Neill).
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GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT

This ~ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into this ~
day of
CARE,

lJrWJU.U~.

ftc".,

business

~h

a

in

1983,

the

non-profit

State

Regional Medical

by and

of

Center

STERLlNG DEVELOPMENT CO.,

between

lNTERI'lOUNTAlN

corporation,

Idaho . under
(hereinafter

the

HEALTH

authorized
name

called

of

to

do

Pocatello

"Lessor"),

and

a Washington partnership authorized to

do business in the State of Idaho,

(hereinafter called "Lessee"),

.B.g_£.!.!~L§..
HHEREAS, Lessor owns certain real property located within l:he

City of Pocatello, Bannock County, ldaho: and
WHEREAS,
acres,

l

Lessor

more

or

Psychiatric

wishes

less,

Hospital

to

of ·said
building

lease

to

property
(the

Lessee
for

approximately

construction

"hospital")

and

to

of

4
a

impose

certain restrictions on the use of such parcel of real property
and Lessee wishes to lease said parcel of real property for such
purpose, subject to Lessor's restrictions: and
WHEREAS, Lessor and Lessee wish to enter
ground lease

ag:ree·ment

restrictions
leased;

und~_r

NOW,
covenants,

setting

forth

the terms,

into

a

written

conditions

and'

which said parcel of real property is to be

THEREFORE,

for

and

in

consideration

conditions and promises

of

the

contained herein,

mutual

Lessor and

Lessee agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1
DESCRIPTION, TERM AND RENTAL
1.1

Real Prooerty Leesed.

Lessor hereby leases

to Lessee

and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property described
G.ROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1
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;n Exhibit "A" attached hereto and hereby made a part hereof, including all easements,

right-of-way

interests associated there-

with whether granted or by prescription,

and any and all other

interests or rights appurtenant to the property and _in adjoining
and

adjacent land,

public

highways,

roads,

which

or

streets

are

lanes,

and

reasonably

whether

required

for

installation, maintenance, operation and service of electricity,

.

.

gas,

s·ewer, 'telephone,

water

and

driveways an-d approaches to and
and

bene'fit

of

improverne·nts
"lease'd

the

above

to be

liind"),

thereon

in

utility

lines

from abutting ways

described

erected

situated

other

the

real

an·d

for

for the

use

proper-ty,

including

(hereinafter· called

County

of

Bannock,

the

State

of

Idaho.
1. 2
thirty

-

Term.

(30)

commencing

The term of this Lease shall be for a period of

years
on

{her~inafter

the: 1st

oay

referred

to

of

as

the

"Term"),

1983, ·or

on

or

..

before thirty (30) days after a buildin
permit i·s issued, r·
whi·chever is iater, (the "Commencement Date"), with one (1) ten \.

-

·(10) year option to extend such term to be exercised as pr·ovided
in .1\.rticle 14, Paragraph 14.1, hereof.

Such option to ext·end the

term·is pefsonal to_ Lessee and rn'y not be.assigned
any manner whatsoever to another,party.

~r

conveYed in

Lessee shall be entitled

to possess ion of the lea.sed land pn the Commencement Date.
1.3

Rent and Pavrnent Thereof .
., .
Lessee shall
(a)
R-ental.

pay

the

following

ann·ual

rental amount:
.1\.n initial ann\)al r..ental shall be -calculated
on the basis of fifteen percent
value of th'e

leased land.

the first thr e~
ment
shal'l

Date
be

of

{15~)·

of the

For purposes of

( 3) years from the Corn::lence-

this

valued

Lease,
at

the

the
rate

leased
of

land

Fifteen

(
GRoUND LEASE .1\.GREEMENT - 2
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Thousand and No/100 Dollars

($15,000.00) ·per

acre.
(b)

hdjustments Based on Property Value.

The

annual

net rental as set forth above Shall be adjusted every three
(3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease,
adjust~ent

referred to below as the rent

date.

The parties' written agreement ,_.ithin ninety
before

the

conclusive
•

applicable

rent

determination

adjustment

bet,..een

the

date

parties

(90) days

shall
of

be

the

a

fair

market value for the period to which the adjustment applies .
lf the parties have
adjustment date,

not

so agreed

by the

applicable rent

the determination shall be made as in the

paragraph on Arbitration in Ar.ticle 13.
The rent as adjusted shall be' equal to fifteen percent
(15%) percent of the fair
exclusive of the

market value of the

leased land,

improvements on the premises.

Determina-

tion of fair market value shall be based on the highest and
best use of the land·on the applicable rent adjustment date
'-'itnout tak.ing the leasehold into account.

The determina-

tion shall tak.e into account the parties' agreement tnat the
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied
to

a

fair

Dollars
account

mar'k.et

value

($15,000.00)

of

per

Fifteen

acre

and

Thousand
shall

also

and

No/100

ta'k.e

into

any determinations of mar'k.et value made under this

lease for

the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding

·-. -··

the applicable rent adjustment date.
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the
applicable
pay

rent

until
shall,

rent
at

the

adjustment
rate

date,

a!?plicable

lessee
to

shall

the

the adjusted rate is determined.

continue

to

preceding period
The party indebted

promptly after the determination,

pay any difference

for the period affected by the adjustment.

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 3
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(cl Definition of Lease Year; Jll le.e.se ·yen is either a
calendar year or
fiscal year, as selecteo'by Lessee.

a

l. 4

Partner~;hip.·

!:!!g_ation of

·Nothing .in this Lease

c

shall

be construed to render the Lessor in any wa:t or for 1\nY purpose a
partner,

joint venturer,

or· associate

Lessee other than that of

landlord

in any relationship with

and ten·aht,

nor shall this

Lease be construed to autho-riz.e either to ac:t as agent for the
other,

except

as

expressly

pr·ovided

. .

Lease.

Plllc:e of Rental P;:Yment.s.

1.5

to

t:he

contrary

:All payments

in this

of Rental

required to be paid to Lessor under the terms of this' lease shall
be made in lawful .money of the United'' States which at time of
such payment shall be legal tender for 'the' payment of public: and
private'debts,

free

from

all

c:'l'aims,

demands,

deductions,

a.bl!tement.s, set-offs, .prior notices· or c:o·unterc:laims ot' any kind
or: character against Lessor and shall be payable at' the followin9
address or at such other place or 'places· as may· 'be from t irne to
t irne desig_nated by Lessor by written· notic:e gi-ven to· Lessee:

(_

Pocatello Regional ~!edic:al Center
777 Hospital 'tl·ay
Pocatello, ldaho 83201
Lessor may grant mortgages, Deeds of
Trust or o.ther security i·nterests in the leased land by
subordination agreement', provided, however, that such mortgages,
1.6

fee Mortctages;

D.ee.ds of 'rrust a.r security interests. sha'll· be

subject to this

lease and further provided that Lessee deliver a copy of any sueh
proposed mortga.ge,
related

note

provided,

to

ht;>wever,

t>eed of Trust or other security interest and
Leossor
that

for

prior

examination

and

approval;

such examination and approval shall be

accomplished by Lessor in a diligent manner.
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ARTICLE 2
USE OF LtAStD LAND AND TITLE TO IMPROVEMENTS
2.1

Use of Leased Land.

Lessee shall use the leased

land

solely for the purpose of constructing, maintaining a.nd operating
the hospital for psychiatric care and substance abuse

treatment~

provided that Lessee may at any time use the leased land for any
lawful

purpose.

Lessee

shall

commence

construction

of

the

hospital within forty-fiv~ (45) days after the commencement date
of 'this Lease and the issuance of· a building permit.

If Lessee

• is delayed in commencing c.onstruction or receiving the parmi t by
any

cause or

causl!s

i ncl\lding but

not

beyond

necessarily

Lessee's
being

control,

limited

.

strikes, war, insurrections,
and the like,
day

period·· to

commence

construction

such

of

God,

said forty-five

(45)

shall

to Acts

causes

be

extended

for

a

period e~uivalent to the tirne lost by reason of any such cause or
causes; provided, however, that no extensions shall be granted
for any such delay which commences more than ten (10) days before
Lessee notifies Lessor of·· such delay and the reasons there~or.
Once construction is besun, Lessee shall, with reasonable
diligence, prosecute to completion all construction of improvements,

additions,

or

alterations

and

shall

completed construction of the hospital within
after date of this
lease.
.

h~ve

substantially

'/!2ie {..}__)

years

shall mean ..
that the hospital is ready for occupancy and use as a hospital as
evidenced by a

"Substantial completion"

Ce-rtificate of Occupancy or other li'ke document

issued by an appropriate governmental authority.

If Lessee

is

oelayed in substantial completion of the hospital by any cause or ·
causes beyond
necessarily

Lessee's
being

control.

limited

to

such
J<cts

causes
of

including but

God,

strikes,

insurrections, and the like, said date for substantial

not
...:.ar,

co~pletion

of the hospital shall be extended ~or a period e~uivalent to the
time lost by reason of any such cause or causes; provided,·
however, that no extensions will

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 5

be s-::anted for any such delay
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':"hich copun.ences more -than te-n· ·(·).0) ··o-a:y·s -befo·te 'l::E:'.ssee notif.ies (-.
Lessor of .such delay· and the reasons therefor.
performed in a
comply

good ind workmanli'Ke rnanner,

with plans

required by this
permits,
bring,

laws,

and

specifications

lease,

and

ordinances

shall

submitted

substantially
to

shall comply with all

a.nd

cause to be brought,

All wor'K shall be ·

regulat.ions.

Lessor

as

governmental

Less-ee

shall

not

or permit to be brought or· kept on

the leased land anything which will in any way con:Uic:t ·with any
law,

rule, or regulation~

orcainance,

• committed any waste upon

tne lea .. ec

or

coi1Ullit or

land,

suffer

to be

or use or a"ilow the

.-.leased land or ·hospital to be used for any immoral 'or· u~lawful
.pu.t:pose.
2. 2. Ari:nitectural Compatibility.

It is understood and

agr.eed t'hat the bospi tal will be architecturally compatible with
the

1'\ed

Center

hospital.

In

order

to

insure · that·

tliis

be

accomplishec, Lessee shal+ submit it'!' site plan,.; elev-ations, and
architectural plans and s~ecifi7ations for the ho'spital to toe (
Boa.rd of Directors of the Ned Center hospital for approval before
commencing construction.· The approval of the Board of-Directors
shall·-.not be

unreasonably -withh.eld and t:esponse

s'hall be' given

w-ithin £orty""five ('15) days following the submission of l:.e!lsee's
pla~s abd specifications.

2. 3 · · Requ'ired Pal;'king.

Lessee agre·es that in des ignin9 the .

site plans and' the plans and specifications for constnic\:.ion of
the

i't:

hospi t'al,

will

incl \.Ice

sufficient

off-.street

parking.

spaces t:o 'accommodate the minimum reguired by.local codes.

2.4

appurtenances

thereto

and

to

Title

Title tb Euilcinos.
all

other

the

h6spital

irn.prove.ments

and

and

fixtures

locatec on the leased lane or constructed or placed on the leasec
land

by

during

Lessee
the

or

its

Term.

tenants

Lessee

shall

sh.a11

be

·have

and
tne

rer:'lain
right

alter·ations, changes and repairs as provided herein.
in any builc ings,

GROUND LEASE

per~:~anent

~GREEMENT
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improvements,

in

Lessee

to

rna);e

No interest

or fixtures shall pass
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(

Lessor until

the

expiration

of

the

Term

or

the

prior

termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the
right

to terminate

Lessee covenants
will

this

lease

pursuant

to

"-rticle

10

hereof.

and agrees that upon expiration of. the Term i t

yield up

and

deliver

buildings, permanent

the

leased

improvements,

land

Ylith

any

and fixtures upon the

such
leased

land at such time free and clear of all liens and encumbrances of
any kino,

and

Lessor.

upon

ln the

such

event

expiration
of

title

earlier

therein

termination

of

shall

be

in

this

lease,

• Lessee covenants and agrees that it ....-ill yield up and deliver the
leased land '"'i th any suc:'h buildings,

permanent

improvements,

and

fixtures upon the leased land at such time free and clear of all
liens and indebtedness of any kind.

Provided, hoY/ever, that such

obligation to deliver the leased land and improvements free and
clear

of

all

liens

and

indebtedness

shall

not

apply

to

the

original lien of first encumbrance represented by the mortgage or
Deed of Trust or other security interest referred to in Article 6
hereof given to secure the· financing for the construction of the
original buildings, permanent improvements,
leased

land.

buildings,

Upon

permanent

suc:h

earlier

improvements

and fixtures upon the

termination,

and

fixtures

title
upon

in

the

the

leased

this

lease,

land shall be in Lessor.

2.5
Lessee

Deed at Termination.
shall·,

satisfactory in
title

to

any

subject

to

Upon
the

foregoing,

:form and content to
buildings,

termination of

permanent

Lessor

execute

a

confirming

improvements,

deed

Lessor's

and

fixtures

therein, upon the leased land at the time of termination.
2.6
require

hdditional Real Propertv.
additional

real

proper-ty

At such time as Lessee shall
for

the

expansion

of

the

hospital, Lessee shall so notify Lessor- and Lessor- shall in sooo
faith consider the leasing of acditional r-eal pr-oper-ty to Lessee
for such purpose.

'
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., . 2,, ..7,. Gr,ant....o.f, Ces·t o.f..· Utilities and Easements·
requests
other
only

being

made,

Lessor shall grant

public service· corporations·,
the property,

property

for

rights

poles

electricity, wat.er,

for

to public
the ·-purpose

of way or easements

or

conduits

sanitary

or

or

entities

both,

of serving

on .or over the
for

storm sewers

or · '

telephone,

or both,

and

for

other utilities and municipal or special district services.
The cost of utili ties,

their installation and maintenance,

are to be assumed, fully paid and katisfied by Lessee •
•

ARTICLE 3
CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
3.1

shall,
and all

General Maintenance.

Throughout

at Lessee's· sole. cost and expense,

the

Term,

Lessee

maintain the premises

improvements in good condition and repair, ordinary wear

.and .teC!r .excepted,

and in' accordance with all applicable la,.•s,

rules, ordinances, orders and regulations of ( l) federal, state,
county, municipal, and other gciver·nmental agencies and bodies
having or claiming jurisdiction and all their
departments,
bureaus,
and
officials:
(2)
the

·

C

respective
ins~,trance

underwriting board' or insurance companies insuring all or any
part of the premises or improvements or both; and (3) Lessor, as.
shall be in effect froni time to time·.

Lessee

sha~l

rnanag~

and

operate the hospital and the surrounding grounds in a competent
and professio·na·l -manner.

Lessee s'ha.ll maintain the sidewalks and

roadways giving access to the hospital free and clear o£ ice and
snow.
Except

as

provided

below,

Lessee

sha.ll

promptly

and

diligently repair, restore and replace as required to maintain or
comply as above, or' to r·emedy all damage to or

d~struction

of all

or any part of the improvements resulting wholly or in part from
causes required by this lease to be covered b)' fire or elCtended
coverage insurance, if the cost of the work so required does not

(
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e~ceed

(

of

seventy-five percent {iS\) of the ~eplacement value of all

the

improvements.

If

the

cost

Lessee may nevertheless repair,

does

e

~ceed that percent,

restore and

replace as above or

may by notice elect instead to ~az.e the improvements damaged or
destroyed. Within thi~ty (:30) days after such notice, Lessor may
by notice elect to repair, restore and replace as above, and
Lessee shall not ra:te until the expiration of the time for
Lessor's notice of election.
Lessor · sha 11 not be req11ired to
furnish

any services ·or

facilities

or

to

any repairs or
Lessor's election

make

alterations of any :kind in or on the premises.
to

perform any

Lessee's

obligation

failure

or

of

refusal

waiver o~ ~ny ~ight or

Lessee

to

do

under

so

this

sball

provision

not

constitute

remedy fo~ Less•e's.default,

shall promptly reimburse,

defend,

and

on
a

and Lessee

indemnify Lessor against

all liability, loss, cost, and expense arising from it.
In

determining -whether

Lessee

has

acted

promptly

as

required under the foregoing paragraph, one of the criteria to be
considered is
proceeds.

the

Nothing
maintenance

shall

elsewhere in this
replace

any

availability
in

this

be

construed

of

provision
as

lease to alter,

improvement,

any

or as

applicable

defining

limiting

modify,

insurance

the

any

duty

right

demolish,

of

given

remove,

or

limiting provisions relating

to

condemnation or to damage or destruction during the final year or
years of the Term-.
No deprivation, impairment, or limitation on
use resulting froro any evt;>nt or work co.ntemplated by this
paragrapn

shall

reduction
'l'errn.

in

3.2

entitle

rent

no;r

Lessee

to

any

to

any

offset,

termination

or

Relief for Substantial Less of hrea.

or

abater.~ent,

extension of

the

lf any dar..age to

or dest;ruction of tbe premises or the improvements is such that
75% of the floor area is rende~ed unusable for purposes stated in
the

Lease,

Lessee

may,

at

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - g

Lessee • s

election,

cielay

the

.,;ork
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Nothing ('·
contained· in this
moclify

paragraph

an::t provision ·of

shall

this

be

'lease

construed

to

negate

o,;

relating

to

dar:~age

or

approval

is

a Iterations,

or

destruction during the final year(s) of the term.
3.3

not

Major and Minor Distinc::uished.

required

additions.

Le!is~e

fo.r

• s .. minor

Lessor's

repa.irs,

"Minor" means a construction cost not exceeding Five

Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00), none of which is derived
from funds

advanced on the

leaseht;>ld or the

security of

property.

an

"Construction

encumbrance on the
cost•

includes

all

c::osts that. .,ould constitute the basis of a valid claim or c.laims
under the mechanics' lien laws in effect at the time the worK is
c'ommenced for

any

impr~vem;nt.s .o; pa~ts

demolition

and

r~moval

allY

of improvements as well as

of

~9r

e:t~.sting

preparatio;;,

construction and. completion of all ne,.. i:mprovements or parts of
irnprovemen~s.

The dol~ar amount stated abo~e shall be adjusted

by th.e percentage change in the index known as the united s~~.t~s.
ne·part.ment of Commerce Composite con'struction Cost Index as
published

in

Department of
discontinued

the

Survey

Commerce,
and

there

of

Current

or

suc:cessor

is

no

Business
index.

successor

by

!f

index,

the
'the

the

(
:.~

·-

U.S.

index

is

refe::ence

figure shall be determined by the senior officer in the clo~est..
office of the u.s. Department of Commerce or ·successor departm~nt
or agency.
"M.ajor'' re.pairs, alterations, or additions ~re tho~e
not cefined as mi-nor a.bove.
additions,

for major repairs,

alterations •.. o:s;.

Lessee shal·l receive Lessor's approvals of the plans

as set forth ,above in Paragraph 2. 2.
3.4. G~,ver.n,mental. Authorities.

wit'h all applicable laws,

Lessee shall promptly comply

regulations,

ordinances,

req:uirements

anc5 orders of governrnenta·l authorities, in·clu'ding 1 but net.
lirnited to 1 the ~a'l;.ing, at its sole ex?ense, of any instal.,l.a ti-on,
alteration,

modification,. change

or

repair,

structura.l .or

otherwise; j?rovided, bo..-ever, Lessee has the right to contest by

GROUND L£1\..SE AGREEMENT - 10
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~ithout

cost

validity or application of any

la~.

appropriate judicial or administrative proceedings,
or expense to Lessor,
ordinance, order,

the

rule,

regulations or requirement

(hereina ft.e r

called "Law") that. Lessee repair, maintain, alter or. replace the
improvements in whole or
default

for

failing

fcllo.,ing final

in part.,

to

do

and Lessee shall

such work until

detel."mination of Lessee's

gives

notice of

request.,

bond,

satisfc.ctol."y

to

Lessee

Lessor

sh.:.ll

reasonable

contest.

first

in form,

suaranteeing cotnpl iance by Lessee with

a

in

time

If Lessor

furnish Lessor

amol.lnt

the

not be

and

contested

a

insurer,
la'-',

and

indemnifying Lessor against all liability that Lessor.may sustain
by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law.
Lessor

may,

b_ut

is

not

required

to,.

contest

any

such

Law

indepeno~ntly o~ Lessee.

Lessor may, ano on Le.ssee's notice of
request shell, join in Lessee's contest.

S.S

Damage or Destruction During Final Years of ~errn.
In
the event of substantial damage or destruction to the hospital or
any part thereof during the last five (5) years of the Term,
Lessor shall have the right, exercisable curing the ninety ( 90)
Clays following the date of such damage or destruction, to
terminate

this

delivering
termination,

to

lease·.

Lessor

Lessee

written

which date

shall

exercise

notice

of

the

shall not be earlier

such
oate

right
of

by

such

than thirty

days following the date of Lessor's notice of termination.

(30)

Upon

exercise of such ....right, Lessor snall be entitled to recover the
full proceeds of any policy of insuranc::e covering any such Clamage
or destruction except
Lessee's

loss

of

such proceeds

personal

property

as rnay be attributable

to

and/or

of

to

interruption

Lessee's business.
If Lessor does not elect to te>minate this lease,
Lessee shall be responsible for the repair, rebuilding or
replacement of the hospital or any part thereof so damaged or
destroyed as the case may be.
All such repairs, rebuilding or

GnOUND
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.n:pl.acernen:ts shall· -:rent5re·

t:; ~he

·t:fie'''ll.ospl'tal

condition it was

(

in· i~t~meoiately prior til> the event 'giving rise to the wo~l<..

3.6

Last Year of Term.

notwithstanding,

Anythins

herein

to

the

contrary

Lessee shall not have the right during the last

3'65 days 9f the Tem to alter, remove or demolish, in. 1,1'J,ole or in
part, any buildings, structures or other improvements :wh,ich exist
upon

the

leased

365 days prior

land

to

the

except with the written consent of Lessor.

end of the

'l'erin.

This provision shall

not impair the right o·f Lessee to' remove any moveable· items of
'•

• personal prc;.perty ·,from the leased land as
hereof.

...

pro':',S,qe~

i.n, ·ll,rticl'e 3

ARTICLE 4
LE.!'.SEH'OLI> LIENS

4,1

So long as

Riqht to Gran~en ·on Leasehold Estate.

Lessee shall not be in. de'fill.llt under ··the termt;, ..of. this

lei!ose•,

Lessee shall. have the right 'to grant a lien ,upon or a security
.
intere.st in its leasehold. estate under this lf!:ase; provided,

-

ho'wevel:,

that notwi.thstanding ·anf such instrur.~,nt grant,ing such

lien

security

or

obligat:i-911!? and
forth

in this

interest,

Lessor

is

bound

on_ly by

(
;...

-

those

enjoys all rights and privile~es w.hich ··ar~ set
lease.

. Any mortgage

or

I>eed of Tr.ust or otner

sec\Jrity ipterest executed by Lessee pursuant to this authority
is

hereinafter

oesigna:ted

and

referred

to

as

tf\e

mortgage" and th,enolder or owner of such lea!}ehold rnort9a9e
the

lea~eh_old

estate of Lessee,

•

"leil.seh6lQ.
~pen

including the benefl,ci-ary .of a

Deed of Tru~t. if such rnort(ilage be in the for;m of a Deed of Tr<\l·st
or . othe::, _o;ecu1:ed

party,

"leasehold mort.gage.e".

is

hereinafter

designated

.as

t·'he ·

A:rly leasehold mortgage sha,l.l not be for a

period exce_.edi-ng the T-erm.
Lesso'r agrees, at any time .and from
time to time, uxoon receipt C!>f not less' than ten (.10) days. pri.c.;>r
written request therefor by Lessee or by the leasehold mort·gagee,
to

execute,

GROOND

LE~SE

acknowledge and

AGREEMENT - 12

deliver

to

Lessee

or

to

leasehold

(

i,
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mortgagee a statement. in writing,
case, that this

certifying,

lea:oe is then unmodified and

is not in default,

and that it is

in

if

such

is

the

unamended,~that

full force and effect.

it
If

there have been modifications and amenoments to this· lease, said
statement shall, if sucn is the case, certify that the same is
not tnen in d efa ul t· and · is in full force and effect as then
modified and amended.
set

forth

further

in

state

Said modifications and

full

in

said

the

dates

to

statement.
which

the

a~endments

Said
basic

shall be

statement
rental

er

shall
other

• charges have been paid, and whether or not there is any existing
default by Lessee with respect to any covenant, promise of
agreement on the

::.nis

part of Lessee provided to be performed under

lea~-.:\

and also "''hether a notice of such default h:as been
served by Lessor.
If any such statement contains a claim of
non-perforJt.ance, ·insofar as actually known by Lessor, shall be
summari~ed

(

in said statement.

Lessee shall make

pa)~ent

when due

and before delinquency o.f all principal, interest and otner
charges for which Lessee may be or become obligated under any
leasehold mortgage upon the leasehold estate.
4.2

foreclosure of Lien.

foreclose a leasehold mortgage,

Prior to

com~encing

any action to

the leasehold mortgagee,

or any

assigns of such mortgage, shall notify Lessor in writing of tne
default by Lessee witn a statement of the amount then due and
offer to withhold any acceleration of ma t.uri ty of the promissory
not.e, p20yment. of which is secured by the leasehold

r.~ortgage.

In

the event Lessor shall, within tnirty (30) days o:: the :-eceipt of
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrears on
said mortgage,

then upon said payment said mortgagee shall rein-

state the ll)crtsage in al.l respects as if no default had. occurred.
Lessor may, at its option, ma'ke such payments on said mort;;age,
and t.he amounts of such payments shall be considered additional
S u':> sequent. and
rental due Lessor from Lessee under this le:ase.
successive defaults by Lessee in making payr:.ents required by any

GR.OUND LEASE AGRF:£MENT - 13
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leasehold mortgage

shall be subject to the foregoing provisions

each time any ·such

cefa~lt

occurs.

provisions contained· -in this

Lessee

lease

s~all

insure that all

c

reguiring ·act ion by parties

not a party hereto shal-l be incorporated into doc\lr:lehts to whi.ch
such parties are a party and that executed copies
documents be delivered tO Lessor within ten (10)

of such
Clays of

execution thereof.·
A.RTlCLE 5
•

PROTECTlO~

OF

MOR~GAGEE

Lessee shall give notice to Lessor of any leasehold !liOrta!'le
~hich Lessee grants as provided for in Article 4 hereof ~nd shall
~eliv.er along wi t.h said notice

a copy of· the -mortgage instrument.

So long as any. sum remains owipg on any obligation secured by
such a leasehold 'mortsage, Lessor. and Lessee agree:

.'

(a) That no modification Ot' termination of this lease o.r
surrender of the leased la~d may be made by't~e Lessor or Lessee
without the prior written consent of the mortgagee;

(
'·

(b) ·That. the Lessor will give· to the mortgagee al.l notice
sirnult.aneous~y

of default
(c)

That

the

with any notice given to the

mortgagee ..,ill have thi::-t~·

{30)

Les~ee:

days

~

'w

a!ter

notice of Clefault delivered to it "'ithin '-lhich to cure :Lessee.' s
default: provided, 1>owever, that. said · per:iocf in ..,hich default may '
be

correct.e~

i~

may be extended to no more than ninety (90) days

the event the mortgagee requires such a period as a condition for.
granting a

loan

to Lessee anc if lo'it:.hi'n forty

notice of default

the

~:~ 0 rt.gagee

g-ives

notice

(40)

days after

to ·Lessor if

it

intends to cure Lessee's default ~ithin said extenC!eC! period;
{d)

That

the

Lessor

will

aecept

performance

ttl~

by

mortgagee in lieu of performance by the Lessee;
{e)
That. the Lessor ..,ill not terminate the lease for those
defaults,

the

poss'ession

cure

of which

provided

that

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - l4

requires
the

said

that the mortg11gee be in
mort.g&gee

{ i)

promptly
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t"e
~

.'
commences

foreclosure

tliligence,

and

charges

(ii)

required

and

continues

continues

to be

paid

payment

by

Lessee

"'hicn become due and payable during

its
of

action
rent

with

and

which have

all

due
other

accrued

antl

the period the. foreclosure

proceeding is pending;

(f)

'l'hat the Lessor shall not have the rignt

to terminate

this lease solely on account of any of the events anticipated by
subdivision (d) of paragraph l of Article 10 without the written
consent of the leasehold mortgagee, provitled that such mortgagee
promptly commences foreclosure if it has tne right to do so and
thereafter continues its action with due diligence;
(g)

That

in

the

lease shall be soltl,

event

tne

Lessee's

interest

under

this

assigned or other"'ise .transferred FUrsuant

to the exercise of any rignt, power or remedy of any mortgagee or
pursuant

to judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragraph l

of

Article 10, and if no rent or other charges shall then be due an
payable under this lease,
arranged to the reasonable

and if such mortgagee shall have
satisfaction of the Lessor for the

curing of any default susceptible of being cured,
sixty

(60) days

after

Lessor within

receiving a written request

upon

receiving

fees,

incident thereto, will execute and deliver such instrument

or

instruments

assignment

or

payment
as

may

other

of

its

be

expenses,

therefor and

required

transfer

of

incl•Jding

to

confirm

Lessee's

atton:eys'
sucn

interest

sale,

under

tne

lease; or
{h)
mortgage

That
shall

in

the

have

event

occured,

a

default

the

under

mortgagee

an)'

may

leasehold

exercise

any

right, po'Wer or remedy of tne mortgagee under the mortgage which
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease.
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ii..RTICLE 6

•,

SUSORD!NAT!O:N
6.1

Subordination.

The Lessor_ shall,

promptly after

the

notice of request of Lessee, e);ecute and deliver a mortgage, Deed
of Trust or other ~ecurity instrument {herein call eo mortgage)
sufficient to subordh1ate, to the lien of a first encumbrance
represented by t.'he !1\0rt'lJage, Lessor's fee title (which shall be
'considered to h•c:lude fee t.i tle in the leased premises or any
part or parts of t'he

l~ase'd

premises,

including

al~

rig'ry.ts and

• appurtenances) •. to any mortgage lender who is prepared to rna.ke a
mortgage loan to Lessee to be secured by a first mortgage or need
of Trust covering sa.id I.essor's fee interest in the demised
premises (or suc'h part thereof as may pe d!!signateo. by r.essee·)
'
..... .
.
p'rovided that said mortgage is oh 'terms not more onerous than t'he
following:
Principal..:

Not mor·e than s~Jenty-fi ve percent .. {-7 5·%)
of the value of the property tC!l be
rnot-tgaged
.,_s
appraised.· b;t
any
i,nstitl:lti:onal lender prop~s.~n.g ..~o rna'Xe
the loan, 'Or as independently ·appraised

(

if
the
lender
be
other .than
an
·.institution.
An insti'tutional lender is
a bank, insurance company, _charitable
institution, c·ollege or other institution
of learning,

retirement

system, welfare
or
fune, O'r any other oraanizetion
.•
any of the
institution
similar to
The principal mu.st be
fGregoi:ng.
sel f-li·quidating by periodic

Maturity•

payments

over t'he term o£ t'he mortgage;
Not more than thirty (30) years or
alternatively not more than the period of
the

unexpired

t'he

mortgage

GROUND :LEASE AGREE:KEN'l' - 16

term bet.,.een the date of
and

the

end of

the

(

term,
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whichever

t'

(

means

is

the

exercise

the

shorter.

original

of

the

The

term

renewal

uterrnu

herein

options

or

herein

provided for.
6.2 X:~penses.
All expenses in connection with the making
of said mortgage or Deed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and
Lessor will execute any and all documents that :may be required
with respect ther etc.

However,

Lessor shall assume no persona 1

liability for the underlying indebtedness, but the mortgage note
• or other evidence of indebtedness shall be executed s?lely by the
Lessee.

e~tend

The foregoing provisions of this Article shall

to

any construction mortgage loan applied for by Lessee, as well as
any permam;nt mortgage loan, and any mortgages in substitlltion or
in replacement

thereof,

and

as

often

as during

the

term such

loans are applied for by the Lessee.
6.3

(

Non-Mortgage

~

Lessor.

Lessor agrees not to place any

m'ortgage on the premises, _or .permit the same to be encumbered in
any manner, without the prior written consent of the Lessee.
6.4 Limitation on Subordination.
Lessor's agreement to
subordinate

any

given

portion

of

fee

the

title

to

a

first

.-

~

mortgage is limited to one such mortgage on the given pcrtion of
the fee title for the purpose of enabling Lessee to obtain
financing for the improvements as contemplated herein and located
on the given portion of the leased land; provided that, for this
purpose, mortgages securing separate construction and take-out or
permanent

loans

considered to be
securing

it

for

the

obligor,

or

shall
any
any

work

expressly

of

improvement

be

shall

Both the note and the mortgage

one mortgage.

extension of the due date,
alteration of

same

provide

that

there

can

be

no

addition to the balance of the loan,

provision
refinancing

in
of

the
the

documents,
unpaio

"ithout Lessor's prior written approval.

release

principal

of any
balance

Not.hing in this para-

graph shall prohibit mortgagee :from paying delinquent. taxes or
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ess.essments or providir;g insurance coverage
eure such defaults of Lessee.
subordinate Lessor's
securing

fee

or

to (

Lessor she.ll not. be required to

ti t.le

a construction

if Lessor fails

to

the

interim

1 ien of
loan

an

encumbrance

exeept ·on

l-essee • s

presentation of evidence, delivereo as provided for giving
notices, of a firm .• and-enforceable cornmi·tinent for a tal;e-out or
permanent loan.
Curinq of Defaults.

6.5

the mortgagee or trustee
• balance· outstanding

on

lnll;Y

any

The mortgage

shall

provide

that

not accelerate the due da':.e of the
loan

by

reason of

any

default

by

Lessee ...rithout having first given Le:~~sor wri'tten notice .of, suc;h
default and without having permitted 'Lessor thirtY

( 30) days in

which
to ....
cure sucb default or, if more .'than. <;.'1-.irty (30),
.
·~

necessary

to

cure

such

default,

without

adequate 'time· to cure such default.

'having

given

~ays

is

Lessor

'I'he mortgage and related

documents shall further prov~de t.')"lat:·.the pe'rforrnanc:re of any and·

.•

all o'bllgatio·n·s .of Le&see thereunder shall be accepted if
tendered ·by Lessor.
Nei~her Lessor's :i':ight to c::ure any default
nor any· e:Xereise of such a right shall consti:tute an assumption

(

.'-~

of liability under the note or mortga9e.
6. 6

Indemnificat-ion.

indemnify Lessor

On request ·by

Lessor,

Lessee :.:hall

from al)y and all: liability and expense caused

Lessor as a result of any .action of L>essee in connection ~>~ith t.'he
mortgage or Deed

o~

Trust•
ARTICLE 7
.INSURANCE

7.1

Liability and ProPerty Damaoe.

From the time

~>~hen

the

Lessee comrne!'lces construction on· the demised .prernis es or an}' part
thereof, the Lessee will cause to be wri'"tt.en a policy or .Policies
of insurance in t'he form and contents "generally Y.nown as pub,lic
liability

and/or

owner't>, lanEllo.rd and :te·nant policies and boiler

insurance policies and elevator insurance policies, when there be
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boilers and elevators i?cluded in any improvements located on the
demised premises, insuring tne Lessee against any and all claims
~homsoever

and demands made by any person or ·persons

for ·injuries

received in connection with the operation and mainte·nance of the
premises, improvements, and buildings located on the demised
premises or for any other risk insured against 1:ly such policies,
each

class

o£

which

policies

shall

have

been

~ritten·

within

limits of not less than Five Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($500,000.00) for damages incurred or cla;med by any one person
• for bodily injury,

or

ot.ner~~;•ise,

No/100 Dollars

{$100,000.00)

less

Million

than One

and

plus One Sundred

damages

to

prope:l:'ty,

No/100 Dollars

~ousand

and

and

for

not

($1,000,000.00)

for

damages ~nt:;l\rrec'l or claimed by more .than one person for ".:lodily

or ·otherwise,

injury,
Dollars
shall
(

($100, 000.00)
name

the

plus
Clat:~ages

Lessee

and

One
to

Eundred Thousand and No/100
property.
All su<::n policies

the

Lessor,

as

their

respective

interests may appear, as ~he persons assured by such policies:
and the original or duplicate original of each of such policy or
policies shall he delivered by the Lessee to the Lessor promptly
upon

the writing

of

such

policies,

together

with

adequate

·-

evidence of the fact that the preniums are paid.

7.2

Fire anc'l Wind Damaoe Insurance.
(l}
The
Lessee's Ohlioation.

Lessee

covenants

anc'l

agrees with Lessor that from anc'l after the time when the
lease commene-t.s, the Lessee will keep insured any and all
buildings and improvements upon the said premises against
all loss or damage by fire anc'l '.dndstorm, and what is
'i)enerally

termed

coverage",

which

in
saic'l

the

insurance

insurance

trade

as

.. extended

"'ill be maintained in an

amount which will be sufficient to prevent any party in
interest from being or becoming a co-insurer on any part of
the risk,

~hich a~ount

shall not

b~

less than eighty percent

(80%) of the full insurable value, and all of such policies
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of insurance shall inc:luoe ·the ··nar.~e of· tf\E,-·'Less~r as one of(..
the parties insured thereby and shall fully protect both tne
Lessor and
appear.
or

the

Lessee

as

their

respective

interest

may

In the event of destruction ol the said buildings

improvements by fire,

vindstorm,

or other

casualty

for

which insurance shall be payable and as often as su.ch
insura·nce money shall have been paic to the Lessor and the
Lessee,

said

sums

so

paid

shall be

deposited

account of the Lessor and the Lessee in a
Bannock County,
.

- .·

Idaho,

and

a

bui~ding,s

joint

located in

shall be made available

Lessee for the construction or repair,
of any building or

bank

in

to the

ll.s the case may be,

damaged or destroyed by fire,

.

vindstorrn, or other casualty for which insurance money shall
be

.... . .

...

payable

.Lessee from

..

and

shall

said

'be

paid

out by

joint account

from

.

the

time

Lessor
to

and

the

on

the

time

estimate of any reliable architect licensed in the State of
Idaho having jurisdiction of such reconstruc-tion ano repair,
c-ertifying th.at the amount of such estimate is being applied

(

to the payment of the reconstruction or repair <>nd at a
r-easonable cost therefor; provided, however, that it fi-rst
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Lessor that the
total amount of money necessary to provide for the
reconstructi.on or repair of a.ny buii'cHng or buildings
destroyed or injured,
adopted

the~for,

purpose and
the Lessee

its

as aforesaid,

according to the plans

has 'been provided by the Lessee for such
application for

covenants

and agrees

such purpose assured: and
that iri .the

event

of the

destruction or damage of the buildings a'nd improvements or
any

part· thereof,

and

as

often

as ·any

buildil)g

or

improvement on said premises shall be destroyed or .dar:teged
by f.ire,
vindstorm, or other casualty, the Lessee shall
rebuild and repair the same in such manner that the 'builcing
or

i~:~provemen't

so
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property upon the .demised premises prior to such damage or
destruction,

and shall nave the same rebuilt and ready for

occupancy within fifteen (15) months from the time when the
lou or destruction occurred.

The fifteen (15) ·month period

for reconstruction shall be enlarseo by delays caused
without fault or neglect on the part of the Lessee by act of·
God,

strikes,

lockouts,

or

other

conditions

beyond

the

Lessee's control.
(2)
•

Delivery of Policies.

policies

shall

be

delivered

to

The originals of all such
the

Lessor by. the

Lessee

along with the receipted bills evidencing the fact that the
the~:efore

premiums

are

paid; b\lt nothing herein

contained

shall .be construed as prohi'bitins the llessee from financing
the premiums where the terms of the policies are for three
(3)

years

or. more

and

in

such

event

the

receipts

evidence it to be the fact that the installment

shall

pre~ium

pay-

ment or payments are_ paid at or before their respective
maturities.
Where, however, there is a mortgage on the
premises created pursuant to the provisions contained in
this lease and if, under the terms of such mortgage, it is
obligatory

upon the Lessee to cause the

originals of the

policies to be delivered to the mortgat:;ee, then the Lessee
shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate certificates of such
policies.

The policies or duplicate certificates thereof,

as the cese may be, shall be delivered by the Lessee to the
Lessor at least ten (10) days prior to the effective date of
the policies.
( 3)

W.."ect of Mortcaae Subordination,

All of the pro-

visions herein contained relative to the disposition of payments from insurance companies are subject to the fact that
if any mortgagees holding a mortgage created pursuant to the
in accordance "'i t'h
the terms of such mortgage, to require that the proceeds of
provisions of this lease hereof elects,
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the insurance be paid t.o the ll1ortgagee on account. of sueh
·mortgage,
event,

it

create the

then

such

payment

shall- sti;ll
compl~te

be

fund

shall

be

obligatory

made,

but

in .such

upon· ·the.. · Lessee

to

in the manner set forth in this

section to assur.e and ~omplete the payment. for the work of
reconstruction and r•pai~.
(4)
Pi!,maof(!s~ Insuran~e Proceeds! Joint !lank. t\ccount.
I't. is agreed that any excess. of money recei.ved from insurance remaining in the :joint bank account. after the reconstruction or repair of such building or buildings, if there
be no default on the part of the i.ess'ee in the perfor~r.ance
of.the covenant~ herein, shall·be paid to the Lessee, and in
case. of the Lessee not ..,enterir1g. into the reconstruction or
repair of the building Gr· buildings within a period •of six
(6) months
from
the,
date .o·f payment of the l<;J!!S,,
.-·
. '
'
. ' ... after
damage or destruction . oec:·a.sic:med by fire, windstorm, or

(

other cause for \'lhich .. insurance· 'inoney shall be payable, and
prosecuting the same thereafter with such dtspatc~ as.rnay be
necessary to complete the same within fifteen (15) months
after the occurr·ence of such dam'age or ~e.struction
''·' r.>ccesioned as aforesaid, then the amount so collectecl, or
the balance there,of. re!Tiaining in the joint account, as the
'·· case may 'be, shall be paid· to ·the 'Lessor and it will be at
the Lessor's opti,on ..,to te:t'l:linat'e the leas~ and retain such
'amount as liquida~ed. an.d a·greed upon dama9es resulting from
the· failure ~f the Lessee to promptly, within the time specified, complete such work of reconstruction and repair. The
fift.een ( 15) month period herein provided for reconstruction
:.hall be enlarged [)y delays caused without fault or neglect
on the part of th.e Lessee by· act .. of God, str~'kes, loc'kout,
or other condi.tior>.s ( o.ther than matters o.f finance,) beyond
the contr!=>l of Lessee.
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(5)

(

Direct Repayment,

The foregoing notwithstanding,

in the event the insurance proceeds are the sum of Twenty
Five Thousand and No/lOO Dollars

($25,000.00)

or less,

then

such proceeds shall be paid directly to the Lessee without
the necessity of creating the joint bani<: account as
hereinabove set forth, and Lessee shall use such funds to
make the replacements or repairs as required hereunder.

i.J

Lessee's Covenant to Pay lnsurance Premiums.

The

Lessee covenants and agrees with Lessor that the Lessee will pay
premiums for all
obligated to
deliver

to

of tne insurance policies which the Lessee is

carry
tbe

under

Lessor

the

terms

evidence

of

of

this

such

lease,

payme.nts

payment of . any. such premiums become .i.n. default,
·~

><~ill

and
before

the

and the Lessee

will cause renewals of expiring policies to be written and the
policies or

copies

thereof,

as

tne

lease may

require,

to

be

delivered to Lessor at least ten (10} days before the expiration

(

-

date of such expiring policies.
.
?.4 lndemnification.
(a}
Defense and Pavment of Claims.

:Lessee agrees to

defend, indemnify and hold Lessor harmless together with all
of its servants, agents, or employees, from and against all
liability or loss for injuries to or deaths of persons or
damages to property caused by Lessee'$ acts or omissions to
act,

use

of.

or occupancy of

the

leased land,

result of tessee' s operations on said leased
party hereto

wh i c'h

give

as the
Each
land.

the other parties prompt and
timely notice of any claim or suit instituted coming to its

l<:nowledge

shall

or

in

any

contingently or otherwise,

to

way,

directly

or

indirectly,

affects or might affect another

party, and all parties shall have the right to participate
in the defense of the .same to the extent of each parties'
own interest.
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(b)

Mechanic's Liens.

·other liens or orders
filed

against

improvements

the

):.hereon

f·or

ln the event any mechanic's or (
the

l~ased

by

payment of money shall be

land

reason

of

or
or

any

building

or

arising· out of any

labor, material furnished or alleged to have 'been furnished,
or to be furnished to or for Lessee on the leased l~nd, or
for or by reason of any change,

alteration, or addition of

the cost or expense thereof, or any contract. relating
thereto., or against the Lessor as owner thereof, Lessee
shalL within thirty (30} days after it receives
or
.
. notice
.
'knowledge thereof, either pay or· bond the· same ~r provide
for the discharge thereof in ·s·uch manner. as may be provided

-

by ll!w.
.. .Lessee· shall also defend· on ·behalf of Lesst~t· at
Lessee's ·sole e;:pense, any action, suit or proceeding Which
may he brought thereon, or for the enforcer:~ent of '· sucb
lien~, o·r orders, and Lessee shall pay any damage and
discharg~ any judgrne~t entered therein and save harmless
.
'.
Lessor from any and all claims e>r ·danages resulting
there£ rom. Lessor reserves .the right, however, to defend or
to dhect the defense of any such suit· or proceedings.

(

Les:>:ee shall pay all expenses of such dafense, incl:.u.lin9
attorney's fees, and shall pay any ·damage and _discharge any
judgment entered therein and save Lessor harmless from any
and all claims or damag·es resulting 'therefrom • .
(c)
Resistinp C;I.g'ims.
ln th~ event Lessee

shall

desire tc resist any mechanic's or r..at.erialmen's lieps.,
or
,. .
any 'othe• claim against the hereinabove described
.. premises
on account of building, rebuilding, repairing, reconstruc\

tion or

other.,•ise 'improving the

leased

land,

Lessee shall

bave the right to do s.o, provided Lessee shall first place
funds into escrow in an amount sufficient to pay said claim
or "lien, with said escrow directed to pay such clair.1 or lien
in the event of a result adverse to Lessee.
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7. S

Insurer Cualified •

The insurer shall be qualified and

authorized through the· DepartJnent of

Insurance of the State of

ldaho.
ARTICLE 8
TAXES, ASSESSMENTS, L!ENS AND ENCUMBRANCES
Lessee shall be responsible to pay and discharge all existing and

future taxes and assessments which are or may become a

lien upon or "'hich may be levied by the State,
other

tax

levying

body

upon

the

leased

land

thereon or property located on the leased
also

be

responsible

liabilities •. charges,
associated ··.,.ith
leased

or

for

all

fees,

but

to
not

the

improver.~ents

or

land.

Lessee

premiums.

obligations,

relating

l11nd including,

insurance

County or any

and

shall

for

all

liens and encumbrances

existence

lirr.ited

to,

and

use

of

the

all

assessment

installments due or payable after the date of this lease.

All

payr.~ents

of taxes or assessments or both, except permitted
installment payments, shall be prorated for the initial lease
year and for the year in which the lease terminates. Lessee rnay,
in its own name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name,
contest in_good fait'h by all appropriate proceedings, the amount.,
applicability

or

validity

of

any

tax.

assessment

or

fine

pertaining to the leased land, or to any building, structure or
improvement upon the leased land, and in the event Lessee does in
good

faith conte.s..t

the

applicability

or

validity of any

tax,

assessment or fine, Lessor ~ill cooperate in such contest
whenever possible with Lessee: !?rovided that such contest ~<till
not subject any part of the leased land to forfeiture or loss,
except that, if at any time payment of the whole or any part of
such tax. assessment or fine shall bec:or.te necessary in order to
prevent any suoh forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or
cause the same to be paid in tipe to prevent such forfeiture or
loss.
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'JIRTlCLE 9
·CONDEMNl'.TlON

9.1

Priority.

ln the event .of the taking or condemnation

by any competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or
purpose of the whole or matelfially all of the dernise·d premises at
any time during·· the term a.na -after any outstanding first mortgage
indebtedness ha·s ·'been

paid

and

satisfied,

then

the

rights

of

Lessor and Lessee to share in the net proceeds o,f any awa~:cis for
land,

irnprov'en\ents and· da,~age s ul?on. a!fy.. such taking,

bu il.ding s,

• shall be as ,follows and in the followina-. order of priority:
•' (a) Lessor. at all times I
occur~.

-.
fo:r the

'

'

resard.less of when the ta'k.ing

shall 'be entitled to receive, with iRterest thereon,

tho:-.t po.rt~on
of
..
. the a"w'ard

as

shall

~:epr~sent

compens11tion

value of. t·he demised premises, considered as va·cant

and unimproved· land,

such value being hereinafter

referred

to as. the ''land value•.
Lessor shall also J:>e entitled to
costs awarded in the condemnation procee~ing .. proportionately

(

attributable .to such ia.rid value.
Duri:ns all the term herein demised, e~cept the

(b) (1)

last five years of the term, Lessee shall .be -entitled to the
entire balance

of

the award,

which ba 1 anc:e is hereinaf-ter

.•eferred to as "a"Ward balance•.
(2)

'If·

the

taking or condemnation as

above

forth shall occur at any time during the last five
the term,

Lessee

shall ·be

entitled

award, ...,ith intere·st ···thereon,

the award

b_y twenty percent '(20\) · ci£ such
yea.r

{and

in

proportion

for

to

a

aw~rd

yea~:s

re9eive out
'b~lan.1=e,

set
of

of the

diminished

l:lal.a.nce for eac:'h full

fraction

of

a

yead

-

that

elapses from the firs·t day of said five year period to the
da~~

of the vesting of title in the condemnor; the ~emaining

award balanc;:e and interest thereon, as well as th-e a"·ard for
la,nd value and intere'st
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For the purpose

(3)

of

computing

the

last

five

years of the term within the

meaning of subpara9raphs

and

that

(2) above, -J.t ··i-s agreed

said' "last five

(1)

years"

shall mean the last five years of the original ·term, or if,
at or prior to the date that the award or the first partial
payment thereof (if there be such partial payments) becomes
payable, the parties

shall have

duly agreed to extend the

term of this lease pu•suant to the options to renew herein
containad or by a written instrument executed in the manner

•

required for

rf;COrding, then said last five years shall be

deemed to mean the last five
extend ell.
~

l.cl

(5) years of the term as so

I..f the values of the respective interests of Lessor

and Lessee shall be determined according to the provisions
of

subdivisions

(a)

ceeding pursuant

and

(b)

of

this

Section in
~remises

to which the demised

the

pro-

shall have

been taken or condemn.ed, the values so determined shall be
conclusive upon Les.sor and Lessee. lf such values shall not
have been thus separately determined, such values shall be

<
.... -

fixed by agreement between the Lessor and Lessee or if they
are unable to agree, then the controversy shall be re3olved
by arbitration under the

?l"O~edure

to

gove~n

in Arbitration

as set forth in this lease hereof under Article 13.
{d) In the event of the taKing in condemnation of less
than the

~hole

said premises
premises that
that was

of the demised premises but materially all of
as hereinbelow defined
remains

taKen,

improvement only,

includes

then as

to

the

but not any

shall endeavor to agree on

a

anc

part

the part of the

of the

untaKen

remainder of

remal.n:l.ng land,

the then

fair

improvement
the

the pa::-ties

t:~ari:et

value ot

such remainder of the improvement, and if they fail to agree
then the controversy shall be resolved by arbitration.
The
value so agreed upon as the then fair .market value of such
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remainder of the improvel!lent or as

determined in arbitra-

c-

tion, but diminished in the same manner as provicl.ecl. for in
"(b)" above relative to an ''a.,.ard balance", shall be paid by
Lessor to Lessee,

and until paid shall be a charge on the

share of the a~o~ard for land value to which Lessor shall be
entitled in the condemnation proceeding.
(e) If

title

to

the

demised _premises shall

whole

be

or

taken

materially

or

all· of

condemned,

this

the

lease

shall. cease and terminate as to the provision so taken and
shall

terminate

as

to

the

entire

parcel

if

in

Lessee's

judgment the taking materially and substantially affects the
use and value of the
···-.

re~ainder

of the demised premises.

·•

..

ARTICLE 10
DEFAULT l'ROVlS!ONS; REMEDIES; ATTORNEY'S FEES
10.1

Default by Lessee.·

Each

of

the

following_

shall

be

deenied an event o£ default by Less•ee and i!. breach of this lease:
(a)
If 'Lessee shall default
Rent o;r Other Payments.

-

paymen~

in the

of rent or other payments her'eunder whe_n due

tO the terms of this l'ea·se and does not fully

according
correct

(_

the

saJI\e

wit,:hin

thirty

'days

(30)

after

wd.<:.t.en

notice thereof to Lessee.
(b)

default

If Lessee shall
Otf\er CQV·e,nant-s or c·ondi tions.
in the performance -or observance of any other

coven~;~nt

or co-ndition

mortgag~,

Deed of Tru$t,

financing

of

Lessee,

this'

lease

or

of

any .note,

or 'other document reiating to the

the hospital ·to be

whether

documents.

of

or

not

Lessor

and does

not

fully

performed
is

a

or observed by

party

correct the

to

any

such

same within

30

days afte.r notice ·the;r:.eof to the Lessee.
(c)

Abandonment.

Abandonment of the premises.

(d)

Bankruptcy l?·ro:ceedings,

ll' during the Term of

this le_ase, Lessee shall:
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(i)

(

Appointment of Receiver.

Apply

or consent in writing, signed on behalf of
or

its

duly

authorized

appointment of a receiver,

attorney,

for

~essee

to

the

trustee or liquidator

of the ~essee or of all or a substantial part of
Lessee's assets: or
(ii)

Voluntary l.lan'Kruptcy.

File

· a

voluntary petition in bankruptcy or admit in
writing its· inability 'to pay its debts as they
become due; or
(iii)

·~

Ma'l<e

Assignment for creditors.

a

general assignment for the benefit of creditors:
or
File
{iv) Reorganization or Arranoement.
a reorganization or arrangement with creditors to
take advantage of any insolvency law; or
{v) .Admit Insolvency.
File an answer
admitting the material allegations of a petition
filed
against.
~essee
in
any
bankruptcy,
reorganization or insolvency ,proceetling, or
during the Term of this lease, an order, judgment

(

or decree shall be entered by any court of
competent jurisdiction, on the application of a
creditor,
insolv.&nt

adjudicating
Lessee ban~rupt or
or approving a petition see~ing a

reorgani~ation

of Lessee
or
appointing a
receiver, trustee or liquidator of ~essee, or of

all or a substantial part of its assets.
10.2

this

Remedies.

lease by

In the event of any breach or default of

Lessee,

then

Lessor,

besides

other

rights

of

re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of
the hospital and use of the property upon the premises for these
purposes.
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Shoulo Lessor elect to re-enter as herein provided, or

·I

should Lessor ta'lte posses sian pursuant to legal proceedings, or
pursuant to any notice provideCI
terminate this

for by la'-1,

Lessor may t';!ither

lease or Lessor may from tirne to t'ime,

Without

terrninatins this lease, relet said premises or any part thereof
for such term or terms anCI at such rental or rentals ana upon
such

other terms

an.:l

conoitions

as

Lessor

in

Lessor's

sole

discretion m~y deem advisable, wit~ the right to make alterations
ana repairs to the premises.
Rentals received by Lessor from
such reletting shall be applied:
first, to payment of any
indebtedness, other than rent, due Lessor hereunoer from Lessee:
second, to the payment of rent due'and unpaid hereunder; third,
to the payment- of ·any costs of such relett'ing; fourth, to the
payment of the cost of any alterations and repairs to the
premises made necessary by Lessee • s breach of the provisions of
this lease: and the residue, if any, shall be'helo by. Lesser and (
applied in payment of future rent as the same may become due and
payable hereunC!er.
Shoulo S1JCh rental reee'ived from such
reletting be less than the rental agreed to be paid that month by
Lessee hereunoer, then Lessee shall pay such deficiency to
Lessor.
Such deficiency shall be ealculated. an.:! paid monthly.
t<o such re-entry or taking possession of the prernis'es by Lessor
shal.l be construed as an election on Lessor • s part to termintlte

-

this lease unless a written notice of such intention is given to
.
Lessee or unless the termination thereof be decreed by a cou~t of
competent jurisdiction..

Notwithstanding any such reletting

without termination. Lesllor may at any ·time thereafter elect to
terminate this lease for such previous breach.
Should Lessor at any time terminate this lease for any ·
breach, in addition to any other remedy Lessor may have, Lessor
may recover from Lessee all damages Lessor may incur by reason of
such breach, including the costs of recovering the premises, and
including the wo't'th at the time of such termination of the
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excess,

if any,

charges

equivalent

of

the
to

amount
rent

of

rent.

reserved

additional

in

this

remainder of the Term over the then reasonable
the premises for the remainder of the 'l'erm.

rent

and

for

the

lease

rental value of

The remedies herein

given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the exercise of any one
remedy by Lessor shall not be to the exclusion of any other
remedy.

With previous written notice or demand,

separate actions

may be rnaintained by .Lessor against Lessee from time to time to
recover any rent or damages which,

at

the

commencement

of any

such action, has become due and payable to Lessor without waiting
until the end of the Term of this lease.
10.3

I>.ttorney's Fees.

In the event suit shall be brought

.for an unlawfui detainer of the said premise.>,

for the recovery

of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, or because of
the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or
performed,

the

prevailing

party

shall

be

paid

a

reasonable

attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee shall
be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and
shall be
judgment.

paid

whether

or

not

such

action

is

prosecuted

, :;:

to

1\CTICLE ll

COVENANTS ANP WI>.RRANTIES
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this lease, lessee
agrees

to

tal<e

condition,

possess ion

of

provided hO"'ever,

the
that

leased
Lessor

land

in

covenants,

an

"as

is"

represents

and warrants as follows:
ll.l
the

Title.

leased

land

That Lessor has good and mar'ketable title to
and

said

title

is

free

and

unencumbered.·

Lessor's right, title and interest in and to the le .. sed land,
except for this lease and for any lien or indebtedness incurred
pursuant to Article 4,

shall not be

subordinated to any other

claim or interest of Less~e or to any other claim or interest of
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any rnortgegee or other.oreditor in connection with the financing

c···

of the improvements to be c.onstructed on the le~:~sed premises.
· ll. 2 -~ 1\ioht ...to E·xecl,lte.
That· Lessor hu full r:fght ana
power 'to execute and per.form this lease and to grant the estate
leased

'herein
and
toe
rights,
ea semen·ts,
privileges,.
app~rterian~es and hereditaments belonging or pertaining thereto,
·.\
·including. air-rights.
11.3 Peaceful.Enjovnent.
That Lessee, on ·J?'aying the .r~~t
her·ein ·reserved and performing the covenants 'and provisions
··. h·ereof on its p'art to be per.formed, shall peaoefully and qu'iet:J_y

have ·and enjoy the leased land, ano·all such existing or future
required rights, easen·;~~ts, privile·ges, appu:rrten~n~e's and

?eredit~~~nts~
belonging
.
. ..

or pertaining ~hereto, including
.
air-rights', during the 'l'~rrn1 provided, however, t:l'iat Lessor does
not Wa}:'rant that 9overnrnental aUthority ma:y nOt 'at Some time
during' t'he Term,· w.i. ~h;ut 1;.he con.sent . or permissidn oi . Lessor,
oidinances or perform acts whic'h may 'be prejudicial to
Les·see 'through ~o fau~·~ of Lessor; pr.ovided, however. that' Lessor
agrees·. ·to join with L~ssee in protest or opposition to such

·pa·ss

(

ordinances·· or acts, the expenses of such opposition to be borne
by Lessee.
..

~C.LE

ASS!'GNM~NT,

i\.~;signm~n:t,

'12.1

3:2.

SUJ?LE:r''I'lNG · Allt> SJ\.LE

SP,.blet"t;ins anc ·Sal!!.'· Lessee

may no.t

as'sign or sublet this leas~ agreement ·,.·itbout ·the 'prior w~itt~:~
consent
Lessor, which consent shall not be unreasonably

of

withheld; provided, however,

that in ·t:he event I,e·ssox gives its
..

conse'r:it for tbe assignment or sublettin.g .of this lease, Lessor is

bot:m'd·

only by such obligations an<l enjo:j>s ·.such rights e,nq
privileges as 11re set for~h in this. leas·e.
lt is el:presssly
ag'reed t'hat Lessor may require, as a cGlndition of such consent,

...

that the officers of the I.essee corporation agree to be person-
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ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants
of Lessee's assignee(s} or subtenant(s) under this Lease.

!n the

event Lessee shall determine to sell all or any portion of the
hospital, and/or any additions or expansions thereto or thereof,
.
gran~ed first righ~ of rafusai
Lessor shall be )e(n:U;ilxe:ll!{ to purchase tne hospital as the fair
market value which, unless agreed upon by the parties, shall be
determined by an M.A.!. real estate appraiser appointed and paid
by Lessor.

lf Lessee is not satisfied ""ith the fair market value

appraisal sUbmitted by the appraiser selected by Lessor. Lessee
may, at its own expense and within t""enty {:20) days of tbe
receipt of the appraisal,

select an M.A.I. real estate appraiser
who, together with the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose
third~ sl!ch

appraiser 'Whose fees sha-ll be snared e·.;:ually by
Lessor and Lessee.
If Lessee fails to select a 1!-econd appraiser

.a

within the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed shall be
the sole appraiser and shall set the

fair market velue of the

hospital. lf Lessee does timely act, and a majority cannot agree
as to the fair rna r"ket value of the hospital, the three (3)
appraisals shall be added together and
tnree (3).

their

total divided by

The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value

of the hospital for the

pu~pose

of this purchase option.

ARTICLE 13
~BITAATION;

13.1

Arbitration.

of any matter-

Al'POJ;!.ITMEN'l'

Either party may require the arbitration

arising under or in connection 'With this

lease.

Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice specifyins
the matter to be arbitrated.
matter

concerning

ineffective unless

..,hich

the

If action is already pending·on any
notice

given before

the

is

given,

expiration

the
of

notice
thirty

is
(30)

days after service of process on the person g·iving the notice.
Except as provided . to the contrary in these provisions on
arbitration,

the arbitration shall be in conformity and subject
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to applic:.a.ble rules and procedures
Association.

The

arbitrators

of t'he

shall

be

(

American Arbitration

bound

by

t'his

leas·e,

Pleadings in any action pending on the same matter shall, if the
arbitration is

required . or

consented to,

be deemed

amended to

l.irnit the issues to those contemplated by t.he rules prescribed
above.
Each party shall pay half the cost of arbitration
including arbitrator. s fees. Attorneys' fees shall be awarded as
i~

separately provided

1'3. 2
req~ired

t'hi.s lease.

h?oointrnent.
for

the

provided to the
lease.

Appointment shall be made in the manner

appointment

c:oJ;1tre.ry

o.f

arbitrators

unless

expressly

in the !!pplicr.ble provisions

J:o~lows:

'The.,::e,:;hall be three (3} arbitrators appointed as
(a)

Within

twenty

( 2.0)

days

after

not.ice

arbitration, each party shall appoint one (l)

of this

requ,iring

arbitra~or

and

give notice of the appointment. to the othe.r party.
(b) The two (2) arbitrators shall choose a. third
arbitrator within thirt·y (30) days after appointment of the
second.
(c)

(

lf either party fails to appoint an arbitrator,

or if the

two

(2)

arbitrators

fail to choc;-se a

third, the

appointment shall be made by the t.'hen presiding judge of the
Superior Court for the county in which t'he premises are
located,

acting in his individual a·nd. nonoffS.cia.l. capacity

on the appli"'cation of either party and on ·(30) days' notice
to the other party: provided that ~i ther party :-'ay, by
notice given before. commencement. of the arbitration 'h.earing,
consent to arbitration. by t'he
ot'her party.
arbitrator

In
shall

that
be

event,
~ade

arbitrator
no

.and

further
any

appoint.~d

by the

appointments

other

of

arbitrators

previously appointed shall be dismissed.

(
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ARTICLE 14

(

MlSCtL!.JIJU:OUS PROVISIONS

1.11.1

Exercise. of Renewal Option. __

option to extend the Term granted under
h~reof,

;t.es~.e!t

~rticle

1!\~Y

exercise

its

·-· -

I, paragraph 1.2,

by giving Lessor written notice thereof not later than

120 days prior to the expiration date of the Term.
exercised shall

extend the leese on the

same

Any option so

terms as

effect at the time of the exercise of such options,

are

in

subject to

adjustment and notification in accordence herewith.
14.2
leased

Inspe,ction by Lessor.

land at

Lessor

any reasonable time

for

may enter upon

any purpose

the

necessary,

incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance

.

of Lessee's
hereunder,
bUt
to any provisions
.... . obligations
...
'
. subject
.

.

with respect thereto otherwise contained herein14. 3

Necation of Partnershi-p.

Nothing in this lease shall

be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for any purpose a
partner, joint venturer, or associate in any relationship with
Lessee other than that of landlord and tenant. nor shall this
authori~e

lease be construed to

either to act as agent for the

other except as expressly provided to the contrary in this lease.
14 • .11 Controllinc:; Law.
This lease shall be deemed 'tn be
made and shall 'be construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of Idaho.
1.11.5

deliver

Surrender of Possession.
to

Les-sor

possession

of

termination of

this

lease or as

good

and

in accordance

condition

provided herein,
shall

execute

Lessee agrees to Y.ield and
the

demised

other"'ise
with

the

lane

provided herein,

deliver

to

Lessor

a

the
in

u:press obligations

except for reasonable wear and tear,
and

at

good

and

and Lessee
sufficient.

document of relinquishment, if and when requested.
14.6 Successors.
This lease shall bincl and inure to the
benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors
or

assignees

of

Lessee

whet:.her

resulting

from

any mer\!er,

..
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consolidation,

reorg.ani:Za tion,

assisnment,

foreclosure

\.•.

or

otherwise.
14.7

Headinqs.

The

article

and

paragraph

headint;~s

containei! herein are for convenience and reference ";;~nd are

not

itnendecl to define or limit the scope of any pr.ovision of this
lease.
14. a

Notices.

All notices required to be given to Le.ssee

under the terms of the lease shall be given by certified mail,
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed to Lessee as
follows:

·-. ··

STERLI~G DEVELOPMENT co., a
Washington partnership
1906 Broadway
Vancouver, Washington ·98663

wi t.h copy to:
EOR£NSTEIN, WYNNE, FERGUSON & STOUHBOS
1220 Main Street, Suite 300
p. o. Box 694
Vancouver, Washinston 98666

(

or at such other addresses as Lessee may desisnate in writing
delivered to Lessor.
Similar notice shall be addressed to Lessor
as follows: :
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
Suite 2200, 36 South State Street
Salt Lake Gity, Ut~h 94111

. -·

with c:;opy to :
POCATELLO REGIONAL HEOlC~L CENTER
777 Hospital Way
Pocatello, ldaho 83201

Attention:

Chris Anton, Acministrator

or at such . other adC!ress as Le!!SOr may designate in· -....·riting
Clelivered to Lessee.
Notices shall be sent in a similar manner
to any

r:~o:rtgegee

of Lessee at such address as

rna~·

be designated

in writing..
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(

Amendment of Lease.

Lessor and Lessee shall cooperate

and include in this lease 'l:ly suitable amendment from time to time
any provision that may reasonably be requested by any proposed
Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing

~he

Mortgagee

protection provisi9ns contained in this lease and al.lo...,ing such
mortgagee reasonable means to protect or preserve the lien of a
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of
this lease. Lessor and Lessee each agree .to execute and deliver
and

to

acknowledge

if

necessary

for

recording

purposes,

any

agreement necessary to effect such amendment.; provided, ho..,ever,
such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent under
this lease nor

otherwise

in

any

respect. atlversely affect

the

.

rights of the Lessor in this lease.
14.'10 ·~ecording.

Lessor ano Lessee agree to execute and
have ac'kno,.,ledged, and Lessee agrees to deliver to Lessor, a
memorandum of this lease in the fo:rm attllched hereto as Exhibit
"ll~ for the purpose of recort:Ung such memorandum with the County
Recorder of Sannock County.
IN W!TNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands
the day and year first above written.
LtSSOR:
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a
Utah non-profit corporation
authorized to do business in Idaho,
dba Pocatello Regional Medical
Center

By

'-';'/ !/~ I ~1

~~1:-

By_____________________________
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DEVELOP~IENT

STERLING

washington pa•tnership

~~--H-.--L.--~---C-E-LO_S_l--------~-------

By ___

WDITSIC"l

A'l?'l'!:Sl':

•

·.· ...

w~-

~/~··1!/IJ~
I
"-~
-....

-~

8.

~

STATE OF

)

~}J_

County of

55
'.

~

On .this ,LZ.f~ay of ~- 1 l~..
under-signed, a Notary Public in a~ for

,

·19~

., be£·ore rne, the
State, personally

said

(

d; IJ. th.~ ;e;mr .........,,_....,..,.......=--------.

appeared
4
.//
. -r ./,7---e.;...~;;;::;;::::zo~-_,_
known to me to be tp-e F'Ees:Ldent=anw Eeo;:rgtary,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
a~tnv~i~ed

Medical

to

Center,

J~

business

INC.,
in

a

Utah

idaho,

the "cor-poration ·that

l!'espect:t•.•e.J.y, of

non-pro'Eit
d~a

cor-pont ion

Pocatello

executed

the

Regional
foregoing

instrument, -and acknowledged to me that sucn corpor-ation executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
wr-itten.

/NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State
of Idaho
, residing at PpcateHo
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STI\TE OF

,

(

l

tDA\!0

:

County of

Bannock

ss ..

l

On this ~May of

--~J~a~n~u=a~r~y____________ ,

undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
a'ppeared H. 1.. CANCELOSl
General Partners of
partnership,

the

19~,

before me,

said State,

the

personally

and .nt1 R. 'iUOl'!'SKY , kno"-"Tl to me to be the
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington

partnership

that

executed

the

foregoing

instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed
•

the same •
IN w.ITNESS 'WHEREOF, I have 'hereunto set my hand and affixed
roy official seal the day and year in this certificate first above

-

written.
.... ·

...
NOTARY PUBLIC
of Idaho

and for the State
residing at Pocat.ello

~n

.' "
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for the Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
NOTICE OF APPEAL

L4 ~

vs.

\0\ _tPtfP

Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants/Appellants.
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, KENT L.
HAWKINS AND R. WILLIAM HANCOCK, 109 NORTH ARTHUR-5TH FLOOR, P.O.
BOX 991, POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Appellants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Forrest L.
Preston, appeal against the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the Judgment entered on October 23, 2013.
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Judgment from
which this appeal is taken is appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(l).
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3. The issues raised on this appeal are as follows:
a. Whether the district court erred by entering summary judgment for the plaintiff
and by failing to apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the
plaintiffs claims.
4. The Appellants request a standard, hard copy transcript of the hearing held on October 21,
2013.
5. The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 2S of the Idaho Appellate Ru1es:
a. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on September 5, 2013;
b. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on
September 5, 2013;
c. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
submitted on September 5, 2013;
d. Affidavit of Don Wadle submitted on September 5, 2013;
e. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on September 23,
2013;
f. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
submitted on September 23, 20 13;
g. Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment submitted on September 23, 2013;
h. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
submitted on October 7, 2013;
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i. Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffney in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment submitted on October 7, 2013;
j. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment submitted on October 8, 2013;

k. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment submitted on October 14, 2013;
I. Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on

October 15,2013.
6. I certifY:

a. That a copy of this notice of appeal and any request for additional transcript have
been served on each reporter of whom an additional transcript has been requested
as names below at the address set out on the Certificate of Service;
b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation
of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents requested in the appeal;
c. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20.

Mich I . Gaffiiey
John . Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on November 6, 2013, I served
a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL on the following by the method of delivery
designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 232-2499
Stephanie Davis
Court Reporter
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

/

~.U.S. Mail

(QI,

Hand-delivered

ig

Facsimile

~.S.Mail

ll:;J

Hand-delivered

~~·

Facsimile

~.Mail

~·

Hand-delivered

~·

Facsimile

Mich I .
John
vondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, AND FORREST L. PRESTON, an
Individual
Defendant-Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF
APPEAL

____________________)
Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding
Bannock County Case No: CR-2012-5289-0C
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Judgment filed on the 23'd day of October,
2013.
Attorney for Appellant: Michael C. Gaffney and John M. Avondet, Attorneys,
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, P.A. Idaho Falls, Idaho
Attorney for Respondent: Dave R. Gallafent and R. William Hancock, Attorneys,
MERRILL & MERRILL CHARTERED
Appealed by: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, An
individual.
Appealed against: Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ Portneuf Medical Center, LLC
Notice of Appeal filed: November 7, 2013
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No

398 of 447

Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional records filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 100
DatedU

'

o~w~ ~ ;--:2..0 \'>:>

DALE HATCH,
Clerk of the Di
(Seal)

Deputy Clerk
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

c.,_;;;

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)

Supreme Court No. 41589

.)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289

RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

COMES NOW the Repondent/Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical
Center, LLC ("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to
I.R.A.P. 19, and hereby requests the following additional records and reporter's transcript to be
included in the clerk's record in the above-referenced appeal:
1. The Respondent requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record

in addition to those documents automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules and in addition to those documents previously requested by the
Appellants:
a. Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on February 7, 2013;
b. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on
February 7, 2013;

5975: Respondent's Request for Additional Transcript

Page I
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c. Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion for Stay or, in the alternative,
Request for Bond submitted on February 25, 2013;
d. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion
for Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted February 25, 2013;
e. Affidavit of Don Wadle in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants'
Motion for Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted on February
25, 2013;
f.

Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay submitted on
March 1, 2013;

g. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on June 13, 2013;
h. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on
June 13, 2013;

i. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel submitted July
1, 2013; and,

J.
2.

Minute Entry and Order entered on July 8, 2013.

The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the

hearing held on March 4, 2013.
3.

The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the

hearing held on July 8, 2013.
DATED this \q"''ll day of November, 2013.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

v}iJ/;v
R. William Hancock, Jr.
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby
certifY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this !'l.Jh day ofNovember,
2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

!if U.S. Mail
U Hand Delivery

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

U Overnight Mail

1i) Fax: (208) 529-973 2

B/1ltiJ;;vk9

c
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
) SupremeCourtNo.41589
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
) Case No. CV-2012-5289
vs.
)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC, ) AMENDED RESPONDENT'S REQUEST
and FORREST L. PRESTON, an individual,
) FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND
) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
Defendants.
)
)

COMES NOW the Respondent/Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical
Center, LLC ("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to
I.R.A.P. 19, and hereby requests the following additional records and reporter's transcript to be
included in the clerk's record in the above-referenced appeal:
I. The Respondent requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in

addition to those documents automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules and in addition ·to those documents previously requested by the Appellants:
a. Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on February 7, 2013;
b. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on
February 7, 2013;
c. Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for Stay or, in the alternative, Request
for Bond submitted on February 25, 2013;
d. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for
5975: Amended Respondent's Request for Additional Transcript
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Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted February 25, 2013;
e. Affidavit of Don Wadle in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion
for Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted on February 25, 2013;
f. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay submitted on

March I, 2013;
g. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on June 13, 2013;
h. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on June
13, 2013;
i. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel submitted July 1,
2013; and,
j. Minute Entry and Order entered on July 8, 2013.

2.

The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the

hearing held on March 4, 2013.
3.

The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the

hearing held on July 8, 2013.
4.

I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcript(s) has been served on the

Court Reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below at the address set out below and that
the estimated number of additional pages being requested is less than one hundred pages for the
reporter's transcript of the hearing held on March 4, 2013, and less than one hundred pages for the
reporter's transcript of the hearing held on July 8, 2013.
Stephanie Davis
Court Reporter
Bannock County Courthouse
P.O. Box 4574
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
I further certify that this request for additional records has been served upon the clerk of the
district court or administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this

·Z,'ld'ey ofNovember, 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA.tE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289
ORDER REGARDING
ATTORNEY FEES

)
)
)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This matter comes before this Court pursuant to a Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees
filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical Center, LLC ("PMC").
The motion is a result of this Court's decision granting PMC's Motion for Summary Judgment
and the subsequent Judgment. This Court heard oral arguments regarding this matter on
December 16,2013.
DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff is basing its request for costs and fees on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54
and Idaho Code§ 12-121, as well as this Court's granting of summary judgment in favor ofPMC
and entry of the corresponding Judgment. With regard to its request for attorney fees, the
Plaintiff additionally asserts it "is specifically entitled to an award of attorney fees ... as a matter
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of contractual right under Section 10.3" of the parties' 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. (See
Pl.'s Mot. for Costs and Attorney Fees, Nov. 6, 2013, 1.)

1.

ATTORNEY FEES
1

Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) provides a court with the
discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party when authorized by statote or
contract. However, IRCP 54(e) also limits an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
("IC") § 12-121

2

.

Attorney fees may be awarded under that section of the Idaho Code only when

the court is left with the abiding belief the case was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation .... " IDAHO R. CN. P. 54(e)(1) (2012). "An award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is
appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was
brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." McGrew v.

McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 PJd 833, 844 (2003)(citingNampa & Meridian Irrigation
Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001)). A trial court's award of
attorney fees under the statute is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Madsen, 142
Idaho at 639, 132 PJd at 396. However, even in cases where ''the losing party has asserted
1

Rule 54(e)(l). Attorney fees. In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defmed in Rule 54(d)(1)(B),
when provided for by any statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section
12-121, Idaho Code, on a default judgment.
2

§ 12-121. Attorney fees.- In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for
the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state ofldaho or political subdivision thereof.
Order
2
Re: Attorney Fees
Case No. CV-2012-5289
414 of 447

factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation", as long as "there
is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be
awarded" under IC § 12-121. Id. (internal citations omitted); Joyce Livestock Co. v. United
States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502, 517 (2007). Furthermore, attorney fees may not be awarded
under IC § 12-121 unless the losing party's entire case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.
When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account. Thus, if
there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under 1..Q,_§_
12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington
Fed. Savings. 135 Idaho 518, 524-25,20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001).
Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale, Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95 P .3d 34, 52 (2007).
As explained, the Plaintiff asserts it is "specifically entitled to an award of attorney fees
... as a matter of contractual right under Section 10.3" ofthe parties' 1983 Ground Lease
Agreement. 3 That section of the contract provides for the payment of reasonable attorney fees in
the event an action is brought for the recovery of any rent due or because of the breach of any
other covenant. The Defendant counters that attorney fees are not appropriate because this case
was not brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

3

Section 10.3 Attorney's Fees:
In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful detaiuer of the said premises, for the recovery of any rent
due under the provisions of this lease, or because of the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or
performed, the prevailiug party shall be paid a reasonable attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee
shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action is
prosecuted to judgment.
Order
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PMC is the prevailing party in this case. This Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff on the
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment to that effect, finding that the Defendant
had clearly breached the ground lease by failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent as required.
Judgment to that effect was entered, with the Defendant being ordered by this Court to pay the
unpaid rent, plus interest. Thus, the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to
the parties' Ground Lease agreement, as set forth previously. Furthermore, this Court has
determined the Defendant mounted an unreasonable defense in this case, as the motion for
summary judgment and entry of the Judgment was necessitated by the Defendant's failure to
comply with the order of the district court to "promptly" pay the rent due and owing under the
parties' Ground Lease Agreement. Therefore, this Court hereby grants the Plaintiffs request for
an award of attorney fees. Having thoroughly reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and
Attorney's Fees and the supporting memorandum and affidavit, as well as taking into careful
consideration the Defendant's objections and the oral arguments presented at the hearing, this
Court hereby awards the Plaintiff the sum of$15,599.75 in attorney fees. This Court reduced the
Plaintiffs request for fees by $197.25.

2.

COSTS

IRCP 54(d)( I)(c) allows a court to award costs to a prevailing party in its discretion. As a
matter of right, the prevailing party is entitled to costs related to filing fees, service fees, witness
fees, travel expenses of witnesses, expenses for certified copies, costs for preparation of map,
models, photographs or other exhibits, cost of bond premiums, expert witness fees, costs of
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reporting and transcribing a deposition, and costs for a copy of a deposition. 4 This Court has
determined the Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and, as such, is entitled to costs as matter of right
pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(l )(C). After reviewing the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees, this Court has determined the Plaintiff is entitled to $96.00 in costs as a matter of
right for the filing fee.
The Plaintiff has also claimed discretionary costs for Westlaw research incurred in
bringing the Motion for Summary Judgment and in defending the Defendant's Cross-Motion for

4

Rule 54(d)(!). Costs. Items allowed.
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of
right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following
costs, actually paid, as a matter of right:
I. Court filing fees.
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by a public officer or other
person.
3. Witness fees of $20.00 per day for each day in which a witness, other than a party or expert, testifies at a
deposition or in the trial of an action.
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other than a party, who testifY in the trial of
an action, computed at the rate of$.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence, whether it be within or
without the state ofldaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel other than by private transportation, other than a
party, computed as the actual travel expenses of the witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of
residence of the witness, whether it be within or without the state ofldaho.
5. Expenses or charges of certified copies of documents admitted as evidence in a hearing or the trial of an action.
6. Reasonahle costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in
evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of
each party.
7. Cost of all bond premiums.
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed
the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all appearances.
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for trial of an action, whether or not
read into evidence in the trial of an action.
10. Charges for one (I) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of
the action.
Order
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Summary Judgment. The right to discretionary costs is governed by IRCP 54(d)(l )(D). 5
"Discretionary costs are additional items of cost not enumerated in Rule 54(d)(l ), and cau
include such items as long distance telephone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel expenses aud
postage." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965,971 (1993). While
the awarding of such costs is discretionary as explained previously, "the burden is on the
prevailing party to make au adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary aud
exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the
adverse party. Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991)." Id.
Furthermore, "Rule 54( d)(l )(D) also provides that the trial court shall make express findings as
to why each discretionary cost item should or should not be allowed." Id. However, "[e]xpress
findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary,
reasonable, exceptional, aud in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this
requirement." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d 161, 168
(2005) (internal citation omitted); see also, Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 494, 960 P .2d 175, 177
(1998)(affirming trial court's denial of discretionary costs for expert witness fees despite the fact
that the court did not evaluate each cost item by item).

5

{D) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in
subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably
incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express fmdings as to why
such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an
item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall
make express findings supporting such disallowance.

Order
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The Plaintiff asserts the claimed research costs "were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred" in this case. After reviewing the Plaintiffs memorandum and considering
the arguments in opposition presented by the Defendant, this Court has determined the research
costs associated with this matter were a necessary and reasonable part of this case. This Court
has also determined these were exceptional costs reasonably incurred. As such, the Plaintiff is
also entitled to $1,135.18 in discretionary costs.
CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion and Section 10.3 of the 1983 Ground Lease
Agreement entered between the parties, the Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees is
GRANTED. The Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees in the total sum of
$16,830.93.

DATED this

1._ day of January, 2014.

~C.~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge

Copies to:

R. William Hancock
Michael D. Gaffney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
Individual, ·
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289-0C

FINAL JUDGMENT

Based on the decision entered by this Court, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED
that Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of$416,812.50 plus interest of$45,221.30 for a
total of $462,033.80. Plaintiff is also awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$16, 830.93.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

L

day of January, 2014

~C.~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
R. William Hancock (Attorney for Plaintiff)
Michael D. Gaffney (Attorney for Defendants)

FINAL JUDGMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
Individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-5289-0C

FINAL JUDGMENT

)

)
)
)
)

Based on the decision entered by this Court, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED
that Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of $416,812.50 plus interest of$45,221.30 for a
total of$462,033.80. Plaintiff is also awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$16, 830.93.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

L

day of January, 2014

~C.~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
R. William Hancock (Attorney for Plaintiff)
Michael D. Gaffuey (Attorney for Defendants)

FINAL JUDGMENT
Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge.
CV-20!2-5289-0C
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Stroet
ldaho Falls, ldaho 83404·7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaff'ney@bcardstclair.com
javondet@bell!'dstclair.com
Attorneys for the Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Pottneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plailitifti'R.espondent,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
STIPULATION RE: lU!CORP ON
APPEAL

vs.
QuJilil Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. PrcstOD,

Defendants/Appelbmts.
The parties throush counsel of record hereby stipulate and agree that the attached
documents are true and correct copies oftho Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendapt's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted on October 8, 2013, and
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted
on October 14, 2013.
The parties further stipulate and agree that the Record on Appeal be augmented to include

these documents as they were submitted to the Court on the dates identified in the Cortitioatcs of
Service. contained in each respective document.
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Mic I . fuey
=
John: . . vondet
OF Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA
Attorneys for Ule Defendants/Appellants

FAX NO. 208 232 2499

P. 03

Dated: February~, 2014

~W&Q

·nt L. Hawldns ·
:w;;llam Hancock
Merrill & Monill, Chattered
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I am a licensed a.ttomey in the state ofldaho and on February,&{. 2014, I sel'Ved
a true and col'rect copy of the STIPULATION RE: RECORD ON APPEAL on the following by

the method of delivery designated below:
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 8320 I
Fax: (208) .236-7013

i('U.S. Mail

ll:Ji! Hand-delivered

Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
POBox991
Pocatello, ID 83204
Pax: (208) 232·2499

__.(
IQ: U.s. Mail

1!1"

' Hand-delivered

~ Facsinlile
IWI¥

""" Facsimile

Mic e D. Ga:ftl:tey
John •Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffi:tcy PA
Attorneys for Defendants
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor

P.O. Box991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286

(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF Tlffi
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

)
)

)

Plaintiff,

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an
individual,
Defendant~.

Case No. CV-2012-5289

)
)

)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEF!£NDANT'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
)
)

----------- )

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. S6(c), the Plaintiff subtnits the following as its Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for SlllllllUII'Y Judgment:'

INTRODUCTION
Although the parties do not dispute that this case arises from the failure of Quail Ridge
Medical Investors ("Quail Ridge") to pay Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center,
LLC

("PMC'~

adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period, the parties certainly dispute

when and how the present breach of contract action arose.
Quail Ridge asserts that the present breach of contract action arose when PMC filed its
Verified Complaint in Bannock County Case No. CV-20102724-0C- the action which Quail
Ridge identifies in its Cross-Motion for Sllliiilllll'y Judgment as PMC I- seeking, among other
things, to declare the adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period.
Pagel
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Although PMC did raise a breach of contract claim as part of its claims in PMC I, the court,
without opposition from PMC, dismissed such claim for the reason that such claim was not ripe tbr
determination by the Court. Indeed, Judge Brown had already opined from the bench in PMC I
that a breach of contract claim could not be ripe until after the court determined the amount of rent
due under the lease and the tenant failed to promptly pay the rents as adjlJ&ted by the court.
Thus, while it is undisputed that these same parties have litigated the issue of adjusted rents
for the 2010 rent adjustment period, it is also abundantly clear that this present breach of contract
claim was not ripe for litigation until after the court in PMC I declared what atljusted rents were
due and owing for the 2010 rent adjustment period and the tenant, Quail Ridge, thereafter failed to
pay the rants as adjusted by the court. :Because this breach of contract claim was not ripe for
adjudication in PMC I, it is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata in the present action. As will
be discussed more thoroughly below, the Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that ripeness is
an exception to the doctrine of res judicata.
RELEVANT MAJERlAL FACTS

While Quail Ridge made reference to the Order on Form ofJudgment entered by Judge
Brown in PMC 1, Quail Ridge failed to cite this Court to the relevant portion of that order which
succinctly clarities the legal and factual basis for the present action. In that Order, Judge Brown
states the following concerning the consequences of Quail Ridge's failure to promptly pay the
acljusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period:
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that 'the party indebted shall,
promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the
adjustment." Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the
determination has been made as contemplated tmder the Ground Lease Agreement,
the Otound Lease Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the balance due under
the Ground Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease Agreement does not
define the term prompt for purposes of the parties' agreement, !!: failure to nay this
amount in a reasonable certainty would giye rile to an action for broach of

coatracf.
(Avondet Aff., Ex. F, at p. 3) (emphasis added).
There can be no confusion from the above cited language that Judge Brown clearly
understood that Quail Ridge's failure to promptly pay the adjusted rents declared by him as due
and owing for the 2010 rent adjustment period "would give rise to an action for breach of

contract." Further, it is clear within the context of this language that such breach of contract
5975, Oppo!tltlun to Ci'Omi-MOtloll ror $1111\Ulllllry ,ludjlmtnt
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action would be separate and distinct from the action tried before Judge Brown in PMC !because
the factual basis for such action could not arise until a:l\er the rents had been declared in that action
and the tenant, Quail Ridge, thereafter failed to promptly pay the rents as adjusted by the court. In
short, Judge Brown made it ab$olutely clear that his role was to deola:re the adjusted rent due for
the 2010 rent adju$111'1ent period, which he did, and that the tenant. Quail Ridge, would therea:l:\er
be obligated to promptly pay such adjusted rents. Judge Brown made it further abundantly clear
that should Quail Ridge fall to promptly pay the rent as adjusted by the court, then "a fuilure to pay
this ll.!llOunt in a reasonable certainty would give rise to an action for breach of contract."
Because it is undisputed in this ease that Qual! Ridge and its personal guarantor, Forrest
Preston, have not paid the outstanding adj\'!Sted rents for the 20 I0 rent adju$111'1ent period (Wadle
A.ff.) declared by Judge Brown as due and owing, it is also clear that this breach C1f contract action
is now ripe for adj ~ldication and, as will be discussed more thoroughly below, Is not barred by the
doctrine ofrcs judicata.

ARQUMENI
Plaintiff will spare this Court a long recitation of the doctrine of res judicata. Indeed,
Plaintiff has previously briefed this doctrine in its Motion for Summary Judgn1ent. If, however,
the Court wishes a more detailed review of this doctrine and the progression of its application and
limitatious by the Idaho Supreme Court, then Plaintiff refers the Court to the opinion rendered by
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Aldape v. Akins, 105 idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Idaho App. 1983)
(limited in part by Diamondv. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990)).
For purposes of this discussion, it is important for this Court to understand that the Idaho
Suprenie Court has long recognized two situations where the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply: (1) in cases where mandamus and damages are sought as alternative or CUIIIulatlve forll'ls
ofrelief; and (2) In cases where matters raised in the second action were not ripe for adjudication in
the prior action. See Aldape, 668 P.2d at 149 (citations omitted). In the present case, the second
exception applies and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not btU' the action,
Indeed, as has been demonstrated by the plain language of Judge Brown's Order on Fonn
of Judgment, even Judge Brown appreciated the fact that if Qual! Ridge were to fail to promptly
pay the adjusted rents for the 20 l 0 rent adjustment period based upon his declaration of such rents,
then a breach of contract action would arlse from such failure. !11.0 filet that this action would not
59715; Oppolldon to Cra•s-Modtm far Summary Judgntettt
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arise until qfier Quail Ridge had failed to promptly pay such adjusted rents clearly demonstrates
that this action could not arise at the time that PMC 1 was being litigated before the court. Thus,
the present action was not ripe for litigation in PMC I.
Notably, in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983), the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized that there can be circumstances when facts occur subsequent to a first
trial that !rigger the filing of a second suit and that the issue raised in the second suit was not ripe
for adjudication in the first case, but rather was premature until after a determination had been
made in the fll'st suit. Duthie, 104 Idaho at 754, 663 P.2d at 290. Such is the present case before
tl:Us court. In this case, the complained of breach of contract could not arise until after Quail
Ridge and Forrest Preston had failed to promptly pay the adjusted rents for the 20 I0 rent
adjustment period as declared by the court in PMC I as due and owing for the 20 I 0 rent adjustment
period. Indeed, neither Defendant had a contractual duty to pay such rents until after Judge
Brown had declared the rents due and owing for the 2010 rent adjuStment period. Therefore,
similiU' to the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in Duthie, the fltCts giving rise to this second
suit could not have occurred until after the first determination had been made in the prior action.
Because the present ltCtion is based upon new and distinct breaches of contract by these
respective Defendants, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny the Defendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court should find that this present action was not
ripe during PMC I and, therefore, the Plaintiff's claims iU'e not barred by the doctrine of.res
judicata against either Defendant. Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant it any such
further relief the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances of this case including, but not
limited to, attorneys' fees associated with defending this Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this f)!!>day of October, 2013.

MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD .

..~~ys
1{@fP
for the Plaintiff
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COMMENTS:
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Dejimdant's Cross-Motion/at Summary Judgment regarding the above noted case. Please contact
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for the Defendants

In the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of Bannock

Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in
Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants.
The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge), through counsel of record Beard St. Clair
Gaffney PA, respectfully submit the following reply memorandum in support of Quail Ridge's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 23, 2013. This memorandum is
supported by Quail Ridge's memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment
filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, LLC (PMC); the
second affidavit of John Avondet, counsel for Qu~ Ridge; and other pleadings and affidavits in
the record.
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INTRODUCTION
PMC's breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge is the second such claim brought by
PMC arising from the parties' Ground Lease agreement. As explained in Quail Ridge's
memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment, res judicata and collateral
estoppel should preclude PMC' s present breach of contract action against Quail Ridge. In
arguing otherwise, PMC relies on criticized case law that is factually inapposite to the present
litigation while simultaneously ignoring PMC's procedural posture in PMC I. For the reasons set
forth below, this Court should grant Quail Ridge's cross-motion for summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Quail Ridge references and incorporates its Statement of Facts contained in its crossmotion for summary judgment as if set forth fully herein. (See generally Defs.' Mem. Re: Defs.'
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 3-6.) 1

ARGUMENT
In its memorandum in opposition to Quail Ridge's cross-motion for summary judgment,
PMC argues that its present breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge, arising out of the
parties' Ground Lease Agreement, was not ripe for adjudication at the time of PMC I, and
therefore res judicata does not preclude PMC from pursuing its current breach of contract claim
against Quail Ridge. However, PMC's ripeness argument hinges on questionable and factually
distinct case law while ignoring what occurred at trial in PMC I.
In argning that its current breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge was not ripe at the

time of PMC I, PMC relies on Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287

1

Submitted on September 23, 2013.
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(1983). The facts underlying Duthie, however, are distinct from this litigation, and Duthie has
been soundly criticized in subsequent Idaho case law.

Duthie was the second litigation between the parties over the plaintiff Duthies' right to
connect their residence to the defendant Gun Club's domestic water line. Id., 104 Idaho at 752,
663 P.2d at 288. The Gun Club initially sued the Duthies for trespass, construction costs, and
maintenance fees; the first trial court determined that a valid license existed and granted the
Duthies' motion to dismiss with prejudice. !d., 105 Idaho at 752-53, 663 P.2d at 288-89. Almost
two years after the conclusion of the first case, the Gun Club cut the Duthies' waterline, after
which the Duthies brought the second action against the Gun Club, arguing that res judicata
precluded the Gun Club from claiming that the Duthies' license was revoked in the second
litigation. !d., 105 Idaho at 753, 663 P.2d at 289.
In fmding that res judicata did not bar the Gun Club's argument that the Duthies' license

was revoked, the Duthie court cited res judicata precedent, including the following language
from Intermountain Food Equip. Co. v. Waller:
"We think the correct rule to be that in an action between the same parties upon
the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies
not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but
also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."

Duthie, 104 Idaho at 753, 663 P.3d at 289 (quoting Intermountain Food Equip., 86 Idaho 94, 98,
383 P.2d 612, 615 (1963) (internal citations omitted)). The Duthie court then determined that
"because facts occurred subsequent to the fust trial that triggered the filing of the second suit, we
hold that the issue of revocability was not ripe for trial in the first case, but rather, was premature
until the license was actually revoked." This decision was constantly criticized by Justice
Bistline, who wrote a scathing dissent in Duthie and subsequent case law:
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Today's opinion is surely the epitome of appellate ambivalence, arming the Court
with opposing lines of precedent which serve the purpose of finding justification
for whatever appellate result is desired. Today's opinion is result oriented; the
Court's entire rationale for an incomprehensible result, wholly at odds with all
notions of res judicata •..

Id., 104 Idaho at 754, 663 P.2d at 290 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
The [Duthie] Court was then faced with the task of "discovery the correct theory."
In doing so, it had to work around its own concession that the law of res judicata
was firmly entrenched by prior Idaho cases, none of which were in the least
equivocal.

Walker v. Shoshone Co., 112 Idaho 991, 998, 739 P.2d 290, 297 (1987) (Bistline, J., concurring).
The doctrine of res judicata is still alive in Idaho although it suffered
serious injury at the hands of this Court in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104
Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983). In that case a majority of this Court, over the
protest of a strong dissent, emasculated what had been until then one of the most
strictly adhered to principles of Idaho jurisprudence by declaring that the doctrine
of res judicata need not be applied where the circumstances were not "ripe," i.e.,
that after a judgment became wholly final, a second suit involving the same issues
previously litigated could nevertheless be brought, provided that there was the
interjection into the second law suit of some additional fact not present in the first.
Here is Paul Harvey, again, with the rest of the story: After the Duthie
case ending in a final judgment decreeing Duthie entitled to take and use water
from a Gun Club supply line, and after all time for appeal had expired, the Gun
Club severed the line to Duthie's residence. That was the "new fact."
It would be a kindness to the trial bench and bar if two more votes were
forthcoming to erase any precedential effect which may otherwise some day be
accorded it.

Olsen v. Olsen, 115 Idaho 105, 108, 765 P.2d 130, 133 (1988) (Bistline, J., concurring, n. 1). As
evidenced by this language from Justice Bistline, the Duthie decision is not without its faults in
addressing the applicability of res judicata.

Duthie's obvious problems aside, it is also factually inapposite to the case currently
before the Court. In Duthie, the parties' first litigation concerned the Gun Club's claims of
trespass by the homeowners tapping into the Gun Club's water line. Ahnost two years after the
first case concluded, the parties were again embroiled in litigation, this time to determine if the
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homeowners' license to tap the water lioe was revoked. The facts, claims, and timiog of these
two cases are far removed from each other in comparison to PMC I and the parties' current
litigation.
Unlike the claims in Duthie, PMC's breach of contract claims against Quail Ridge in

PMC I and the present litigation constitute the same grievance: PMC's allegation that Quail
Ridge breached the parties' Ground Lease Agreement. After the conclusion of PMC I in the trial
court, PMC was quick to again sue Quail Ridge for allegedly breaching the Ground Lease
Agreement, with the present lawsuit coming mere months after Judge Brown's decision in PMC
I. The proximity and similarities between PMC's breach of contract claims against Quail Ridge
!'

suggest that PMC's present breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge was indeed ripe for
adjudication in PMC I, and shonld therefore be precluded by res judicata.
In arguing that its current breach of contract action against Quail Ridge was not ripe in

PMC I, PMC argues that "Judge Brown had already opined from the bench in PMC I that a
breach of contract claim could not be ripe until after the court determioed the amount of rent due
under the lease and the tenant failed to promptly pay the rents as adjusted by the court." (Pl.'s
Mem. Re: Defs.' Cross-Mot. Sunun. J. 2 (emphasis in original).) However, this statement ignores
Judge Brown's language from the bench after PMC's case-in-chief and upon Quail Ridge's
motion for a directed verdict on PMC's frrst breach of contract claim:
I would agree with Mr. Gaffney that the evidence that was introduced yesterday
was deficient in establishing that there has been a breach of contract associated
with this matter.
(Avondet Aff. Ex. E; PMC ITrial Tran. Vol. II, 86:25-87:3, May 15, 2012.)
PMC presented its case-in-chief, including its breach of contract claim against Quail
Ridge, in FMC I. "[T]he former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every
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·.
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which
might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Duthie, 104 Idaho at 753, 663 P.2d at 289
(quoting Intermountain Food Equipment Co. v. Waller, 86 Idaho 94, 98, 383 P.2d 612, 615
(1963) (internal citations omitted)). PMC made its choice- it elected to bring its claim for
breach of contract against Quail Ridge in PMC I. In presenting its case-in-chief, including its
breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge prior to dismissal of the breach claim, PMC offered
the matter of its claim for breach of contract by Quail Ridge. PMC should be made to face the
ramifications of its procedural strategy. This Court should find that res judicata therefore
precludes PMC from again asserting its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge in this
litigation.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing and previous pleadings and affidavits before the Court, Quail
Ridge respectfully requests the Court grant its cross-motion for surmnary judgment.
DATED: October 14, 2013.

Michl.aey
John . Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendants
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7 495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com

BY~~~

DEPlJTYci.~

Attorneys for the Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC,
Plaintif£'Respondent,

Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C
ORDER RE: RECORD ON APPEAL

vs.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and
Forrest L. Preston,
Defendants/Appellants.
This matter having come before the Court by means of the Stipulation Re: Record on
Appeal executed by the parties, and good cause having been shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Record on Appeal be augmented to include the
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
submitted on October 8, 2013, and Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment, submitted on October 14, 2013.
Dated: February~ 2014

~C.~

Honorable Robert C. Naftz

Order Re: Record on Appeal --

1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRicfbFr8E: · · , .. ,! .. · 1
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOC~U!l

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent1
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC1 AND FORREST L. PRESTON, an
Individual
Defendant-Appellant,
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)
)
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APPEAL

_______________________)
Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding
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Bannock County Case No: C\{-2012-5289-0C
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Judgment filed on the 23"' day of October,
2013.
Attorney for Appellant: Michael C. Gaffney and John M. Avondet, Attorneys,
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, P.A. Idaho Falls, Idaho
Attorney for Respondent: Dave R. Gallafent and R. William Hancock, Attorneys,
MERRILL & MERRILL CHARTERED
Appealed by: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, An
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Appealed against: Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ Portneuf Medical Center, LLC
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Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional records filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 100
DatedU,C\J..tAMb

~ , """2 0 \ ~

(Seal)

441 of 447

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

STEPHANIE DAVIS (208 ) 236-7247
442 of 447

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

)
)
)

)

Supreme Court

)

)

vs.

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON,
Defendants/
Appellants.

No. 41589

)
)
)
)

___________________________ )
)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
VOLUME ONE OF ONE
PAGES 1 THROUGH 48

Appeal from the District Court
of the Sixth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock,
HONORABLE ROBERT C. NAFTZ,
District Judge, presiding.

ORIGINAL

--ooo-APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff/
Respondent:

MERRILL & MERRILL
Attorneys at Law
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK
PO Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

For the Defendant/
Appellant:

BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY
Attorneys at Law
JOHN M.. AVONDET
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495

COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

STEPHANIE DAVIS (208)

236-7247
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, AND FORREST L. PRESTON, an
Individual
Defendants-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

41589

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or
admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this

d.S

day of:\e'o!u.A6014.
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Supreme Court No.
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_______________________)
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Record in this cause as follows:
Michael D. Gaffney
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